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Abstract  
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) should be underpinned by multi-hazard assessments that 
integrate community and scientific knowledge.  Humanitarian and development non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) are key implementers of DRR, but there is little guidance 
for them regarding the requirements of a multi-hazard approach.  Using mainly qualitative 
methods, a conceptual framework for multi-hazards is proposed, which emphasises the 
interrelations between hazards as well as the need to address more than one hazard.  This 
framework is compared to existing NGO hazard assessment methods at Head Office and in the 
Philippines (a multi-hazard hotspot), along with a case study of the 2006 Typhoon Reming 
lahars disaster at Mayon Volcano.  Throughout the research, the role of scientific knowledge is 
explored. 
Interviewees assume that their community-based assessments ‘toolkits’ capture multi-hazards, 
but these are constrained by preconceptions related to DRR, the confined temporal and spatial 
scales of analysis and the emphasis on community knowledge.  Particularly amongst Head 
Office NGOs, the need for science and a more anticipatory approach is driven by climate 
change adaptation rather than DRR.  However, the Reming lahars disaster emphasises that 
DRR strategies must anticipate, prepare for and respond to simultaneous hazards, whilst 
accounting for how previous hazards might amplify or alleviate the anticipated event.  The 
disaster emphasises the limits of community knowledge but also those of the available science, 
along with the need for good communication between scientists, NGOs and communities.   
The conceptual multi-hazard framework provides NGOs with a multi-hazard ‘lens’ to their 
analyses, but the findings emphasise that multi-hazard assessments require more than a 
toolkit.  NGOs need the skills to access, understand and evaluate science and engage with 
scientists.  There are numerous ideological and practical barriers to integrating science, which 
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are partly addressed by a set of practical guidelines developed alongside the research.  Beyond 
NGOs, the research has important implications for DRR policy. 
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Glossary 
Term Definition 
Accumulated 
rainfall 
Here, taken to mean a measure of rainfall from the beginning of the 
rainfall event to the time of failure.  
Avulsion Lahar abandonment of a channel to form a new channel. 
Barangay The lowest geographical administrative unit in the Philippines.  
Barangays are located in both rural and urban settings. 
Beneficiary A recipient of aid. 
Capacity All the resources, assets and strengths people, society or organisations 
possess to cope with and recover from shocks and stresses (Wisner et 
al., 2004; Gaillard et al., 2010; UNISDR, 2012).   
Climate change 
adaptation 
Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or 
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or 
exploits beneficial opportunities (UNFCC, 2014). 
Critical rainfall 
intensity threshold 
In the context of Mayon volcano, the hourly rate of rainfall that must be 
reached in order to trigger a lahar. 
Debris flow (lahar) A lahar of high viscosity and shear strength with typical sediment 
concentrated in excess of 60% by volume and 80% by weight (Lavigne 
et al., 2000). 
Disaster Changes and disruption that exceeds the affected society’s capacity to 
cope (Twigg, 2004). 
Disaster risk 
reduction 
The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic 
efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including 
through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people 
and property, wise management of land and the environment, and 
improved preparedness for adverse events (UNISDR, 2009c). 
Donor A government, institution or individual that funds aid. 
Epistemology The theory of knowledge (implied in some social science texts to mean 
what is acceptable knowledge; Bryman, 2008) 
Exposure The presence of people, livelihoods, environment, economic, social or 
cultural assets in places that could be adversely affected (Mitchell and 
Harris, 2012). 
Hazard A potential threat to humans and their welfare (Twigg, 2004). 
Hyperconcentrated 
flow (lahar) 
A lahar that typically has a sediment concentration from 20% to 60% by 
volume and 40% to 60% by weight and is intermediate between debris 
flow and streamflow (see Lavigne, et al., 2000). 
Interdisciplinary Relating to more than one discipline within a single research 
endeavour. 
International NGO They seek funding from individuals, governments or foundations to 
develop programmes in developing countries depending on their 
particular vision of development, emergency relief, DRR and CCA etc.  
They can also provide technical assistance, resources, training and work 
on advocacy and policy (Thompson, 2013).  Some are operational within 
countries, but many operate through local partners. 
Lahar A general term for a rapidly flowing, gravity-driven mixture of rock 
debris and water (other than normal streamflow) from a volcano (Smith 
and Fritz, 1989). 
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Local NGO Agencies working with one community or several communities in the 
same area (Thompson, 2013). 
Multi-hazards 
 
For the purpose of this research, the term multi-hazard reflects the 
potential for more than one hazard to occur in an area and that hazards 
are interrelated and therefore might trigger secondary hazards, 
exacerbate the impact of future hazards or might occur simultaneously. 
National NGO Based in one country, they can range from huge, multi-activity groups 
to small single-focus organisations.  Usually depend on bilateral 
institutions, international NGOs and foundations for their funds 
(Thompson, 2012). 
Non-governmental 
organisation (NGOs)
  
Traditionally a not-for-profit organisation independent of government 
that is funded by institutions or individuals for the purposes of 
implementing and distributing aid.  In this context, NGOs are discussed 
primarily in the context of humanitarian and development NGOs. 
Ontology A theory of the nature of social entities (Bryman, 2008). 
Proneness Used in the context of lahar hazard mapping at Mayon, lahar proneness 
represents which areas are more likely to be affected but does so on a 
relative, qualitative scale. 
Rainfall duration The time interval over which rainfall falls. 
Rainfall intensity The rate of rainfall over a specific duration. 
Resilience A contested term, broadly defined as how a system, community or 
individual can handle a disturbance, surprise or change, by withstanding 
or adapting to shocks or stresses (DFID, 2011; Mitchel and Harris, 2012). 
Risk The likelihood of a specific hazard occurring and its probable 
consequences for people and property (Twigg, 2004). 
Science The systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and 
natural world through observation and experiment (Soanes and 
Stevenson, 2009).   
Vulnerability The extent to which a person, group or socio-economic structure is 
likely to be affected by a hazard (Twigg, 2004). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
The project ‘multi-hazard assessments for disaster risk reduction: lessons from the Philippines 
and applications for non-governmental organisations’ has arisen from the formal partnership 
between University College London (UCL) and the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development 
(CAFOD).  The partnership was established in 2008 for the purposes of integrating scientific 
knowledge and research on disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA) 
into CAFOD’s programmatic and policy work.  The thesis is the result of a need identified by 
CAFOD to explore how non-governmental organisations (NGOs) could improve the way they 
assess multi-hazards.   
In countries exposed to multiple hazards, the challenge is in addressing the range of frequent 
disasters that undermine development and the higher magnitude events that periodically 
devastate large portions of the country (CCCD, 2009).  Hazards can also interact and cause 
cascading (chains of) hazards and compounding impacts through the coincident occurrence of 
unrelated hazards (Ashdown, 2011).  The increasing vulnerability and exposure of people and 
infrastructure in multi-hazard developing countries poses challenges for NGOs and the 
communities they assist.  DRR strategies must be underpinned by a thorough analysis of these 
underlying multi-hazards.  Natural and physical sciences are being increasingly recognised by 
policy-makers as an essential means of assessing and anticipating disaster risk (UKCDS, 2013) 
and in identifying means of preventing, preparing for and responding to disasters (Southgate 
et al., 2013).  The NGO DRR sector is, therefore, faced with two challenges: how to implement 
multi-hazard assessments and how to utilise science for this purpose.  The doctoral research 
addresses these challenges in the context of multi-hazards in the Philippines. 
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1.1 Anticipating disasters in a multi-hazardous world 
Disasters have long been acknowledged as not naturally occurring events; instead, they are the 
consequence of the interplay between hazards, the exposure and vulnerability of elements at 
risk, the capacity to reduce or respond to the disaster and, more recently, the level of 
resilience in a system (UNISDR, 2006; Mitchell and Harris, 2012; Wisner et al., 2012).  In this 
thesis the focus is on hazards, rather than vulnerability and risk, owing to the emphasis being 
on interacting hazards and the application of physical and natural science.  The thesis also 
focuses on natural, rather than human-induced, hazards because they are the focus of the 
international framework for DRR – the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA; UNISDR, 2005), 
which is the means by which many governments and NGOs measure their progress on DRR. 
Any strategy for DRR needs to be underpinned by a good understanding and anticipation of 
the likely severity, timing and location of hazards (Rees et al., 2012).  In an increasingly 
interconnected world, distal hazards can create disasters for countries well beyond the origin 
of the hazard (Ashdown, 2011).  For example, the 2010 European ash crisis caused by the 
eruption of Eyjafjallajökull Volcano in Iceland resulted in the cancellation of flights across 
Europe (Sammonds et al., 2010).  There is also growing recognition that hazards can manifest 
as combinations of hazards that are ‘a factor of magnitude more difficult’ to anticipate than 
single hazards (Ashdown, 2011: 15).  The 2011 Mw9 Tōhoku earthquake in Japan resulted in 
the deaths of 15,703 people and displaced a further 130,927 (USGS, 2012).  Whilst the 
response to this event reflected the good investment in disaster preparedness, the emergency 
plans, preparations and mitigation strategies were based on an inadequate assessment of the 
seismic hazard (Cyranoski, 2011).  The magnitude of the earthquake and the accompanying 
tsunami were, therefore, seemingly unprecedented, but it has emerged that the hazard was in 
fact underestimated (Normile, 2011).  In the Philippines, the devastating Typhoon Haiyan 
(November 2013) occurred only one month after the Ms7.2 earthquake that killed 209 people 
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in Bohol and destroyed 14, 512 homes, rendering many residents homeless and extremely 
vulnerable to typhoon hazard whilst living in temporary accommodation (Matus, 2013).  These 
recent events emphasise the need for scientists and decision-makers to anticipate 
combinations of hazards (Ashdown, 2011).  These hazard combinations can equate to more 
than the sum of the independent hazards (Marzocchi et al., 2012a); for example, the 1991 
eruption of Mt Pinatubo in the Philippines was accompanied by Typhoon Yunya, which 
saturated the accumulating tephra with rainfall, the weight of which caused the roofs of 
homes and businesses to collapse, resulting in most of the 300 deaths directly associated with 
the eruption (Wolfe, 1992).  In spite of being recognised as a threat, the assessment of these 
interrelations is a notable omission from multi-hazard risk assessments (Kappes et al., 2012), 
partly because they are perceived to be too challenging (e.g. Tweed and Walker, 2011).   
Instead, the majority of analyses tend to compare, rank or aggregate independent hazards for 
the same location (e.g. Thierry et al., 2008).  Furthermore, the DRR advocacy for multi-hazard 
approaches has not typically been accompanied by guidance for decision-makers (including 
NGOs) on what these entail (e.g. UNISDR, 2005). 
1.2 Non-governmental organisations and multi-hazard assessments 
Humanitarian and development NGOs are key implementers of DRR strategies.  It is 
imperative, therefore, that they have the skills (or access to those who do) to analyse and 
understand the risks they are trying to address.  NGO approaches to DRR comprise policy and 
advocacy at the national and international scale and community-based DRR interventions at 
the local scale (Benson et al., 2001).  Historically, responding to disasters has primarily been a 
concern for humanitarian departments, but with international recognition that disasters can 
undermine or be caused by development (DFID, 2004) NGOs have attempted to integrate DRR 
activities across their programmes, to varying degrees of success (Benson et al., 2007).  
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The divide between humanitarian and development sectors and, therefore, response and risk 
reduction activities is perpetuated by separate funding streams (DIFD, 2004).  These funding 
streams reinforce humanitarian and development trends including DRR, climate change 
adaptation (CCA) and, more recently, resilience.  The recent emphasis on CCA compared with 
DRR in the NGO sector indicates a need to question whether NGOs are taking an objective, 
multi-hazard approach to their interventions.  Climate change is being perceived as the 
greatest threat to vulnerable communities without accounting for the numerous threats and 
exacerbations of hazard and risk (for example environmental degradation) occurring at the 
local level (Walker et al., 2014).  However efforts to synthesise DRR and CCA reinforce the 
need for a multi-hazard, integrated approach to risk reduction (Turnbull et al., 2013). 
Whilst the policy surrounding DRR, CCA and resilience tends to emphasise a multi-hazard 
approach (e.g. DFID, 2012), history demonstrates that NGOs have not always successfully 
ensured that their programmes account for the entire range of hazards that might affect a 
community or region within which they work.  The seismic hazard that caused the January 
2010 earthquake in Haiti was overlooked because the emphasis amongst humanitarian and 
development organisations working in Haiti was on hurricane preparedness due to a 
succession of tropical storms and hurricanes that had affected the country in recent years (see 
Nicolas et al., 2009).  This situation arose despite the earthquake risk having been identified by 
seismologists (see Hayes et al., 2010) and publically stated by a prominent local geologist as far 
back as 2008 (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011). This example highlights that there is a need for better 
communication between scientists and decision-makers. 
The need for humanitarian decision-makers to better anticipate disasters has prompted policy 
makers to advocate for the better utilisation of natural and physical science in DRR (e.g. 
Ashdown, 2011).  Rather than repeat the positivist and criticised International Decade for 
Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), the recent guidance emphasises that science must be 
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integrated with community and indigenous knowledge of disaster risk (Southgate et al., 2013).  
NGOs typically implement risk assessments with local (rural) communities through 
participatory methods of assessing hazard, vulnerability and capacity that rely upon 
community knowledge (e.g. IFRC/RC, 2007).  But, despite being key actors in international and 
local efforts to reduce disaster risk, NGOs are notably omitted or underemphasised in some of 
the recent advocacy for decision-makers to better engage with science for DRR (e.g. Southgate 
et al., 2013).   
There are a number of examples of the positive contributions science has made to DRR 
(Southgate et al., 2013) and the potential role of partnerships between NGOs and academia 
for enhancing humanitarian goals is growing in recognition (Green, 2013).  However, it is 
apparent that the uptake and integration of science within NGOs for the purpose of DRR is still 
largely lacking.  This is in spite of the fact that addressing multi-hazard risk requires a range of 
expertise (Ritchey, 2006).  Whether this is because science is largely inaccessible to or simply 
not appreciated by NGOs is explored in the EngD research.   
1.3 Aims, objectives and research approach 
To date, there has been a lack of appraisal as to whether NGOs adopt a multi-hazard approach 
in their assessments of disaster risk. There is also a need to determine whether science is 
widely utilised by NGOs for the purpose of these assessments.  The principal research question 
is, therefore:  
To what extent do and can NGOs assess multi-hazards and do they incorporate science 
for this purpose? 
In order to fully address the research question, it is first necessary to determine what the term 
multi-hazard refers to.  The data collection and analysis is then divided into two parts.  The first 
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part considers current approaches to NGO hazard assessment, whilst the second part 
examines the reality of multi-hazards through a case study involving both NGOs and scientists.  
Pursuing the research in this sequence is crucial since it ensures the research is understood 
within the context of NGO applications throughout.  It also illustrates a progression of the 
research, from the more general, sector wide consideration of multi-hazards to the specific 
understanding of a case. 
Given the above approach, accompanying the research question are three key research 
objectives: 
1. to identify a conceptual framework for multi-hazards, especially their interrelations, 
and what is required by their assessment; 
2. to determine current methods adopted by NGOs for the purposes of assessing 
hazards, whether these incorporate a multi-hazard and scientific approach and what 
factors constrain or enable the implementation of multi-hazard assessments by NGOs; 
3. to examine the reality of multi-hazards and their assessment within a case study to 
support or challenge the findings from the first two objectives. 
The EngD research is exploratory, with the findings from earlier objectives being used to 
inform and refine subsequent research.  Given its scope, the research adopts an 
interdisciplinary and partnership-based model of research In order to address the aim and 
objectives.  The critical analysis of multiple hazards and their interrelations is achieved through 
the analysis of a case study of multi-hazards in the Philippines.  The reason for selecting the 
Philippines is because it offers a truly multi-hazard environment and, at the beginning of this 
research, CAFOD and its partners had already started to implement a DRR project there.  The 
model of research and the Philippines are introduced in the following sections. 
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1.3.1 An academic-NGO partnership: the ambition of applied research 
Currently, there are two factors driving the increased interest in academic-NGO collaborations.   
Firstly, funders are demanding that NGOs improve their evidence and results and secondly, 
academics in the UK are under pressure to demonstrate impact from their work in order to 
secure future research funding (Green, 2013).  A frequent complaint amongst NGOs is that the 
demands of their work, together with limited staffing and financial resources, negate the time 
available for research (Roper, 2002).  Academics can provide perspective and analytical 
capacities that are often unavailable in-house (Roper, 2002), although Chapter 9 argues 
whether this lack of in-house capacity is something that NGOs need to address.  For 
academics, working with NGOs enables the application of research and expertise of tangible 
benefit to the NGO (Mercer, 2006), whilst simultaneously making a contribution to larger 
intellectual projects by testing ideas and theories (Roper, 2002).   
The UCL-CAFOD partnership creates an opportunity to academically evaluate the extent to 
which NGOs can implement multi-hazard assessments, as well as identify the factors that limit 
the implementation of these assessments and the opportunities for improvement from other 
fields, for example hazard science.  At the same time, the partnership provides insight into the 
NGO sector and the researcher has the benefit of academic and practitioner advice, guidance 
and expertise.   
There are practical and ethical challenges to working in partnership with a group that 
represents partners, subjects and users of the research (Mercer, 2006; Duncan et al., 2014).  
Avoiding the pitfalls of NGO-academic partnerships necessitates clear goals of the 
collaboration, regular communication between project members and a balance between 
developing theory and solving problems (Roper, 2002; ELRHA, 2012, see case study 3: 45).  
Chapter 9 contains a reflection on the experience of a partnership based research project with 
suggestions for the implementation of future collaborative research projects. 
30 
 
1.3.2 Interdisciplinary research  
There is increasing recognition amongst academics and DRR specialists that no single discipline 
is suitably equipped to fully understand and develop risk reduction initiatives (Ritchey, 2006).  
In order to understand and evaluate the concept of multi-hazards and their assessment, it is 
necessary to adopt an interdisciplinary approach (Tweed and Walker, 2011). 
There are major benefits to an interdisciplinary approach: it allows for exploration of the wider 
context of a research topic and creates opportunities for identifying approaches and strategies 
from other disciplines.  This is particularly helpful in the case of this research where there is an 
absence of previous research in this field.  At the same time, it is necessary to balance this 
breadth of analysis against what is achievable within a project time-frame.  The reader should 
therefore be aware that in order to address the scope of the project, some topics have 
received less attention than others, which represents the reality of interdisciplinary research.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that projects that contain an interdisciplinary component end up 
being framed primarily as either a physical or social science project, especially with regard to 
methods (Donovan et al., 2011).  Methodologically, the EngD project adopts a mainly 
qualitative approach in order to access the perspectives and experiences of NGOs.  However, 
the project also necessitates an understanding of natural science and quantitative analysis in 
order to evaluate quantitative methods for assessing multi-hazards.   The research strategy is 
further discussed in Chapter 3. 
1.3.3 The Philippines as an appropriate case study 
The Philippines is widely recognised as one of the most disaster prone countries in the world 
(GFDRR, 2010; Figure 1.1).  The country is exposed to frequent natural hazards (typhoons, 
floods, landslides, droughts, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis) and interspersed 
with high impact disasters (e.g. Typhoon Haiyan in 2013).  Combined with the vulnerability of a 
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significant proportion of the population, which is closely linked to high levels of poverty and 
environmental degradation (Benson, 2009), the Philippines is classed as a disaster hotspot.  As 
of 2010, the Philippines had a population of 92.34 million (National Statistics Office, 2014).  
The World Bank classes the Philippines as a lower-middle-income country, with 25.2% of the 
population living below the national poverty line (World Bank, 2014). 
The tectonic and meteorological setting of the Philippines make it highly susceptible to 
multiple and interrelated hazards.  The archipelago is the consequence of the meeting of three 
plate margins and is comprised of several volcanic arcs (Yumul Jr et al., 2012).  There are four 
climate types, which each reflect the different patterns of rainfall over the year.  In the main, 
however, most areas are exposed to high levels of rainfall during parts (if not most) of the year 
(Yumul Jr et al., 2012).  The pattern of rainfall is dictated by the incidence of typhoons (on 
average seven to eight make landfall each year), the north-east and south-west monsoons, the 
seasonal movement of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) and the El Niño Southern 
Oscillation, which brings increased rain in La Niña years (Bankoff, 2003; Yumul Jr et al., 2008). 
Given the topography, frequent incidence of heavy rainfall and periodic earthquakes, the 
Philippines is frequently affected by mass movements.  These hazards can manifest as primary 
hazards or as the consequence of another hazard (e.g. earthquake or typhoon) and can also, 
themselves, trigger subsequent hazards, such as damning lakes that subsequently flood (Yumul 
Jr et al., 2012).  
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Figure 1.1 Seismic, volcanic and tropical storm risk in the Philippines.  The black box indicates the 
location of the case study: Albay.  Source: OCHA (2011). 
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Home to 22 volcanoes that have erupted within the last 600 years, volcanic eruptions also 
readily manifest as multi-hazard events that include lava flows, earthquakes, pyroclastic flows, 
lahars, lightening and ballistics (PHIVOLCS, 2008).  Thus focusing the multi-hazard case study 
analysis in a location where mass movement hazards occur in volcanic systems is an 
appropriate means of exploring multi-hazards in general.  The chosen site is the province of 
Albay, within which sits Mayon volcano (Figure 1.1).  The case analysed is the 2006 typhoon 
triggered lahars at Mayon and is introduced in Chapter 6. 
1.4 Thesis outline 
The outline of the thesis is as follows: chapter 2 presents a review of the literature, including 
an analysis of NGOs, the definition of key terminology, the history of DRR and the concept of 
multi-hazards and their assessment.  Within this chapter a working conceptual framework for 
multi-hazards is proposed.  Chapter 3 provides a justification for the qualitative and mixed 
methods approach to this research, along with details of the methods adopted, their 
implementation and the means of analysing qualitative data.  The remainder of the thesis 
reflects the division of the research into the two, complementary, parts: (1) ascertaining how 
NGOs assess hazards and whether they adopt a multi-hazard approach and (2) analysing the 
multi-hazard characteristics of the case study of the 2006 typhoon triggered lahars at Mayon 
Volcano, in order to understand the reality of multi-hazards and their assessment.  Chapters 4 
and 5 present the analysis and findings of the first part of the research, which comprises two 
studies of NGO community-based hazard assessments: one from the perspective of those from 
Head Office NGOs in the UK and the other from programme staff and local agencies in the 
Philippines.  Chapters 6, 7 and 8 address the second part of the research.  Chapter 6 introduces 
the rationale for and the geographical context of the case study, as well as providing a 
reflection on the field work and information used to analyse the case.  Chapter 7 provides a 
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narrative of the case study, alongside an analysis of key aspects of the disaster related to the 
conceptual framework for multi-hazards derived from the literature review (Chapter 2).  
Chapter 8 presents the current scientific means of anticipating lahar hazard at Mayon volcano, 
reflecting on their incorporation of a multi-hazard approach and NGOs’ means of accessing 
science and associated expertise.   The thesis concludes with Chapter 9, which comprises a 
synthesis of the findings from both parts of the EngD research and the wider implications of 
these for DRR, multi-hazard analysis and NGO applications. 
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Chapter 2: NGOs, disaster risk reduction and multi-hazard 
assessments 
 
The chapter begins with an introduction to NGOs, followed by the background to DRR within 
the humanitarian and development sector, the transition from disaster management to DRR 
and the overlaps between DRR and climate change adaptation (CCA).  The purpose of 
reviewing this literature is in order to emphasise the context within which multi-hazards are 
being perceived by humanitarian and development NGOs, their donors and the frameworks 
they adhere to.  Section 2.2 explores the concept of multi-hazard and approaches to their 
assessment, whilst introducing the roles of natural science and community knowledge in 
hazard assessment and NGO approaches to hazard assessment.  The chapter concludes with a 
summary of the main findings of the literature review and proposed next steps. 
2.1 Introduction to non-governmental organisations 
There is no generally accepted definition of what is an NGO, owing to the fact that these 
organisations represent the outcome of the interaction between ideological trends, donor 
policies and agendas and national historical and cultural conditions (Tvedt, 1998).  NGOs also 
vary in size (international, national and local), values and scope.  Hilhorst (2003) argues that 
scholars of NGOs should move their attention from organisational features, structures and 
reports to the social actors in and around the organisation.  This view emphasises why it is 
important to speak with individuals within agencies in order to understand their approaches to 
multi-hazard assessment and not simply rely on secondary information.  The EngD research is 
largely concerned with humanitarian and development NGOs owing to the fact that they are 
major actors in DRR and because CAFOD is involved in humanitarian and development work.   
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2.1.1 A brief history of NGOs 
Civil society concerns the manner in which citizens organise themselves to an agreed purpose 
to improve, regulate or change society and NGOs represent one sector within civil society 
(Thompson, 2012).  Barrow and Jennings (2001) argue that ‘war has been a characteristic 
impetus to the formation of an NGO’ (2011: 11) and that NGOs emerged in order to provide 
for those affected by the breakdown of government-provided systems, becoming increasingly 
political in their ‘enunciation of their ideologies’ (Barrow and Jennings, 2001).  However, the 
emphasis on emergency relief remained the focus until the 1940s and 1950s and it was not 
until the 1960s that the more strident political tone was adopted owing to development 
discourse entering the NGO sector (Barrow and Jennings, 2001).  With the retreat of the state 
(and particularly the fall of the Soviet Union), aid agencies and governments encouraged NGOs 
to provide welfare services (Benson et al., 2001).  The consequential increased proportion of 
aid being channelled to and through NGOs led to a rapid increase in the number and size of 
NGOs in the 1980s, with a resounding emphasis on development, welfare services and 
emergency relief (Tvedt, 1998; Barrow and Jennings, 2001; Benson et al., 2001; Hilhorst, 2003; 
Mercer, 2006).  The earliest effective developing country NGOs were in south and east Asia 
and within a number of countries in Latin America (Barrow and Jennings, 2001).  In the context 
of DRR, community preparedness work grew in the 1980s and early 1990s, particularly in those 
countries prone to multiple hazards and with large civil societies, such as Bangladesh, the 
Philippines and Nicaragua (Thompson, 2012).  The initiatives and thinking around social justice, 
partnership and social change, which emerged during the 1970s and 1980s, provided the 
foundations for current DRR work by civil society organisations (Barrow and Jennings; 
Thompson, 2012).   
Institutional donors and the United Nations rely heavily on NGOs as implementing partners in 
humanitarian operations (Benson et al., 2001).  Consequently, many NGOs rely on institutional 
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funding to support their operations.  The NGO sector is increasingly recognised amongst a 
number of stakeholders (including the general public) as an effective means of implementing 
development and relief (Benson et al., 2001; Barrow and Jennings, 2001).  They are 
understood to work with those most in need, adopt a participatory approach (see section 
2.3.4), make long-term commitments, operate flexibly and cost-effectively, address emerging 
issues in an innovative way and empower marginalised people in policy discussions  (Benson et 
al., 2001).  The position of NGOs to provide assistance in areas of political instability, given 
their ability to act independently of host governments, is also deemed an essential factor in 
their effectiveness as implementing partners (Barrow and Jennings, 2001).  However, with the 
rapid growth of NGOs towards the end of last century, many practitioners and analysts began 
to critically evaluate the role of NGOs in the context of humanitarian and development work.   
2.1.2 Criticism of NGOs 
Since the end of the Second World War the large extension in development and relief aid 
between nations and the ‘spectacular’ growth of NGOs has raised concerns over the act of 
charity itself (Barrow and Jennings, 2001).  Many social movements criticise NGOs owing to the 
perception that they are increasingly influenced by the neo-liberal forces acting through 
donors, states and multilateral institutions (Benson et al., 2001; Thompson, 2012).  Related to 
this, Benson et al. (2001) observe several concerns facing development and relief NGOs, 
including how to increase and evaluate impact, accountability (particularly to beneficiaries), 
dealings with other actors in relief and development and the nature of partnership between 
‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ NGOs.  There exist power discrepancies between NGOs based in the 
‘global North’ and the local or national organisations that they fund (Thompson, 2012).   
The role of NGOs as advocates for the populations with which they work has been questioned 
because these same populations may not necessarily want the NGO to represent them 
(Thompson, 2012).  Class, power dynamics, differing concepts of authority and representation, 
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urban/rural discrepancies and organisational culture all have a role in creating distrust 
between NGOs, community-based organisations (CBOs) and the population they are 
supposedly assisting (Thompson, 2012).  Furthermore, claims to a participatory approach have 
been challenged (e.g. Bowman and White, 2012). 
To emphasise the legitimacy of NGOs and their approaches, a number of professional 
standards have emerged including the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership Standard 
(HAP, 2010) and the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response 
(The Sphere Project, 2011).  A number of agencies have established ‘humanitarian principles’, 
including the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movements’ concept 
of ‘the humanitarian imperative’, which is the right to receive and offer humanitarian 
assistance unimpeded and not through a partisan or political act (IFRC/RC, 2003). 
Another effect of the recent dissatisfaction has been to question the success of the 
humanitarian aid principle that it should ‘do no harm’ and to challenge the ‘relief-development 
continuum’ (Barrow and Jennings, 2001: 23).  The principle of ‘do no harm’ emphasises the 
importance of a multi-hazard approach within NGO work, since focusing on single hazards 
might increase vulnerability to other hazards, for instance tropical cyclone shelters that do not 
account for seismic risk.  The relief (humanitarian)-development continuum (or divide) is of 
particular interest to this research since it influences how DRR is theorised and implemented 
by NGOs (see Section 2.2). 
Historically, relief operations were primarily concerned with the physical survival of 
individuals, whereas development activities were usually planned in respect of the 
sustainability and suitability of social and economic systems (Barrow and Jennings, 2001).  The 
focus on humanitarian aid was not to build institutional capacity; rather, it aimed to be neutral 
and impartial regarding the legitimacy of competent authorities (Barrow and Jennings, 2001). 
In contrast, development assistance implied the need to make decisions regarding the 
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legitimacy and desirably of different institutions, neither neutrally nor impartially (Barrow and 
Jennings, 2001).  
For those agencies grappling with the relief-development continuum, the legitimacy of 
humanitarian NGOs as apolitical and neutral has been questioned internally and externally, 
particularly given that attention has turned to NGOs’ political role in development, 
empowering the poorest, building on civil society, advocacy work and creating the conditions 
for liberal democracy to flourish (see Mercer, 2002).  At the same time, humanitarian 
organisations have found themselves criticised for not challenging the political factors 
underlying crises’ and sometimes for their lack of professionalism (see Benson et al., 2001). 
In the 1960s, NGOs moved beyond the humanitarian emergency operations that characterised 
their early years.  Large organisations recognised the need to address the root of the problems 
they were responding to and over the next two decades aid budgets were increasingly 
channelled to development, rather than relief, work.  In the 1980s, however, there was a 
series of ‘high-profile’ emergencies resulting in a return to focus on relief into the 1990s.  
Benson et al. (2001) observed that the emphasis on ‘complex’ emergencies dominated 
humanitarian concerns and that development agencies were preoccupied with broader issues 
that arose from the post-Cold War era, meaning that ‘natural disasters’ were marginalised 
within NGO aid agendas.  However, in the late 1990s and hastening in the 2000s, community-
based disaster preparedness grew as a viable alternative disaster preparedness model 
(Thompson, 2012).  Organisations gained a range of experience in DRR at this grassroots level, 
particularly in the context of ‘mega-disasters’, including Hurricane Mitch in Central America 
(1998), the Gujarat earthquake (2001), the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), Hurricane Katrina 
(2005) and the Haiti earthquake (2010; Thompson, 2012).  Given the history of responding to 
disasters, NGOs at times focused on the most recent or frequent disasters rather than an 
assessment of multi-hazard threats (e.g. Nicolas et al., 2009).   
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The history of NGOs is immersed in religious, political and cultural influences and each agency 
has different principles and values.  However, as observed in the discussion above, there have 
been paradigm shifts that have undoubtedly influenced thinking and approaches to risk 
reduction, including multi-hazard approaches, across the NGO sector.  These trends and 
paradigms also relate to the evolution of DRR.  It is imperative to understand these influences 
and how these might have left a legacy with regard to approaches to multi-hazard assessment. 
2.2 The history of disaster risk reduction and associated concepts 
Before exploring the history of DRR, this section begins with an introduction to key 
terminology and justification for the adoption of certain definitions within this research. 
2.2.1 Disaster risk reduction terminology 
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) defines a disaster 
as:  
A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread 
human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of 
the affected community or society to cope using its own resources (UNISDR, 2009a). 
The term disaster has a number of different definitions but most writers agree that a disaster 
is the consequence of both a hazard (an event) and inherent characteristics that make people 
and places vulnerable (IFRC, 1993).  The term is often defined by the application of certain 
criteria, for example the CRED Em-dat International Disaster Database adopts the UNISDR’s 
categorisation of a disaster, the conditions for which are:  
 ten or more people reported killed 
 hundred or more people reported affected 
 declaration of a state of emergency 
 call for international assistance (CRED, 2012) 
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Historically disasters were termed ‘natural’ owing to focus upon the natural hazard trigger of 
the event.  Paradigmatically, there was a shift from viewing disasters as natural to recognising 
that disasters only occur because of the interaction of hazards with people and associated 
socio-economic-political systems (Thywissen, 2006; UNISDR, 2006; Boudreau, 2009).  This shift 
led to an emphasis upon vulnerability and a move to viewing risk as a component of hazard 
(H), vulnerability (V) and sometimes exposure (E) (Birkmann, 2006; Schneiderbauer and 
Ehrlich, 2006; Thywissen, 2006): 
 R = H x E x V (1)   
Risk tends to encompass a temporal measure, in other words the likelihood or probability that 
an outcome might occur (UNISDR, 2009a; Mitchell and Harris, 2012).   
There has also been increasing emphasis on the capacity (C) of communities to use existing 
resources to cope with hazards (Wisner, 2006).  In the context of NGOs, the emphasis upon 
communities’ capacity to address their risk has become a key component of risk reduction; for 
example, CAFOD’s 2009 DRR Framework adopts the popular formulisation of risk as: 
 R = H x V/C (2)   
More recently, the emphasis has been increasingly shifting from vulnerability to capacity and 
moreover resilience.  In order to understand how these terms shape understanding of disaster 
risk reduction, the history of these concepts and their definitions are introduced below. 
Hazards, exposure, vulnerability, capacity and resilience 
The 1979 UN workshop identified the theoretical division of cause and effect, and the 
application of the terms ‘hazard’, ‘vulnerability’ and ‘risk’ within this theoretical framework 
(Boudreau, 2009).  Over time, the definition of each of these terms has been extensively 
discussed and challenged (see Crozier, 1988; Cutter, 2003; Thywissen, 2006;  UNISDR, 2009a).  
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It is widely agreed that hazard refers to the event that has the potential to cause damage or 
harm (Twigg, 2004; Smith and Petley, 2009; Mitchell and Harris, 2012), and some defintions 
extend this to include the likelihood or probability that these events might occur (e.g. UNISDR, 
2004).  Hazards are often grouped into natural, technological and anthropogenic 
(Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich, 2006); the latter two are often classed as man-made, whilst 
natural hazards are at times termed environmental hazards (Smith and Petley, 2009).   
Vulnerability is a contested concept, with some viewing it as a process (e.g. Cutter et al., 2008; 
Bahadur et al., 2010) rather than a state of being.  Vulnerability was first introduced in the 
context of rural poverty (see Wisner et al., 2012) and what is agreed is that it is generally the 
poor who tend to be most vulnerable to hazards, owing to the economic pressures that force 
them to live in unsafe locations and conditions (Twigg, 2004; Ashdown, 2011).  The definiton of 
vulnerability differs across the perspective of different points of view, for example social, 
economic and climate change (Wisner et al., 2012).  Scientists and engineers are often 
criticised for their limited consideration of vulnerability owing to their tendency to focus on 
physical structures rather than people (Twigg, 2004).  In disaster risk management, the focus 
on vulnerability came about because of recognition that disasters are not simply a product of 
natural hazards but instead are the consequence of social and economic failings (Wisner et al., 
2004).  The emphasis on vulnerability within the humanitarian and development sector is in 
the context of placing people at the centre of DRR (Thywissen, 2006; UNISDR, 2006; Boudreau, 
2009).   
Although contested, vulnerability is generally recognised as the extent to which a person, 
group or socio-economic structures is likely to be affected by a hazard (Twigg, 2004).  One of 
the frameworks for understanding vulnerability and risk that underpins a lot of humanitarian 
and development work was developed by (Wisner et al., 2004) and distinguishes root causes of 
vulnerability (e.g. social and economic structures) and dynamic pressures (e.g. societal 
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deficiencies) and fragile livelihoods and unsafe conditions (Wisner et al., 2012).  Implied within 
this defintion, is the distinction made by a number of writers between intrinsic (internal) 
vulnerability and physical (external) exposure to hazard (Birkmann, 2006; Schneiderbauer and 
Ehrlich, 2006; Thywissen, 2006).  The term exposure relates to the number of people and/or 
other elements at risk that can be affected by a particular event (Thywissen, 2006; Mitchell 
and Harris, 2012).  Similar to vulnerability, the definition of capacity varies from the 
perspective of different disciplines; however (coping) capacity is generally agreed to refer to all 
the resources, assets and strengths people, society or organisations possess to cope with and 
recover from shocks and stresses  (Wisner et al., 2004; UNISDR, 2009a; Gaillard et al., 2010).   
Thywissen (2006) notes that coping capacity is difficult to differentiate from resilience but that 
resilience tends to be the more encompassing term, with coping capacity falling within it.  The 
theory of resilience has been fiercely debated and here no attempt is made to fully represent 
the entire discourse; however, broadly, resilience is recognised as being concerned with how a 
system, community or individual can handle a disturbance, surprise or change, by withstanding 
or adapting in the face of shocks or stresses (DFID, 2011; Mitchell and Harris, 2012).  In terms 
of risk management, resilience is increasingly being considered as managing change and 
thriving in the context of dynamic systems (Mitchell and Harris, 2012) and is sometimes 
termed as the ability to ‘bounce forward’ (Manyena et al., 2011).  Vulnerability and resilience 
are at times treated as opposites (e.g. Twigg 2007; Manyena et al. 2011; see Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002); they can appear as opposite ends of a continuum if vulnerability is understood 
as a process (e.g. capacity to respond) rather than simply circumstance (Bahadur et al., 2010).  
Gallopin (2006) counters by arguing that resilience refers to changes from one state to another 
whereas vulnerability is defined within these states.    
For the purposes of clarity, the definitions of the terms discussed above that will be used 
within this research are outlined in Table 2.1.  For terms beyond these, the reader should refer 
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to the glossary on page 8.  The development of these terms over time is reflected in the overall 
transition from a technocratic risk management perspective to a people-centred DRR 
approach.   
Table 2.1 Key DRR terminology 
Concept Adopted definition 
Capacity All the resources, assets and strengths people, society or organisations possess 
to cope with and recover from shocks and stresses (Wisner et al., 2004; 
Gaillard et al., 2010; UNISDR, 2012).   
Disaster Changes and disruption that exceeds the affected society’s capacity to cope 
(Twigg, 2004) 
Exposure The presence of people, livelihoods, environment, economic, social or cultural 
assets in places that could be adversely affected (Mitchell and Harris, 2012). 
Hazard A potential threat to humans and their welfare (Twigg, 2004). 
 
Resilience A highly contested term, broadly defined as how a system, community or 
individual can handle a disturbance, surprise or change, by withstanding or 
adapting to shocks or stresses (DFID, 2011; Mitchell and Harris, 2012). 
Risk The likelihood of a specific hazard occurring and its probable consequences for 
people and property (Twigg, 2004). 
Vulnerability The extent to which a person, group or socio-economic structure is likely to be 
affected by a hazard (Twigg, 2004). 
 
2.2.2 A short history of disaster risk reduction 
Historically, approaches to disaster management were primarily reactionary, focused on 
humanitarian responses to the event, rather than reducing the risk in the periods both prior to 
the disaster and after the event itself.  From the mid-1990s, a succession of global conventions 
have been influential in an international paradigm shift  from simply managing disaster events 
to adopting a more comprehensive approach to reducing risk, addressing the root causes of 
vulnerability and advocating anticipative, long-term, prospective strategies to risk 
management  (DFID, 2004; Islamic Relief UK, 2006) – more recently termed disaster risk 
reduction (DRR): 
[DRR is] the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse 
and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, 
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lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, 
and improved preparedness for adverse events (UNISDR, 2009a). 
The United Nations (UN) heralded 1990-2000 as the International Decade for Natural Disaster 
Reduction (IDNDR; see UN Resolution A42/169/1987), the goal of which was the prevention 
and reduction of the risk of ‘natural disasters’ through the extensive application of science and 
technology (Giardini and Bashman, 1993).  A survey of more than 100 academics and 
practitioners conducted in the 1990s indicated that sectoral, discipline-based approaches to 
development, and narrowing attitudes towards the natural environment, science and 
technology, were perceived to be factors contributing to the inability to reduce disaster losses 
(Haque and Burton, 2005); thus, the decade began with a largely technical and scientific focus 
and electorate.  It gradually became apparent, however, that it was necessary to include the 
broader socio-economic agenda and involve political organisations (Wisner et al., 2004; 
UNISDR, 2009b).   
During the mid-decade conference held in Yokohama, Japan, dissatisfaction emerged with the 
seemingly top-down, technocratic approach to disasters; as a consequence, efforts were then 
made to include NGOs and communities (Wisner et al., 2004).  Subsequently, the current 
UNISDR, which was established in 2000 as a follow up to the IDNDR (UNISDR, 2009b), provided 
a coordinating framework to address disaster risks at local, national, regional and international 
levels (UNISDR, 2014a).  In the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, representatives of 
168 countries met in Kobe, Japan, in 2005 for the World Conference on Disaster Reduction 
(WCDR).  The conference marked an historical turning point with the international recognition 
of the role of human actions in reducing risks and how NGOs, academics, governments, CBOs 
and individual citizens have a responsibility to increase their communities’ resilience to natural 
hazards (Innocenti and Albrito, 2011).  The WCDR encompassed the platform for what would 
eventually become the global consensus for DRR, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), 
which comprises the key objectives and activities required by nations in order to reduce risk.  
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The HFA emphasises a multi-hazard approach across DRR policies, planning and programming 
(UNISDR, 2005).  The framework outlines five key priorities for action to be completed during 
2005-2015: 
1. Ensure DRR is a national and local priority with strong institutional basis for implementation. 
2. Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning. 
3. Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels. 
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors. 
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels (UNISDR, 2005: 6). 
The HFA does not embody a binding agreement between countries, but it is monitored and 
reviewed by the UNISDR.  Every two years, the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(GPDRR) assembles academics, governments, the UN, NGOs, practitioners and the private 
sector (UNISDR, 2012) with the mandate (imposed by the United Nations General Assembly 
(A/RES/62/192) to assess the progress countries are making with regard to the objectives of 
the HFA, whilst also providing the opportunity for delegates to share                                                                                                                        
good practice and identify gaps and targeted action (PreventionWeb, 2012).    With regard to 
HFA priority 2, a key measure of the progress reports signatory countries provide is whether 
they are implementing national multi-hazard risk assessments.  Moreover, the Chair’s 
Assessment of the Third Session of the GPDRR (held in Geneva in May 2011) highlights the 15 
critical steps identified during the Session, two of which make reference to multi-hazards: 
8.4 Account for disaster losses in a standardized manner to support multi-hazard, integrated 
assessments as the basis for development decision-making and open-source risk public 
information... 
8.9 Identify and prepare for emerging risks, including those associated with technological 
hazards and pandemics, through scientifically-informed multi-hazard risk assessments and 
scenario development.  Encourage cross-sectoral cooperation that makes best use of available 
information and technology (Chair’s Summary, 2011:3).  
The chairman’s comments emphasise the need for multi-hazard assessments and that these 
must be underpinned by science in order to better prepare for emerging risks.  These 
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comments are also echoed in the recent Humanitarian Response Review (HERR), which states 
that science is required for agencies to better anticipate threats (Ashdown, 2011).   
Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006) note that, whilst over the last few decades the focus of 
disaster management research has shifted from ‘hazard assessment’ to ‘vulnerability analysis’, 
the determination of vulnerability and coping capacity is one of the weakest components of 
risk assessment.  The emphasis on vulnerability appears to be in the context of both its major 
role in determining the cause of disasters and the perceived complexity and difficulty of its 
assessment (e.g. Boudreau, 2009).  In 2009, however, the UNISDR Scientific and Technical 
Committee expressed concern that such shifts have been accompanied by decreasing 
recognition of the role of science and technology – and the hazard component (UNISDR, 
2009c).  Within its report it is noted that natural hazards are insufficiently studied in many 
regions, as exemplified in the findings of the recent Volcanic Risk Study compiled as part of the 
Global Facility for Disaster Risk and Recovery Programme (Aspinall et al., 2011).  Furthermore, 
the HFA mid-term review raises concerns regarding the identified lack of systematic multi-
hazard assessments (Louw et al., 2011).   
Many governments and NGOs have been attempting to integrate DRR into their short-term 
humanitarian response to disasters and their long-term development programmes.  However, 
with the growing acceptance of the threat of and need to adapt to climate change, policy 
makers have begun to question whether DRR is sufficiently equipped to address emerging 
threats.  There is growing concern that climate change may increase vulnerability through both 
the intensification of meteorological hazards and through the long-term changes in the global 
climate (DFID, 2004; see Schipper and Pelling, 2006; UNISDR, 2009b).  As a reaction to this 
concern, the concept of climate change adaptation (CCA) has rapidly taken shape and 
increased in importance. It is, therefore, necessary to briefly review CCA since the debate 
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surrounding where it overlaps with DRR provides important context to the humanitarian and 
development sector and perceptions of hazard and risk by NGOs. 
2.2.3 Overlapping concepts: DRR and CCA 
Following the release of the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) fourth assessment 
report (2007), adaptation to climate change emerged as a necessary field of engagement both 
for developed and developing countries (Innocenti and Albrito, 2011).  The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines climate change adaptation as: 
[the] [a]djustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic 
stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities (2014). 
The necessity of integrating CCA into strategies and decision-making processes for 
development has been emphasised by the acknowledgement that development and CCA are 
interlinked (Olhoff and Schaer, 2010), and the perception of an increase in climate-related 
disasters (Mitchell et al., 2010a).  Being both a political and practical issue, and with the 
increasing number of funding opportunities for CCA initiatives, there is growing advocacy for 
the integration of DRR and CCA (Mitchell and van Aalst, 2008; Venton and La Trobe, 2008; 
UNISDR, 2009b; Mercer, 2010; Mitchell et al., 2010b).  Points of convergence and divergence 
span international agreements and financial mechanisms to practical applications (Mitchell et 
al., 2010b; Table 2.2).  The following discussion does not attempt to address the entirety of 
this extensive debate but instead focuses upon those elements that relate to how 
humanitarian and development NGOs perceive hazards and risks.  Two key perceived 
distinctions between DRR and CCA, which appear to underpin much of the debate, are scale 
and type of hazard (Venton and La Trobe, 2008; Romieu et al., 2010). 
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Table 2.2 Conceptual and practical differences between CCA and DRR updated from Venton and La 
Trobe (2008) by Mitchell et al. (2010b).  Source: (Mitchell et al., 2010b; Table 2: 8). 
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Both DRR and CCA aim to reduce the impacts of shocks by anticipating risks and uncertainties 
and addressing vulnerabilities (Mitchell et al., 2010).  Climate change is anticipated to affect 
disaster risk through the probable increase in meteorological disasters and through increasing 
vulnerability of communities to natural hazards (DFID, 2004) through, for example ecosystem 
degradation or long-term nuances in global and local economies (see Schipper and Pelling, 
2006; Pelling, 2011).  At the same time, however, the perceived increase in the frequency of 
climate-related disasters (Mitchell et al., 2010a) is resulting in greater emphasis being placed 
upon CCA, at the expense of DRR, within the humanitarian and development sector.  In 
contrast, the framework for DRR is struggling to demonstrate success (Louw et al., 2011). 
DRR and CCA have emerged from different disciplines (humanitarian response and 
environmental science respectively) and this separation is maintained by the perception that 
there are two key distinctions between DRR and CCA: the temporal and geographical scales 
which are addressed and the type of hazard considered (Venton and La Trobe, 2008; Romieu 
et al., 2010).  DRR is perceived to adopt a short-term, local, perspective whereas CCA tends to 
be described as adopting a long-term, global, perspective (e.g. Sperling and Szekely, 2005; Few 
et al., 2006).  However, the lack of local level information and data (Romieu et al., 2010) and 
the associated uncertainty (Prabhakar et al., 2009) means that CCA lacks context and the local, 
bottom-up perspective inherent in NGO approaches to DRR (Mercer, 2010).   
In 1999, Burton and van Aalst suggested that a ‘full risk analysis’ of development projects was 
needed, which addresses natural hazards as well as increases in risk due to climate change 
over the life-time of a project (Sperling and Szekely, 2005).  However, a number of authors 
have justified a distinction of separate communities of practice by arguing that DRR addresses 
all natural hazards, thus making it beyond the remit of CCA, which is perceived to address 
adaptation to the changing nature of meteorological hazards and long-term climate change 
(e.g. Venton and La Trobe, 2008).  As such, some DRR specialists are sceptical of the adaptation 
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community’s perceived focus on a long-term agenda that only encompasses part of the entire 
array of hazards (Mitchell et al., 2010).  Some DRR writers suggest that a long-term perspective 
is an inherent component of DRR (Kelman and Gaillard, 2008; Mercer, 2010), owing to its 
requirement to be integrated in development planning (DIFD, 2004). 
However, it is implied that most contributors to the integration debate do not believe that DRR 
has brought about the adoption of a long-term perspective in practice (e.g. McBean and 
Ajibade, 2009; Birkmann and von Teichman, 2010).  Furthermore, in spite of a conceptual 
claim that CCA addresses long-term vulnerability and gradual, creeping change (Romieu et al., 
2010) current practice is to address existing climate variability as a practical approach to CCA, 
owing to the assumption that by coping better with existing risk, it may be possible to reduce 
risk to long-term climate change (Sperling and Szekely, 2005; Schipper and Pelling, 2006; 
Thomalla et al., 2006; Tanner and Mitchell, 2007).  
Given that, in actuality, both DRR and CCA are only addressing risk in the short-term, it is 
questionable whether NGOs are fully appreciating the dynamic nature of hazards over time.   
Within the integration of DRR and CCA debate, there is some recognition that the components 
of risk require regular revision due to the dynamic nature of risk in general (Dilley, 2006; 
Tanner and Mitchell, 2007; Birkmann and von Teichman, 2010).  However, the emphasis on 
the changing nature of hazards tends to be in the context of climate change: 
in contrast to geological disasters, it is important to ensure that current disaster prevention 
efforts aimed at weather related events have the built-in capacity to accommodate changes in 
frequency and magnitude over time (Sperling and Szekely, 2005: 28).   
In stating the above, Sperling and Szekely (2005) are apparently making the assumption that 
only meteorological events are variable over time.  There is a growing emphasis within the CCA 
discourse, however, on the fact that the climate system is nonlinear and thus building 
resilience does not simply encompass addressing the uncertainties surrounding changes to 
existing climatic threats, but also necessitates addressing emergent, unanticipated risks (CCCD, 
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2009).  The supposition is that DRR is more likely to struggle to integrate risks that are yet to 
be experienced, whereas this is a core component of CCA (Venton and La Trobe, 2008; McBean 
and Ajibade, 2009).  However, there is a growing emphasis within the humanitarian discourse 
on better anticipation of hazards and disasters in general (e.g. Ashdown, 2011).  The 2011 
Global Assessment Report notes that a growing number of potential and plausible risks are 
either difficult to assess or have severe impacts due to the growing interconnection and 
interdependency of modern societies: 
As such, there is a growing probability of ‘simultaneous crisis’ where different hazards occur at 
the same time, ‘sequential crisis’ where hazards trigger cascading disasters in a range of 
interlocked systems, and ‘synchronous failures’ where different risks converge and interact 
(UNISDR, 2011:7).   
The appreciation of the complexity of disasters, the interrelatedness of hazards and the 
compounding effects of environmental degradation is growing amongst DRR actors (e.g. 
UNISDR, 2004; FIC, 2010), typically manifesting through concerns regarding the uncertainty of 
what the future may bring and over the disaster ‘surprises’ of the recent past (e.g. the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti and the 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear reactor failure in Japan).  
Whilst humanitarian organisations have become more conscious of vulnerability and its root 
causes, the separation of natural hazards (DRR) from climate change hazards (CCA) means that 
in some cases climate change is taking precedent over DRR.  DRR proponents argue that CCA 
must be mainstreamed within DRR since it has established and applicable methods and tools 
(Prabhakar et al., 2009; Birkmann and von Teichman, 2010; Gaillard, 2010; Mercer, 2010).   
Rowling’s (2008) interviews with NGOs found that, whilst respondents adopted a variety of 
lenses, almost all linked their work on DRR with climate change; but, although some assumed 
that climate change in practice was interchangeable with DRR work, others argued for a 
necessary clear distinction (Rowling, 2008).  Thus, both the DRR and CCA communities seem 
reluctant to fully integrate – a need for ‘convergence but not conflation’ (Harris and Bahadur, 
2011: 6).  This situation has consequently created an inefficient approach to visualising risk, 
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one which does not readily reflect the views of those at risk; for example communities tend to 
view hazards, risk and the environment holistically (Mercer, 2010).  Mitchell and van Aalst 
(2008) note that the driver for closer integration between DRR and CCA has grown from the 
implementation side, with projects attempting to tackle the full spectrum of risk.  Some 
advocate CCA as the platform to move away from the current compartmentalised approach to 
addressing risk (Harris and Bahadur, 2011), but, more recently, DRR and CCA have been 
increasingly converging through their common goal of building resilience to shocks and 
stresses. 
The above discussions have highlighted that there are different paradigms for framing hazards 
and risk currently being adopted in the humanitarian sector, which make reference to multi-
hazards.  However, multi-hazard is concept that has never received the same level of 
attention, despite its frequent appearance across policy and strategies for risk reduction.  It is, 
therefore, necessary to elucidate the concept of multi-hazards and strategies for their 
assessment. 
2.3 Multi-hazard concepts and their assessment 
Multi-hazard does not constitute a new term; it was emphasised by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1992 through their recognition that one type of risk 
reduction could possibly increase vulnerability to other risks (UNEP, 1992).  Furthermore, the 
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (see the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development and the subsequent Millennium Development Goals) included government 
pledges to an inclusive, integrated and multi-hazard approach to tackle vulnerability, risk 
assessment and disaster management (ICSU, 2008).  Thus, multi-hazard understanding has 
historical foundations within the environment and development discourse.  In the context of 
DRR, it is included in a number of international agreements, notably emerging within the 
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general considerations of the HFA (UNISDR, 2005).  The Fourth Asian Ministerial Climate 
Change Conference held in Incheon, South Korea (October 2010), emphasised the role of 
multi-hazard assessments in the context of raising awareness and capacity for DRR and CCA 
(AMCDRR, 2010).  Even prior to the introduction of the term DRR, multi-hazards were 
discussed in the context of emergency planning (e.g. Foster, 1980), challenging the notion that 
traditional disaster management only considered a mono-hazard approach.  There is, 
therefore, general recognition across policy that DRR should incorporate a multi-hazard 
approach (DFID, 2004; Ashdown, 2011; UNISDR, 2011; Shepard et al., 2013). 
In spite of advocating the need for multi-hazard approaches, the majority of assessments are 
concerned with single hazards (Kappes et al., 2010; Tweed and Walker, 2011).  Furthermore, 
and contrary to most terms within the DRR lexicon (see Thywissen, 2006), inadequate 
attention has been paid to the concept of ‘multi-hazard’ and what is required of a multi-hazard 
assessment.   
2.3.1 The concept of multi-hazard 
The concept of multi-hazard is becoming increasingly prevalent in hazard and disaster studies, 
especially within spatial planning (e.g. Greiving et al., 2006; Schmidt-Thome, 2006; Delmonaco 
et al., 2007), but most studies remain fairly limited and primarily focus on discrete hazards 
(Schmidt-Thome, 2006; Kappes et al., 2010; Tweed and Walker, 2011).  Further limitations 
have come about owing to the fact that hazard analysis has traditionally been discipline 
specific (e.g. seismology) and natural hazards are readily categorised into typologies, such as 
geophysical, meteorological, hydrological and climatological (see Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3 Disaster Subgroups as described by Guhar-Sapir et al. (2011).  The table is adapted from Table 
1 (pg. 7) in the original document – the Biological sub-group is omitted since it is not considered within 
the context of this study.  Source: Guhar-Sapir et al. (2011: 7). 
Disaster Subgroup Definition Disaster Main Types 
Geophysical Events originating from solid earth Earthquake, Volcano, Mass 
Movement (dry) 
Meteorological Events caused by short-lived/small to meso 
scale atmospheric processes (in the spectrum 
from minutes to days) 
Storm 
Hydrological Events caused by deviations in the normal 
water cycle and/or overflow of bodies of 
water caused by wind set-up 
Flood, Mass Movement (wet) 
Climatological Events caused by long-lived/meso to macro 
scale processes (in the spectrum from intro-
seasonal to multi-decadal climate variability) 
Extreme Temperature, Drought, 
Wildfire 
 
There has been increasing recognition that multi-hazard analysis also requires an 
understanding of the interdependencies across hazards (Ashdown, 2011).  However, there 
remains neither a uniform conceptual approach nor agreed and standardised terminology of 
these interdependencies (Kappes et al., 2012; see Table 2.4). 
Terms such as compound hazards, interactions, interrelations, or synergic effects are not 
particularly explicit and obvious (Kappes et al., 2012).  In contrast, one type of phenomena can 
be clearly distinguished: the triggering of one hazard by another.  This triggering is sometimes 
termed a ‘cascade effect’ – when an ‘adverse event’ triggers one or more ‘sequential’ 
(‘synergistic’) events, resulting in a chain of hazards (Marzocchi et al., 2009).  Delmonaco et al. 
(2006: 10) equates these chain events to the domino effect or cascading failure in a system of 
interconnected components, where the service provided depends on the operation of a 
preceding component and, as such, the failure of a preceding part can trigger the failure of 
consecutive parts.  The need to anticipate these connections was particularly recognised after 
the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan (Tweed and Walker, 2011).    
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Table 2.4 The terms used to describe the relations between hazards and different hazard processes.   
Source: Kappes et al. (2012: 11).  The original table has been reproduced for clarity.  See Kappes et al. 
(2012) for the references listed below. 
Terminology Author 
Cascades, cascading effects, cascading failures or 
cascade events 
Delmonaco et al. (2006b), Carpignano et al. 
(2009), Zuccaro and Leone (2011), European 
Commission (2011) 
Chains Shi (2002), Erlingsson (2005) 
Coincidence of hazards in space and time Tarvainen et al. (2006) 
Coinciding hazards European Commission (2011) 
Compound hazards Hewitt and Burton (1971), Alexander (2001) 
Coupled hazards Marzocchi et al. (2009) 
Cross-hazard effects Greiving (2006) 
Domino effects  Luino (2005), Delmonaco et al. (2006b), Perles 
Roselló and Cantarero Prados (2010), European 
Commission (2011) 
Follow-on effects European Commission (2011) 
Interactions Tarvainen et al. (2006), dePippo et al. (2008), 
Marzocchi et al. (2009),  Zuccaro and Leone (2011) 
Interconnections Perles Roselló and Cantarero Prados (2010) 
Interrelations Delmonaco et al. (2006b), Greiving (2006) 
Knock-on effects European Commission (2011) 
Multiple hazard Hewitt and Burton (1971) 
Synergic effects Tarvainen et al. (2006) 
Triggering effects Marzocchi et al. (2009) 
 
Understanding of the relations between hazards can be derived from existing hazard 
disciplines. For instance, landslides can be considered as primary, secondary and tertiary 
hazards in the sense that they can be triggered by non-hazardous and hazardous phenomena, 
as well as lead to subsequent hazards (e.g. damning of rivers and subsequent flooding; Catane 
et al., 2012).  Lee and Jones (2004) distinguish three multi-hazard characteristics of landslide 
events: compound events (cascade of different types of landslide); multiple events 
(widespread landslide activity) and complex events, where part of the damage emanates from 
the generation of secondary geohazards, such as floods, tsunamis or volcanic eruptions. 
Similarly, volcanology inherently adopts a multi-hazard approach.  Most eruptions are 
accompanied by several different hazards; phreatic and magmatic eruptions may produce 
tephra fall, pyroclastic density currents, lava flows, blasts, sector collapses, gas emissions, 
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landslides, rockfalls, lahars, floods, earthquakes and tsunamis (Neri et al., 2013).  Volcanoes 
often interact with other hazards; in the Philippines, the 1991 eruption of Mt Pinatubo is 
believed to have been related to the preceding 1990 Luzon earthquake (Bautista et al., 1996) 
and in tropical environments volcanoes frequently interact with typhoons to create lahars (e.g. 
Mt Mayon in the Philippines – see Paguican et al., 2009).  It is therefore necessary to also 
consider the adverse events that may occur during both periods of rest and unrest when 
adopting a multi-hazard approach (Neri et al., 2013).   
Marzocchi et al. (2009) highlight that understanding hazard chains is an essential component 
of multi-hazard analysis since the overall measure of hazard and risk of causally connected 
processes may be much higher compared with an assessment which only measures the 
aggregation of what are perceived to be independent hazards.  Kappes et al. (2010) note that 
the difficulty of Marzocchi et al.’s (2009) definition is that it implies that the triggering event 
needs to be a hazard when in fact processes may themselves not cause damage but still act as 
triggers of more than one hazard.   
Woo (1999) has emphasised the importance of distinguishing between ‘causative’ events and 
‘trigger’ events.  He argues that causative events and possible consequences are defined by 
the fact that the relationship between the two types of event is physically apparent and that a 
good understanding exists of the precise dynamical mechanism of causation (e.g. a landslide 
damming a river which subsequently causes flooding).  Woo (1999) notes the significance of 
‘extraneous factors’ which may be paramount in creating an environment conducive for the 
occurrence of the secondary event.  In the case of trigger events, the association is more 
physically tenuous and the precise dynamical mechanism of trigger is obscure.  In this 
situation, Woo (1999) notes that the environment must be in a ‘critical dynamic state of 
preparedness’; for example whilst an earthquake may not be the direct cause of a volcanic 
eruption or another earthquake, it may alter stress in the crust so as to precipitate the 
58 
 
occurrence of further regional geological events (e.g. McCloskey et al., 2005), thus arguably 
increasing the probability a second event.  However, as noted by Woo, much uncertainty 
resides in determining the transition from mere association to clear causality (Woo, 1999).  
Thus, these two processes shall be distinguished as causation (as defined by Woo, 1999) and 
association (Woo’s, 1999, ‘trigger’).   
Hazards can also be interrelated through the influence of one hazard on the susceptibility of a 
future hazard (Kappes et al., 2012).  In their analysis of tsunami hazard in Sri Lanka, Garcin et 
al. (2008) observe the amplification of hazards through positive feedback; the impact of 
tsunamis can alter coastal morphology and the coastline, consequently influencing processes 
of erosion, transportation and sedimentation resulting in a modification of the erosion hazard 
and morphology of the coastal zone.  Such changes in the near-shore bathymetry will affect 
the tsunami hazard, which will in turn alter coastal morphology (Garcin et al., 2008).   
Independent hazards can also influence the conditions for the occurrence of subsequent 
hazards, for example the influence of forest fires on flooding owing to the formers destruction 
of vegetation cover and, consequently, the removal of this hydrological and soil protection 
(Bovoloa, 2009). 
The above discussion demonstrates the temporal and spatial interdependency of hazards 
(Marzocchi et al., 2009; Kappes et al., 2010; Table 2.5).  As a consequence of these 
interdependencies, hazard interrelations do not simply relate to processes of linear cause and 
effect but that two or more hazards could simultaneously occur and produce compounded 
effects and/or secondary events (e.g. an eruption and a typhoon resulting in lahars).     
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Table 2.5 The types and effects of hazard relations conceptually determined by Kappes et al. (2011), 
emphasising the spatial and temporal dimensions of hazard interdependencies.  Source: Kappes et al. 
(2011, Table 3: 582). 
 
Multi-hazard, by accounting for the interdependencies between hazards, should comprise 
more than simply the aggregated analysis of individual hazard assessments – it should 
encapsulate the amplification of events, ‘cascading’ events and the temporal coincidence of 
events in time and space.  In light of the review of the literature, the following conceptual 
framework for multi-hazards is proposed.  The concept of multi-hazard is defined as 
comprising two key components, which require determination through an analysis of varying 
temporal and spatial scales:  
(1) more than one hazard 
(2) interrelations between hazards 
Within this conceptual framework, four categories of hazard interrelations are proposed (Table 
2.6).  It is necessary to emphasise that each of these is not mutually exclusive; in particular, 
there is a continuum between causation and association (event that leads to another event), 
and coincidence and amplification (factors that enhance the magnitude and impact of the 
event).  These interrelations manifest as simultaneous and/or cascading hazard events in space 
and time. 
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Table 2.6 Categories of hazard interrelations. 
Category Working definition Example Examples of 
related work 
Amplification Hazards that exacerbate future 
hazards (applies to the same or 
different hazards). 
The effect of coastal 
erosion on the impact of 
coastal flooding and 
tsunami inundation. 
Garcin et al., 
2008; Bovoloa, 
2009; Kappes et 
al.’s (2012) 
concept of 
‘disposition’. 
Association Hazards that increase the 
probability of a secondary event, 
but which are difficult to 
quantify.  
Stress transfer along 
faults. 
Woo’s (1999) 
‘trigger’. 
Causation Hazards that generate secondary 
events, which may occur 
immediately or shortly after the 
primary hazard (including 
cascading hazards). 
An earthquake triggered 
landslide. 
Kappes et al. 
(2010); 
(Marzocchi et al., 
2012b); Woo’s 
(1999) ‘causative’ 
events. 
Coincidence The simultaneous (or closely 
timed) occurrence of hazards in 
space and time, resulting in 
compounded effects or 
secondary hazards. 
The coincidence of a 
windstorm with a volcanic 
eruption (lahar hazard) or 
an earthquake (firestorm 
hazard).  
Kappes et al. 
(2011); Marzocchi 
et al. (2009). 
 
There is a lack of systematic guidance for governments and NGOs as to how they might 
undertake multi-hazard risk assessments that account for the processes discussed above; for 
example, in spite of the DFID’s recommendation of multi-hazard risk assessments as a key step 
in embedding resilience in their work, their guidance as to how to implement these 
assessments is fairly vague and does not readily bring out the complexities of multi-hazard risk 
assessment (see DFID, 2012).  As such there is a need to explore practical methods of assessing 
multi-hazards.  The following discussion, therefore, builds upon the work in hazard and risk 
assessment research more widely, before introducing NGO approaches to hazard assessment. 
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2.3.2 Approaches to multi-hazard assessment 
The essence of most multi-hazard assessments at local and global scales is the adoption of a 
‘more than one’ hazard approach, which is achieved by aggregating or comparing the results of 
individual hazard assessments, but does not consider the interdependencies between the 
hazards (e.g. DFID, 2004; Greiving et al., 2006; Stanganelli, 2008; DFID, 2012).  In order to make 
decisions regarding risk reduction strategies based on the assessment of multi-hazards, it is 
deemed necessary to categorise individual hazards into hazard classifications, for example low 
to high hazard (e.g. UNISDR, 2004; Schmidt-Thome, 2006; Bovoloa, 2009; Mosquera-Machado 
and Dilley, 2009; Peduzzi et al., 2009; Kappes et al., 2010; Kappes et al., 2012).  However it is 
difficult to compare these hazards since the criteria applied most likely differ (Kappes et al., 
2011).   
Hazards have different characteristics and their impacts on elements at risk differ (Kappes et 
al., 2012).  In order to combine hazards, it is therefore necessary to identify a common 
reference point, for example a vulnerability index or a damage scale rating  (e.g. Grünthal et 
al., 2006), which is usually weighted in accordance with the influence of each hazards using a 
method of expert elicitation (e.g. Kappes et al., 2011).  Once risk is determined per hazard, 
these are either compared or often combined to determine the aggregated multi-hazard risk 
(e.g. Dilley, 2006).  The results of assessments are often presented spatially using, for example, 
geographic information systems (GIS; e.g. Thierry et al., 2008).  UNISDR (2004) and Stanganelli 
(2008) suggest that GIS techniques have broadened the possibilities to undertake multi-hazard 
assessments; however, GIS does not comprise a methodology for assimilating the hazard 
parameters and assigning and predicting the interactions between hazards.  Kappes et al. 
(2010) suggest, however, that in overlaying maps qualitative inferences can be made about 
interdependencies, specifically amplification effects, and that these can be supported by more 
sophisticated event trees and probabilistic scenarios.   
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Interaction matrices have also been used to identify relations between hazardous processes 
and can be utilised to determine the location of these interactions by overlaying spatial 
information (Kappes et al., 2012).  In general, these relations are qualitative or semi-
quantitative; for example Tarvainen et al. (2006) present the summarised list of the 
‘interactions’ of fifteen different hazards in a matrix according to the following scheme: 1 = 
existing influence of a hazard on the other hazard; 0 = no physical influence of a hazard on the 
other hazard.  In the case of ‘vice versa’ interactions (e.g. earthquakes - volcanic eruptions), 
the interaction is counted twice.  Interactions were only considered when the hazard 
intensities in a certain region were above a defined threshold, which is intuitive since there 
may be some interactions that will only occur given a certain intensity (e.g. earthquake 
triggered landslides).  Whilst such an exercise allows for the identification of the influencing 
dominance of certain hazards on others (see Tarvainen et al., 2006), matrices like that of De 
Pippo et al. (2008) assume a linear process of cause and effect rather than accounting for the 
compounding effect of more than one hazard and the secondary hazards this ‘interaction’ 
might trigger.  The use of the term ‘interaction’ is confusing because it suggests a mutual 
influence between two processes, but in the case of these matrix examples it has been used to 
describe linear cause and effects (Kappes et al., 2012). 
Another means of quantifying multi-hazard chains has come from volcanology.  Assessing 
eruption risk scenarios in a probabilistic manner has become one of the major challenges of 
modern volcanology because of the need to assess the relative likelihoods of different ways in 
which a volcanic system may evolve in the future or during real-time volcanic activity (Martí et 
al., 2008).  This situation is compounded by the difficulty of communicating this information to 
the corresponding decision-makers, without losing essential information (Martí et al., 2008).  
To this end, and more recently for the assessment of hazard interrelations (see Lacasse, et al., 
2008; Marzocchi et al., 2009), event-trees of impact scenarios have been generated (Newhall 
and Hoblitt, 2002; Neri et al., 2013).  An event tree is defined as: 
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A graphical, tree-like representation of events in which branches are logical steps from a 
general prior event through increasingly specific subsequent events (intermediate outcomes) to 
final outcomes (Newhall and Hoblitt, 2002: 3-4).  
In comparison with event trees applied in volcanic settings (see Figure 2.1), event trees for 
multi-hazards may start with a number of branches and slowly focus towards a single 
outcome, for example in the case of multiple triggers for an event (e.g. landslides).   
 
 
Figure 2.1 Type of hazardous events and their possible frequencies at Kanlaon volcano in the Philippines. 
Grey branches represent activities that occur so rarely that it is not possible assign reliable statistical 
calculations.  Source: Neri et al. (2013: 1937). 
 
 
64 
 
The branches of the event-tree are weighted probabilistically through either statistical analysis 
of historical or geological data, or by elicitation of expert judgement (Aspinall and Cooke, 1998; 
Lacasse et al., 2008).  There is difficulty in assigning probabilities and uncertainties to the array 
of possible futures that might present themselves (Allen, 1998).  The branches of the event 
tree can, however, be a useful means of checking the relative probability of events (e.g. 
Marzocchi et al., 2009) and identifying whether ‘known’ probabilities require revision.   
The concept of multi-hazards has been demonstrated to include a number of components, 
including a complex set of interrelations between hazards that can be characterised over time 
and space.  Kappes et al. (2012) state that:  
A multitude of methodologies and approaches is emerging to cope with [the] challenges [of 
assessing multi-hazards], each with certain inherent advantages and disadvantages.  Whatever 
approach is chosen, it has to be adjusted according to the objectives (e.g. what results are 
required) and to the inherent issues (e.g. stakeholder interests), respectively. (2012: 28) 
There is therefore an emphasis on the requirements of the end-user as a means of 
determining appropriate approaches (Marzocchi et al., 2009), which also implies that it might 
be challenging to propose a standardised approach to multi-hazard analysis.  In order to 
determine a suitable method, Kappes et al. (2012) propose that two principal choices have to 
be made: (1) whether a multi-hazard or multi-hazard risk outcome is desired and (2) whether a 
qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative outcome is required.  From Kappes et al.’s (2012) 
review it appears that multi-hazard risk is more appropriate when comparing hazards, whereas 
multi-hazard analyses have tended to explore scenarios of interacting and cascading hazards.  
These two choices emphasise that selecting the appropriate approach is not only dependent 
on the research objective, but also on the availability of data (Kappes et al., 2012). 
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In spite of the general agreement of the need for multi-hazard assessments, there are few that 
take account of both multiple and interrelated hazards (Schmidt-Thome, 2006; Kappes et al., 
2010).  This may in part be due to the single-discipline approaches to hazard science which 
traditionally dominate scientific research (Stanganelli, 2008; see Checkland, 1999), 
compounded by the difficulties of defining academic excellence within interdisciplinary multi-
hazard research (Darnell, 2009).  Furthermore, the scarcity of analyses of multi-hazard 
interrelations may be a manifestation of a reluctance to attempt multi-hazard assessments 
owing to the perceived array of identified difficulties in doing so (Tweed and Walker, 2011).   
Maps, matrices and event trees represent tools for identifying and visualising possible 
connections across hazard, but the means of anticipating these is reliant on a combination of 
statistical analysis and expert judgement.  As such, the quantification of hazard interrelations 
depends on the availability of data and expertise.  This might be problematic for developing 
country contexts where data and expertise may be lacking.  
2.3.3 Knowledge and expertise for assessing multi-hazards: the role of science 
and community-knowledge 
Multi-hazard disaster risk management is a complicated area necessitating expert knowledge 
and practical experience from a range of disciplines (Tweed and Walker, 2011) and a 
methodology to collate this information in a participatory manner (Ritchey, 2006).  In the DRR 
policy, there has been a recent emphasis on the role of scientific expertise for risk reduction, 
along with recognition of the key role of knowledge provided by communities at risk (Twigg, 
2004; Mercer et al., 2009; Gaillard, 2010; Ashdown, 2011).  This is also recognised in the 
context of multi-hazards: 
A holistic, all-hazard, risk-based and problem-solving approach should be used to address the 
multifactorial and interdependent nature of the disaster risk chain and to achieve improved 
[DRR].  This requires the collaboration of all stakeholders, including suitable representatives of 
governmental institutions, scientific and technical specialists and members of communities at 
risk.  By working in partnership to share the outputs of scientific research, and by building 
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translational science – motivated by the need for practical applications…[DRR] decision-making 
will be more easily informed (Southgate et al., 2013: 34). 
The UNISDR omit NGOs in the last quotation, despite their being key actors in community-
based DRR and emergency response.  If NGOs wish to adopt an ‘all-hazard’ approach, then the 
implication is that they must also partner with scientific and technical specialists.    
The type of knowledge utilised for the purposes of DRR is often subdivided into ‘scientific’ 
(natural or physical) and/or ‘technical’ knowledge (outsider knowledge) and ‘indigenous’ (or 
‘local’) knowledge (insider knowledge).  Science can be defined as the ‘the systematic study of 
the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and 
experiment’ (Soanes and Stevenson, 2009).  Scientific knowledge is often termed as ‘Western’ 
technology or techniques (Mercer et al., 2009; Mercer, 2012), although arguably such a 
categorisation is dismissive and disempowering of the influence of scientists within developing 
countries.  Mercer et al. (2010) summarise the relevant literature in their definition of 
indigenous knowledge as: 
a body of knowledge existing within or acquired by local people over a period of time through 
accumulation of experiences, society-nature relationships, community practices and 
institutions, and by passing it down through generations (Mercer et al., 2010: 217).   
Shaw et al. (2009) make a distinction between indigenous technical knowledge (for example 
the use of fertilisers) and indigenous knowledge (for example folk songs for raising awareness), 
characterising the latter as being specific to a culture, context and community and typically 
regarded as informal knowledge, which is generally orally transmitted and not documented – 
in other words tacit knowledge (Mercer, 2012).   Knowledge derived from local communities is 
referred to as ‘community’ knowledge in this thesis, owing to the application of hazard 
assessment at the community level.  Whilst the notion of community is contested, given its use 
in NGO literature it is here used to imply the local level analysis employed by NGOs. 
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To some extent, scientific and community knowledge are interdependent – actors are part of 
the system such that as scientists develop data on the effects of global climate change, for 
example, people’s perceptions are altered and social practices change (Allenby, 2007).  In spite 
of this, there is the tendency to polarise science – social scientists define science as outsider 
knowledge (e.g. Mercer, 2012); however, some scientific methods, such as river level 
monitoring, can be implemented by local communities.  Whilst a number of writers 
acknowledge the benefits of indigenous knowledge, there is also the danger of romanticising it 
and treating local knowledge as harmonious when in reality there are widespread conflicts 
among local groups over knowledge (McIlwaine, 2006; Bowman and White, 2012).  At the 
same time, natural and physical scientists have a history of defining themselves as ‘pure 
scientists’ rather than as ‘honest brokers’ (see Pielke, 2007), and are perceived to have 
historically downplayed the potential of community knowledge (Mercer et al., 2009; Gaillard, 
2010) because science mirrors the historical institutional top-down approach that favoured 
hazard analysis over vulnerability assessment (Mitchell, 2006).   
Much of the hazard science and risk expertise has historically focused on understanding 
discrete hazards, rather than on their interaction.  Tweed and Walker (2011) argue that 
knowledge applicable to a ‘mono’-hazard case studies does not readily apply to multi-hazard 
settings in which ‘interconnection and interdependency complicate likely hazard scenarios’ 
(2011: 939). Furthermore, traditional research and scientific approaches have been criticised 
for not adequately responding to the problems of modern society (Hjorth and Bagheri, 2006).  
The response from scientific groups is to broaden their definition of science to recognise 
natural, physical and social sciences (e.g. ICSU, 2008).  Policy makers have moved to refocusing 
on science in the context of DRR; for example, the UNISDR Science and Technical Advisory 
Group has deliberately adopted ‘science’ in its broadest sense in order to include natural, 
environmental, social, health, economic and engineering sciences; ‘technical’ refers to 
technology and engineering practice and implementation (UNISDR, 2009c).  These approaches 
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reflect the recognition of the complexity of multi-hazard disasters across spatial and temporal 
scales through acknowledging the requirement for an interdisciplinary approach.  This 
approach requires the full integration of natural, socio-economic, health and engineering 
sciences in excellence in disciplines and through the activities across disciplines (ICSU, 2008; 
Darnell, 2009).  Furthermore, scientists themselves are more conscious of their role in 
providing informed assessments of risk to enable decision-makers to substantially reduce the 
impacts of disasters (e.g. Hill et al., 2013); however this science needs to be made accessible 
(Mercer, 2012). 
Scientific (outsider) knowledge has been known to bring strategies that are detrimental to 
communities at risk or damaging to community knowledge; likewise, some local knowledge 
can be inappropriate and may actually increase vulnerability (Mercer, 2012).  However, in 
integrating these knowledge types Mercer (2012) emphasises that it is not ‘whose knowledge 
counts’ but ‘what knowledge counts’ in order to develop ‘hybrid’ knowledge in DRR.  Whilst 
DRR arguably requires the collaboration of a multitude of diverse experts, the disciplines 
within which these experts reside have cultivated their own understanding and terminology of 
disaster terms and this has led to misunderstandings (Twigg, 2007; Mercer et al., 2010).  Thus, 
the process of integration requires parity and a mutual understanding of the cultural, material 
and epistemological essence of both science and community-based knowledge (Agrawal, 
1995).  Such recognition requires a brief overview of some of the key debates within the 
sociological approach to the public understanding of science. 
Sociological perspectives of science 
The thesis focuses on knowledge transfer in the context of multi-hazard assessments rather 
than the sociological analysis of public understanding of science.  This latter approach 
addresses concerns beyond the communication of science, including why people cannot utilise 
scientific information even when they possess it.  Whilst this sociological perspective is beyond 
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the extent of this research and is largely framed from studies in developed countries, it is 
important to briefly review since it relates to the integration of science debate. 
A number of studies have assumed that scepticism toward science is owing to a lack of 
understanding or knowledge or science, termed the ‘deficit model’ (Sturgis and Allum, 2004).  
The implication is that greater public understanding will lead to greater public acceptance of 
science and a more welcoming public climate for scientific and technological developments 
(Irwin and Michael, 2003).  The deficit model has been criticised for oversimplification and 
disregarding the important contextual factors that influence people’s attitudes towards 
science (Ziman, 1991; Irwin and Michael, 2003; Sturgis and Allum, 2004), including their pre-
existing knowledge and information networks (Irwin et al. 1996).  For instance, having more 
knowledge can also increase awareness of the associated uncertainties within science and, 
consequently result in less support for, or confidence in, science (Irwin and Michael, 2003).  
Furthermore, it may not be public ignorance but rather a lack of opportunity or trust in the 
body presenting the information that has led to less acceptance and utility of science (see 
Irwin and Michael, 2003).  The problem may also be related to cognitive influences.  From an 
interview analysis of laypeople in Lancaster, Irwin and Michael (2003) note three ‘discourses of 
ignorance’ including mental constitution (‘[I] do not have a scientific mind’), division of labour 
(‘it’s not my job’) and deliberate choice (‘[I] don’t know’ and ‘don’t want to know’; see Irwin 
and Michael, 2003: 28).   In the case of the deliberative choice, scientific knowledge is 
consciously ignored or avoided because it is perceived as essentially peripheral to or a 
distraction from the public’s main concerns (Irwin and Michael, 2003).  People may worry 
about risks according to the norms of their social context rather than reacting to allegedly 
more ‘objective’ hazards (Sturgis and Allum, 2004).   Consequently, it is the scientific experts 
who are perceived as ‘ignorant’ since they are seen as opposed to the views of the layperson 
(Irwin and Michael, 2003).    
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Irwin and Michael (2003) argue that emphasis should not be on the public understanding of 
science per se but instead on the cultural conditions in which trust and identity shape the 
relationships between science and public.  Understanding science relates to experience, 
judgement and understanding of science’s institutional forms as much as its cognitive contents 
(Wynne, 1996).   
In spite of the points raised above, Sturgis and Allum (2004) argue that the deficit model 
should not be totally rejected.  Culture, economic factors (e.g. poverty), social and political 
values, trust, risk perception and worldviews are all influential in shaping the public’s attitude 
towards science; but scientific knowledge may also have an additional and independent effect, 
for reasons not immediately understood (Sturgis and Alllum, 2004).   
Sociologists maintain that the theory of risk society requires a constructivist interpretation of 
scientific knowledge and expertise (Fischer, 2000).  Irwin et al. (1996) found that science has 
no special status in everyday life amongst the public and that it has to compete with other 
types of ‘local’ knowledge and understanding.  Professional bodies have been criticised for 
being elitist and undemocratic (Irwin and Michael, 2003) and it has been argued that science is 
laden with social value judgements hidden within the steps and phases of the research process 
(Yearley, 2005). 
Sociologists contend that it is difficult to separate facts from values and some have suggested 
that the public may not simply express values about the world but may also have knowledge of 
its own to offer – lay understanding and citizen science (Irwin, 1995; Wynne, 1996).  Indeed, 
the citizenry is increasingly recognised by sociologists as being ‘more intelligent’ than many 
opinion researchers suggest (Fischer, 2000: 36).  Furthermore there is an argument that 
(especially policy) experts need citizens (as much as citizens need experts) more than their 
professional ideologies have acknowledged (Fischer, 2000).  The recent emphasis on 
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community knowledge within DRR is acknowledging these respective needs (see Southgate et 
al., 2013). 
Mercer et al. (2010) adopt an ‘action research’ based approach to the integration of science 
and community knowledge, suggesting that the researcher should facilitate the process of risk 
assessment in terms of guiding rather than teaching.  Through the process, facilitators become 
experts in how people learn, clarify and decide for themselves (Fischer, 2000). Failure of 
citizens to participate in decision-making is frequently a manifestation of institutional 
processes that either hinder it or render it meaningless (Fischer, 2000).   As such, scientists 
must be willing to engage with alternative worldviews and knowledge, rather than perceiving 
them to be ignorant or emotive (Irwin et al., 1996).  This model of working underpins NGO 
approaches to participatory to community-based assessments of disaster risk (McCall and 
Peters-Guarin, 2012), which is the level at which hazard, vulnerability and capacity tends to be 
assessed. 
2.3.4 Participatory approaches to hazard assessments 
There is a notable absence of review of the hazard assessments implemented by NGOs.  Here, 
the approach to community-based hazard, vulnerability and capacity assessments is 
introduced to provide context to the research that follows.   
Humanitarian and development NGOs work at grassroots levels with communities and local 
organisations as partners, and use participatory approaches to assist communities to identify 
the risks they face, their development priorities and foremost to build local capacity (Benson et 
al., 2001; UNISDR, 2006).  In 2001, a study of 22 humanitarian and development NGOs 
indicated that a stumbling block to the incorporation of hazard risk in planning was a lack of 
practical guidance (Benson et al., 2001).  As a consequence, NGOs gradually began to develop 
methods – known as ‘tools’ or ‘toolkits’ – for participatory hazard, vulnerability and risk 
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assessment.  Toolkits consist of a set of instructions, checklists, guidelines and case studies 
outlining how to conduct what is usually a participatory analysis of hazard, vulnerability and 
capacity assessment (PHVCA).  Participatory methods rely on the assumption that, even in the 
absence of sophisticated assessments tools, local communities can collect and share 
information on hazards (UNISDR, 2004).  The techniques employed draw from approaches 
used in participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and rapid rural appraisal (RRA) that are discussed by 
Chambers (1997) and also incorporate the essence of the capabilities and vulnerability analysis 
(CVA) designed by Anderson and Woodrow (1998).  CVA provides a method to assess the 
disaster situation and identify priorities for action (Heijmans and Victoria, 2001), as it 
questions any efforts to return to ‘normalcy’.  Normalcy constitutes the contributing 
vulnerabilities to the present and possible future disasters (Anderson and Woodrow, 1998; 
Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2009).  CVA also highlights to relief workers how their interventions may 
unintentionally contribute to future vulnerabilities (Anderson and Woodrow, 1998).   
During the 1990s, the pressure and release model (Wisner et al., 2004) and DFID’s sustainable 
livelihoods approach (Carney, 1998) also emerged from a growing awareness of the need to 
incorporate hazard risks within a broader analysis of the underlying causes of vulnerability.  As 
such, CVA techniques have subsequently been adapted by NGOs to aid their analysis of 
hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities of local people.  These have then been further adjusted 
in order to include climate change, with revised and new toolkits emerging, developed 
specifically for CCA at the community level.  A number of organisations have developed tools 
for PHVCA with nuances in naming conventions – notably most omit ‘hazard’ from the title.  
The processes adopted are highly qualitative and there appears to be a lack of probabilistic 
approaches to hazard and risk assessment.  Some toolkits do determine risk through the 
combination of likelihood of impact and significance of impact, but these are still utilising 
qualitative approaches (e.g. Wiggens and Wiggens, 2009).  Twigg (2004) notes that in practice, 
the difference between hazard, vulnerability and risk analysis is often blurred; hence there 
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tends to be a lot of overlap.  Risk analysis is, however, arguably broader, pertaining more to 
the interpretation of hazard, vulnerability and capacity data in order to make decisions 
regarding suitable interventions (Twigg, 2004). 
Vulnerability is generally perceived to be the more complex measure to assess (e.g. Benson 
and Twigg, 2004; Twigg, 2004; Chiwaka and Yates, 2005) and there is concern that 
interventions initiated through community participatory techniques have a tendency to focus 
on the hazard rather than address the underlying vulnerabilities (Mercer et al., 2009).  
However, it is imperative to ensure that project planners and managers understand the 
characteristics of the hazard and its impact as part of a broader ecosystem and environmental 
context (Twigg, 2004) – not by over emphasising hazard risk but in highlighting its relative 
importance within the vulnerability context (Benson and Twigg, 2004).  Physical characteristics 
of hazards affect coping strategies and therefore need to be identified, as evidenced in the 
Philippines where a group of urban poor conceptualised flood ‘manageability’ as a 
combination of household and community responses to the intensity (depth) and the duration 
of inundation (example in McCall and Peters-Guarin, 2012: 782).   
Some tools make reference to multiple hazards or threats (e.g. De Dios, 2002); however since 
most toolkits have apparently been created for a specific purpose (for example, DRR or CCA) 
the implication is that they focus on the types of hazards as defined by these concepts (see 
Section 2.1.3).  Notably, however, almost all toolkits draw on similar participatory methods for 
vulnerability analysis.  These include transects walks; mapping (physical and socio-economic); 
stories and oral histories; semi-structured interviews and focus group discussion; daily time 
charts and seasonal calendars; time lines illustrating trends and change; direct observations; 
problem trees and flow charts and Venn diagrams of institutional linkages (see IFRC/RCS, 
2007).  The process requires facilitation by the NGO or local partner organisations and/or 
trained community members, which necessitates balancing the views of the facilitator with 
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those of community members.  Anderson and Woodrow (1998) stress that the CVA method is 
not designed to be prescriptive, but instead to guide users through a process of diagnosis.   
Sources of information and knowledge 
Owing to the difficulty of accessing quantitative technical reports and data within developing 
countries, Twigg (2004) suggests that it is not always necessary to rely upon technology and 
outside expertise and suggests that visual surveys and local people’s knowledge of hazards are 
often more accurate and extensive than outsiders appreciate.  Nevertheless, Anderson and 
Woodrow (1998) and Chambers (1997) state that secondary sources of information should be 
utilised in conjunction with participatory techniques of assessment and analysis.  However of 
the few reviews of PHVCA (e.g. ActionAid, 1999-2003; Betts-Symonds, 2003; van Aalst et al., 
2008; British Red Cross, 2009; Ruiz, 2010) most make little or no reference to secondary data 
for assessment and where it is discussed it is purely in the context of climate science.  
Understanding of climate change effects is driven by advances in science; consequently, these 
often encompass the starting point for practical measures (Sperling and Szekely, 2005).  Van 
Aalst et al. (2008) suggest that facilitators should be able to triangulate the information 
provided by communities with the observed or projected climate change for the region.  
However, owing to the different spatial and temporal scales of community based assessments 
and global/regional climate change projections, it is unclear how the two would be readily 
triangulated (Prabhakar et al., 2009; Christian Aid and Ewbank, 2010; Romieu et al., 2010).  A 
failure to effectively communicate climate change uncertainty in a practical manner has 
created substantial challenges for practitioners (Birkmann and von Teichman, 2010).   
Twigg (2004) suggests that in addition to secondary sources that contain contextual situation 
reports and information on hazards, interviews with key informants, who may even include 
hazard experts, should be conducted.  Fundamental to the PHVCA process itself, but a point 
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often overlooked (Twigg, 2004), is enabling action via community empowerment in order to 
increase their capacity to improve their own situation (van Aalst et al., 2008).   
In terms of DRR, local level analysis is the standard approach; however national-level analyses 
are at times conducted, particularly by larger organisations (Twigg, 2004).  Ruiz (2010) argues 
that applying hazard, vulnerability and capacity analysis at the national level focuses too 
heavily on organisational capacity rather than the process of community vulnerability analysis 
and is time and resource intensive.  In developing countries, local communities frequently 
form the first line of defence in reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience; there is a 
broad acknowledgement of the capacities of local communities in dealing with a variety of 
threats on their own (Gaillard, 2010).  Natural systems and hazards, however, manifest at 
scales often well beyond that of the community level (Lee and Jones, 2004; Greiving et al., 
2006; Schmidt-Thome, 2006; see Woo, 1999).  This may well lead to the scale of the hazard or 
risk not being sufficiently understood.  
In order to understand the historical context of risk, NGOs undertake participatory 
assessments using a variety of techniques, which include the creation of seasonal calendars 
and timelines in order to map the change in hazards over time.  Whilst these methods are 
useful, they may miss the low frequency high impact events owing to the fact that they may 
not have occurred within the memory of community residents (van Aalst, et al., 2008).  Missing 
such events could be an issue as NGOs and their partners try to be anticipatory.   
Critique of toolkits 
There are very few systematic reviews of the tools developed by NGOs for participatory 
community-based hazard (and risk) assessments, although participatory processes have 
received scrutiny more generally (e.g. Cooke and Kothari, 2001).  In the context of hazard 
assessment, some general pitfalls of the methods adopted include: 
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 that ‘findings’ are often more descriptive than analytical (Heijmans and Victoria, 
2001; De Dios, 2002), and this of course makes it difficult to set priorities for 
intervention (Twigg, 2004); 
 that projects tend to be designed towards specific hazards, running the risk of 
overlooking other significant hazards (Twigg, 2004); 
 by emphasising the socio-economic vulnerability, there is a prospect that risk more 
directly related to hazards may be overlooked (Benson and Twigg, 2004); 
 the results are not standardised since the methods used and data collected vary 
according to time and place, thus it can be difficult to compare findings (Twigg, 
2004; e.g. van Aalst et al., 2008).   
However, the advantages of participatory community assessments are deemed to outweigh 
the limitations, as they provide a more detailed analysis and understanding of the 
communities’ situation whilst also identifying their capacity to deal with the circumstances 
(Twigg, 2004).  Furthermore, the PHVCA process encompasses more than just a method for 
assessing hazard, vulnerability and capacity; it also emphasises community solidarity and 
empowerment, gender issues, power dynamics and project ownership by the community (see 
Twigg and Bottomley, 2011).  The emphasis on taking action is, however, potentially 
outweighing the importance of underpinning decisions with rigorous analysis of the risk itself.  
In their inter-agency review of DRR, Twigg and Bottomley (2011) describe how agencies 
struggle to address all threats since the adoption of a holistic perspective to the 
disaster/vulnerability problem gives rise to the implication that NGOs are in the ‘impossible’ 
position of being able to deal with the array of problems that emerge.  A key consideration in 
the assessment of hazards is, thus, prioritisation, which requires an initial assessment of the 
full range of risks (Twigg, 2004), however, van Aalst et al.’s (2008) review of climate change 
community risk assessments highlights a tendency to focus on recent, large disasters rather 
than the entire spectrum of hazard possibilities prioritised by likelihood and possible impacts.  
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Moreover, it is unclear whether the toolkits allow for the identification of hazard 
interrelations. 
2.4 Summary: multi-hazard concepts and assessments  
The review of the literature has emphasised some key concerns with regard to the concept of 
multi-hazards and their assessment across the humanitarian and development sector and 
hazard science.  These concerns are summarised here. 
A multi-hazard approach is the recognised basis for DRR.  The humanitarian and development 
sector has, however, a tendency to compartmentalise risk into either DRR or CCA, which have 
inherent assumptions regarding the types of hazards and the spatial and temporal scale over 
which risk has to be considered.  Adopting a multi-hazard approach might offer an opportunity 
for greater integration across these communities of practice.  However, what constitutes a 
multi-hazard approach has received little attention beyond the field of hazard science.  
Within this thesis, multi-hazard is conceptually framed as comprising both more than one 
hazard in a given place and the interrelations between hazards.  These interrelations are 
categorised as amplification, association, causation and coincidence.  However, the 
implementation of multi-hazard assessments has tended to focus on the analysis of more than 
one hazard, rather than the interrelations between hazards.  Referring especially to NGO 
community-based hazard assessments, the choice of knowledge and the limited temporal and 
spatial scale of assessments are possible constraints on the extent to which multi-hazards are 
being assessed.  The scope of identified hazards may also be constrained by the choice of a 
CCA or DRR approach, owing to the assumptions outlined above.  Further investigation is 
required to fully determine whether the methods adopted are capturing the full range of 
hazards and their interrelations. 
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The literature review has demonstrated that both community-based and scientific knowledge 
and approaches should be integrated for more effective DRR, particularly in the context of 
multi-hazard assessment.  Science is required to understand and quantify the complexity of 
multi-hazards, but the extent to which it is being utilised by NGOs for the purpose of hazard 
assessment appears to be fairly limited.  However, owing to the lack of comprehensive reviews 
of hazard assessments, a key next step is to determine more specifically how NGOs assess 
multi-hazards and whether they utilise science in this context.  The toolkits and processes 
NGOs utilise are not designed to be prescriptive (Anderson and Woodrow, 1998); as such, it is 
only by talking to those involved in developing and applying these that the process of 
implementing multi-hazard assessments can be determined. 
The literature review has also identified a lack of guidance for NGOs regarding the 
requirements of a multi-hazard assessment, which is in part owing to the limited application of 
these assessments in hazard science.  In order to address the shortfall in guidance, it is 
necessary to explore the reality of multi-hazards and their assessments by examining an actual 
case of multi-hazards.  While assessments of ‘all hazards in a given place’ are imperfect, the 
focus of the case analysis is on the under-addressed area of hazard interrelations.   
In order to address the above concerns, it is necessary to adopt a two-part approach to the 
subsequent analyses.  Part one addresses current NGO approaches to hazard assessment, as it 
is necessary to first understand what NGOs are currently implementing and compare this with 
what is thus far understood about the requirement of a multi-hazard approach (i.e. the 
assessment of more than one hazard and the interrelations between hazards).  Part two is a 
case study analysis of a multi-hazard disaster, with particularly emphasis on the interrelations 
between hazards, in order to refine the conceptual framework for multi-hazards and better 
understand the implementation of NGO and scientific approaches to multi-hazard assessment.  
The methodology adopted is discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3: A two-part research strategy  
 
Chapter 3 addresses the theoretical and practical aspects of data collection and analysis, 
emphasising why a largely qualitative approach to this research was adopted and justifying 
why semi-structured interviews, secondary data analysis, participant and field observations 
and informal meetings were regarded as suitable and complementary research methods.  The 
research is divided into two parts; the first part explores current methods adopted by NGOs 
for the purpose of assessing multi-hazards. The second part builds on this initial analysis by 
examining a case study of a multi-hazard disaster in the Philippines, comparing it with the 
multi-hazard conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 2, particularly the interrelations 
between hazards, and examining the reality of multi-hazard assessments in this context.  This 
case study is also used to explore methods and principles for assessing multi-hazards that 
incorporate scientific methods.  The rationale for the chosen case study – the 2006 Typhoon 
Reming triggered lahars disaster – is specifically addressed in Chapter 6.  Chapter 3 begins with 
an overview of the two-part research design, followed by an introduction to qualitative and 
mixed methods research and the validity of this approach and the details of the methods 
adopted.  The chapter then outlines the design of the semi-structured interviews, the 
challenges of their implementation, critical reflexivity in social research and ethical 
considerations.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the techniques used to analyse the 
data.   
3.1 Overview of research design  
The research is divided into two parts; however these are can be subdivided into three distinct 
but complementary studies.  Study A comprises interviews with (mainly) UK based Head Office 
NGO staff regarding their development and implementation of hazard assessment tools.  Study 
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B comprises the same analysis but with NGO staff from the Philippines.  Study C is the case 
study analysis of the Typhoon Reming lahars disaster and associated critical evaluation of 
scientific methods for assessing lahar in the context of multi-hazards.  Figure 3.1 outlines how 
each of these studies was informed by the former and how the successive study helped to 
reinforce or challenge the findings of the previous study.  Study A is largely exploratory, 
whereas Study B was conducted in order to test the developing theories from the results of 
Study A.  Study C serves to compare the conceptual framing of multi-hazards from the 
literature review and is, therefore, informed by inferences made from the scoping study to the 
Philippines conducted during Study B, as well as the overall results from part one.  Together 
the studies support a rigorous and triangulated approach to the research.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual framework for the research process. 
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3.2 Qualitative and mixed methods research 
Maynoux (2006) suggests that the choice of research approach is based upon its purpose – in 
other words: what requires quantification and why – and that more information does not 
necessarily better yield a better result.  Given the lack of critical analyses regarding the 
implementation of NGO multi-hazard assessments, the first part of this research is largely 
exploratory, thus lending itself well to the in depth, descriptive characteristics of qualitative 
research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000), which are more likely to lead to serendipitous findings 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
In its broadest sense, qualitative study is focused upon observing, describing, interpreting and 
analysing the way that people experience, act on, or think about themselves and the world 
around them (Bazeley, 2007).  Denzin and Lincoln (2000) state that: 
‘qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate 
relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that 
shape inquiry.’ (2000:8) 
A frequently cited distinction between quantitative and qualitative research is that the former 
tends to involve measurement whereas the latter does not; however, Bryman (2008) argues 
that such a superficial distinction does not capture the deeper differences.  In social science 
research, both qualitative and quantitative researchers are concerned with the point of view of 
the individual (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000); however the epistemological and ontological 
positions of the different types of research tend to differ (Creswell, 2014; Table 3.1), but this 
distinction is not without contention (Bryman, 2008).  
82 
 
Table 3.1 The theory and philosophical differences between quantitative and qualitative research 
(however these are not mutually exclusive).  Source: replication of table from Bryman (2008: 22, table 
1.1). 
 Quantitative Qualitative 
Principle orientation to the 
role of theory in relation to 
research 
Deductive; testing of theory Inductive; generation of theory 
Epistemological orientation Natural science model, in 
particular positivism 
Interpretivism 
Ontological orientation Objectivism Constructionism 
 
Qualitative researchers take the position that reality and observations cannot be viewed from 
the epistemological position of positivism, which advocates the application of methods from 
the natural sciences to the study of social sciences (Bryman, 2008).  Ontologically, positivists 
tend to claim that ‘social entities can and should be considered objective entities that have a 
reality external to social actors’ (Bryman, 2008: 18).  A side step from positivism is critical 
realism, researchers of which acknowledge that ‘we will only be able to understand – and so 
change – the social world if we identify the structures at work that generate those events and 
discourses’ (Bhaskar, 1989: 2).  In more direct opposition to positivism, qualitative research is 
often defined from the interpretivist perspective.  Walsham (1993), in line with Bryman (2008), 
suggests that: 
Interpretative methods of research start from the position that our knowledge of reality, 
including the domain of human action, is a social construction by human actors and that this 
applies to researchers.  Thus there is no objective reality which can be discovered by 
researchers and replicated by others, in contrast to the assumptions of positivist science (1993: 
5). 
The meaning of interpretivism is contested (Guest et al., 2013) and the term is often used 
interchangeably with ‘qualitative research’ (Williams, 2000).  Williams (2000) broadens the 
term interpretivism to not only concentrating on ‘linguistic interpretation of actors’ meanings’ 
but to include observation techniques, ‘which seek to make sense of actors’ actions and 
language within their “natural” setting’ (Williams, 2000: 210).  As hinted at in the above 
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definitions, the major ontological debate is whether social entities can and should be 
considered objective entities that have a reality external to social actors (objectivity) or 
whether they can and should be considered social constructions built up from the perceptions 
and actions of social actors (constructionism – also known as constructivism; Bryman, 2008). 
Most writers have focused on positivism/post-positivism, critical realism and interpretivism in 
their discussions of epistemologies.  Creswell (2014) suggests two other philosophies or ‘world 
views’: transformation and pragmatism.  Transformation is concerned with political change 
and tends to include participatory action researchers and power and justice oriented 
researchers.  Pragmatism is problem-centred and not committed to one system of philosophy 
and reality (Creswell, 2014).  Advocates of pragmatism argue that the research approach is 
problem led and embraces whatever methods are most suited to the analysis of the problem 
(Creswell, 2014). 
Creswell (2014) suggests that researchers should make explicit the larger philosophical ideas 
they espouse in order to explain why they chose qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods 
approach for their research.  The difficulty for an interdisciplinary researcher is that this type 
of research does not fit well within discrete philosophies and methodologies as defined by 
social science research.  Furthermore, writers are not in agreement as to which philosophies 
require consideration (e.g. compare Bryman, 2008, and Creswell, 2014) and the definitions of 
these philosophies are to some extent contested (Bryman, 2008).  However, here the 
researcher attempts to make explicit her position and the approach of the research.   
Given the aim of this research, the emphasis is upon (1) understanding perspectives from the 
subject and audience of this research (NGOs); (2) grounding abstract concepts regarding multi-
hazards in reality; and (3) the practical application of this research.  The core philosophy held 
by the researcher is that research must be applied; this is distinctive from action research 
which adopts a transformative worldview – applied research is arguably broader and pertains 
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to many worldviews and methodologies.  The researcher would argue that applied research is 
the driving philosophy behind the methodological choices and methods adopted, whilst 
acknowledging that the research also holds interpretivist and constructivist claims (valuing the 
interpretation and context of respondents) and is pragmatic, by choosing not to be 
constrained in methodological options. 
Finally, whilst the research is primarily qualitative, the case study (part two) adopts a mixed 
methods approach, best described by Creswell’s ‘convergent parallel mixed methods’ in the 
sense that ‘the investigator typically collects both forms of data at roughly the same time and 
then integrates the information in the interpretation of the overall results’ (2014: 15; see 
Chapter 8). However, it should be recognised that Creswell’s discussions are in the context of 
mixed methods approaches for social science research and perhaps do not consider instances  
where natural science data requires analysis in the context of qualitatively derived information 
(as in Chapter 8).  Indeed, the mixed methods literature tends to focus upon the combination 
of qualitative and quantitative research strategies under the umbrella of social science (see 
Bryman, 2008; Guest et al., 2013; Creswell, 2014), rather than the combination of social and 
natural science enquiry.   The application of quantitative analysis within this research is solely 
with regard to natural hazard (specifically lahar and rainfall data) as part of exploring 
quantitative multi-hazard assessments.  The analysis of the data employs statistical principles 
regarding sample size, data quality and representativeness and these are discussed alongside 
the interpretation of the data in Chapter 8.  The role of research evaluation criteria with regard 
to qualitative research is scrutinised in the following section. 
3.1.1 The role of validity and reliability in qualitative research 
Qualitative research has long been criticised for being subjective, challenging to replicate and 
often difficult to make generalisations from (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Bryman, 2008).  The 
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challenge from social researchers is that positivist measures of appraising research do not 
readily apply to qualitative research.  
Qualitative ‘validity’ is concerned with the accuracy of the findings, whilst qualitative 
‘reliability’ assesses whether the researcher’s approach is consistent across different 
researchers and different projects (Gibbs, 2007).  These terms are often differentiated into 
internal and external measures (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982): 
 internal reliability: whether members of the research team are in agreement about 
what they ‘see and hear’; 
 internal validity: whether the observations correspond to the theoretical ideas 
developed; 
 external reliability: the extent to which the study can be replicated; 
 external validity: the extent to which the findings can be generalised across different 
settings. 
External reliability is particularly difficult in social research owing to the fact that it is 
impossible to replicate the social setting and the circumstances of an initial study in the sense 
in which the term is usually adopted (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982).  Probably the most readily 
discussed measure is that of external validity, owing to the tendency to employ case studies 
and small samples in qualitative research (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982).  Most qualitative case 
studies do not rely upon the use of statistics, therefore research design should involve the 
anticipation and enumeration of the important rival explanations for what is interpreted from 
the case study (Yin, 2009).   
Given the problems in applying these terms to qualitative research, Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
present alternative criteria for evaluation, arguing that validity and reliability are quantitative 
research evaluation criteria and therefore do not lend well to the evaluation of qualitative 
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research.  Instead, they suggest the criteria of trustworthiness and authenticity.  A comparison 
of the measures of trustworthiness is made against the concepts of reliability and validity 
outlined by LeCompte and Goetz (1982) in Table 3.2.  Authenticity raises issues regarding the 
political impact of the research, for example whether the research fairly represents the views 
of the participants (Bryman, 2008).  Criteria include ontological authenticity, educative 
authenticity, catalytic authenticity and tactical authenticity, which highlight how authenticity 
has affinity with action research, for example through empowering participants to engage in 
action (tactical authenticity; see Bryman, 2008). 
Table 3.2 A comparison of Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) criteria for evaluating research methods with 
LeCompte and Goetz’s (1982) measures of validity and rigour.  Source of information: Bryman (2008) 
Lincoln and Guba’s (1994) research 
evaluation criteria 
Example of tools Corresponding quantitative 
evaluation criteria 
Credibility: ensuring the research is carried 
out according to the canons of good practice 
and submitting research findings to members 
of the social world who were studied for 
confirmation. 
Respondent validation 
Triangulation 
Internal validity 
Transferability: thick descriptions – these 
provide others with a database for making 
judgements about possible transferability of 
findings to other milieu. 
Rich descriptions External validity 
Dependability: ensuring that complete 
records are kept of all phases of the research 
process. 
Auditing (however not 
readily utilised owing 
to the demanding time 
involved) 
Reliability 
Confirmability: whilst recognising that 
complete objectivity is impossible in social 
research, the researcher can be shown to 
have acted in good faith. 
Reflexivity Objectivity 
 
The criteria for evaluating qualitative research are contested, with researchers in disagreement 
regarding which is best to use, and a number of writers suggesting alternative methods 
(Bryman, 2008).  Of particular relevance to this research is Hammersley (1992)’s reformulation 
of validity through his position midway between quantitative and qualitative research criteria.  
From a subtle realism position, he suggests that relevance is an important criterion of 
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qualitative research, discussing whether the interests of the practitioner, who are defined as 
those who are part of the social setting being investigated and who have a vested interest in 
the research and its findings, might be considered (see Bryman, 2008).  Clearly this practitioner 
focus is of relevance to the evaluation of this research, given the partnership with CAFOD. 
Although contested, the above discussion highlights certain standards against which 
qualitative research might be evaluated.  Qualitative researchers have been criticised for lack 
of transparency in terms of evaluating their research (Bryman, 2008).  The reporting of this 
research has, therefore, endeavoured to embrace the need for transparency by emphasising 
where data is limited, the challenges that were faced and the limitations of this research.  
3.3 Methodology and methods  
Methodology is defined as ‘a theory of how inquiry should proceed’ (Schwandt, 2007: 193) and 
tends to relate to the epistemological philosophies and assumptions about validity introduced 
above.  However, it is important not to overstate the interconnections between 
epistemologically and research practice since they represent tendencies rather than hardened 
rules (Bryman, 2008).  What Bazeley (2007: 10) advises is that researchers are ‘informed by 
methodology, but not a slave to it’, which is the stance adopted here.  
3.3.1 Grounded approach 
The research concerns the process of multi-hazard assessment implementation by NGOs, their 
actions and the reality within which they made decisions to implement these processes, along 
with what is truly required by a multi-hazard approach to assessments.  Being in a university-
NGO partnership meant that the researcher had the opportunity to study and participate in 
the workings of NGOs; it was only by gaining an understanding of their reality and the context 
of their work that the research findings became meaningful.  These findings are for the benefit 
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of CAFOD and the NGO community.  As such, the research is grounded in the perceptions of 
these participants, whilst also reliant upon their participation since NGOs comprise subjects, 
partners and end-users of the research.   
Understanding a process in its reality pertains to grounded theory (Guest et al., 2013), which is 
an inductive data-led approach to building theory in a recursive and reflexive fashion (Hay, 
2010).  The process is inherently iterative in the sense that it employs a method of identifying 
themes or trends from data, collecting more data to refine the themes and repeating the 
process to build theory grounded in the ‘real world’ (Charmaz, 2006; Hay, 2010).  Charmaz 
(2006) argues that grounded theory has both pragmatist and constructivist perspectives, which 
emphasises its applicability to the research: 
A pragmatist foundation can help you preserve an emphasis on language, meaning, and action 
in grounded theory…If you hold constructivist sensibilities, you may learn and interpret 
nuances of meaning and action while becoming increasingly aware of the interactive and 
emergent nature of your data and analyses (2006:184). 
The background assumptions and disciplinary perspectives of grounded theorists’ alert them 
to look for certain possibilities and processes in their data and give the researcher initial ideas 
to pursue and sensitise them to ask particular questions about their topic (Charmaz, 2006).  
Grounded theory as a methodological stance is contested, with some writers viewing it more 
as an approach to the generation of theory, through data analysis and interpretation (Bryman, 
2008).  For the purpose of this research, elements of a grounded theory approach to data 
analysis were adopted (see Section 3.7). 
The research does not attempt the full extent of a grounded theory approach; there is less 
concern with the generation of theory and more with the exploration of the research question 
in an inductive manner.  Elements of a grounded approach are adopted, for example no pre-
set sample size (Guest et al., 2013) and the fact that the analysis of Study A was used to 
identify the need for more data and consequently Study B was implemented (cf. Charmaz, 
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2006).  However, the research does not involve the in-depth, unstructured interview approach 
that characterises grounded theory and is, to some extent, pre-defined by literature.  
Furthermore, the majority of data was analysed after (and not during) the data collection (cf. 
Charmaz, 2006).  Arguably the approach is ‘grounded’ in data rather than embracing the true 
extent of a grounded theory approach (Bryman, 2008).  In contrast to the first part of the 
research, the second part is concerned with ‘the in-depth analysis of a case’ (Creswell, 2014: 
14), which is discussed in the following section.   
3.3.2 Rationale for a case study approach to critiquing multi-hazards 
In the literature, different authors refer to case study as a method, methodology or a 
philosophy and not always consistently (Hammersley and Gomm, 2000; Simons, 2009).  
Frequently, definitions of case studies merely repeat the topics to which the case study has 
been applied (Yin, 2009).  In general, however, it is agreed that a qualitative case study is a 
research approach that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a 
variety of sources of data (Yin, 2009; Guest et al., 2013).  Case study enquiry allows for the 
situation in which there will be many variables of interest and therefore it benefits from the 
prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2009).  
This methodology therefore provides the opportunity to explore the conceptual framework of 
multi-hazards framed in the literature and how they might be assessed, utilising a triangulation 
of different sources of data.  
As noted by Bryman (2008), there is a tendency to associate case studies with purely 
qualitative research, when in fact they lend themselves to both qualitative and quantitative 
lines of enquiry (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Simons, 2009; Yin, 2009).   Yin (2009) distinguishes case study 
research from ethnography and grounded theory owing to the role of theory development 
prior to the conduct of any research – implying a deductive approach.  Both the literature and 
the results of part one of the research help to determine theories regarding the concept of 
90 
 
multi-hazards and NGOs capacity to assess these.  However, beyond this doctoral research, the 
existing knowledge base regarding these phenomena (in particular NGO assessments of multi-
hazards) is limited. 
Opinions differ as to what constitutes a case.  Stake (1995) argues that it relates to a specific 
unit, for example a person or location, whereas others are more open to including processes, 
policies and events (Simons, 2009).  Stake (1995) distinguishes between intrinsic cases 
(interest in the case) and instrumental cases (gaining insight into a particular research question 
by studying a particular case) the latter being more applicable to this research.  Yin (2003) 
develops the different cases further, by differentiating between five different types of cases: 
 critical case: testing a well-formulated theory; 
 extreme or unique case: specific case may be so rare that any single case is worth 
documenting and analysing; 
 representative or typical case: the objective is to capture the circumstances and 
conditions of an everyday or commonplace situation; 
 revelatory case: the opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon previously 
inaccessible to social science inquiry; 
 longitudinal case: studying the same single case at two or more different points in 
time. 
For the purpose of this research, the case study of the 2006 Typhoon Reming triggered lahars 
(introduced in Chapter 6) was selected on the basis of the scoping study to the Philippines.  
The aim was to identify a case that elucidated the reality of multi-hazard analysis, arguably (in 
this context) the ‘representative or typical case.’  At the same time, however, the case selected 
is situated within one of the most progressive DRR provinces in the Philippines (Albay), which 
is not only unique to the Philippines (see Chapter 6) but also in relation to many countries in 
which humanitarian and development actors operate.   Whilst it may not be simple to situate 
this research within one of Yin’s (2003) categories, it is important to have these categories in 
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mind when analysing and discussing the results of the case study, especially in terms of 
explaining and generalising results and being aware of any potential bias. 
Making generalisations from a single case 
Many researchers harbour prejudices against the case study method, particularly owing to 
their concern over lack of rigour in case study research, evidenced by examples of case study 
research being deliberately altered to demonstrate a particular point more effectively (Yin, 
2009).  However, bias can creep into any research method (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2009).  In view 
of the criticisms and perceived limitations of a case study approach emanating from critics, 
Flyvbjerg (2006) has identified five common misunderstandings of case study research and 
instead highlights the value of such an approach (see Table 3.3). 
These criticisms particularly relate to the generalisability of case studies and the perceived 
associated biases.  Indeed, a pervading concern amongst critics is that case studies provide 
little basis for scientific generalisation (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2009).  Yin (2009) argues that case 
studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations 
or universes.  Bazeley (2007) observes that:  
it is not that we can describe the characteristics of a larger population, survey style, but rather 
that we gain understanding of the way some aspect of society works – an understanding of 
processes and principles, theory rather than facts (2007: 411).    
It is by virtue of the above that Bazeley (2007) considers, with appropriate modifications to 
account for variations in context, such theory might then be applied to a new setting within 
that society, or perhaps even more widely, for example a multi-hazard framework for a setting 
beyond the Philippines.  
92 
 
Table 3.3 Common misunderstandings of case study research and alternative points of view.  Source of 
information: Flyvbjerg (2009). 
Misunderstanding Alternative 
(1) General, theoretical (context-
independent) knowledge is more 
valuable than concrete, practical 
(context-dependent) knowledge. 
Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the 
study of human affairs.  Concrete, context-dependent 
knowledge is, therefore, more valuable than the vain search 
for predictive theories and universals. 
(2) One cannot generalise on the basis 
of a single case and that the case 
study cannot contribute to scientific 
development. 
One can often generalise on the basis of a single case, and 
the case study may be central to scientific development via 
generalisation as supplement or alternative to other 
methods.  But no formal generalisation is overvalued as a 
source of scientific development, whereas “the force of 
example” is underestimated. 
(3) The case study is most useful for 
generating hypotheses; that is, in the 
first stage of a total research process, 
whereas other methods are more 
suitable for hypothesis testing and 
theory building. 
The case study is useful for both generating and testing of 
hypotheses but is not limited to these research activities 
alone. 
(4) The case study contains a bias 
toward verification, that is, a 
tendency to confirm the researcher’s 
preconceived studies. 
The case study contains no greater bias toward verification of 
the researcher’s preconceived notions than other methods of 
inquiry.  On the contrary, experience indicates that the case 
study contains a greater bias towards falsification of 
preconceived notions than toward verification. 
(5) It is often difficult to summarise 
specific case studies into general 
propositions and theories. 
It is correct that summarising case studies is often difficult, 
especially as concerns case process.  It is less correct as 
regards case outcomes.  The problems in summarising case 
studies, however, are due more often to the properties of 
the reality studied than to the case study as a research 
method.  Often it is not desirable to summarise and 
generalise case studies.  Good studies should read as 
narratives in their entirety. 
 
Whilst, qualitative researchers may claim to adopt a generalisation free approach to their data 
interpretation, Williams (2000) states that generalisation is ‘inevitable, desirable and possible’ 
in interpretivism.  Additionally, Stake notes that seldom is ‘case-by-case uniqueness’ a 
component of scientific theory (2000: 439).  It is therefore necessary for the researcher to be 
conscious of the tendency to generalise, aiming for analytic generalisation (expansion and 
generalisation of theories) and not statistical generalisation (enumeration of frequencies; Yin, 
2009).  At the same time, it is necessary to avoid the danger of overly focusing on 
generalisation at the expense of understanding the details of the case itself (Stake, 2000).   
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Case study researchers encounter circumstances to generalise by drawing on observations 
from comparable cases investigated by others (Williams, 2000).  In addition, combined with 
the findings from part one of the research, this case can provide informative results for 
shaping future NGO approaches to hazard assessment more generally.   
Bazeley (2007) suggests that methods are directed but not prescribed by a particular 
philosophical or methodological view.  For example, Charmaz (2006) states that grounded 
strategies can be used with a variety of data collection methods and that she treats these 
methods as ‘tools to use rather than as recipes to follow’ (2006: 28).  Case study research also 
lends itself to a number of methods, both qualitative and quantitative.  The following section 
outlines methods used in both parts of the research, but the specific implementation of 
methods and the data collected for part two are outlined in Chapter 6.  A discussion of the 
research evaluation criteria applicable to these methods then follows.  
3.3.3 Multi-method research approach  
Given the interdisciplinary nature of the research, no single method was sufficient for data 
collection.  Consequently, the decision was made to adopt a mixture of four different methods: 
semi-structured interviews, informal meetings, observations and secondary data analysis.  The 
selected methods and the justification for each are outlined below, followed by the means of 
evaluating the rigour and quality of the research applied.    
Semi-structured interviews 
The most obvious means of understanding how NGOs conduct multi-hazard assessments is by 
collecting the experiences and views of those who develop and implement these methods 
themselves.  Essentially, interviewing is a conversation, albeit one manufactured for research 
ends (Dowling, 2010), and can range from structured inflexible formats to fully unstructured 
in-depth discussion.  Where the researcher positions herself on this spectrum relates to both 
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the objective of the research as well as the practicalities of implementation.  Given the lack of 
prior reviews of NGO tools for hazard assessment, and having regard to the formulation of 
some ideas regarding the approaches NGOs adopt from the literature analysis, the most 
appropriate approach to interviewing was semi-structured.  This type of interview allows for a 
balance between gathering data on topics the researcher is interested in (e.g. knowledge and 
scale of application), whilst also allowing unanticipated information to emerge.   
Semi-structured interviews are a means of exploring the perceptions and views of respondents 
by probing for more information and clarification of answers (Barriball and While, 1994).  This 
method is therefore a powerful means of conducting exploratory research, as its flexibility 
allows for unanticipated avenues of enquiry to be pursued should they emerge during the 
conversation (Valentine, 2005).   Semi-structured interviews were also deemed appropriate for 
part two of the research since they comprise a means of documenting the opinions of a 
diverse sample group (Barriball and While, 1994).  This latter data collection and analysis 
necessitated meeting with interviewees ranging from government scientists to local 
communities.  
The challenge of interview based research is in managing its labour intensive implementation 
and data analysis demands.  There are numerous opportunities for bias to emerge since 
interviews are couched within the experiences and subjectivity of the interviewee and the 
influence and positionality of the researcher (Valentine, 2005).  Unless they can be repeated, 
interviews represent a snap shot in time and may reflect the mood and level of engagement of 
the participant and interviewer at that moment. In order to minimise bias, questions are 
carefully constructed and phrased and, where possible, more than one perspective from the 
same organisation included.  The researcher should adopt a reflexive stance, by acknowledging 
where she might have influenced the interview process and data analysis and how her position 
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and perception in the eyes of the participant may have influenced their choice of answer (see 
Section 3.5).   
In the context of the case study, there is also the question of the veracity of the eye witness 
accounts of those interviewed about the Typhoon Reming lahar disaster (Guthrie et al., 2009), 
especially in the case of accurately reciting a disaster that occurred six years prior.  However, 
this can be minimised through data triangulation.  The implementation challenges and ethical 
considerations when conducting this type of research are explored in later sections.   
Semi-structured interviews employ an interview guide, which can (and did) include fully 
worded questions that the researcher is not restricted to asking.  Furthermore, the interview is 
organised but questions need not be followed in a sequential manner (Bryman, 2008; Dunn, 
2010; Newing, 2011).  The challenge of semi-structured interviewing lies with the interviewer; 
they have to balance the skill of allowing emergent topics to transcend, whilst at the same 
time ensuring the interviewee focuses upon the topic at hand (Dunn, 2010).   
Semi-structured interviews were adopted as a primary means of gathering data for both 
components of the research.  The details of their design, sampling strategy and 
implementation are discussed in Section 3.4.   
Informal meetings  
The opportunity for informal meetings arose both in the UK and the Philippines.  These 
meetings provided an additional opportunity to (1) understand the NGO sector and multi-
hazards as well as (2) determine the key actors in the field of multi-hazard assessments in the 
Philippines.  In the UK, informal meetings were conducted with: 
 DRR and CCA representatives from the UK Department for International 
Development: four meetings over the course of the research to discuss multi-hazards, 
DRR and CCA; 
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 two representatives of International Institute for Environment Development (IIED): 
met to discuss community-based CCA, multi-hazards, the utility of science and the 
Philippines; 
 a representative of the Emergency Capacity Building Project: discussed NGO toolkits 
over a Skype meeting; 
 a representative of the international NGO Acción Contra el Hambre: discussed their 
work in the Philippines over a Skype meeting. 
A number of informal meetings were also conducted during the scoping visit to the Philippines 
(September 2010) in order to help the researcher understand the DRR and multi-hazard 
context of the Philippines, as well as identify a possible case study for the final component of 
the research (see Table 3.4).  Some of the information from these is directly referred to within 
the presentation of results in chapters 5 and 9, but the majority is acknowledged as having 
played a role in informing the researcher as to the wider context of her research. 
Table 3.4 Informal meetings in the Philippines. 
Type of participant Number of 
participants 
Location Details 
Local NGOs 4 Manila and Legazpi 
City (Albay) 
3 humanitarian/ development; 
1 conservation 
International NGO 1 Manila Humanitarian/Development 
Donor 1  Manila Asian Development Bank 
Scientists 8 Manila 5 government (PHIVOLCS, 
MGB, NAMRIA, PAGASA); 1 
not for profit; 2 academic 
(Geologist and Hydrologist) 
Local government 3 Legazpi City (Albay) Emergency managers 
Total 17 - - 
 
Informal meetings were unrecorded and did not always involve the signing of the consent 
forms, as this was deemed inappropriate in the Philippines and instilled a sense of formality in 
what was an informal setting built on verbal understanding and trust between the participant 
97 
 
and interviewer.  Participants were fully aware that they were meeting to discuss topics for the 
research project. 
Secondary data and information 
During both studies, a key component of the research was the collection and analysis of 
documentation relating to (1) the NGOs interviewed and their existing toolkits for hazard 
assessment and (2) literature and internal reports on the case study, along with historical 
records of previous disasters, lahar occurrence and quantitative rainfall data.  The data 
collected for the case study analysis are further described in Chapter 6. 
For the purposes of part one of the research, prior to and during the interviews, 
documentation detailing the background to the organisations being interviewed was collected, 
which helped to contextualise the answers from different organisations.  Specific details 
regarding these cannot be shared since they would compromise the anonymity of the 
interviewees but they included: 
 annual reports 
 programme summaries and reviews 
 toolkits 
The respective organisations’ toolkits for conducting participatory community-based (hazard), 
vulnerability and capacity assessments for the purpose of DRR and/or CCA were reviewed in 
order to tailor specific questions to ask of interviewees.  In addition, toolkits for conducting 
participatory community-based hazard, vulnerability and capacity assessments for DRR or CCA 
were more broadly consulted, in order to identify at a more general level the extent of their 
adoption of a multi-hazard approach and inclusion of scientific as well as community 
knowledge.  This study gave the researcher a prior understanding of these toolkits; and it was 
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through this analysis that she recognised the need to speak with those actually involved in 
designing and implementing the process in order to fully understand these toolkits.   
The challenge of collecting secondary data and information is that it relied upon the goodwill 
of the interviewees, who were often extremely busy and, therefore, not always able to send 
these to the researcher.  However, when shared it was an invaluable means of providing 
context and triangulating the information collected during the interviews. 
Observation research: the importance of context and participation 
Kearns (2010) argues that ‘observation has been taken for granted as something that occurs 
‘naturally’… [but that] with critical reflection observation can be transformed into a self-
conscious, effective and ethically sound practice’ (2010: 241).  In social science observation 
requires more than simply seeing – listening is a critical aspect of participant observation 
(Kearns, 2010).   
The research makes no claims to adopting an ethnographic approach but opportunities for 
observational research comprised an important means of understanding the context of the 
other methods of data collection.  Bazeley (2007) notes that awareness of context (e.g. 
through ‘naturalistic observation’) is one of the most often acknowledged characteristics of a 
qualitative approach to research.  Irrespective of the primary mode of data collection, she 
states that observations ensure a balance of perspectives gained from participants (Bazeley, 
2007).  Qualitative observation involves the researcher taking notes on the behaviour and 
actions of individuals at the research site, essentially field notes, and can vary from non-
participation to totally participation of the researcher (Creswell, 2014).   
There were three main opportunities for participant observation during this research, and 
reflecting on these emphasises the need to be reflexive regarding how the researcher’s 
presence in these situations may have shaped and influenced the observations she made 
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(Valentine, 2005).  The first opportunity was time spent at CAFOD, which would range from 
passive observation of the workings of an NGO (Kearns’, 2010, ‘observer-as-participant’), 
participation during meetings and workshops, giving of presentations and involvement in 
group discussions, to discussing concerns with individual staff on, for example, how to 
integrate science or hazard assessment in a particular project.  The second opportunity was via 
external NGO/donor workshops, forums and trainings, which allowed the researcher insight 
into the context of DRR in the NGO sector.  Lastly, observations were made in the Philippines 
at additional activities the researcher was invited to attend.   
Observations are a useful means of contextualising the research and achieving insight into the 
bigger picture.  However, there are ethical implications of recording observations of those 
perhaps not fully appreciative of why they are being observed.  However, in the context of this 
research, most participants were aware of the researcher’s position.   
The details of the opportunities for observation are given in Appendix A.  Opportunities for 
observations were by at times unforeseen (e.g. last minute invitation to attend NGO forums in 
the Philippines).  Field notes were taken throughout the two visits to the Philippines, with the 
researcher compiling a daily account of her experiences and reflections of interviews, meetings 
and surroundings of the previous day.  The research also required observations in the 
Philippines beyond that of participants in the study, for example observations of structural 
vulnerability and exposure to multi-hazards (see Chapter 6).  A key means of documenting 
these was by taking photographs.   
3.3.4 Research evaluation criteria 
The following means are adopted in order to ensure rigour and quality of research in the 
context of the evaluation criteria outlined in Section 3.1.1.   
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 Triangulation: the two-part research design means that different studies and methods 
are brought together to answer the research question.  In the context of the first part 
of the research, in-country agencies in the Philippines were interviewed in order to 
triangulate initial findings from the Head Office interviews (Study A).  Furthermore, by 
including observations, informal meetings, document analysis and (in the case study) 
quantitative secondary data analysis in the research, the findings are triangulated by a 
number of sources.   Lastly, the case study not only requires mixed methods in its 
approach but is also a means of building on the findings from part one of the research.  
In Chapter 9 the findings are compared with other studies and cases in order to 
support or refute the findings from this analysis. 
 Two field visits: being in the fortunate position of being able to have both a scoping 
and subsequent visit to the Philippines helped to refine the researcher’s 
understanding, interpretation and development of concepts, as well as meaning she 
was able to meet with some participants more than once.    
 Reflexivity: this quality in a researcher is introduced in the discussions above and is 
explored in greater detail in Section 3.6. 
 Auditing: this methodology chapter, along with Chapter 6, provides a rich detail of the 
methodologies and methods pursed so that the process might be repeated, in as far as 
is possible in the context of qualitative research, by future researchers.  
 Research partner validation: CAFOD are partners in this investigation, therefore a key 
component has been constant liaison and communication of research findings with the 
appointed representative at CAFOD.  Ensuring the research is reviewed by a 
practitioner and end-user helps to ensure that it is grounded within the field of applied 
research. 
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The following discussions outline the design of the semi-structured interviews along with 
challenges in their implementation and the ethical implications of this method.  This discussion 
is followed by overview of the methods adopted for data analysis. 
3.4 Design of semi-structured interviews 
Valentine suggests that ‘hard and fast rules’ of interviewing do not exist because each 
interviewee is an individual and therefore each interview will be different (2005: 119).  
However, for transparency it is necessary to outline the principles observed and choices made 
in this research.   
The interview guide consisted of primary and secondary questions – the former to initiate 
discussions and the latter as prompts to encourage the informant to expand upon a point 
discussed (Dunn, 2010).  However the style of interviewing was flexible enough that the 
interviewer often asked follow-up questions based on participants’ responses.  The questions 
were all open-ended, in other words the interviewer did not present the participant with a set 
of possible answers to choose from (McCracken, 1988; Bryman, 2008); however, she would 
supply prompts if the participant was struggling to answer. 
The interview questions were specific to the three data collection activities that took place: (1) 
the interviews with INGOs that took place in the UK; (2) the interviews with INGO and local 
NGOs in the Philippines (September 2010); (3) the interviews with scientists, NGOs, 
government officials and local communities for the purpose of the case study analysis in the 
Philippines (October to November 2012).  The topics discussed during each of the respective 
studies are outlined in Table 3.5 and Appendices B and C contains the interview guides for 
parts one (Studies A and B) and two of the research.  The questions asked in Studies A and B 
were similar, save for the removal of the development of toolkits in Study B.  In the case of this 
first part of the research, the topics were selected to encourage discussion regarding the 
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design and implementation of community-based hazard assessments (‘toolkits’) from a 
number of different angles.  Although semi-structured in their approach, certain questions 
were deliberately asked owing to prior interest and assumptions made by the researcher from 
reviewing the literature.  The most notable example is questions regarding the inclusion of 
scientific information and knowledge in the process of hazard assessment.   The finer details of 
the semi-structured interviews implemented during the case study are discussed in Section 
3.4.2 and Chapter 6. 
Table 3.5 Categories of enquiry in the semi-structured interviews 
Study A Study B Study C 
1. history of CCA/DRR in 
the organisation 
2. adoption and/or 
development of toolkits 
3. process of hazard 
assessment 
4. evaluation of process 
and toolkit feedback 
5. role of science in 
CCA/DRR 
1. history of CCA/DRR in 
the organisation 
2. adoption of toolkits 
3. process of hazard 
assessment (and 
decisions regarding 
where to work) 
4. evaluation of process 
and toolkit feedback 
5. role of science in 
CCA/DRR 
1. experience of the event 
2. anticipation of the 
event 
3. learning from the event 
4. understanding of the 
event and perceptions 
of future risk 
 
Questions were largely a mixture of the following types of questions (see Valentine, 2005; 
Dunn, 2010):   
 descriptive (background to participants) 
 structured (e.g. development of toolkits) 
 opinion (e.g. do you think science can help in DRR?)  
 storytelling (e.g. history of DRR in the organisation and the story of the Typhoon 
Reming disaster) 
During study A, the interview was piloted with the first NGO interviewed in order to determine 
whether the questions were fully understandable; only minor revisions to the interview guide 
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were required after this.  All interviews were designed to be conducted on a one-to-one basis, 
however in the Philippines interviews were at times conducted in pairs or groups.   
3.4.1 Sampling strategy 
Sites or individuals are generally purposefully selected for study in order to help the researcher 
understand the problem and the research question (Dunn, 2010; Creswell, 2014).  However, 
consideration of sample size is less often discussed than other components of research design 
(Bryman, 2008; Robinson, 2014); therefore it is necessary to ensure that this component of 
research design is adequately addressed in this study.  Robinson (2014) suggests four 
considerations with regard to sampling, which are detailed in Table 3.6 alongside their 
application to this research.  The sampling strategy for parts one and two of the research are 
described in the following sections. 
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Table 3.6 Sample considerations for this research based upon the four considerations identified by Robinson (2014). 
Consideration Approach Application to part one  Application to part two 
Sample universe Establish a sample universe, 
specifically by way of a set of 
inclusion and/or exclusion criteria. 
Those involved in the development and 
implementation of NGO tools for hazard 
assessment. 
Scientists, DRR practitioners (local 
government and NGOs) and communities 
affected by Typhoon Reming lahars (over 18 
years of age). 
Sample size Choose a sample size or sample 
size range, taking into account 
what is ideal and what is 
practical. 
Balance between saturation and logistics; saturation criterion was on the basis that no new 
themes were emerging in subsequent interviews (Charmaz, 2006). 
Sample strategy Select a purposive sampling 
strategy to specify categories of 
person to be included in the 
sample. 
Snowball (chain sampling) Majority of suitable participants identified 
during the scoping trip; this was also 
supported by a snowball (chain sampling). 
Source Recruit participants from the 
target population. 
Targeting through a gatekeeper; contacts in 
Philippines through supervisors and initial 
interviewees. 
Recruitment was through inviting participants 
identified during the scoping study as well as 
through gatekeepers who would invite 
communities to be interviewed. 
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Part one: Interviews with NGOs on hazard assessment methods (Studies A and B) 
The sample universe consisted of primarily humanitarian and development actors who had 
been involved in the design or implementation of NGO toolkits for assessing hazard in the 
context of DRR and/or CCA.  Within this, there were two kinds of participant: international 
NGOs (both head office and in-country) and researchers/consultants (Table 3.7).  The reason 
for seeking to interview in-country NGO staff was owing to the researcher’s suspicion that 
interviewees at Head Office might be removed from the day-to-day activities in which the 
research is interested (Mercer, 2006).   
In terms of sample size, the interviews were conducted upon a trade-off between saturation 
and practical constraints.  A number of major organisations within the UK were included, but 
only a small number of ‘in-country’ representatives were interviewed, as establishing 
interviews with their operational staff proved difficult; organising these relied on the help of 
the Head Office interviewees, whose busy workload meant they were not always able to assist.  
The decision was therefore made to conduct a second study of in-country participants in 
person during a scoping visit to the Philippines (Study B; Table 3.8).  
Table 3.7 Number of participants across each of the types of participants interviewed during Study A.  
The number of organisations represented in given in brackets. 
Type of 
participant 
Number of 
participants 
Type of organisation 
participant is from 
Current position  
Humanitarian 
or 
development  
Other DRR CCA Both 
Head office 
NGOs 
19 18 1 11 7 1 
Field based 
NGOs 
4 4 0 3 1 0 
Other 
(researchers 
and 
consultants) 
3 2 1 1 2 0 
Total 26 24 (12) 2 (2) 15 10 1 
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Table 3.8 Number of participants across each of the types of participants interviewed during Study B.  
The number of organisations represented in given in brackets. 
Type of 
participant 
Number of 
participants 
Type of organisation 
participant is from 
Current position  
Humanitarian 
or 
development  
Other DRR CCA Both 
Country 
office NGOs 
4 4 0 4 0 0 
Local NGOs 5 5 0 5 0 0 
Total 9 9 (7) 0 9 0 0 
 
There was unequal representation of each of the organisations interviewed (ranging from one 
to four participants per organisation); however, the aim was to understand the sector (rather 
than individual organisations) and the researcher felt that saturation was reached by the fact 
that towards the conclusion of the study fresh data gathering ceased to reveal new insight  
(Charmaz, 2006; Newing, 2011).  All those interviewed are involved in DRR and/or CCA in their 
respective organisations, so it was assumed that their opinions were representative of the 
organisation (however the instances when these opinions were contested within interviewees’ 
organisations are acknowledged during the presentation of the findings).  Furthermore, this 
study encompassed only the first part of the research and not the research in its entirety, thus 
it was bound by practical constraints.  The comparatively smaller number of interviews 
conducted in the Philippines reflects the time-frame for this activity (three weeks) and the dual 
purpose of the trip, part of which was to identify a suitable case study for the second part of 
the research. 
Participants were recruited in the first instance by targeting INGOs through the assistance of a 
gatekeeper – ‘an individual who has the power to grant access to people or situations for the 
purposes of research’ (Burgess, 1984: 48).  In this instance, the gatekeeper was an academic 
supervisor who had access to INGOs and could verify the legitimacy of the researcher to them.  
Through these initial interviews, the researcher was able to establish further interviews – a 
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technique known as snowball or chain sampling (Valentine, 2005; Hay, 2010; Secor, 2010; 
Robinson, 2014).  Such a strategy acknowledges the fact that the identification of possible 
participants may only become apparent during meetings and interviews with other 
participants.  
Part two: Case study interview sample (Study C) 
The criteria for interview sampling was any person who had either been affected by the 
typhoon (e.g. residents in the five most affected municipalities) or had been involved in 
planning for, or responding to, the event in the capacity of an NGO, scientist (academic, 
government or other) or local government.  Those involved in the event from a professional 
stance are termed ‘DRR stakeholders’.  All but one participant was Filipino.   
Selection of DRR stakeholders 
The main strategy for sampling was the identification of key people from the information 
gathered during the 2010 scoping trip – meaning that some of those interviewed in 2012 were 
also interviewed in 2010.  The representation from each of the scientific organisations is 
variable, with the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) representing 
the agency with the most scientists interviewed.  This is in part attributable to the snowballing 
technique but more so owing to the relevance of this agency to a lahar case study and is, 
therefore, not deemed to create any additional bias.  Table 3.9 summarises the participants 
interviewed and more detailed information about each of the participants is presented in 
Chapter 6.  Of these participants, nine scientists, four representatives of local government and 
seven NGO staff were primarily interviewed about the case study.  The additional scientist and 
NGO interviewees were less familiar with this disaster and so were instead asked about NGO 
applications of science in order to build on the findings from part one of the research. 
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Table 3.9 DRR stakeholders interviewed during the case study 
Type of participant Number of participants 
interviewed 
Number of agencies 
represented 
Location 
Scientists (government) 10 3 Manila and Albay 
Scientists (academic) 2 1 Manila 
Government (local and 
regional) 
4 3 Albay 
International NGO 3 2 Manila 
Local NGO 7 5 Albay 
Total 26 14  
 
Access to local communities 
In order to meet with communities, the strategy was to gain access via ‘gatekeepers’ (Mercer, 
2006; Dunn, 2010; Creswell, 2014), in this instance local NGOs and local government.  The 
researcher requested visits to the lahar affected municipalities of Guinobatan, Sua, Daraga and 
Santo Domingo, as well as the relocation Barangays Anislag (housing former residents of 
Barangay Tagas in Daraga) and Taysan (housing former residents of Barangay Padang, Legazpi).  
The selection of communities was dependent upon the gatekeeper’s time and the availability 
of community members, which is reflected by the fact that some barangays were more 
represented than others (see Table 3.10).  The only area where no visit could be arranged was 
Barangay Taysan.  Barangay Padang was visited for the purpose of field observation not 
interview.  See Figure 3.2 for the locations of barangays (communities) visited. 
The criterion for interviewees was that they had been affected by the lahars in terms of impact 
to their home, livelihoods, valuables and/or family.  The only demographic prerequisite of 
community participants was that they were over the age of 18, to comply with the ethical 
approval awarded by UCL.  It so happened, however, that the majority of interviewees were 
women between the ages of 35 and 64 (Figure 3.3).  This is mostly an artefact of culture: the 
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interviews were conducted during the day, which coincided with when the men were at work; 
however it is not clear why this age range was predominant.  The local NGOs appear to have 
channelled their work through women’s groups (e.g. child nutrition group in Barangay 
Salvacion) resulting in their taking the researcher to meet with these groups.   
 
Figure 3.2 Location of the Municipalities, including Legazpi City, and the Barangays visited in October 
and November 2012.  The grey circle represents the approximate circumference of Mayon volcano and 
the dashed red circle is the 6km radius permanent danger zone (PDZ).  Source of data: Phil GIS (2013). 
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Table 3.10   Residents interviewed during the case study.  Numbers in brackets reflect the number of 
people who predominately spoke as some of these interviewees involved groups of participants. 
Municipality Barangay Numbers 
interviewed 
Percentage 
female 
Percentage 
male 
Camalig Sua 1 100% 0% 
Daraga Binitayan 12 (5) 100% 0% 
Anislag (Tagas) 6 (3) 100% 0% 
Guinobatan Tandarora 15 (9) 93% (88%) 7% (11%) 
Santo Domingo Lidong 5 60% 40% 
Salvacion 4 100% 0% 
San Antonio 2 50% 50% 
San Isidro 1 0% 100 % 
Total All barangays 46 (30) 89% (83%) 11% (17%) 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Age range of community interviewees. 
There were numerous actors involved in and/or affected by the Typhoon Reming case study 
disaster who might have been interviewed.  The reason for cessation of the study was that 
community members shared very similar stories of the events and that the means of accessing 
DRR stakeholders were exhausted within constraints of the project.  The following discussion 
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reflects upon the experiences of implementing the research, in particular the semi-structured 
interviews.  Each study is addressed in turn. 
3.4.2 Data collection: implementation, limitations and suggestions for future 
research  
Study A – interviews conducted in UK 
The interviews with NGOs were conducted between December 2009 and August 2011, but the 
majority occurred between December 2009 and August 2010.  The aspiration was that all 
interviews be conducted face to face; but five interviews were implemented via Skype owing 
to the fact that these participants were based outside the UK or could not be met in person.  In 
consequence, there were challenges in the Skype interviews due to poor internet connectivity 
and the different dynamic between interviewer and interviewee due to their not meeting in 
person.  
A key element of qualitative interviewing is ensuring flexibility, not just in the ordering of 
questions but also in terms of the resilience of the researcher in the face of unexpected 
challenges during implementation (see Bryman, 2008).  Faulty recording equipment meant 
that two of the interviews could not be recorded, resulting in total reliance on the researcher’s 
notes.  Due to some of the participants’ time constraints, it was not always possible to pose 
every question to each of the interviewees, but in these instances the researcher endeavoured 
to ensure key questions were answered – namely those directly about multi-hazard 
assessments.   
Finally, two CAFOD UK staff were included in the study; thus their close connection to the 
EngD could be considered a bias.  Therefore the researcher has attempted to ensure a 
balanced argument by not favouring the viewpoints of these respondents (which are more 
aligned with that of the researcher) over those of the remaining respondents.  Indeed, the 
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comments provided by each individual are highly insightful in terms of understanding the 
process and role of hazard assessment within the DRR and CCA work conducted by 
humanitarian and development NGOs, since most interviewees have good knowledge of the 
sector as a whole.   
Study B – interviews and scoping study to the Philippines 
The interviews were conducted as part of a scoping study to the Philippines between the 6th to 
the 28th September 2010, the additional purpose of which was to identify a case study for the 
second part of the research.  The interviews involved NGOs based in Metro Manila, Legazpi 
City (the provincial capital of Albay) and Illigan City in Lanao del Norte (Mindanao; see Figure 
3.4).  The reason for targeting participants in these areas was owing to the fact that (1) the 
INGOs are based in Manila; (2) partners of one organisation included in Study A (HD INGO D; 
see Chapter 4) are located in Albay, which was proposed as a suitable case study owing to it 
being one of the most multi-hazardous provinces in the Philippines; and (3) because the 
researcher was invited to observe and participate in CAFOD’s ‘Regional Exchange of Southeast 
Asian CAFOD Partners on Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction in Land Use 
Planning and Management’ – a 6 day workshop held between the 18th and 25th September 
2010 in Illigan City and Osamiz, Mindanao.  The workshop is referred to as ‘Regional Exchange 
Workshop’ in Chapter 5. 
In addition to the challenges outlined in the section above, challenges during the Philippines 
interviews related to language and cultural issues, and the fact that participants did not tend 
to share the same level of detail as those interviewed in the UK.  The challenges are discussed 
in the context of both visits to the Philippines in the following section. 
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Figure 3.4 Location map of 2010 field visits.  Source of data: Phil GIS (2013). 
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Study C – case study interviews and field work 
The fieldwork for the case study was conducted between the 10th October and the 9th 
November 2013, with the five weeks spent between Metro Manila and Albay interviewing key 
stakeholders and making participant and field observations.  The interview guide contained a 
number of prompt questions for each category, with the guides slightly differing between 
technical experts (scientists and local government), NGO practitioners and community 
members (Appendix C).  All of the pre-arranged interviews were recorded, expect where one 
interviewee expressly requested there be no recording made.  Two impromptu interviews 
were not recorded owing to the fact that these began as conversations, which developed into 
interviews but did not cover the extent of the interview questions.   
It was envisaged that interviewees might use the interview as an opportunity to volunteer 
their experiences of Typhoon Reming; however most required prompting.  In situ revision of 
questions by the researcher was necessary, owing to the emergence of new information 
during the interview or because interviewees struggled to understand the question being 
asked of them.  Owing to time constraints on certain interviewees, not every question could be 
asked of every participant, but the researcher endeavoured to ask the most pressing 
questions.  Interviewees generally tended to be reluctant to criticise other groups with true 
conviction, which is interpreted as their being uncomfortable to be fully open with the 
interviewer. 
Whilst the aim was to conduct one-to-one interviews, circumstances often meant that 
interviews were conducted in pairs and, in the case of local communities, larger groups.  The 
choice of interview location was beyond the researcher’s control and, at times, meant that the 
interviewee was distracted by their surroundings, such as interruptions by family members and 
neighbours (see Mercer, 2006).  During the group interviews, curious community members 
would often approach and become involved mid-way through the interview.  These are just 
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some of the realities of conducting research in this type of setting and are difficult to avoid.  In 
order to negate the dominance of more confident or authoritative figures the researcher 
would direct questions to other members of the group to ensure their involvement.  For 
transparency, the dominant speakers have been emphasised in Appendix G. 
The challenges encountered during the field visit have implications for the quality of the data 
collected; whilst these challenges could not be avoided, they are important to highlight to 
ensure transparency.  Whilst English is a formal language in the Philippines, most communities 
communicate in Tagalog or the local Filipino dialect.  Translation took the form of either a 
disaster management officer from the municipal government or an NGO who was familiar with 
the community or, likewise, an NGO (as per Usamah and Haynes, 2012).  Despite being briefed 
regarding the objective of the translation (i.e. verbatim translation), one NGO translator often 
provided their own answers and opinions whilst the other translators would, from time to 
time, undoubtedly nuance the answer with their own understanding of the issue.  The quality 
of interpretation also varied owing to the different competencies in the translators’ knowledge 
of English and their perception of how much the researcher understood of what had been said 
(communities often spoke in a mixture of Bicolano and English).  Whilst the problems 
associated with this were unavoidable, the researchers’ awareness aided her to differentiate 
between the opinions of the community and those of the translator, assisted by the fact that 
the local dialogue was interspersed with English.  Future research in the Philippines would 
need to involve a dedicated and impartial translator who adequately understands the 
approach of qualitative research.  Furthermore, it would be preferable to get a more even 
representation of age and sex by, for example, conducting interviews before or after working 
hours with the aim of interviewing more male participants.   
In terms of the interviews with NGOs, local government and scientists, there was a range of 
levels of understanding of English and there were nuances in the meaning of a number of 
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English words.  Given that English is mostly spoken by the more educated, it would have been 
deemed inappropriate to have requested an interpreter in these interviews.  This is, perhaps, 
an unavoidable problem given that Usamah and Haynes (2012) also conducted their key 
stakeholder interviews in English.  During the interviews, it became clear that (at times) 
respondents misconstrued the questions being asked of them; unfortunately, this was not 
always obvious until after the interview.  When it was apparent during the interview, the 
interviewee attempted to clarify the question or follow up with additional questions but this 
did not always result in a successful understanding of the question by the respondent.  It is 
evident that longer engagement and multiple meetings with those interviewed would have 
ensured more detailed responses and better understanding between the interviewer and 
respondent and is, as such, suggested for future research. 
Accepting these inevitable challenges is part of being a qualitative researcher and, moreover, 
these problems are outweighed by the rich and detailed information interviews provide.  
Beyond being aware of the limits of the research, qualitative researchers must also be mindful 
of how they may have influenced and created bias in the research.  Identifying these influences 
requires the researcher to be reflexive.  This quality and other implications of interview 
research are discussed in the following section. 
3.5 Critical reflexivity in social research  
There are a number of influences that shape and have the potential to create bias in 
qualitative research (Figure 3.5) and it is only by being aware of these that the researcher has a 
true understanding of the results of the research.  The influence of practical considerations, 
epistemology and ontology has largely been addressed; therefore the following discussion 
focuses on reflexivity – the recognition by the researcher that her own background shapes the 
interpretation (Valentine, 2005; Creswell, 2014).   
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Figure 3.5 Influences on social research.  Source: adapted from Bryman (2008: 24, fig. 1.3) using Creswell 
(2014). 
 
Reflexivity involves the researcher reflecting upon how their biases, values and personal 
background shape their interpretations of a study (Creswell, 2014), how these relate to 
research participants and how they themselves are represented (Charmaz, 2006).  Critical 
reflexivity is a strength of the evaluation of qualitative work, since it involves a ‘conscious 
deliberation of what we do, how we interpret and how we relate to subjects’ (Baxter and 
Eyles, 1997: 505).  The values of the researcher can and will intrude upon a number of 
components of the research process from formulation of the research question to the 
interpretation of data and the conclusions made (Bazeley, 2007; Bryman, 2008).  Some of the 
obvious points at which the researcher may have unwittingly influenced the research process 
through accident or design are discussed below and two ‘reflexive diary’ extracts written by 
the researcher are provided in Appendix D. 
The researcher’s own values and belief systems reflect her training as a natural and physical 
scientist, which made her a suitable candidate for a research project focused upon multi-
hazards but also meant that her prior assumptions regarding social research may have 
intruded and biased the research.  Having these influences in the forefront of her mind 
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ensured that she had an open view to the identification of key themes from the interview 
findings. 
In addition to her own values, her being a researcher may have affected the perceptions of 
participants, especially because it transpired that some regarded scientists as being at times 
disconnected with the needs of the humanitarian and the development sector (see Chapters 4 
and 5).  Conducting research as part of an academic-NGO partnership undoubtedly influenced 
the research process, since NGOs are driven by practical application rather than academic 
discourse.  Being associated with CAFOD may also have affected how other NGO interviewees 
perceived the researcher and the information they were happy to share.  NGOs are in 
competition with each other for funding and are often ‘entangled within alliances and/or 
rivalries based on personalities and institutional histories’ (Mercer, 2006: 97). 
Furthermore, interviewing in less developed countries necessitates a heightened sensitivity to 
the complex power relations that exist between researchers and interviewees, as well as to 
local codes of behaviour (Valentine, 2005).  The researcher was acutely aware of these 
influences during both visits to the Philippines, particularly during the first visit it was realised 
that some interviewees appeared uncomfortable when asked to sign consent forms since they 
placed more emphasis upon unspoken trust.  There was also a sense during some of the 
community visits that the NGO gatekeepers wanted communities to endorse the beneficial 
work of the NGO to the researcher.   
3.6 Ethical considerations 
Whilst qualitative research necessitates that certain aspects of the encounter with individuals 
must be crafted, it is also essential that the rights (both formal and informal) of the respondent 
are taken into consideration (McCracken, 1988).  As a UCL student, the researcher was bound 
by the ethical frameworks of both the university and the research council (Engineering Physical 
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Sciences Research Council) as well as those of the research partner (CAFOD).  However, it is 
acknowledged that what is deemed ethical by a university may differ from that of a 
humanitarian organisation because they operate under different frameworks and approaches 
(see Duncan et al., 2014).  One of the major ethical components of this research is the fact that 
the partner also comprises one of the subjects of the research, which can make it difficult to 
be critical of their work in support of the research (Mercer, 2006).   
Four areas of ethical concern in qualitative research include whether harm comes to 
participants, the avoidance of deception, the need for informed consent and the invasion of 
privacy (Bryman, 2008; Dowling, 2010).  The approach and content of the research minimises 
the first point, however they each warrant further discussion. 
3.6.1 The principle of ‘do no harm’ 
Ensuring harm does not come to participants is a principal concern in NGO code of conducts as 
well as research ethical frameworks (e.g. UCL, 2014a).  However, these may be juxtaposed; in 
research this may involve weighing up risk of harm with the benefits in the research, whereas 
the principle of NGO practice of ‘do no harm’ is underpinned by their mandate to improve the 
lives of others (Duncan et al., 2014).   
The only element of harm within this research was possible ‘psycho-social’ harm – in other 
words raising issues that may be upsetting or potentially psychologically damaging to 
participants (Dowling, 2010).  The risk of this impact applies to the interviews with 
communities about the impact of the case study disaster, so only general questions with 
regard to how they were affected by the disaster were asked, rather than enquiring about 
specific issues, such as whether family members were killed.  The researcher was also sensitive 
in her manner of asking questions, judging when it was inappropriate to probe further, 
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especially during instances when the information required was contextual but not critical to 
the analysis (Stake, 2000).   
In general, the potential harm to participants was deemed minimal; the participants 
interviewed are ‘healthy adults’ who were interviewed about hazard assessment practices and 
professional experiences and therefore were not asked personal details beyond their name, 
occupation and their background related to their work.  More background information was 
requested of communities in order to give context to their answers, but this information was 
not largely intrusive nor is it sensitive.  Furthermore, Studies A and B were decreed exempt 
from ethics approval by the UCL Research Ethics Committee, whilst Study C was given ethics 
approval under the criteria of minimal risk under the UCL Research Ethics Committee Terms of 
Reference (UCL, 2014b).  The data were stored in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 
1998 in order to maintain trust with participants; however this legislation was meaningless to 
the Filipino participants as there is no equivalent act in their country.  As such, the interview 
transcripts are not included as an Appendix as it is not possible to guarantee participant 
anonymity throughout these scripts.   
In Studies A and B, participants were told that they would be made anonymous, however in 
Study C they were given the option as many Filipino participants interviewed during the 
scoping visit were surprised by the fact that they would be anonymised.  However, despite the 
minimal implications of the research, in the end all professional participants were made 
anonymous in the discussions of findings as a matter of respect for their honest criticism of 
respective organisations.   
3.6.2 Avoiding deception through informed consent 
The researcher provided each respondent with an information sheet explaining the purpose of 
the study, how the information they provide will be used and stored and their right to leave 
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the study at any point.  Each interviewee also signed a consent form, agreeing that the data 
they provided could be used for the purposes of this and future research, and notifying them 
that their responses would be kept anonymous (see Appendix E for forms).  In terms of 
observations, it is more difficult to ensure informed consent; however, this is recognised as 
being a legitimate exemption of the need for informed consent (Dowling, 2010).  As was 
discovered during the scoping trip to the Philippines, informal mechanisms of information 
sharing are the norm in the Philippines which explains why some participants (in particular the 
scientists) could not understand why written agreement was required. 
In terms of gaining consent from the communities, the researcher asked the gatekeeper (NGO 
or local government official) whether they thought written or verbal consent was more 
appropriate.  In some cases, it was deemed more appropriate for the community to be 
informed about the research and what their giving consent entailed and then to verbally 
agree.  Proof of their agreement is provided by a consent form signed by the facilitating 
official. 
3.6.3 Invasion of privacy 
In the case of this research, the questions focus upon a process (hazard assessment) and an 
event (typhoon triggered lahars).  As such, the questions asked are not particularly private, 
save for some background information about the participant.   
Wallace (1997) conducted interviews with NGOs on changes in development policies and 
practices and found that the openness and self-critical discussions NGOs were happy to have 
internally was not replicated when the discussions moved to a public arena.  Given Wallace’s 
experience, the decision was made to anonymise their and other professional participants’ 
answers.  It is acknowledged, however, that certain answers may be indicative of the identity 
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of the participant, especially to those familiar with the field.  Every effort has been made to 
avoid this.   
In terms of communities, they are referred to by their first name and village (Barangay) since 
they were given the option to be anonymised or not.  The reason for not fully anonymising 
them is that there is no ethical reason for not referring to them by first name and location. 
3.7 Analysing qualitative data 
It is generally considered that interviews should be transcribed verbatim (Dunn, 2010).  
However, during any conversation, people rarely speak in fully formed sentences: they often 
repeat themselves or are hesitant (Bryman, 2008). 
For the benefits of the reader some of the hesitancies are removed in the quoted evidence and 
words are inserted to bring clarity, especially in the case of interviews where the participants’ 
first language is not English.  Any hesitancy or text removed (so as to reduce the size of the 
quotation) is indicated by ellipsis, whilst inserted text is indicated by square brackets.   
3.7.1 Coding qualitative data 
Coding is the starting point for most methods of qualitative data analysis (Bryman, 2008).  The 
purpose of coding is to select, separate and sort data in order to begin the challenge of 
determining what they mean (Charmaz, 2006; Bazeley, 2007).  Charmaz (2006) states that 
coding forms the analytic frame upon which the analysis is built and, as such, should begin in a 
very open manner – breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualising and categorizing 
the data (see Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  In general, most coding strategies employ a structure 
that begins with the numerous codes that emerge, which are assimilated into categories and 
sometimes concepts and theories (Bazeley, 2007). 
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Grounded theory embraces a process of coding that builds initial concepts through constant 
comparison with the data, building categories (a concept regarded as representing real-world 
phenomena) and hypotheses (initial hunches about relationships between concepts) and 
theorising (Bryman, 2008).  The process beings with open coding (often of individual words), 
followed by focused coding, which is more directive, selective and conceptual (Charmaz, 
2006).  Coding in this manner is, however, criticised by some writers for being too 
fragmentary, resulting in a loss of sense of context (e.g. Coffey and Aitkinson, 1996).  
Furthermore, Bryman (2008) states that many claims to a grounded theory approach result in 
the identification of concepts rather than theories.  Indeed, the research focuses upon the 
identification of themes rather than theory and therefore relates more to a thematic (content) 
analysis approach, which is increasingly regarded as an alternative, but closely linked, means of 
coding and analysing qualitative data (Bryman, 2008; Creswell, 2014). 
Burnard et al. (2008) states that in thematic content analysis, open coding involves reading 
each transcript and making notes or short phrases that summarise what is said within the text.  
Cope (2010) suggests that coding includes ‘descriptive codes’ (category labels) that express 
themes or arrangements that are more obvious or directly voiced by the respondent and 
‘analytic codes’ that highlight issues and themes that intrigue the researcher or have emerged 
as significant.  Bazeley (2007) goes one step further to suggest that codes can be descriptive, 
topical or analytical.  Without being overly concerned with the labelling of the technique 
employed here, arguably the researcher follows a thematic content analysis with elements of a 
grounded theory approach, adopting procedures outlined by Bazeley (2007), Bryman (2008), 
Creswell (2014) and, to some extent, Charmaz (2006) for coding and interpreting data. 
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3.7.2 Coding scheme and strategy 
Both descriptive and analytical codes were adopted in order to analyse the qualitative data, 
the former relating specific areas of enquiry (e.g. ‘toolkit development’) and the latter to the 
themes that emerged (e.g. ‘scale’).  Owing to the volume of interview data, qualitative data 
management software was utilised (NVivo), as it facilitated the management and retrieval of 
coded data.  The pitfalls of electronic coding were acknowledged, including the danger of 
ending up with more codes than are manageable (Bazeley, 2007).  The software supported the 
complimentary analysis of the interview data in terms of memo-writing, annotating text and 
auditing (within NVivo, a journal was kept of significant decisions and reflections upon the 
coding process; see Bazeley, 2007).   
Owing to the identification of themes within the literature, some of the codes were a priori 
(see Bazeley, 2007), whilst others emerged during the analysis process.  The researcher opted 
to code entire phrases, sentences and – at times – paragraphs to avoid overly fragmenting the 
data and losing too much of the contextual meaning (cf. Coffey and Aitkinson, 1996).   The 
codes were revised as each transcript was analysed and the coding scheme was refined 
through the re-coding of the same interviews until the researcher was convinced the meanings 
were well represented by the codes.  All three studies employed qualitative coding, 
categorising and theme building and an example of the codes that were adopted for the 
analysis of the Study A (and largely Study B) is given in Figure 3.6.  The descriptive codes are 
shaded blue; analytical codes are shaded brown, with sub-codes being indicated by the use of 
ellipse shapes.  The attribution of each of these sub-codes to the primary code is indicated by a 
line.  Ultimately, all the codes are linked since the analytical codes emerged from the 
responses to the descriptive codes.   
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Figure 3.6 Diagram of descriptive and analytic codes assimilated into categories and themes respectively 
identified during the analysis of Study A.  The diagram was created using NVivo. 
  
3.8 Summary 
Qualitative research is challenging to define and implement but incredibly rewarding; it 
provides researchers with the means to explore topics that have largely received little 
attention to date.  The research is driven by pragmatic concerns and practical needs and this 
reflects the choices of methodology and methods adopted for this research (see Table 3.11).  
Semi-structured interviews, informal meetings, secondary data and information and 
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observations were selected as a suitable means of exploring to what extent NGOs are 
assessing multi-hazards and a case study of the reality of multi-hazards and what their 
assessments entail.  These methods are a means of triangulating the research and the 
description of their implementation ensures a rigorous and transparent approach to research 
was adopted.  The research emphasises the importance of an ethical and reflexive approach.  
The decision to address the research question in two complementary parts reflects the nature 
of interdisciplinary research, which necessitates a problem to be addressed from more than 
one angle. 
Table 3.11 Summary of the research approach. 
Research design Part one Part two 
Study A Study B Study C 
Approach Qualitative Qualitative Mixed 
Methodology Grounded Grounded Case study 
Methods 
Semi-structured interviews; 
informal meetings, 
participant observations, 
secondary data. 
Semi-structured 
interviews; informal 
meetings; participant and 
field observations, 
secondary data. 
Semi-structured 
interviews, field 
observations and 
quantitative secondary 
data analysis. 
Target group 
26 interviews with NGOs 
and researchers developing 
and implementing tools for 
hazard assessment 
(additional informal 
meetings with donors and 
humanitarian/development 
practitioners). 
Nine formal interviews 
with local and INGOs (17 
informal meetings with 
donors, local and INGOs, 
scientists and local 
government). 
26 interviews with 
scientists, local 
government and NGOs 
involved in the case 
study.  One to one and 
group interviews 
involving 46 
community members. 
Location of study 
UK Manila, Albay and 
Mindanao (Philippines) 
Manila and Albay 
(Philippines) 
 
The following two chapters present the findings from the first part of the research and 
chapters 6 to 8 introduce and discuss the findings of the case study.  The approach to 
presenting the qualitative information is a combination of findings with some initial discussion 
(see Burnard et al., 2008) before synthesising parts one and two in a final discussion in Chapter 
9. 
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Chapter 4: UK-based analysis of NGO hazard assessments 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 present the findings from the analysis of the interviews conducted as part 
one of this research.  The purpose of this analysis was to determine: 
(1) whether and how NGOs are conducting multi-hazard assessments; 
(2) whether they use science for this purpose; 
(3) what factors constrain or enable their ability to implement these assessments. 
Chapter 4 presents the findings from the interviews from Study A (Head Office and three ‘in-
country’ international NGO (INGO) representatives), which were conducted in the UK.  The 
findings from Study A are then compared with the interviews with NGO practitioners in the 
Philippines in Chapter 5, in order to determine whether the findings from Head Office reflect 
those from the field.    
The results presented are supported with example quotations from the interview transcripts.  
Interviewees are referred to as interviewees, representatives or participants with ‘Head Office’ 
referring solely to participants from Study A.  ‘In-country’ participants refer to those based in 
INGO country offices or local agencies in the Philippines.   
The analysis begins with some background to the participants.  Section 4.1.2 introduces some 
of the institutional barriers to implementing multi-hazard assessments, focusing upon how the 
agencies represented are engaging with DRR and CCA since both are insightful as to how they 
consider multi-hazards.  The approaches, scale, process and review of hazard assessments are 
then critiqued, in order to determine the extent to which multi-hazards are realistically being 
assessed.  Section 4.1.4 explores the sources of information and knowledge included in the 
assessments.  Study A concludes with the proposal of three developing answers to the three 
objectives above. 
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4.1 Background to interviewees 
Table 4.1 outlines the participants interviewed, including some background to their 
organisations.  Participants are referred to by their job description and the type of organisation 
they work for.  During the discussions it is indicated if a finding is more indicative of the three 
interviewees who work in-country or those working in the Head Office.   
The majority of interviewees represented humanitarian and/or development international 
NGOs (HD INGOs).  The NGOs vary in size and capacity, but all represent major and far-
reaching international NGOs operating across Latin America, Africa and South-east Asia.  
Owing to their involvement in creating toolkits utilised by NGOs there is also the inclusion of 
one conservation NGO representative, one consultant (who previously worked for one of the 
HD INGOs interviewed) and two researchers.  Whilst a number of organisationally branded 
tools were discussed, these are collectively referred to as participatory hazard, vulnerability 
and capacity assessments (PHVCAs) so as to make interviewees less identifiable. 
The purpose of interviewing participants from both DRR and CCA backgrounds (Table 4.1) was 
because both had packaged methods (‘toolkits’) for the purpose of assessing community 
vulnerability and capacity to natural hazards and environmental change and that these toolkits 
adopted similar participatory processes of analysis.  Analysing participants’ and their 
organisations’ positions with regard to DRR and CCA provided insight into their perceptions of 
hazards and highlighted the prior assumptions being made with regard to the hazards and 
threats communities need to be addressing.  
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Table 4.1 Participants in Study A.  HD INGO is the acronym used to represent humanitarian and development international non-governmental organisations.  CC refers to 
climate change. 
Organisation Operations 
History of Engagement 
Respondent 
Date of 
interview 
Location 
 
Developed 
Tools (Y/N) 
Interview 
recorded 
(Y/N) 
DRR CCA 
(HD) INGO A 
Direct; work with 
but not through 
partners 
[No date given] 2008  
Director – humanitarian 
team 
01/03/2010 UK Y 
N 
 
(HD) INGO B Partners 2008 2007 
Regional Programme 
Manager – DRR 
23/03/2010 Nicaragua N Y 
Adviser – DRR 20/05/2010 UK N Y 
Adviser – CC 25/05/2010 UK N Y 
(HD) INGO C 
Partners and direct 
operations 
 
Early 2000s; 
2005/6 
established risk 
reduction 
working group  
2007 (became 
strategic approach; 
programmes new 
and ‘thin on the 
ground’) 
Adviser – CCA 28/06/2010 
Canada (in 
France at 
time of 
interview)
 
 
Y Y 
Team leader - Climate 
change and hunger team  
03/06/2010 UK Y Y 
Developing and training 
on CCA tool 
30/07/2010 
and 
06/08/2010 
Kenya N Y 
(HD)  INGO D 
Partners; country 
offices 
2006 
2007/8 (mitigation: 
2004/5) 
Policy and research 
Adviser – DRR 
12/01/2010 UK Y Y 
Adviser - Climate Change 
Programme  
 
 
20/01/2010 UK Y Y 
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- N/A N/A N/A 
DRR Consultant 
 
01/04/2010 USA 
Y (prev. 
worked for an 
NGO) 
Y 
(HD)  INGO E Partners 
Post-2003 – 
wrapping up 
linking relief 
and 
development 
programme – 
finalised in 2005 
[Did not state] Adviser – DRR 30/04/2010 Philippines Y Y 
Advocacy 
INGO for 
DRR 
Network members 
Since beginning 
(2007) 
N/A Network coordinator 16/12/2009 
Global 
Advocacy 
for DRR 
Y Y 
Research 
institute A 
- [Did not state] 
Believes climate 
change came first 
Team leader – CC  02/08/2010 Research  
Y
 
 (screening 
projects 
rather than 
conducting 
PHVCA) 
Y 
Research 
institute B 
- 
Not a core 
programme 
2001 (climate 
change and energy 
project) 
Senior researcher (CC 
more than DRR) 
15/08/2010 Geneva Y Y 
 
 
 
(HD)  INGO F 
 
 
 
 
Partners and direct 
operations (relief 
work) 
5/6 years ago 
formed DRR 
operations 
Overlap with DRR 
unresolved 
Programme Policy 
Management Team 
member – DRR 
02/08/2011 UK Y Y 
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(HD)  INGO G 
 
 
Partners and direct 
operations 
 
2006 
[Working on but 
did not state] 
Policy Coordinator – DRR 
(formally DRR Project 
Manager) 
05/03/2010 UK  N (developing) Y 
Adviser – CC and DRM 
programme 
20/03/2010 Philippines 
N (just use 
lots of tools) 
Y 
Development 
INGO 
Partners and direct 
operations 
Several decades 
ago (10-20 
years) 
2003 (first meeting 
then 2-3 years later 
recruited 
campaigner; now 
team of two) 
Policy Adviser – CC 12/01/2010 UK 
Conceptual 
framework for 
adaptation, 
rather than 
tool 
Y 
Project Manager – 
Livelihoods and Disaster 
Management 
15/01/2010 UK 
Final stages of 
development 
(resilience 
tool) 
Y 
(HD) INGO H 
Partners (few direct 
operations) 
2005/6 
(working on as 
early as 2003; 
policy work 
2004) 
2007/8 (early 90s 
started hearing 
form partners that 
weather changing) 
Adviser – DRR 16/12/2009 UK 
Y 
Y 
Research and policy 
officer (advocacy for DRR) 
21/12/2009 UK Y 
Director -  Disaster 
Management Team 
21/12/2009 UK Y 
Adviser - Environmental 
sustainability 
18/01/2010 UK Y 
(HD) NGO I 
Direct (view to local 
autonomy) 
[No date given] 
Overlap with DRR 
unresolved 
Director - DRR and 
Community Resilience 
04/03/2010 UK Y Y 
Conservation 
NGO 
Partnership with 
Humanitarian INGO 
2004 ~2005 
Team leader - Climate 
Adaptation and DRR 
28/10/2010 USA Y Y 
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4.2 Institutional influences on multi-hazard approaches: perceptions of 
DRR and CCA 
The NGOs represented began addressing DRR and CCA at similar points (see Table 4.1) and the 
interviews came at a time when agencies were trying to resolve the overlap between these 
two communities of practice.  Many NGOs were looking to move away from organisational 
silos to more integrated approaches to addressing risk: 
‘I got together with our DRR staff and basically said...you are half right in saying DRR 
covers it [climate change] but you can’t actually have another box saying this is 
adaptation we’ll just create another specialisation and we’ll have...everybody working 
in their little silos and not thinking about the other issues.  So what we’ve really tried to 
promote is a much more integrated approach....’ (Adviser – Climate Change 
Programme, INGO D) 
Nonetheless, several interviewees remarked upon the growing emphasis upon CCA within the 
sector1.  Many interviewees noted that the decision to focus work on adaptation was also 
owing to their concern over what climate change means for existing projects, fuelled by the 
international narratives as well as what they and their partners were witnessing on the 
ground: 
‘he was actually pushing a fairly half open door and as soon as the partners began to 
understand the science behind climate change they immediately started to say: “that 
explains a lot of what we have been seeing.”’ (Adviser – Climate Change Programme, 
INGO D) 
As such, it is difficult to fully determine whether developing toolkits for CCA was driven by 
changes on the ground attributable to climate change or due to prior perceptions that these 
changes were caused by climate change.  During the interviews there was a sense that all 
changes in weather, environment and meteorological hazards were attributable to climate 
change:  
                                                          
1
 INGOs F and H have made it a corporate priority 
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‘everyone seeing that seasons were changing, freak storms changing, not as 
predictable...we thought far more than coincidence and through that stumbled across 
climate change’ (Adviser – Environmental Sustainability, INGO I) 
Four interviewees2 noted a degree of ‘re-branding’ of DRR approaches that occurs, which is 
possibly owing to the urgency (particularly emphasised by one interviewee3) behind 
developing tools for addressing CCA and the pressure from donors: 
‘all of a sudden we jumped from…talking about DRR and started banding around the 
language of CCA and if you’re just a practitioner or one of our partners [they ask:] 
“what’s all this about?” and so what we had to say is “you are doing so much of it 
already” it is nuancing but we need to nuance because we need to recognise things a 
little bit more as an organisation but also for our donors and recognising the way that 
the whole external environment is going.’ (Director – DMT, INGO H) 
Two in-country interviewees4 commented on the fact that DRR and CCA are concepts that 
come from ‘the north’ and it was observed that communities are not readily concerned with 
the abstract categorisation of risk as adopted by humanitarian and development agencies5: 
‘But for the development arena or sometimes NGOs or development agencies are also 
divided into the perspective…but at the community level it doesn’t matter to them if it 
is climate change or [DRR]…they look at things as one integrated thing rather than [a] 
different ball game.’  (Adviser – DRR, INGO E) 
The relative autonomy of in-country staff poses a challenge in terms of transferring thinking at 
Head Office to the ground.  Whilst this might be especially true for those agencies adopting a 
partnership based approach (noted by the Climate Change Adviser at HD INGO B), two 
interviewees remarked on this problem for operational organisations: 
‘centrally there's much more emphasis on climate change than DRR…[INGO F’s] not a 
kind of a very directive organisation on the ground…in the country level, in the regional 
level, you know the countries decide pretty much themselves where the resources are 
                                                          
2
 Adviser – CCA (INGO B); Adviser – CCA (INGO C); Adviser – DRR and Director – DMT (INGO H); Policy 
Coordinator – DRR (INGO G) 
3
 Adviser – Environmental Sustainability (INGO H) 
4
 Regional Programme Manager – DRR (INGO B); Adviser – DDR (INGO E) 
5
 Policy Coordinator – DRR (INGO G); Project Manager – Livelihoods and Disaster Management 
(Development INGO) 
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needed there are many there are more DRR people on the ground’ (Programme Policy 
Management Team Member – DRR , INGO F) 
The DRR Adviser from INGO B felt that there was no need to label projects as climate change 
and that incorporating climate change is about doing development projects ‘a little bit more 
appropriately.’  Furthermore, two interviewees6 did remark that climate change might not be 
the only factor driving environmental change at the community level and another two were 
concerned with the bias this may bring to the assessment process7.  Moreover, approaches to 
the practical application of CCA described tended to address climate variability (e.g. seasonal 
forecasting and climate hazards) more than climate change and, as such, differentiation on the 
ground is not widely apparent (cf. Schipper and Pelling, 2006).  In spite of this, Head Office 
interviewees generally appeared to perceive CCA as requiring quite a different analytical 
approach, particularly because most associated climate change with an uncertain risk future 
compared with DRR: 
‘…there is a distinct difference, I mean climate change adaptation or adaptive capacity 
has to build in this uncertainty about what the future is.  DRR functions looking at 
known hazards based on previous history, how people have responded, how can we 
make people more resilient to the known impact, or pretty well known impact.  
Whereas climate change we don’t know.’  (Policy coordinator – DRR, INGO G) 
The above quotation also indicates that the move towards creating tools for CCA projects is 
driven by available funding and not analytical objectivity.  Furthermore, the interviewee does 
not account for the fact that communities might not have experienced all the hazards that 
affect their location.  By emphasising the ‘known’ impact of DRR hazards compared with 
climate change, the interviewee does not appreciate the uncertainty of multi-hazards, where 
hazards might occur simultaneously or in close succession resulting in an overall impact that is 
much larger than the ‘known’ impact of the individual hazards (cf. Marzocchi et al., 2009).  The 
                                                          
6
 Adviser – Climate Change Policy (Development INGO); Environmental Sustainability (INGO I) 
7
 Team Leader – Climate Change and Hunger; Adviser – CCA (both INGO C) 
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mind-set above is consistent with the criticism of DRR in the sense that it is concerned with 
historical hazards, planning for the short-term and addressing known risk (Few et al., 2006). 
Fundamentally, INGOs are concerned with implementation, and it appears as though the 
driver for developing toolkits has come from a need to address how to do adaptation or DRR, 
rather than perhaps an initial objective assessment of the risk.  Moreover, the beliefs behind 
climate change and DRR mean that toolkits for assessing multi-hazards already embody 
assumptions about the type of hazards and their dynamic nature, with anticipating future risk 
and emergent threats being considered much more in the context of CCA tools.    
4.3 Hazard assessments: a critique of approaches and methods 
Interviewees were asked about their toolkits for PHVCA in the context of assessing hazards, 
with specific questions on organisational toolkits posed if the interviewee had access to them 
prior to interview.  With regard to the CCA tools, some are classed as climate screening tools, 
in other words reviewing development strategies against possible climate change; however all 
but one of the tools discussed adopts participatory processes for hazard assessment.   
Most interviewees indicated that toolkits are designed to emphasise the importance of 
assessing and understanding root causes of vulnerability, utilising participatory processes of 
assessment and resulting in an action plan that communities can implement to begin reducing 
their risk.  Toolkit users were perceived to be NGO programme staff or partners.  These groups 
will facilitate the process of PHVCA with the community, sometimes with the assistance of 
trained community representatives8.  All but one interviewee9 stated that their methods adopt 
a multi-hazard approach, the exception being due to the fact that their tool was specifically 
designed to analyse large-scale donor programmes for climate risk.  The two interviewees in 
                                                          
8
 Team Leader – Climate Change and Hunger Team (INGO C); Director – DRR and Community Resilience 
9
 Team Leader – Climate Change Programme (Research Institute A) 
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the Philippines particularly emphasised multi-hazards as an integral part of their approach.  
Only two agencies had not developed their own set of tools, although one of them was in the 
process of doing so (Table 4.1).  Each toolkit reflects the ethos and approach of the 
organisation and/or individual developing the approach, but most adopt similar methods: 
‘A lot of these things have arisen naturally within the different countries and I think the 
whole participatory movement in development is pretty much worldwide, thanks to 
[Robert] Chambers.  I mean this is really an attempt to have a uniform approach 
throughout the organisation. [NGO] have their one, [NGO] have their way of doing 
things.  And when you look at them so much of it is common to each other.  It is all 
based on enquiry, participatory enquiry…for communities.’ (Project Manager – 
Livelihoods and Disaster Management, Development INGO) 
The limited feedback on toolkits interviewees shared was generally good and CCA toolkits 
were particularly well received, but some bias was noted as CCA toolkits were often 
implemented in areas already identified as being vulnerable to climate change:   
‘we don’t specifically ask about climate hazards – we ask about hazards in general; but 
what we found in most of the communities where we’ve used the handbook is that 
climate hazards tend to top the list and that’s somewhat biased because we [were] 
obviously using it in places where we identified climate as an issue.’ (Adviser – CCA, HD 
INGO C) 
Interviewees perceived their toolkits as flexible guidance to be adapted for particular contexts, 
with the DRR Policy Coordinator from INGO G particularly emphasising the process rather than 
the tools.  However, couching risk in certain terms challenges the claim that the tools are 
designed to capture multi-hazards: 
‘We, again like a lot agencies, we realise things move on, the times have changed, the 
challenges are new, they are more intense, new strategies, new threats require new 
responses, and that was why we thought vulnerability and capacity analysis with the 
climate focus, with the climate lens, was necessary.’ (Team leader - Climate change and 
Hunger team, INGO C) 
This same interviewee also claimed that: 
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‘It kind of leaves the discussion open, so for example in the participatory exercises we 
don’t specifically ask about climate hazards, we ask about hazards in general’ (Team 
leader - Climate change and Hunger team, INGO C) 
However, the assumption that methods are neutral and will therefore capture all hazards does 
not always transfer from the developer to the implementer owing to the fact that toolkits are 
designed for a particular purpose.  One interviewee noted that their tool, which is packaged as 
a tool for CCA, was designed to be quite open to incorporation of multiple hazards, but a 
member of staff in-country implied that it had been used solely in the context of climate 
change:   
‘So far we haven’t – or maybe speak for myself – I haven’t like really used it 
deliberately with the DRR community.’  (Kenyan staff, INGO C)  
In reality, toolkits are designed for a particular purpose and whilst attempts are made to 
capture wider perspectives through cross-department consultation during the development of 
toolkits10, this may not be systematically carried out.  Moreover, this consultation does not 
include hazard specialists. 
The need to adopt a DRR or CCA analytical lens is influenced not only by the institutional and 
organisational paradigms and approaches, as well as the assumptions of the developer, but 
also owing to the need to constrain participatory methods of analysis.  The irony is that 
participatory processes are designed to be unstructured and emergent, yet this very quality 
makes them incompatible with organisational capacities (Twigg and Bottomley, 2011).   The 
challenge appears to be that NGOs are trying to manage the suite of problems faced by 
communities: 
‘one of the challenges that we find that to do good climate change analysis… [and] 
DRR, it’s a heavy process so the challenge when you’re trying to find the kind of silver 
bullet of a tool or process that looks at all risks and all issues [is that] it just becomes 
                                                          
10
 Adviser – DRR (HD INGO H) 
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more and more cumbersome’ (Programme and Policy Management Team Member – 
DRR, INGO F) 
However, the lenses applied to focus assessments may serve to limit multi-hazard assessments 
by, for example, emphasising climate change and climate hazards at the expense of other 
hazards.  Furthermore, framing methods in this manner undermines the assertion of NGOs 
that they are moving toward an integrated approach to risk reduction.  The following 
discussion explores the scale, process and review of hazard assessments. 
4.3.1 Spatial scale of assessments 
Chapter 2 indicated that NGO risk assessments are primarily conducted at the community 
level; however, given that the natural systems that might impact communities go beyond 
these restricted spatial scales, it is necessary to determine whether NGOs are considering this 
wider context.   
All the interviewees with the exception of one (whose tool was designed for project portfolio 
screening for climate change) stated that the hazard assessment would be implemented at the 
community level.  When asked about the implementation of larger (e.g. national) scale 
assessments, it was apparent that most agencies undertake some form of national overview, 
but these pertain more to analysis of the institutional setting and poverty context (cf. Ruiz, 
2010), and only include a broad overview of hazards and risk, which lack analytical depth: 
‘I think we used more the findings on the institutional landscape etc. rather than the 
actual findings on the hazards.’  (Policy and Research Adviser – DRR, HD INGO D) 
Two interviewees11 suggested that the PHVCA process applied at any scale.  INGO G’s Policy 
Coordinator for DRR said that they do address national risk assessments and another 
interviewee gave the example of prioritisation of countries based on one factor – climate 
change risk – rather than a multi-hazard analysis:  
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 Humanitarian Team Director (HD INGO A) and DRR Regional Programme Manager (HD INGO B) 
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‘Those 17 [priority countries] are the ones in climate hot spots – we’ve done a sort of 
scanning exercise using various sources of climate risk, global climate risk analysis and 
come up with these sort of key areas’ (Adviser – Climate Change Programme, INGO D) 
In general, regional or national level assessments of multi-hazards are not implemented, and 
hazard profiles are, therefore, not readily utilised as a means of identifying areas to target 
projects:  
‘Risk as a sort of measure of strategic prioritisation has not been one of the primary 
things we sort of, we use, and we still don’t use it and that’s largely what I am trying to 
bring into being I guess.  It’s more a social analysis, socio-political analysis that doesn’t 
necessarily look at the issue of risk that would determine where and how we develop 
development programmes.’ (Director – DRR and Community Resilience, INGO I) 
Two interviewees12 implied that those poorest would also be most at risk, however the Climate 
Change Adviser at INGO B challenged this assumption, and two others13 emphasised the need 
to understand what people are at risk from.  But, one interviewee emphasised that national 
risk assessments would make little difference as to where they support projects owing to their 
working through partners:  
‘I mean say you did a really comprehensive hazard assessment that went into the 
country strategy papers, if the partners aren’t saying that you know whatever it is a 
real hazard I don’t think we would, we might use that information to inform partners 
but I don’t know how much it would change things…’ (Adviser – CC, INGO B) 
Arguably, however, this should not negate an INGO from having a thorough understanding of 
the multi-hazard profile of the country within which they work, thereby identifying where 
they, as INGOs, should be focusing and not just basing this decision on where their existing 
partners are working.  One organisation14 is moving towards more comprehensive assessments 
of risk at the national level (and HD NGO H are also considering this) but this appears more to 
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 Programme Policy Management Team Member – DRR (INGO F); Adviser – CC Policy (Development 
INGO) 
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 Adviser – CCA (INGO D); Adviser – DRR (INGO E) 
14
 INGO I 
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have stemmed from the work and passion of an individual rather than changes in the approach 
of the organisation. 
Discussions around natural system scales, particularly water basin management, emerged 
during the interviews.  Three15 interviewees noted the need to consider processes and 
interventions upstream of communities in terms of how these might affect the hazard profile; 
however one of these interviewees represents a conservation organisation and noted that 
these organisations tend to work on much larger spatial (ecosystem) scales than those 
adopted by humanitarian organisations.  In the context of climate change, agencies were 
growing more aware of the need to consider the wider environmental context, which could be 
an important enabler for their assessments to capture multi-hazard characteristics like 
amplification (see Chapter 2).  The DRR consultant mentioned a need to address this ‘middle 
scale’, advocating for something like a watershed approach and interviewees in INGOs C and H 
discussed ecosystem approaches.  Three interviewees16 indicated that NGOs needed to better 
their assessment of the environmental impacts of their work: 
‘Most humanitarian development NGOs would probably admit that we’ve all neglected 
the role of environment as a risk factor and as a solution and I don’t know of many 
agencies that systematically do good environmental impact assessment [EIA]...but to 
do a proper EIA takes a long time – three weeks and it’s a costly process.  It’s a 
challenge for us.’ (Programme and Policy Management Team Member – DRR, INGO F) 
The above admission suggests that agencies are not committed to the time frames of rigorous 
analysis and that there is a gap in their capacity to assess the environmental processes that 
might affect the incidence of natural hazards and explain changes in local climate.   
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 Adviser – Climate Change (INGO B); Project Manager – Livelihoods and Disaster Management 
(Development INGO); Team Leader – Climate Adaptation and DRR (Conservation NGO) 
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 DRR Programme Policy Team Member (INGO F); the Kenyan representative of INGO C; Director – 
Disaster Management Team (INGO H) 
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One interviewee17 felt that a larger scale analysis would mean losing sight of the differential 
impacts of disasters across communities, whilst another felt that, in order to determine the 
wider context, it is necessary to aggregate detailed local information:  
‘Ecosystem management I guess is a large scale concept, but I think, you know you can 
see it as sort of an aggregate of much more localised interventions and so that’s sort of 
the approach we took, the analysis only makes sense, so it really holds together if you 
get this detailed information that ends up being very community...’ (Senior Researcher 
– CC, Research Institute B) 
However, this presupposes that all communities will be consulted in a region, which has been 
found not to be the case (van Aalst et al., 2008).   
Furthermore, there was a tendency amongst interviewees to blame their inability to change 
their approaches on donor funding or existing structures of working.  However, almost all of 
the initiatives discussed came about owing to the initiative and foresight of individuals working 
within existing systems: 
‘we had just a particularly visionary environmental water engineer who just took it 
upon himself to get some funding and to do some research that became just bigger 
than [our organisation] in many ways because it was received so credibly.  …they 
[UNEP] read this and said “oh my goodness, we understand completely the human 
interface between disasters, drought, conflict and water resources and climate change” 
because it was presented so well and so clearly in this publication and then of course he 
went over to head up UNEP.’ (Director – Disaster Management Team, INGO H) 
There is, therefore, an implication that NGOs need to employ the right people: this individual 
not only had technical knowledge but also processed the particular ‘visionary’ qualities that 
meant he was able to convey this knowledge in an understandable manner.  The above 
example also emphasises the problem of retaining staff with technical skills. 
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 Adviser – DRR (INGO E) 
142 
 
Generally the INGO interviewees appear not to be assessing hazards and risks at the natural 
system scale.  The process of multi-hazard assessment discussed by interviewees primarily 
focused on the community scale, as it is driven by the need to understand the local context. 
4.3.2 The process of (multi-)hazard assessment 
In general, it appeared that the PHVCA process is more concerned with vulnerability, capacity 
and, particularly, generating action than it is with hazard assessment.  Two interviewees 
commented on this as they emphasised the importance of not focusing on hazards18:   
‘I think [the point] was actually to go beyond the hazard data which obviously everyone 
likes to create which is nice and scientific and easy to define but even getting 
agreement in most countries on what the poverty indicators should be is really quite 
political.’ (Team Leader – CC, Research Institute B) 
Only one participant19 (although it was implied by three20 others) questioned whether the 
emphasis on vulnerability had been at the expense of adequate hazard assessment:   
‘I would say, apart from in the Philippines and maybe Bangladesh, we’ve…had a few 
weaknesses…because we haven’t focused enough on the hazards, particularly multi-
hazard assessments’  (Adviser – Policy and Research, DRR, INGO D) 
The first quotation emphasises the misplaced perception that hazard analysis is easy, which is 
in contrast to the challenges of assessing multi-hazards identified in Chapter 2.  The quotation 
therefore implies a lack of appreciation for what multi-hazard assessments entail.  Moreover, 
the first quotation points to a slight anti-science bias, which emerged subtly and, at times, 
more obviously during the Head Office interviews.  During the interviews, there emerged a 
number of biases that influence the process of hazard assessment, which are discussed below. 
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 Team Leader – Climate Change (Research Institute B); Policy Coordinator – DRR (INGO G) 
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 Adviser – DRR Policy and Research (INGO D) 
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 Adviser – Climate Change (INGO B); Adviser – Climate Change (INGO D); Director – DRR and 
Community Resilience (INGO I) 
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Most interviewees described similar community-based participatory methods for the purposes 
of data collection and analysis.  Methods for identifying hazards over space and time include 
timelines, seasonal calendars, transect walks, hazard mapping and hazard prioritisation.  The 
emphasis on facilitation in the process of hazard assessment emerged throughout the 
interview narratives: 
‘…you have to have very strong facilitation to make the link back to the hazard.’ 
(Director – DMT, INGO H) 
When asked what information is important to include in the assessment of hazards, those who 
could answer noted hazard parameters including frequency, intensity and duration.  In 
particular, one interviewee, whose organisation has taken a more hazard focused approach to 
assessment, noted a variety of parameters, however their hazard-focused approach did not 
resonate across the interviews: 
‘...in terms of characterisation, there are so much time elements...from the warning 
signs for warning speed of [onset] also frequency, period <unclear> these are all time 
element[s] – because this is where you can prepare for your contingency plan.’ (Adviser 
– DRR, INGO E) 
Through the historical perspective of the community, multi-hazards can emerge, but 
subsequent analysis constitutes a series of individual hazard assessments with little regard for 
the interrelations between hazards: 
‘...So starting off with the hazard assessment and then going through the various steps 
in terms of understanding vulnerabilities to that hazard and then looking at another 
hazard and this sort of iterative process that would over time highlight what are the 
vulnerabilities that are fundamental to address regardless of whichever hazard we’re 
focused upon in our analysis’ (DRR Consultant) 
As noted above, the emphasis is upon identifying vulnerabilities common to more than one 
hazard.  However, DRR Adviser for INGO E emphasised the need for solutions that are very 
hazard specific, rather than a description of generalities, but this very hazard focused approach 
to the PHVCAs was not representative of the rest of the interviewees.   
144 
 
The identified hazards are subsequently ranked through a prioritisation exercise.  Interviewees 
noted that hazard prioritisation would tend to result in the consideration of the top three 
hazards, but that at times only the top hazard would be considered21. The quotation below 
exemplifies the constraints this imposes upon the analysis of multiple hazards since the 
organisation in question frame their assessment on the possibility of only five different hazards 
occurring and then focus on the top three, or the single most dominating threat as is perceived 
by the community:   
‘Well, we sort of ask about hazards in a few different ways, it’s a bit of a triangulation 
but I think the most interesting one for prioritisation is the vulnerability matrix...we ask 
for you know five hazards and five most important resources and then they do the 
ranking and then we will ask, ‘what are the three priority hazards out of those five?... 
So that’s the key one, but then we also look at the hazard map, so if a hazard is coming 
up in all those different discussions, than it’s clear that that’s one of the bigger ones, 
even though that’s not very scientific, it’s very qualitative approach.’ (Adviser – CCA, 
INGO C) 
Since the PHVCA process is solution driven, the emphasis is upon identifying the top hazard to 
address; although, in reality, it was noted that the selected hazard may also be driven by the 
assumptions or biases of the partner or project managers22.  Section 4.2 elucidated 
institutional bias, including assumptions agencies make regarding the priority hazard and the 
decisions regarding where to implement projects.  Furthermore, one interviewee noted that 
the outcome of the PHVCA may be influenced by the organisational remit of the implementing 
NGO: 
‘Nearly all organisations have a kind of organisational niche, something that they want 
to be known for and they think they do better…so…I really stress the need to sort of 
plan and differentiate between facilitating and brokering a process of community 
analysis…and not prejudicing…what action comes out of that.’ (Programme Policy 
Management Team Member, INGO F) 
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 Adviser – DRR (INGO H) 
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 Climate Change Policy Adviser (Development INGO) 
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Bias might also emerge from the individuals designing the toolkits (Section 4.2) as well as those 
facilitating the process, owing to their assumptions (and uncertainty) about different hazards: 
‘So it is also [a] very important tool for us but it’s not just about climate change it is 
about environmental degradation, it is about disaster risk; but obviously mainly looking 
at disaster risk from a hydro-meteorological perspective rather than necessarily a 
seismic, because obviously prediction of seismic is quite difficult.’ (Research and Policy 
Officer, INGO H) 
However, participants23 also noted the difficulty of managing communities’ expectations with 
regard to what concerns the NGO will be able to assist them in addressing; thus prioritising is a 
means of limiting these expectations.  
The process of prioritisation is essentially based on the community’s perception of the threat 
from different hazards, comparing characteristics such as frequency and intensity or 
sometimes utilising a vulnerability matrix or pair-wise ranking; although at times the 
prioritisation of hazard will just consist of a conversation with the community24.  As noted by 
five25 interviewees, the prioritisation is, consequently, largely qualitative, with two 
interviewees emphasising that it is not underpinned by science26: 
‘Generally people are happy with [the method] and we’re clear, it’s not scientific, it’s 
consensus.’ (Adviser – Environmental Sustainability, INGO H) 
The participant from Kenya (INGO C) said that feedback from partners indicated that they 
wanted more quantitative measures and they also criticised the tool they used because 
prioritisation of three hazards was too constricting.  Furthermore, in environments where 
hazards might reoccur over different time periods, it becomes questionable whether these top 
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 Adviser – DRR (INGO B) 
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 The Climate Change Programme Adviser (INGO D) says that these are simply listed; the CCA Adviser 
(INGO C) emphasises that it is a very qualitative approach, based on what emerges from discussions with 
the community. 
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 CCA Adviser (INGO C); Kenya staff (INGO C); DRR Adviser (INGO E); CC Policy Adviser (Development 
INGO) 
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 Adviser – Environmental Sustainability (INGO H); Adviser – CCA (INGO C) 
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three hazards can be rigorously determined.  Two interviewees27 noted that because the 
process relies upon community knowledge it may be strongly influenced by the occurrence of 
the most recent event or seasonality of events28:  
‘[earthquakes] happen very, very rarely if at all.  But it was extraordinary because the 
affect it had on the psyche of the people and in terms of what they … considered as the 
most sort of imminent hazards was absolutely identified as an earthquake in the 
months following that particular incident; whereas we’re working with communities 
who are living on the banks of a river which floods all the time’ (Translator (formally in 
programme team) providing additional information as requested by Regional 
Programme Manager – DRR, INGO B)  
Such a perception of risk poses a challenge to the objective identification and prioritisation of 
hazards, which is also challenging owing to differences in frequency of occurrence and the 
impact of different hazards: 
‘So essentially we do rank them but whether we rank them in a systematic way, I don’t 
think we do.  I am just thinking of the situation in Haiti now and we have obviously got 
an earthquake which is a rare event and yet the country is sort of afflicted every year 
by hurricanes so how do you balance your intervention.’ (Policy Coordinator – DRR, 
INGO G)  
Compounding this is the challenge of managing the emerging multitude of non-extreme events 
faced by the community (the day-to-day hazards) that readily surface during the hazard 
assessment process29.  Lastly, the community are not passive in their participation.  The DRR 
Adviser at INGO B noted that, at times, a community may manipulate the process so as to 
ensure it serves what they want, which may not necessarily lead to a reduction in risk.  Thus, in 
spite of the intentions of the developers, it appears that the design of toolkits, compounded by 
biases from organisations and individuals, hinders the application of a multi-hazard approach 
to PHVCA.  However, it is important to note that the in-country interviewees placed less 
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 Regional Programme Manager – DRR (INGO B) and Policy and Research Adviser – DRR (INGO D) 
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 Policy and research adviser – DRR (INGO D) 
29
 Project Manager – Livelihoods and Disaster Management (Development INGO) 
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emphasis on the tools and more upon the process of PHVCA, as similarly observed by Twigg 
and Bottomley (2011).   
There was some acknowledgement of the limits of current approaches; Climate Change and 
Hunger Team Leader (INGO C) noted the need to develop a more methodological tool to 
ensure that hazards and vulnerabilities would not be missed, whilst four others30 mentioned 
that improvements were needed in the field of multi-hazard assessment, particularly regarding 
concerns over unanticipated, emergent threats: 
‘I think in fairness this [tool] does keep the pages open, it does allow for genuine 
inclusion of every possible threat or hazard that the community might come up with. 
And we have committed to address that as far as possible, but I think we can do more, I 
don’t know how, but I think we need to, not start from scratch, but we need to consider 
wider hazards, wider multiple hazards, and multiple threats that we might not expect. 
And that we might not even expect the community to come up with.’ (Team Leader – 
Climate Change and Hunger, INGO C) 
It was apparent, however, that unknown future scenarios were largely considered a concern 
related to climate change and not other hazards.  However, the three DRR in-country 
interviewees discussed climatic and geophysical hazards in more equal terms and did not 
appear to make the same distinctions between DRR and CCA as those at Head Office.   
Given the emphasis upon integrated risk and, moreover the emphasis upon climate change, it 
appears that agencies are attempting to move towards a better understanding of the links 
between hazards, the environment (i.e. conditions that exacerbate risk), vulnerability and 
interventions.  Such a shift in approach presents an opportunity for the interrelations between 
hazards to be more readily identified; however, whether this emerges within PHVCAs appears 
to rely heavily upon facilitation as illustrated in the example of the challenge of linking 
vulnerability and environmental degradation to an increased frequency of disasters: 
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 Adviser – Climate Change (INGO B); Policy and Research Adviser – DRR (INGO D); Team Leader – 
Climate Change and Hunger Team (INGO C); Director – DRR and Community Resilience (INGO I) 
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‘…and an increased population has actually contributed to the increased land 
degradation and consequently more hazards, more flooding and landslides. So we 
might easily make that connection but often you will find that communities haven’t 
made that connection and once that’s made, and…they start seeing how they can 
reduce it, [it] is quite easy.’  (Adviser – DRR, INGO B) 
In relying on facilitators to help communities make these connections, there is the implication 
that facilitators have sufficient knowledge and understanding to identify these connections 
themselves; yet discussion regarding secondary or interrelated hazards did not greatly emerge 
during the interviews.  However, some acknowledgement of hazard interrelations emerged 
during interviews when participants mentioned earthquake and rainfall triggered landslides31, 
‘secondary or tertiary hazards’32, the influence of climate change on hazards33 and that there 
might be no one single cause34 of a disaster.  Consideration of the cascading effect of hazards 
was particularly apparent during the interviews with Philippine participants:  
‘…typhoon result to a multi-hazard: from typhoon of course we have rainfall, we have 
landslides, from landslides we have these flood the inundation of flash flood and from 
that another secondary or tertiary hazards will come there are other diseases after the 
disaster like we have this sickness related to diarrhoea…’ (Adviser – Climate Change 
and DRM programme, INGO G)  
But, in spite of these interrelations being mentioned, it was unclear how these might be 
accounted for in the PHVCA process since interviewees discussed them in general terms:  
‘…we try and make sure that community does really view things, everything from a 
multi-hazard perspective.  But…for example in North India in Behar they say it’s floods, 
…and yet they are in [the] seismic floor zone and that’s because nothing has happened 
in living memory of great significance and…the problem is…one really big earthquake… 
and you might get a re-alignment of the rivers and you might get a different set of 
flooding anyway, it might be that one hazard triggers another so …We try and make 
sure it is as multi-hazard orientated as possible.’ (Director, DMT, INGO H) 
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 Adviser – Climate Change Programme (INGO D); Project Manager – Livelihoods and Disaster 
Management (Development INGO) 
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 Adviser – Climate Change and DRM Programme (INGO G, Philippines) 
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 Adviser – DRR (INGO E) 
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 Adviser – Climate Change Policy (Development INGO) 
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The above quotation also hints at the limits of community knowledge for multi-hazard 
assessments.     
Given the emphasis on community knowledge for the purpose of identifying and prioritising 
hazards, historically, the PHVCA process has not been particularly successful at anticipating 
disasters:   
‘one of the weak links we saw with [PHVCA] was that it wasn’t reviewing things, it 
wasn’t reviewing the future enough and it was doing a lot of past historical assessment 
based on date test historically when we don’t know, we are in un-chartered territory 
with a lot of these…climate variabilities.’ (Director – DMT, NGO H) 
Therefore, an integral part of the PHVCA should include reviewing and updating the 
assessment at regular intervals.   
4.3.3 Reviewing assessments: changing hazard profiles over time 
Identifying multi-hazards is constrained by the extent and degree to which the community can 
reliably remember disasters, especially when specific data like frequency and impact are 
required.   Two35 respondents noted that the process of prioritisation was time dependent and 
often dominated by the most recent event and seasonality of events: 
‘We had one partner in Nicaragua which came up with a really nice chart.  They 
actually had it on a timescale so they were prioritising not just, not just giving us a one 
off answer that actually this is the most important thing, they were saying well it 
depends on the time.’ (Adviser - Climate Change Programme, INGO D) 
Reviewing and updating the hazard and risk profile of communities should be an essential 
component of the PHVCA process, owing to the fact that interviewees feel that PHVCAs are 
not particularly good at anticipating future risk36.  However, the review of PHVCAs constituted 
the ideal rather than the norm and would, in reality, involve reviewing the interventions, 
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 Regional Programme Manager – DRR (INGO B); Adviser - Climate Change Programme (INGO D) 
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 Director – DMT (INGO H) 
150 
 
action plan and monitoring vulnerability, rather than reflecting upon any changes in the hazard 
profile:  
‘But I don’t think that the actual assessment would be done again but it is a good point 
that if you are in a location where the hazards and risks are changing through climate 
change or anything else then perhaps the assessment should be repeated as well.’ 
(Adviser – DRR, INGO H) 
However, reviewing hazards appeared to be more established amongst two of the in-country 
interviewees37, owing to their emphasis upon the process of PHVCA (rather than tools).  They 
emphasised that it will be continually updated (or at least monitored regularly) by the 
community: 
‘Tools are tools but we have to make the tools a living document to make it useful to 
affect change in the community,’ they then go on to say:  ‘…we do the risk assessment 
but once we implement the project there is a continuing evaluation because risk is 
variable, it’s changing, people think that’s right at the time but we do not know that 
there could be emerging hazards...’ (Adviser – Climate Change and DRM Programme, 
INGO G) 
Six interviewees38 mentioned baseline monitoring; however these often pertained to 
monitoring the project rather than the hazard profile.  Moreover, the process of reviewing the 
hazard assessment appears to be informal rather than a prescribed component of the PHVCA 
process39.  Part of the problem is reliance upon good, sustained, facilitation and that review 
involving the NGO is only possible within the duration of the project funding (which may be as 
short as a year), which is why the DRR Adviser for INGO B emphasised the need to instil this 
within the community.  Moreover, institutional funding comes with a strict set of criteria for 
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Livelihoods and Disaster Management (both Development INGO) 
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monitoring and evaluation40, focusing more upon changes in vulnerability and capacity owing 
to project activities rather than encouraging monitoring of the hazard profile.   
In spite of these organisational constraints, the lack of review indicates a poor appreciation of 
the dynamic nature of hazards and risks in general, supported by the fact that the majority of 
interviewees only emphasised the concept of change in the context of a changing climate:  
‘I mean adaption is not a static state whereas [PHVCA] and DRR community based DRR 
tends to…result in plans that don't necessarily change so how do, how do communities 
learn on an iterative principle you know repeatedly understanding how their climate's 
changing and how do they take decisions basically, flexibly to sort of deal with that 
uncertainty.’  (Programme Policy Management Team Member – DRR, HD INGO F) 
Although the perspective of a single conservation NGO is included in the study, it was observed 
that these organisations intrinsically adopt longer-time frames and larger geographical scales 
in their analyses: 
‘the conservation sector looks at projects from a very long time horizon, like our 
planning framework is like 20 to 50 years. And like really big scales, like we talked 
about earlier. You know they look at like satellite imagery and see how forest cover has 
changed over time, which is totally different than how humanitarian organisations 
work.’ (Team Leader – Climate Adaptation and DRR, Conservation NGO) 
Given that conservation NGOs are addressing DRR, there is perhaps an opportunity for 
overlap.  The Conservation NGO above produced a DRR training package for humanitarian 
NGOs, however it does not address how to conduct a multi-hazard assessment as the 
Conservation NGO representative stated that they assume humanitarian NGOs know how to 
implement these.  The findings of this research have, however, challenged the adequacy of the 
multi-hazard assessments currently being employed by INGOS. 
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4.3.4 Summary of multi-hazards in PHVCAs 
Conceptually, toolkits are designed to incorporate more than one hazard.  In reality, the 
approaches adopted and the current emphasis on climate change challenges the integrity of 
the claim to a multi-hazard approach.  The PHVCA process lacks a systematic means of 
addressing hazard interrelations and is constrained by the temporal and spatial scales of 
analysis, which reflect the emphasis on community knowledge.  The emphasis on this single 
information and knowledge source is discussed in the following section. 
4.4 The role of science and community knowledge 
Community knowledge was emphasised as the essential source of information for the PHVCA.  
According to in-country interviewees, the reliance on community knowledge is due to 
communities’ extensive experience of hazards.  Head Office participants particularly 
emphasised the role of community knowledge in empowering communities.  Generally, 
however, all interviewees highly valued community members’ awareness of their own 
situation and emphasised the ideal approach to PHVCA, which is to ensure that communities 
converse, prioritise and identify solutions to address risk free from the influence of the NGO: 
‘So what I’m saying is that communities, they know already their situation, they [have]  
their contacts, they have the solutions, sometimes we could bring our solutions but it’s 
not probably appropriate so their solutions is to also cope by their culture and cope by 
their situation and sometimes we fail to see that’ (Adviser – DRR, INGO E) 
Only one interviewee challenged the above view, suggesting that NGOs are in a unique 
position as outsiders to support the community in identifying solutions: 
‘…frequently the NGOs get so blinkered that we are…the voice of the people.  Rubbish 
we are not the voice of the people at all.  We are not and we never will be and we 
should recognise the advantageous position that we hold which is to be able to give 
that macro overview and saying, in light of that and in light of our knowledge of this 
changing context out here, the solution is not just to empower the community to find 
the solutions to its problems’ (Director – DRR and Community Resilience, INGO I) 
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This perspective emphasises the role INGOs might have in bringing external knowledge and 
expertise, for example hazards scientists, into the process of building community resilience.   
A few interviewees identified limits of community knowledge, including the fact that it is 
constrained by communities’ perceptions of hazards41, influenced by the most recent disaster 
(noted in Section 4.3.2), that communities are more concerned with day to day risks42 and the 
fact that communities do not know everything43.  The greatest emphasis upon the limits of 
community knowledge emerged in the context of climate change, the concern being that 
community knowledge is becoming redundant in a changing climate44: 
Climate change means hazards not predictable anymore – participatory processes can 
be useless – community were not knowing things.  (Director – Humanitarian Team, 
INGO A) 
 
A number of participants noted that focus group discussions with the community are meant to 
be (but are not always45) supported by interviews with ‘key informants’ within the community.  
When asked whether these would include any outside expertise, participants gave the 
example of local government, other NGOs, civil society organisations or agricultural extension 
workers, owing to the fact that many of the programmes have a rural focus.  Agricultural 
extension is, by the simplest definition, the provision of research and agricultural education to 
farmers and communities for a variety of purposes, including agricultural development, 
community resource development, group promotion and cooperative organisational 
development (Rivera et al., 2001).  McCall and Peters-Guarin (2012) describe agricultural 
extension as the ‘first doorkeeper’ between external science and local knowledge, but it was 
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 Regional Programme Manager – DRR (INGO B) 
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 Policy Coordinator – DRR (INGO G) 
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 Director – DRR and Community Resilience (NGO 1); Adviser – CC Policy (Development NGO); Director -  
Disaster Management Team (INGO H; Adviser – Environmental Sustainability (INGO H) 
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 Adviser – CC Policy (Development INGO); Director – Humanitarian Team (INGO A); Team Leader – CC 
and Hunger Team (INGO C) 
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 Noted by Director – DRR and Community Resilience (INGO I) 
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apparent from the interviews that external expertise does not tend to extend to hazard 
scientists (cf. Twigg, 2004): 
‘It would usually be people within the community itself like the tutors, medical people, 
people in other NGOs, community leaders, government officials.  So yeah, I mean I am 
not aware of a situation where they have gone and talked to hazard specialists in the 
university or something like that.’ (Adviser – DRR, INGO H) 
Moreover, the information derived from these outside experts tended to be more for the 
purposes of supporting solutions and adaptation options, rather than for input into the hazard 
assessments.   
As specifically noted by four interviewees, the NGO facilitators are perceived to have a role in 
providing information, owing to their perceived obligation to highlight threats to the 
community that ‘they’ve just not had the opportunity to get informed about’ (Climate Change 
Policy Adviser, Development INGO).  This assumes, however, that NGOs and facilitators have 
sufficient knowledge and access to relevant information to inform the community and it also 
contracts interviewees’ claims that the community know the situation best.   
Chapter 2 emphasised that the process of PHVCA is designed to incorporate secondary 
information, as supported by the following statement:  
‘In theory you should spend as much, if not more, time before you actually get to a 
community doing secondary data collection and understanding you know 
everything…on climate change and hazards, hazard profiling you should have all that 
information and really just be going through certain aspects with communities; and 
you know helping them understand, making that information accessible to them.  But 
it's not done that often very, very well I'd say.’  (Programme Policy Management Team 
Member – DRR, INGO F) 
One interviewee46 emphasised that it is not up to the NGO to conduct ‘volcanic’ or 
‘earthquake’ hazard assessments but that they would rely on ascertaining this information 
                                                          
46
 Project Manager – Livelihoods and Disaster Management (Development NGO) 
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from elsewhere.  Four other interviewees47 mentioned the use of secondary information, but it 
was apparent that the application of this information constitutes an ideal rather than a reality: 
‘I mean they might draw upon secondary data sources as well if there are climatic or 
scientific records for that area people should be making use of this as well but it’s 
primarily based on the community’s information.’ (Adviser – DRR, INGO H) 
As indicated above, the utilisation of secondary information emerged primarily in the context 
of CCA48.  The emphasis on ‘internal’ (community), rather than ‘external’, expertise and the 
limited incorporation of secondary data implies that science is not readily incorporated in the 
context of hazard assessments, but the following discussion explores this further.   
4.4.1 Engagement and utilisation of science: the dominance of climate science  
Although all interviewees valued science, its utilisation was discussed primarily in the context 
of CCA (even by DRR specialists), particularly in the case of Head Office participants.  Two 
examples of engaging with climate scientists were shared.  Firstly, the Kenyan representative 
(INGO C) described engagement with local climate scientists.  However, the mismatch between 
the decadal scale of this information and the outlook of communities was noted (Walker et al., 
2014): 
‘...we are not bringing the international, the meteorological prediction into the 
communities; to be perfectly honest I don’t think it’s served any purpose. You know 
what they’re interested in is three weeks: “I got the seeds, I’ve tilled the land, we are 
ready to go, do I plant or not? Give me a three weeks forecast.”’ (Team Leader – 
Climate Change and Hunger Team, INGO C) 
The Climate Change Programme Adviser at INGO D discussed farmers making decisions based 
on climate science, noting that these have admittedly focused more upon seasonal 
forecasting.  This practice was also noted by INGO B’s Climate Change Adviser with regard to 
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 Adviser – CCA (INGO C); Adviser – DRR (INGO H); Project Manager – Livelihoods and Disaster 
Management (Development INGO) 
48
 Programme Policy Management Team Member – DRR (INGO F) 
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their organisation’s experiences.  In addition, three49 interviewees noted that climate scientists 
need information from the local community.   
Utilising climate science appeared more an exercise in raising awareness of climate change 
rather than utilising the data to inform assessments.  This approach was in part due to the 
associated uncertainty of this data, but three interviewees 50 also perceived the application of 
climate science in this manner to be necessary:  
‘...you are like: well the science isn’t really telling us enough, or you know it’s not really 
on a scale that’s useful enough to inform a decision making so...we wanted users to 
really make a point of reading what’s out there, even if it’s not a, you know, it’s not 
information that’s necessarily digestible or particularly useful at a community level, just 
to sort of familiarize themselves with the quote unquote science is saying about climate 
change in Sahel for example. Maybe the jury’s out and that’s kind of frustrating but it’s 
still good to know that the jury’s out, you know.’ (Senior Researcher – Climate Change, 
Research Institute B) 
In contrast, another three51 interviewees disputed the use of very general information like that 
described above, emphasising the need for precise information that is useful to communities 
for the purpose of planning.  In fact, the Climate Change Programme Adviser at the same 
organisation (INGO D) stated that most of the plans that they have seen are not informed by a 
climate analysis or a PHVCA of any kind.   
Opinion was mixed as to whether communities would directly utilise science.  One respondent 
noted that the community do not need ‘figures’ they just need to know whether or not they 
can plant crops; however two respondents disputed this perception by sharing examples of 
farmers and communities who understand climate science and make decisions based on an 
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 Programme Staff – CCA (INGO C, Kenya) gave the example of community monitored rainfall; Policy 
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 Adviser – Climate Change Programme (INGO D); Kenyan representative (INGO C); Senior Researcher – 
Climate Change (Research Institute B) 
51
 Policy Coordinator – DRR (INGO G); Policy Adviser – Climate Change (Development INGO); Project 
Manager – Livelihoods and Disaster Management (Development INGO) 
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understanding of the uncertainty52.  In the context of integrating science, all but one 
interviewee emphasised that the process should begin with the community’s knowledge. 
In the context of DRR, INGO D’s DRR Policy and Research Adviser noted that their in-country 
partners had demonstrated varying success in integrating science and multi-hazards into their 
programmes: 
‘it was very much again different in each country, and very much down to the program 
office…in the Philippines…she was just so excellent and well-connected…that she 
managed to really bring this kind of scientific multi hazard quite rigorous assessment 
methods and linked those and integrated those with the findings from the community 
assessments…[in Malawi] it was definitely not multi-hazard, very much focused just on 
drought, and …they didn’t really [discuss the Met Office data with the communities], 
but instead focused on community level assessments and gaps with the outcome that 
actually a lot of the DRR work that was being done there was a continuation of the 
same old same old….’ (Policy and Research Adviser – DRR, INGO D) 
Furthermore, during the interviews with in-country representatives, science emerged much 
more in the context of DRR and, without prompting, during the interview with the DRR Adviser 
(INGO D): 
‘– we need to triangulate: well this is the perception of people on hazards, we also 
bring in scientists in the area to have our evidence, to have our facts more scientific.  ’ 
(Adviser – Climate Change and DRM Programme, INGO G) 
One Head Office interviewee and another in-country participant53 shared anecdotes of the 
incorporation of scientific knowledge and expertise in the context of hazard assessments, 
specifically geological surveys that identified previously unknown landslide risk.  These 
examples reflected the initiative of individuals and organisations in-country, rather than a 
sector-wide recognition of the need to engage with scientific experts for the purposes of 
hazard assessment: 
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 Adviser – Climate Change Programme (INGO D); Adviser – Climate Change Adaptation (INGO C); 
Project Manager – Livelihoods and Disaster Management (Development INGO) 
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 Policy and Research Adviser – DRR (INGO D); Adviser – CC and DRM Programme (INGO G) 
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‘Often, the links are sometimes not so clear at first... they [partners] were saying that 
their DRR teams are quite science heavy, in that they will have a geologist…so they are 
quite ‘techy’.  And they said that the interesting thing about that is the PRA approach is 
fine because you need to have that to ensure that the community is confident in the 
whole sort of approach, and they feel it is addressing their priorities.  But there is some 
[hazards] that they don’t know about.  So for instance they frequently uncovered, 
through geological surveys, risks (particularly landslide risks) that were completely 
unknown…sitting right above a village…but through this very scientific surveying 
approach they have uncovered something that people should be aware of.’ (Policy and 
Research Adviser – DRR, INGO D) 
The above quotation emphasises the limits of community knowledge and also indicates the 
interviewee’s initial hesitancy regarding the application of science, indicative of reluctance 
shared by other interviewees.  One interviewee felt that it would not be necessary to ‘bring a 
scientist down to the grass roots to actually participate in the [PHVCA]54’.  Additionally, the 
difficulty for organisations working with partners (and to some extent autonomous regional 
offices) is that it is up to the partner to decide whether or not they engage with external 
expertise, in spite of recommendations from the INGO:  
‘...my experience [of] introducing different partners to different organisations like the 
local UNDP office [is] that they weren’t necessarily connected with and going into the 
district level of governments and government offices...my sort of feeling was I think 
that…the partners I was working alongside, they were very much doing their thing...’ 
(DRR Consultant) 
Thus, there was concern (amongst two Head Office interviewees in particular) as to how the 
process of engaging with scientists would be sustained, with one questioning how 
communities would be able to, for example, pay for a ‘highly trained geologist’55.  At the same 
time, three interviewees acknowledged that they need to improve their engagement with all 
the necessary science since ‘participatory rural appraisal’ (PRA) limits expertise to livelihoods, 
agriculture and climate advice.   
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 Director of the Disaster Manager Team (INGO H) 
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 Adviser – Climate Change Programme (INGO D) 
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4.4.2 Perceived and real barriers to integrating science with community 
knowledge 
All interviewees seemed to value the utilisation of science, but it emerged there were a 
number of perceived and real barriers hindering its integration.  The emphasis on climate 
science meant that interviewees fixated on the problems associated with this type of science.  
Scale, in terms of both poor local data resolution and long-term projections (beyond the length 
of community concerns and NGO project planning) were deemed a blockade to the application 
of climate science.  However, there were barriers identified that apply to science more 
generally.   
Fundamentally, respondents felt that the utilisation of science necessitates simple, local 
analyses that are well communicated to those whom require them.  Communication56, access, 
a lack of local scale information57 and scientific uncertainty were all quoted as hindering the 
integration of (climate) science with community knowledge.  However, the most revealing 
barrier that emerged from the analysis was, however, the uncertainty at both an 
organisational and individual level as to how natural science can be applied and what science is 
of use.  Underlying the barriers is a series of perceptions and assumptions, including 
preconceived ideas about science and scientists and the tendency amongst Head Office 
interviewees to couch science in terms of climate change.  This was partly fuelled by the 
perception that DRR is a much less scientific discipline than CCA: 
‘So [DRR]'s very much more an applied practical discipline and it’s not particularly 
academically rigorous or scientific necessarily; whereas adaptation has really emerged 
from you know from science, from social science and meteorology…’ (Programme 
Policy Management Team Member, INGO F)  
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 Team Leader – CC and Hunger Team (INGO C)  
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 Network Coordinator (Advocacy INGO); Policy Coordinator – DRR (INGO G) 
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What is implied is a relatively poor acknowledgment of the real value of science in hazard 
assessment, in other words the existing knowledge that is arguably easier to utilise than very 
uncertain climate science: 
‘whilst there was much emphasis on climate change science the fact [is] that most of 
its utilisation is in the form of techniques which were already available, such as 
seasonal forecasting, and that perhaps existing science could be more readily utilised 
(rather than new research).’ (Director – DMT, INGO H) 
In general – and specifically noted by the DRR Regional Programme Manager (HD INGO B), the 
Climate Change Team Leader (Research Institute A) and the Director of DMT (HD INGO H) – 
there was the perception amongst the study A interviews that science has to become more 
engaged in the social elements of disasters, be specific to local settings and become more 
understandable.  Head Office NGOs emphasised an ‘action-learning’58 model of research (cf. 
Mercer, 2012) and one respondent questioned how academic discourse could be integrated 
with work so focused on the essential elements between life and death59.  This was also 
reflected by the fact that historically it has been up to the NGO to approach scientists60: 
‘It hasn’t come from universities to the social or the experience in field, their proposal 
comes from us to them.  And the process is that you need to convince them.’ (DRR 
Regional Programme Manager, INGO B)  
However, although not a reflexive stance taken by the majority of the interviewees, two 
interviewees observed that the problem may also lie within NGOs themselves since they are 
primarily comprised of social scientists61:  
‘I was very anti-science…I made a conscious decision early on that actually it wasn’t 
about science, social science was the only way forward; but it is very interesting, NGOs 
are basically made up of social scientists, and it is incredibly how that whole social 
science mentality pervades.’ (Adviser – DRR, INGO B) 
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The above interviewee also suggested that the pervasiveness of social scientists within NGOs 
means that they are not in a position to know what questions they should be asking of 
scientists.  This is also reflected by the underlying uncertainty within NGOs regarding how to 
use science: 
‘we as NGOs I think we’re struggling with that [‘the science thing’] – the simpler the 
better I say and it’s to do with arable land reduction, water table reduction, food crop 
yields – that’s what they [communities] get.’ (Team Leader – Climate Change and 
Hunger, INGO C) 
This limited capacity was recognised by the CC and DRM Programme Adviser (INGO G) from 
the Philippines who stated that:  
‘we are not scientists…[so] why not invite geologists from the…Geoscience and Mines 
Bureau in the Philippines to come.’  (Adviser - CC and DRM Programme Adviser, INGO 
G) 
However, there was also a degree of reluctance amongst some interviewees to engage with 
scientists62 owing to concern over the legitimacy of the participatory process of hazard 
assessment and the need to maintain emphasis on people’s vulnerabilities and capacities for 
action63.  The very participatory approach is juxtaposed against the perceived ‘positivist’64  
mentality of science: 
‘the danger that we see is…where technical aspects become more important…, or 
hazard assessments could become suddenly more important, or suddenly prioritised 
also in terms of funding over analysis of social political economic dynamics that 
underpin peoples vulnerability….’ (Policy and research Adviser – DRR, INGO D) 
Furthermore, as noted by two interviewees65, the process of engagement may not always run 
smoothly: 
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 E.g. Climate Change Team Leader (Research Institute A) 
63
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‘I have seen it go both ways, where you know, sort of the use and the translation of 
science in communicating an environmental threat and to explain changes at the 
community level has been really powerful and very empowering, but I have also seen 
the opposite thing. And so I guess it’s really the role of the person or the medium used 
to sort of do that translation and that communication, that’s just essential.’ (Senior 
Researcher – Climate Change, Research Institute B) 
This quotation emphasises the need for a broker of scientific information.  However the above 
findings question whether NGOs are able to fulfil this communication role. 
4.4.3 The reality of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ information and expertise in PHVCA   
In general, it appears that the knowledge used for hazard assessment is essentially derived 
from the community, supported when possible by agricultural extension workers and local 
government however their input is mostly in terms of building capacity in order to design and 
deliver projects, rather than for the purposes of rigorous assessments of multi-hazards.  
Science is valued but tends to be conceptualised and utilised within the context of climate 
change.  Many real and perceived barriers appear to prevent the greater utilisation of science, 
which is piecemeal in terms of CCA but almost non-existent in the context of DRR.  NGOs have 
a role in facilitating the engagement of external advice and in the provision of information, 
however there appears a general lack of acknowledgement of the limited capacity of NGO 
facilitators (largely social scientists) to provide the necessary information for the purposes of 
(multi-)hazard assessments. 
4.5 Summary 
The findings have highlighted certain characteristics of INGO approaches to multi-hazard 
assessments.  From the limited sample of in-country interviewees, the findings suggest that 
the reality of implementation may be quite different from the experiences and assumptions of 
those at Head Office level.  The three in-country DRR representatives tended to be less 
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concerned with development trends (i.e. ‘DRR’ and ‘CCA’) and toolkits and more focused on 
the process of PHVCA and, especially amongst the Filipino participants, the consideration of 
multi-hazards and the incorporation of scientific information to this end.  However, taking the 
study as a whole, the analysis has resulted in three main findings: 
(1) Agencies are attempting to assess more than one hazard, but are largely not adopting 
a multi-hazard approach that accounts for all natural hazards in a given place and their 
interrelations.  The failure to adopt a true multi-hazard approach is owing to 
constraints upon the process of assessment, including whether it adopts a CCA or DRR 
lens, the utilisation of mostly community knowledge, the reliance upon good 
facilitation and, therefore, facilitators’ and communities’ capacities to identify multi-
hazards and their interrelations. 
(2) Incorporating multi-hazards is constrained by the fact that hazard assessments are 
limited to the community scale and are largely static and therefore might not account 
for distal hazardous processes that could affect the community or changing hazard 
profiles over time. 
(3) Agencies are generally not adopting science for the purpose of multi-hazard 
assessment and, where science is used, it is generally in terms of climate change. 
Given the divergence of opinions between Head Office and in-country representatives, the 
observations above were compared with the results of interviews with local and international 
NGOs in the Philippines.  The results are discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5: NGO hazard assessments in the Philippines 
 
Chapter 5 compares the three main findings from the analysis of the interviews in Chapter 4 
with the findings from the Philippines.  Interviewees in Study A suggested that every 
implementation context is different; as such, the findings from the Philippines are understood 
as being useful for general understanding of hazard assessments but also grounded in the 
context of that country.  Section 4.3 begins with a background to the interviewees, before 
comparing the findings of this analysis with the observations from Study A. 
5.1 Background to interviewees, their organisations and DRR and CCA 
history 
Table 5.1 outlines the participants interviewed, including some background with regard to 
their role and organisation.  The agencies had similar histories with DRR and CCA; most had 
begun implementing DRR projects around 2006.  Local NGO Ph3 had only conducted PHVCAs 
within the last 6 months (April – September 2010).  Interestingly, during the interviews with 
the two local NGOs (Ph 1 and Ph 2), it transpired that their communities had been greatly 
affected by a typhoon (Reming) in November 2006.  As a consequence of this disaster, the 
affected NGOs had begun to focus on addressing DRR: 
‘…[our] DRR work…started shaping up in 2004 it is introduced by one of staff of HD 
INGO D…[he] also introduced us the DRR and…introduced also to us the use of [PHVCA] 
tools but…DRR is already introduced by [local gov. official] to us but…we don’t have any 
interest because during this time we focus on disaster relief.  We started to shake up 
the DRR perspective in office started in 2004 but 2006 (after Reming), become now 
clear picture of what is DRR to us.’ (Point Person – DRR and Community-based DRR 
Programme, Local NGO Ph2) 
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Similarly, Local NGO Ph3 interviewees also described being introduced to DRR by their INGO 
partner but indicated that they had already been thinking along these lines.  The local agencies 
did not tend to have an extensive disaster risk management background; they may have been 
involved in disaster relief (e.g. Local NGO Ph2), but vary in their organisational remits (see 
Table 5.1).  DRR Project Officer (Local NGO Ph3) said that they were trying to move towards 
addressing all their work through a ‘DRR lens’.   
Climate change was not deemed a new phenomenon, with interviewees stating that they 
began discussing it several years ago.  The concepts are differentiated, but it was surprising to 
discern a lack of emphasis on CCA compared with DRR as might have been expected, given this 
emphasis amongst the interviewees in Study A.  In terms of implementation, the majority did 
not appear to draw a major distinction between CCA and their implementation of community-
based DRR activities, and appeared to be addressing climate change in terms of its impact on 
disasters.  However the Executive Director of Local NGO Ph1 perceived CCA to require a 
different approach: 
‘For us, the risk reduction measures are those strategies, activities or mechanisms that 
community are doing in order to… – not adapt – in order to phase, or to handle these 
adverse shocks no? that are coming but we’re seeing that…sometimes this kind of 
actions strategies that we’re doing are not necessarily an adaptation work, but it’s just, 
maybe it’s a tactical or a temporal action for community to respond or to bounce back 
easier into different shocks; but not necessarily yet an adaptation.’ (Executive Director, 
Local NGO Ph1)   
Climate change also emerged as a discussion point for observed hazard and environmental 
changes during the Philippines interviews:  
‘If go to community…the people have own definition of [climate change] because time 
changes according to them.  Noticeably hazard events are becoming more frequent.  
This Mayon volcano used to erupt every 10 years – but it was altered recently: it erupts 
maybe in the span of two to three years.  Rains and floodings are now more frequent 
and just very abrupt unlike before.  That’s what we learn from the community people 
and also us observe as a native of this place.  This hazard typhoon…and others 
becoming more frequent, and the magnitude of destructions becoming wider – very 
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intense.  Before we don’t experience this hot weather, all across the Philippines.’ 
(Regional Programme Manager, Development INGO Ph) 
However there was also more of an awareness compared with Head Office interviewees (Study 
A) of the wider range of natural and human systems that could be causing the observed 
change.  One interviewee1 noted that climate change is ‘quite loosely’ used to explain different 
changes, sharing the example of an area predicted to experience climate change driven 
drought which (along with flooding) is a ‘past and future hazard’.  In this interviewee’s opinion, 
DRR and CCA are ‘all the same’ and ‘difficult to prioritise [as they] all lead to disasters.’   
The comparative lack of emphasis on CCA compared with the findings from Study A may be 
indicative of the lag mentioned during Study A between changes at the international policy 
level and implementation at the practical level2.  Indeed, the NGOs interviewed were still 
getting to grips with CCA and its implications for their work.  
In the following section, the three main findings from Study A are rephrased as questions in 
order to compare them with the analysis of the Philippines interviews.  As the following 
discussion will demonstrate, there were similarities between Studies A and B, but their 
greatest divergence was with regard to the appreciation of multi-hazards and the value and 
integration of science.  Participants did not tend to refer to specific toolkits but adopted very 
similar techniques of hazard and vulnerability assessment to those described during the UK 
interviews, drawing on hazard mapping, timelines and prioritisation methods. 
Interviewees emphasised the process, rather than a rigid set of instructions (tools).  However, 
whilst developers of toolkits in Study A emphasised that tools are not prescriptive and that 
users are encouraged to adapt the tool based on the situation on the ground, these ideas may 
not migrate to those (local partners) implementing toolkits: 
                                                          
1
 Senior Programme Officer 1 (INGO Ph2) 
2
 Director of the Disaster Management Team (INGO H; Study A) 
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‘we would like to use simpler tools but if we can’t help it then we have to [use it] 
because it’s really part of the module but we would find ways to make it simpler and 
more understandable for community because honestly communities are not well 
adjusted to different tools used by local workers and local NGO workers – they just 
think of how they would earn more and how they would run the family.’ (Project 
Officer – DRR, Local NGO Ph3) 
The implication is that, even if the NGO or the community find a component of the PHVCA 
toolkit difficult to implement, they must still use it because it is part of the defined process, 
thus countering the assumptions of developers in Study A that toolkits are used in a flexible 
manner.  However, interviewees tended to emphasise the process of PHVCA more than the 
tools and those interviewees who commented on tools noted the need to adapt the tool based 
on the situation on the ground.  However, the DRR Project Officer and Programme staff at 
Local NGO Ph3 felt that their experience of continually having to adapt tools and augment 
them with additional tools (driven by management) was at the expense of their actual 
understanding of the PHVCA process.  The DRR Project Officer also noted that NGOs have a 
tendency to overly focus on the tools:  
‘I think NGOs have a knack of trying to get every available tool there is and confusing 
ourselves on what tool to use instead of focusing on one effective tool, efficient, simple 
tool – no way can we get every tool there is, try to integrate them and end up with 
complicated integrated tool – one problem of NGOs.’ (Project Officer – DRR, Local NGO 
Ph3) 
What was particularly insightful was that the interviewees from the Local NGO Ph3 included 
both project and programme staff (those implementing) and the executive director, the latter 
being less critical of tools than the project and programme staff.  The last quotation also raises 
the question as to whether NGOs put too much faith in toolkits and do not invest enough in 
facilitation. In the context of multi-hazards and the utilisation of science, it also suggests that 
creating or adapting tools might not be the means of integrating these approaches as it may 
only drive further confusion.   
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Table 5.1 Participants in Study B.  Shaded participants did not contribute to the interview in the main.  HD INGO represents Humanitarian and Development International 
NGO. 
Organisation Operations 
History of Engagement 
Respondent Date of interview Location of interview 
Interview recorded 
(Y/N) DRR CCA 
(HD) INGO Ph1 
(Country Office) 
Direct and local 
partners 
2007 
(‘at programme 
level do not 
have integrated 
CCA’) 
WASH DRR coordinator  17/09/2010 
Makati City, Metro 
Manila 
Y 
(HD) INGO Ph2 
(Country Office)  
Local partners  
(Country office of HD 
INGO D from Study A – 
see table 4.1)) 
(~1980s) 
2006/2007 pilot 
community-
based DRR 
programme 
[Did not specify] 
Senior Programme 
Officer 1 
17/09/2010 
Quezon City, Metro 
Manila 
N 
Senior Programme 
Officer 2 
17/09/2010 
Quezon City, Metro 
Manila 
N 
Local NGO Ph1 
(livelihoods, 
development) 
(partner of INGO 
Ph2) 
Direct (partnership with 
HD INGO Ph2) 
2006 2007 
Executive Director 
 
11/09/2010 Legazpi City, Albay Y 
 
 
 
Local NGO Ph2 
(relief and 
development, 
community 
organisation) 
(partner of INGO 
Ph2) 
 
 
 
Direct (partnership with 
HD INGO Ph2) 
2004 (after 
2006 ‘became 
clear what is 
DRR to us’) 
2007 (some 
discussion in 
2006) 
Point person -  
community-based DRR 
programme 
12/09/2010 Legazpi City, Albay
 
Y (combined 
interview with 
participant below; 
this interviewee did 
the majority of the 
talking) 
Community organiser – 
community-based DRR 
programme 
 
12/09/2010 Legazpi City, Albay Y 
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Local NGO Ph3 
(development, 
environmental) 
Direct 2009 
(2008 
discussion on 
climate change) 
Project Officer - DRR 24/09/2010 
Osamiz, Misamis 
Occidental, Mindanao 
Y 
Programme staff – DRR 25/09/2010 
Osamiz, Misamis 
Occidental, Mindanao 
Y 
Executive Director  27/09/2010 
Osamiz, Misamis 
Occidental, Mindanao 
Y 
Development INGO 
Ph (Country Office) 
Partner [Did not specify] [Did not specify] 
Regional Programme 
Manager – Central  
Philippines  
15/09/2010 Legazpi City, Albay 
Y (combined 
interview with 
participant below; 
this interviewee did 
the majority of the 
talking) 
Programme Officer 15/09/2010 Legazpi City, Albay 
Humanitarian INGO 
Ph (Country Office) 
Direct (and volunteers) 
[Did not specify] 
(2008 project 
on 
strengthening 
community 
preparedness) 
2008 
Head – Disaster 
Management Services 
10/09/2010 Manila, Metro Manila Y 
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5.2 Comparison of findings from studies A and B 
(1) Are agencies looking at more than one hazard, but largely not adopting a multi-hazard 
approach that accounts for all natural hazards in a given place and their interrelations? 
All interviewees emphasised the multi-hazardous nature of the Philippines.  Only one 
interviewee (below) stated that they deliberately focused on one hazard during the PHVCA 
process, which appears embedded in their perception that communities are of limited capacity 
to address more than one hazard, coupled with the fact that this organisation appeared 
relatively new to community-based DRR: 
‘because for them [the community] it is very complicated – we started prioritising first 
for typhoons’ (Regional Programme Manager, Development INGO Ph) 
The NGOs referred to the hazard profiles of the areas within which they work as ‘multi-hazard’ 
and were focusing on natural and increasingly human induced hazards (e.g. INGO Ph2), with 
those working in Mindanao addressing DRR in the context of conflict.  There was, however, an 
emphasis on weather related phenomena (typhoons, flooding, mudslides and drought; more 
frequent hazards) in spite of the fact that the local NGOs were also based in seismically prone 
areas.   
Similar methods to those discussed by Head Office (Study A) participants were adopted for 
assessing multi-hazards:  
‘Timelining can capture multi-hazards, in the story you will remember all those events 
happening – sometimes it’s rare that communities have only one hazard.  It’s mostly 
one or two or three hazards.’ (DRR Programme staff, Local NGO Ph3) 
One interviewee3 said that hazards would be considered only as far back as the last ten years 
noting that this was a decision shared by their academic partner.  Such a time-frame, however, 
does not capture the incidence of less frequent hazards such as strong earthquakes or high-
                                                          
3
 DRR Point Person (Local NGO Ph2) 
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impact volcanic events.  In contrast, the Regional Programme Manager (Development INGO 
Ph) remarked on the fact that the community can remember events from 50 years ago, 
although this interviewee had particularly strong faith in community knowledge.   
The process of prioritising hazards was described as comparing two parameters, for example, 
magnitude, duration and/or frequency (e.g. pairwise ranking4):   
‘They rank the most frequent hazard that occur in their community so base from that 
usually do from 1, 2, 3.’ (Point Person – DRR, Local NGO Ph2)   
One interviewee also suggested that urgency is also a factor5, which is interpreted as the 
urgency to address the hazard.  Similar to the UK-based interviews, standard practice is to 
focus on the top one to three hazards, however in reality it might be that focus is solely upon 
the top hazard.  During the Regional Exchange Workshop, it was observed that one community 
considered only the number one hazard based on severity, frequency and duration.   
Prioritisation is also heavily influenced by the community and NGOs’ capacity to address the 
identified issues: 
‘I suppose for communities they prioritise hazards to respond to – it’s enormous if they 
want to respond to three tops hazards (for example) it will be very costly to the village, 
the local government also; small income small districts and municipalities.’ (Executive 
Director, Local NGO Ph1) 
Similar to the UK interviews, the assessment of ‘multi-hazards’ appeared to encompass a 
collection of individual, hazard specific, assessments.  Only two interviewees6 described 
addressing multi-hazards by identifying common vulnerabilities across hazards (observed in 
Study A) and, subsequently, building capacities that minimise these vulnerabilities:  
‘if perennially hit by typhoon and if you are already prepared, chances are you are 
already prepared to other hazards as well.  So it’s the linking…’ (Head – Disaster 
Management Services, Humanitarian INGO Ph Country Office) 
                                                          
4
 DRR Project Officer (Local NGO Ph3) 
5
 Executive Director (Local NGO Ph3) 
6
 Head – DMS (Humanitarian INGO); Project Officer – DRR (Local NGO Ph3) 
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There appeared to be a greater general appreciation of the interrelatedness of hazards and 
disaster events in terms of secondary hazards, particularly landslides and lahars, amongst 
Philippine interviewees compared with the Head Office (Study A) interviewees.  In terms of 
applying this appreciation to multi-hazard assessments, only one interviewee7 made specific 
reference to the analysis of interrelations between hazards.  However, their admission of 
adopting this approach may have been influenced by their prior attendance at a multi-hazards 
presentation given by the researcher; as such, multi-hazard assessments may not be truly 
carried out.  Their strategy involves looking at common vulnerabilities and strategies to 
address these hazards, rather than the anticipation of these interrelated disasters: 
‘we did the comparative analysis of the hazard and we were able to look into 
interrelatedness; some of the hazards are really the offshoot or the result of this hazard 
and some of the hazards contribute to the formation of this type of hazard which is 
what you [the researcher] exampled in [Regional Exchange Workshop]: volcanoes and 
landslide, heavy rains and landslide and flash flood as well – when managed to look at 
the inter-relatedness of hazards we also managed to look into the inter-relatedness of 
the causes and also the impact the interrelatedness of impacts: more simple to narrow 
down strategies on how to address hazards because once a community thought of one 
strategy to address one hazard (if related to another hazard, it minimises the risk of the 
community to the other hazards); it’s like two birds with one stone.’  (Project Officer – 
DRR, Local NGO Ph3) 
This interviewee noted that there is ‘no specific’ tool for identifying hazard interrelations 
because the information would emerge from the focus group discussion, but that without 
good facilitation communities may struggle to make these links.  Indeed, as noted during Study 
A8, communities were also perceived to require assistance in order to analyse information and 
make connections between hazards: 
‘That’s why it’s important to process it – you stay with community, you have to guide 
them – they have other prevailing needs as well that they can’t assimilate to hazards 
they face...’ (Head of Disaster Risk Management, Humanitarian INGO Ph) 
                                                          
7
 Project Officer – DRR (Local NGO Ph3) 
8
 Adviser – DRR (INGO B); Adviser – DRR (INGO E) 
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One participant emphasised that communities find the process of assessment very mentally 
challenging9 and another10 emphasised that this process needs to be ‘internalised’ within 
NGOs and communities, without which it will not be fully understood nor sustained; this 
extended to the use of science11.    
In comparison to the Head Office interviews, it would appear that hazards are similarly 
analysed independently by NGOs in the Philippines, but that there is greater understanding, 
appreciation and dialogue with regard to the interrelations between hazards.  However, there 
still lacks a systematic approach to the assessment of hazard interrelations.  Whether multi-
hazard assessments are similarly constrained by limited scales of analysis and sole reliance 
upon community knowledge is explored in the next two sections. 
(2) Is the incorporation of multi-hazards in assessments constrained by the fact that hazard 
assessments are limited to the community scale and are largely static? 
The section addresses both spatial and temporal scales of hazard assessment.  The findings 
were generally similar to the UK interviews in the sense that the primary focus is community 
(barangay) level assessment, with interviewees emphasising the need for local level hazard 
and vulnerability information.   
INGO Ph2 Country Office, through fairly advanced engagement with scientists, were involved 
in the commissioning of much larger assessments, for example the risk assessments for lahars 
and typhoons for the province Albay (see MO-UP NIGS, 2009, and Chapter 8).  Through their 
partnership with a research institute, INGO Ph2 Country Office has demonstrated that hazard 
profiles change depending on the resolution of mapping and thus they advocate the need for 
barangay scale hazard assessments.  The Humanitarian INGO prioritised areas to work based 
upon the multi-hazard maps produced by the government (the READY project).  The READY 
                                                          
9
 Executive Director (Local NGO Ph1) 
10
 Programme Staff – DRR (Local NGO Ph3) 
11
 Point Person – DRR (Local NGO Ph1; follow-up meeting after formal interview) 
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project was the result of a realisation amongst government agencies of the fact that the 
government wanted to standardise and consolidate their approach to hazard mapping: 
‘in the Philippines they don’t have multi-hazard mapping, they have independent maps, 
for example landslide maps, because the organisations responsible for each are under 
different departments so they do not work together.  But now they are trying with...the 
READY project’ (WASH DRR Coordinator, INGO P1) 
However, these maps represent the mapping of discrete independently assessed hazards; 
therefore the project does not account for coincidentally occurring or cascading hazards, 
except in their differentiation of earthquake and rainfall triggered landslides.  Moreover, these 
maps do not appear to reflect a return period for the hazards being mapped (see PHIVOLCS, 
2014).     
A comment from one local NGO interviewee implied that the implementation of larger hazard 
assessments can be facilitated by networks and collaborations with research institutes: 
‘We do not have capacity to [do] a larger scale so we have to do it at community and 
as a matter of fact in that community we do it in the Purok.  But we are member of a 
network, take for example the Manila Observatory they can do wider focus of hazard 
assessment - rapid assessment – we can assist them, we are here we can assist you, 
accompany you to the area for conduct ground truthing or something – GPS you use or 
something.’ (Point Person – DRR, Local NGO Ph2) 
The above quotation indicates that communities and NGOs have a role through communities’ 
provision of the local context and NGOs facilitation in ‘ground-truthing’ the data.  However, 
another interviewee12 noted that scientists do not always ground truth their analysis, which is 
perhaps an area of engagement NGOs can encourage.  Moreover, in spite of some discussion 
regarding larger scales of analysis, it was apparent that concern lies with ensuring detailed 
analysis at the local level takes place: 
‘We avoid the very general – ‘livelihoods’, but specifically farmers: what do you need?  
What will happen to the farmers when this flood as high as one or two metres, what 
                                                          
12
 WASH DRR Coordinator (INGO Ph1) 
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will happen to you, to your houses, to your plants, to your livestocks?  Those are 
being… put in detail per hazard in the community.’ (Executive Director, Local NGO Ph3) 
Senior Programme Officer 1 INGO Ph2 noted the need to account for what is occurring 
upstream and downstream of communities (thus adopting a greater spatial perspective), 
whilst for four agencies13 a more holistic perspective of risk has come about through their 
interest in water basin management, their current work in land use management and their 
concern with climate change:   
‘...there is a lot of logging or deforestation going;...ask...people to have an agreement 
with [local government units] and the community to say: okay, listen we want to 
support you to increase the water supply, access to clean water, but [you] have to 
protect or plant in the watershed areas around a number of trees for example; so you 
are just linking both – the  climate change and the development and try to reduc[e] 
landslides; it’s a holistic approach but we are going to pilot that one in Mindanao in a 
project we are starting just now.’ (WASH DRR Coordinator, INGO Ph1) 
However, the extent to which the appreciation of wider natural systems leads to a more 
comprehensive analysis of multi-hazards is questionable since most interviewees only referred 
to flooding and (to some extent) landslide hazard in this context.  However, the influence of 
environmental degradation on hazards emerged during the interviews in terms of their impact 
upon the multi-hazard profile of communities, especially noted by staff from Local NGO Ph3 
owing to their existing work on the impacts of mining and deforestation. 
Temporal analytical scales 
Amongst interviews, the general emphasis appeared to be on the most frequent hazards.  One 
interviewee emphasised the problem of convincing the community of hazards they are yet to 
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 INGO Ph1; INGO Ph2 ; Local NGO Ph2; Local NGO Ph3 
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experience14.  Most interviewees, however, said that they and the community are aware of 
changes in the hazards, placing particular emphasis upon changing climate hazards. 
Three15 interviewees observed the dynamic nature of hazard and risk and others implied this 
by mentioning that there is a need to review hazard profiles because hazards change: 
‘hazard mapping should be periodically reviewed after every hazard and major disaster 
it should be reviewed – we can facilitate that but we are also confident that some but 
not all of partners can already do that.  There are number of community partners that 
can do their own review and then rehancement or adjustment of contingency plan or 
hazard assessment work.’ (Executive Director, Local NGO Ph1) 
When discussed, the responsibility for repeating assessments was perceived to lie with the 
community16 and or the local government unit (LGU)17, with some in-kind support from the 
NGO if possible:  
‘That is part of their contract is to do update the map – the data and the hazard map – 
even [Local NGO Ph2] do not visit them because our programme is already finished.  
But if you have all responsibility in the barangay council they have the responsibility to 
update – but as [Local NGO Ph2] we can visit them.  Because the high risk areas text us 
if they have the questions; last year they recommended trainings but we do not have 
any more funds – but we can help them to network with other agencies.’ (Point Person 
– DRR, Local NGO Ph2) 
Two interviewees18 perceived that by mainstreaming DRR and CCA in government 
development plans, the review of local planning would ensure review of the hazard profile19.  
However, the interviewees commented on the lack of capacity for DRR within LGUs and that it 
is unusual for NGOs and government to work together.    
                                                          
14
 Regional Programme Manager (Development INGO Ph); this was also mentioned during meetings with 
a local NGO in Manila and NAMRIA (informal meetings, September 2010). 
15
 WASH-DRR Coordinator (INGO Ph1); Senior Programme Officer 1 (INGO Ph2); Executive Director 
(Local NGO Ph1) 
16
 Executive Director (Local NGO Ph1)  
17
 WASH DRR Coordinator (INGO Ph1); Point Person – DRR (Local NGO Ph2) 
18
 WASH DRR Coordinator (INGO Ph1); Senior Programme Officer 1 (INGO Ph2) 
19
 Senior Programme Officer 1 (INGO Ph2)  
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If it is within the project timeframe (which may be as short as six months) and covered by the 
budget then the NGO can facilitate and review the hazard assessment: 
‘we validated the [PHVCA] result like 3 times already and when the group...conducted 
the [PHVCA] workshop here...they mentioned hazards but when we conducted this year 
the P3DM and the community level development planning we’ve validated [PHVCA] 
result twice and some of the hazards are omitted – some have added a new hazard, 
some were omitted.’ (Project Officer – DRR, Local NGO Ph3) 
However, their review reflects a short-timeframe (within six months) and might only account, 
for example, for seasonal change in hazards rather than a real change to the hazard profile.  
Whilst Point Person for DRR (Local NGO Ph2) claimed that a community would update their 
flood hazard map ‘every three months’, Executive Director (Local NGO Ph1) admitted that an 
absence of facilitation makes it difficult to ensure the hazards and risks are being updated.  In 
the example of Local NGO Ph2, the researcher was fortunate to visit one barangay over both 
the September 2010 and October 2012 field visits and was able to compare the community 
hazard map (Figure 5.1).  The lack of maintenance of the map calls into question whether the 
PHVCA process truly encourages review and reassessment over time.  Part of the problem 
came down to the finite funding for this project and the termination of their partnership with 
the supporting INGO. 
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Figure 5.1: Example of a community hazard map.  Image to the left (A) was taken in September 2010 and 
the image to the right (B) is of the map in October 2012.  The names of the barangay, NGO and donors 
have been removed to ensure anonymity.  Source: author’s own. 
 
Furthermore, in the context of review, the omission or inclusion of hazards can be heavily 
influenced by community perceptions and capacities and thus, action rather than analysis is 
the focus of prioritisation: 
‘for example drought…because they identified flood last year as one of the major 
causes of the low productivity yield so when we did the 3D mapping… it started raining 
so they don’t consider it [drought] as a hazard anymore, they omitted it …Basically 
some of the hazards are omitted because the community does not know how to come 
up with a solution how to address so they tend to go for the hazard that they could 
address tangibly, like construct spillways or barriers or walls.’ (Project Officer – DRR, 
Local NGO Ph3) 
A 
B 
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Whereas the Philippine interviewees are more aware of the need to review hazard profiles 
than the Head Office interviewees (Study A), it is not clear how this is sustained after the 
project is over; especially given that many interviewees commented on the low capacity of the 
local government in the context of DRR20.   
Similar to the findings from Study A, the process of assessment is limited to the community-
scale.  In spite of this, there was a general sense that appreciating the wider natural system 
scale and the dynamic nature of hazards and risks was more apparent in the Philippines, but 
more systematic means of assessing these are required in order to account for multi-hazards 
and changing hazard threats. 
(3) Are NGOs, generally, not utilising science for the purpose of multi-hazard assessment? 
All interviewees emphasised the importance of community knowledge for the purpose of 
multi-hazard assessment:  
‘Yes [community knowledge is the best source of information on hazards]: they can 
even go back to 1950s – imagine!  They are very positive in narrating what happened 
to them: their families, the communities.’ (Regional Programme Manager, 
Development INGO Ph) 
But, in contrast to the UK interviews, the reliance on community knowledge is not only a 
reflection of its value but an acknowledgement of the lack of access to and availability of 
alternative information and technical knowledge:  
‘Based on our experience I don’t know if call it best but primary [source of information] 
are the communities really, it’s actually – the science people – there’s no massive study 
of different hazards in different communities.  So for lack of that, we would really rely 
more on local communities.’ (Executive Director, Local NGO Ph1) 
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 Executive Director (Local NGO Ph3) 
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Unlike the Head Office interviewees in Study A, all the Philippines interviewees emphasise the 
importance of augmenting and triangulating that community knowledge with available 
science:    
‘sometimes you do VCA and risk and resource mapping but then these priority hazards 
are actually on the top based on the experience of the community, based on what they 
see but not necessarily linked to the multi-hazard map so we ensure that, for examples, 
communities are also aware, that look these are the priority hazards based on the 
scientific community.’ (Head – DMS, Humanitarian INGO Ph) 
The majority of the interviewees brought up the incorporation of science into their PHVCA 
without prompt from the interviewer, and the three who did not were all from Local NGO Ph3, 
which was largely new to DRR.  The examples of utilising science varied from using secondary 
information to asking a consultant to compare the results of the PHVCA with hazard maps and 
satellite images. 
Whilst interviewees did emphasise science in the context of climate change – with one stating 
that in a changing climate indigenous knowledge ‘cannot stand alone’21 – there was also a 
sense that by combing local knowledge and science communities would have a better 
indication of the true cause of changes in hazards: 
‘But then they [the community] said now we have even shorter drought now we don’t 
have water anymore because our watershed – they [communities] said "oh really, it is 
really good information”, they said “this drought thing is not only now that there is 
climate change it has been there so why is that happening?  And when we would listen 
to science they would explain its natural cycle, natural law of nature.”’ (Executive 
Director, Local NGO Ph3) 
Science was discussed and utilised much more in DRR hazard assessments compared with the 
findings of Study A: 
‘they [the community] could easily link the hazard to the environmental condition that 
they have…for example landslide they would just say: “yeah because it’s already 
deforested” but what [the hydrologist] explained to us [is] it’s not only logging, it’s not 
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 Point Person – DRR (Local NGO Ph1) 
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only deforestation that cause the vulnerability of the hazard like landslide: the soil 
structure, the slope of the area...that’s only the time that I’ve learnt because we’re 
thinking [on] all slopes they should plant trees.  But he said know you have to think 
about the relationship of hazard to your action – we need science, explanation based 
on science could help the community better in doing the plan.’  (Executive Director, 
Ph3) 
There was a greater emphasis on the role of existing scientific knowledge for the purposes of 
assessing the range of hazards beyond those directly related to climate:  
‘…in Albay, we have the Mayon volcano so…many people know about Mayon but most 
of them do not know science behind Mayon volcano: the gravity of how will it affect 
the community – the possibility of a major explosion – what will happen.  …Most of us 
experience the typhoons but the science behind the typhoon should be familiarised by 
the people, especially the most vulnerable groups because here supertyphoons is very 
frequent.’ (Point Person – DRR, Local NGO Ph2)  
This quotation emphasises utilisation of science by communities.  However, before it can be 
used, scientific information was perceived to require translation22: 
‘it was us the NGOs who translated it to more understandable version…[scientists’] 
information been there for years in their brains and personal capacities had 
information for years but it hadn’t been shared.’ (Executive Director, Local NGO Ph1) 
With the assistance of a knowledge broker, in this case the NGO, the above example illustrates 
that information scientists took for granted was of utility to NGOs and the community, but 
required the NGO to translate it.  Compared with the Head Office interviews (Study A), there 
was much greater acceptance of the direct engagement between a scientist and a community, 
which is explored below. 
Integration of science and community knowledge  
Those agencies utilising scientific information and partnering with scientists to the greatest 
extent tended to comment more on the limits of relying on community knowledge.  Limits 
mentioned across the interviews included: the fact that ‘indigenous knowledge’ is not always 
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 WASH-DRR Coordinator (INGO Ph1); Executive Director (Local NGO Ph3) 
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passed down23, the short-term memory of this knowledge and the difficulty of convincing 
communities of a hazard that has yet to be experienced by them24.   Three interviewees25 
remarked that science can help communities to identify threats previously unknown to them 
or bring credibility to DRR work: 
‘while you acknowledge that they [communities] should own and do something about 
it, but realising also that they’re not the experts, that they need some guidance and 
this is where for example if there are some mitigation activities that we felt that it’s not 
really worth it but you don’t want to offend the community so you get some experts to 
tell them how to do it’. (Head – DMS, Humanitarian INGO Ph)  
A natural point of integration between science and community knowledge was apparent.  The 
community was seen as the primary source of observations and information inaccessible to 
scientists, and the scientists have a role in explaining and attributing phenomenon 
communities describe (e.g. hazards) to their cause: 
‘scientist not always well informed or not having much information – so get from 
community (flows of river).  But on the other side the community also not so familiar 
with other hazards, information, possibilities so the science explains…’ (Executive 
Director, Local NGO Ph1) 
Five interviewees26 said they would compare the community’s assessment and hazard 
prioritisation with the scientific perspective.  This surfaced through not only the facilitation 
role provided by the NGO in the simplification and communication27 of scientific information to 
the community but also through direct engagement between NGOs, scientific institutions28 
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 WASH-DRR Coordinator (INGO Ph1) 
24
 Regional Programme Manager (Development INGO) 
25
 WASH DRR Coordinator (INGO Ph1); Senior Programme Officer (INGO Ph2); Head- DMS (Humanitarian 
INGO Ph)   
26
 Head – DMS (Humanitarian INGO Ph); WASH-DRR Coordinator, INGO Ph1; Senior Programme Officer 1 
INGO Ph2; Executive Director (Local NGO Ph1); Point Person – DRR (Local NGO Ph2) 
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 E.g. Head – DMS (Humanitarian INGO Ph) 
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 Two representatives of the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) said that 
they work with various NGOs (hazard mapping and community based early warning systems).  A 
representative from PAGASA shared an example of providing technical assistance (i.e. rain gauge 
installation and training) to an NGO (informal meetings, Manila, September 2010) 
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and communities.  Four interviewees29 emphasised that the process should begin with 
community knowledge rather than science and this was also suggested by a hydrologist 
working with Local NGO Ph3 and implied across the NGO interviewees by their description of 
the process of assessment: 
‘Information for hazard assessment – do it localised: tools introduced, people analyse 
their hazards based on their knowledge – we analyse scientifically with experts and 
scientists.  But most important is that community do first, essence of hazard analysis 
from their knowledge….’ (Point Person – DRR, Local NGO Ph2) 
It is unclear whether scientific information is assimilated prior to the assessment or if instead 
whether scientific opinion is only sought in the context of what the community identifies as a 
key risk.  The sequencing of community and scientific knowledge has implications for the 
objectivity of the analysis and raises questions as to whether expertise are only brought in to 
address preconceived risks rather than assist in the identification of risks (similar to Study A).  
In a follow up meeting with the interviewee quoted above, this person explained that the 
process of integrating science should be iterative.  This interviewee described starting with 
what the community know, then incorporating some scientific explanation of hazards, then 
‘digging deeper’ to find out more from the community and then adding more science.  This 
runs counter to the conventional project cycle management (PCM) model, where each action 
takes place in an orderly sequence (Twigg, 2004).  Although this is only the experience of one 
individual, it echoes others who have attempted to integrate science (e.g. Landstrom et al., 
2011).  This discussion therefore highlights a potential barrier for integrating science. 
Challenges of integrating science 
There was little evidence provided of direct disagreements between community knowledge 
and science.  The Head of DMS (Humanitarian INGO Ph) stated that the community had a ‘very 
good batting average’ and tended to be in agreement with the scientist; however, the 
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 INGO Ph2; DRR Point Person, Local NGO Ph1; Head of DMS at Humanitarian INGO Ph  
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Executive Director of Local NGO Ph1 and the WASH-DRR Coordinator at INGO Ph1 were able to 
reflect upon instances when science challenged what the community were saying.  Rather than 
causing confrontation, the main challenge of integrating science in hazard assessments 
appeared to be in terms of accessing science and engaging with scientists.  This challenge was 
related to the limited capacity of government scientists, the cost of accessing scientific 
information, the challenge of communicating science and poor information and knowledge 
sharing30: 
‘…the government has not so much invested so much in science in sharing with 
community and (like us) with social scientists so this information were stopped there.’ 
(Executive Director, Local NGO Ph1) 
Three organisations31 mentioned the high cost of scientific input, one noting that this is 
particularly the case for multi-hazard assessments.  The same interviewee suggested 
alternative free sources of information through support from the local government, 
information sharing with not-for-profit scientific organisations and an academic volunteering 
programme.  Three instances of engagement were in the form of partnerships between NGOs 
and non-government scientific institutions32.  Generally, however, engagements were 
informal33 and either ad hoc or related to non-DRR elements of the NGOs’ work, for example 
livelihoods34.  It emerged that the source of information might be controversial as evidenced 
by the tension between the Manila Observatory (non-profit scientific research institute) and 
the Philippines Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA).  
PAGASA (according to the government) should be the sole provider of weather related 
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 Executive Director (Local NGO Ph3); Hydrologist (academic) working with Local NGO Ph3 (informal 
interview) 
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 Senior Programme Officer 2 (HD INGO Ph2), Executive Director (Local NGO Ph3); Point Person – DRR 
(Local NGO Ph3); Project Officer – DRR (Local NGO Ph3) 
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 INGO Ph2 (and Local NGOs Ph1 and Ph2 through their partnership with INGO Ph2); Humanitarian 
INGO Ph; Development INGO 
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 A representative of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau noted some instances of when they had 
worked with NGOs but stated that they had ‘no fixed linkage’ (informal meeting, Manila, September 
2010). 
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 INGO Ph2; Local NGOs Ph1 and Ph3 
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information and, as a consequence, collaborating with the Manila Observatory could result in 
tension with PAGASA35:  
‘Yes [we worked with both] but some dynamics with that – during project managed to 
struggle with the dynamics.’ (Executive Director, Local NGO Ph1) 
The government agencies might, however, not always work in favour of the NGOs and local 
communities.  The Executive Director of Local NGO Ph3 shared an example of their difficulty of 
trying to get a hazard map the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) had conducted for a 
cement company whose factory was encroaching on a community this interviewee was trying 
to assist.  As such, it was apparent that scientists are not necessarily going to approach NGOs; 
instead NGOs need to make the conscious decision that science is needed and then be 
resourceful in their means of accessing it.  INGO Ph2 employed a former academic, who 
identified a scientific information gap in NGO DRR and CCA work; consequently, they 
established links with the local university and a not for profit research centre.  This example 
indicates the importance of employing academics within NGOs.   
As a consequence of their partnership with INGO Ph2, Local NGOs Ph1 and Ph2 have had the 
benefit of three years of scientific engagement: 
‘For three years of scientific engagement, it help a lot only not only for NGO level, for 
NGO workers; a lot of realisations, a lot learning and a lot of unlearning in working 
with them.  More so we were able to share it well with communities we work with so 
we were really able to serve as channels for the community we work with because of 
course they [scientists] cannot go here frequently.’ (Executive Director, Local NGO Ph1) 
The quotation above implies that the benefit of scientific engagement may only emerge over 
time, which emphasises why it might be challenging to endorse this type of engagement to 
NGOs because they tend to want immediate results (Roper, 2002).  The Senior Programme 
Officer 1 from INGO Ph2 (the agency with the greatest experience of scientific engagement) 
                                                          
35
 During an informal meeting with an international NGO representative, the difficulty of trying to work 
with another agency who were ‘more scientific’ and tended to work with the Manila Observatory was 
described.  The interviewee tended to work with PAGASA instead (Manila, September 2010). 
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noted the challenge of collaborating with scientists who encourage pilot work and operate at 
different timescales.  The Head of DMS at Humanitarian INGO Ph also commented on the 
differing approaches between scientists and NGOs and communities, the example below 
suggesting that scientists observe a problem more clinically, with less appreciation of the 
implications of their decisions:  
‘the scientific community tells me: “no, no, no we’re not going to do that [tsunami 
warnings system] because when you have tsunami you should have hill”; then I just 
told them: “look, are you telling me now that you’re condemning these 20,000 or more 
than 20,000 people to death just because they don’t have a hill?  Or isn’t the essence of 
early warning is to do an early action?” (Head of DMS, Humanitarian INGO Ph) 
Whilst interviewees claimed that scientists would require information from the community36, it 
appeared as though engagement was typically one way – with scientists providing information 
rather than receiving it (confirmed by the informal meetings conducted during the study37) – 
and implied by the fact that the onus was on the NGOs to bring the scientists to the 
community.  Several interviewees noted that scientists do not tend to come to the community 
level – either owing to reluctance to share knowledge38 or owing to the institutional 
constraints upon scientists themselves (e.g. the lack of locally positioned personnel)39.  
Consequently, the majority of science comes from what the NGOs can themselves access, 
which is inhibited by cost and the lack of available information.  The scale of available scientific 
analysis may not be readily transferrable to the small spatial scales adopted by NGOs and one 
interviewee40 commented on the fact that government maps tend to be outdated.   
                                                          
36
 E.g. Executive Director (Local NGO Ph1) 
37
 During an informal meeting with an INGO, an example was shared of when a community disputed 
climate change tends, but PAGASA would not stand down (informal meeting with INGO representative, 
Manila, September 2010) 
38
 Executive Director (Local NGO Ph1); Executive Director (Local NGO Ph3); Hydrologist (informal 
meeting) 
39
 WASH-DRR Coordinator (INGO Ph1); Executive Director (Local NGO Ph1) 
40
 WASH-DRR Coordinator (INGO Ph1) 
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It was emphasised that science had to be creative and simplified since communities might not 
necessarily be interested in science41: 
‘For us we always say simplify things rather than being very scientific with the 
community…they are more knowledgeable basically than us, it’s just putting their 
knowledge and their background on this perspective we want them to achieve.  
Sometimes if you impose something on them they will not also understand it; it’s more 
on letting them process’ (Head of DMS, Humanitarian INGO Ph) 
The above quotation emphasises the key role of facilitation in the process.  One of the main 
challenges facilitators have is in the communication of science and how to translate even DRR 
concepts into layman’s terms42: 
‘Really find it hard to have direct translation of what is meant by hazard, what is meant 
by risk in exact term, what is meant by vulnerabilities’ (Regional Programme Manager, 
Development NGO Ph) 
The DRR Point Person (Local NGO Ph2) discussed their recent attendance at an urban DRR 
training event and noted that the consensus amongst the event participants was that the 
scientific discussion of hazard and risk must come from technical people43.  However, they 
noted that Senior Programme Officer 1 of their partner NGO (INGO Ph2) countered that the 
scientific information can also be discussed by non-scientists:  
‘we [NGOs] can integrate science into community development work – scientists don’t 
always have this skill’  (Senior Programme Officer 1, INGO Ph2) 
Conversely, three44 interviewees described the limitations in their agency’s own technical 
capacity:  
                                                          
41
 Point Person – DRR (Local NGO Ph2; informal meeting) 
42
 Point Person – DRR (Local NGO Ph2) 
43
 PHIVOLCS have recognised the need to translate science since the late 1980s and thus they have 
separate projects for (1) ‘hard core’ science and (2) the dissemination of information (informal meeting, 
Manila, September 2010); NAMRIA mentioned that they attempt to translate terms into the layman as 
far as is possible (informal meetings with PHIVOLCS and NAMRIA staff, Manila, September 2010) 
44
 Executive Director (Local NGO Ph1); Point Person – DRR (Local NGO Ph2); Project Officer – DRR (Local 
NGO Ph3) 
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‘…NGOs in Philippines are social workers; so not really scientific, science people.  It’s 
really hard to work in communities with so much science involved but you are not a 
scientist.’ (Executive Director, Local NGO Ph1) 
It was in recognition of this limited capacity within this agency and their partnership with INGO 
Ph2 that they made the decision to engage with scientists for the purposes of DRR.   
Whilst the role of science in hazard assessments appears more appreciated in the Philippines 
compared with the interviews with Head Office in the UK, it is clear that this represents the 
ideal rather than the norm: 
'so I think if there's a way to have the local knowledge and the scientific knowledge 
come together in order to explain causes, effect, impact - the inter-relatedness of 
hazards experienced by the community I think that would be better; but as for now not 
really fully utilising the scientific data on hazards' (Project Officer – DRR, Local NGO 
Ph3) 
The utilisation and integration of science for (multi-)hazard assessments: current state of 
play in the Philippines 
Community knowledge forms the core component of hazard assessments conducted by the 
agencies interviewed, as (1) interviewees perceived that the community are most 
knowledgeable of the problems in situ; (2) they adopt the same methods that pertain to 
participatory principles of PHVCA, which emphasise community ownership and empowerment 
and (3) in contrast to the UK interviews, interviewees noted or indicated that the reliance on 
community knowledge is also due to a lack of alternatives.   
Amongst all the interviewees, scientific knowledge and understanding are valued highly.  NGOs 
appear to have a three-fold role as instigators of engagement with scientists, providers of 
secondary information and brokers of scientific information that scientists might provide, 
however they have the same capacity problems (e.g. being comprised of mostly social 
scientists) as observed in Study A.  The ideal is to have direct engagement with scientists and 
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communities, however barriers including the high cost and the fact that it is unlikely that 
scientists will visit communities suggests initiating the engagement may be challenging. 
Interviewees emphasised that the essence and starting point of the hazard assessment should 
be the information and knowledge provided by the community, with a subsequent validation 
(explanation) by scientific experts or comparing the results of the community assessment with 
secondary scientific information, primarily hazard maps.  However this sequencing of sources 
of information may generate bias in the process.  What was proposed as a useful means of 
avoiding this bias was through one interviewees’ emphasis on the iterative process of 
integrating science and community knowledge.    
5.3 Discussion of comparisons across studies A and B 
The interviews with 33 participants (26 in Study A and nine in Study B) were conducted in 
order to address three concerns: 
(1) whether and how NGOs are conducting multi-hazard assessments; 
(2) whether they use science for this purpose; 
(3) what factors constrain or enable their ability to implement these assessments. 
Whilst the sample from the Philippines was comparatively smaller, these two studies provided 
the opportunity to form some insight into NGO approaches to multi-hazard assessment and 
whether there is a difference between the perceptions of those at Head Office compared with 
those of in-country NGO staff.  Chapters 4 and 5 conveyed the similarities in NGO approaches 
to (multi-)hazard assessment across the studies, but the findings also illustrated distinct 
differences between Head Office and in-country (Philippines) NGOs’ views and approaches, 
particularly in terms of the actuality of implementation and perceptions of hazard, science and 
scale.  Table 5.2 provides a summary of the main points of comparison across the two groups. 
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In answer to the first point outlined above, risk from multi-hazards is considered only so far as 
the comparative ranking of different hazards and their cross-cutting vulnerabilities, and 
PHVCAs do not readily account for the interrelations between hazards in an analytical and 
anticipatory manner.  Whilst multi-hazards and their interrelations are more appreciated in the 
Philippines, there still lacks an approach to multi-hazard assessments that ensures not only 
that all hazards are included, but also that their manifestations are anticipated.   Furthermore, 
the approach of identifying common vulnerabilities may be suited to ‘quick wins’, but it might 
not be so applicable in the context of interacting hazards, where vulnerabilities might change 
owing to, for example, the simultaneous occurrence of two hazards.  The emphasis on 
qualitative, community knowledge and preconceived ideas regarding what hazards or threats 
need to be addressed (e.g. climate change) questions how well hazards in general are 
assessed.   
In answer to the second point, science appears generally not integrated for the purpose of 
these assessments, however there was greater emphasis on utilising science for the purpose of 
PHVCA amongst the Philippines interviewees compared with the Head Office interviewees.  
Related to the third point, the lack of utilisation of science more generally and, as such, the 
reliance on community knowledge was one of three constraints on the adoption of a true 
multi-hazard approach (one that account for all hazards in a place and their interrelations) 
NGOs are struggling to adopt a true multi-hazard approach owing to constraints on the process 
of assessment (e.g. whether a tool adopts a CCA or DRR lens and the skill of the facilitator), the 
utilisation of mostly community knowledge and the fact that the analyses are spatially 
constrained and largely static.  Head Office NGOs are seemingly advocating for more holistic 
and integrated approaches to risk reduction, however the branding and design of toolkits for 
analysis is compartmentalised, so does not allow this.  In-country interviewees tended to place 
more emphasis upon the process of PHVCA and less on the importance of specific tools; 
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however feedback from Local NGO Ph3 indicated how the emphasis on tools can be at the 
expense of the quality of analysis.  
 
Table 5.2 Summary of the key points of comparison pertaining to the topics discussed across studies A 
and B. 
Point of 
Comparison 
Study A (Head Office, two research 
institutes and three in-country staff) 
Study B (NGO staff in the Philippines) 
Multi-hazard 
approach 
The principle of assessment allows 
for multi-hazards to be identified; 
however the assumptions behind 
analytical lenses (e.g. DRR and CCA), 
the process of analysis and reliance 
upon community knowledge 
constrain the assessment.   
Practitioners are keenly aware of the 
need for a multi-hazard approach; 
however they are bound by similar 
constraints in terms of reliance on 
facilitation and community knowledge (as 
science is not always available). 
Interrelations 
between hazards 
Whilst a number of interviewees 
remarked upon these, it was notable 
that they were more appreciated by 
the Philippine participants.  The 
method of assessing each hazard 
discretely in order to identify 
overlapping vulnerabilities may not 
allow for secondary or cascading 
hazard instances to occur.  These 
links might only be made through 
strong facilitation. 
There is perhaps a greater awareness of 
these and the links between the natural 
environment and hazards (and not just 
climate change); however, again, these 
links will only be made through strong 
facilitation. 
Emphasis upon 
climate change 
as a threat 
All interviewees (whether from a 
DRR or CCA background) discussed 
climate change and their concern 
regarding what this might mean for 
development and DRR. 
Climate change does not appear to have 
relative importance above other hazards, 
although this is likely to be due to the fact 
that most agencies are new to CCA and 
that they are addressing it in the context 
of existing climate variability owing to the 
frequency of weather related disasters. 
Appreciation for 
and use of 
community 
knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Community knowledge is the 
essence of the PHVCA process, owing 
to the emphasis upon 
empowerment, ownership and a 
process free from external influence. 
Community knowledge is the essence of 
the PHVCA process, owing to the 
communities understanding of what 
affects them.  Reliance on community 
knowledge was also acknowledged by 
interviewees as partly owing to a lack of 
available and suitable scientific 
information and available scientists. 
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Appreciation for 
and use of 
science 
All participants valued science but 
mostly owing to its role in 
determining climate change.  In spite 
of this, it is not widely integrated 
into hazard assessments. 
Science is incorporated into hazard 
assessments more readily and is not only 
understood as being useful for 
anticipating climate change but also for 
understanding the cause and risk of a 
number of different hazards.  However, it 
is apparent that the application of science 
constitutes the recognised ideal and not 
necessarily the norm. 
Hazards tend 
only to be 
assessed at the 
community scale 
National scale assessments are more 
for the benefit of understanding the 
institutional landscape, rather than a 
detailed analysis of hazard risk. 
The emphasis was on the need for 
detailed information at the local level, 
which NGOs and communities can 
provide. 
Concern with 
anticipating 
future risk 
appears primarily 
in the context of 
climate change 
The need for more holistic 
approaches to risk reduction, 
implementing adaptation strategies 
and revising approaches to PHVCA 
seem to be down to a great deal of 
concern regarding an uncertain 
‘changed climate’ future.  In 
comparison, other hazards appear to 
not be viewed with the same level of 
uncertainty – these are perceived to 
be ‘known’.  Moreover, the historical 
emphasis within DRR and the largely 
static nature of PHVCAs means that 
approaches are not particularly 
anticipatory. 
Climate change was similarly viewed in 
the context of future risk; however the 
emphasis was less apparent.  The 
awareness of the dynamic nature of risk 
was more obvious, along with the need to 
review assessments however similar 
practicalities of ensuring hazard 
assessments are reviewed were noted. 
 
There were a series of themes that emerged during the interview analysis, but the two that 
emerged as key constraints and opportunities for assessing multi-hazards were scale (temporal 
and spatial) and knowledge.  The scale at which multi-hazard assessments are applied and the 
knowledge utilised in order to implement them largely determines the extent to which the 
components of multi-hazard are addressed in the course of the assessment.  How these are 
incorporated relates strongly to the methodological approach of PHVCA, which is underpinned 
by the skill of the facilitator whose responsibilities ranged from ensuring the process is 
community led to identifying when communities need additional information (Cronin et al., 
2004).  How NGO practitioners perceive and value scale and knowledge has major implications 
for the successful identification and assessment of multi-hazards.  The following discussion 
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synthesises the results of the two studies under three major themes: method, knowledge and 
scale. 
5.3.1 Methods and process: practical and institutional constraints 
During the interviews, a number of institutional (e.g. donor-driven funding for CCA) and 
organisational (e.g. lack of internal scientific capacity) constraints emerged, however directly 
related to the process of hazard assessment were a series of assumptions and decisions made 
by agencies and individuals that influence the degree to which the assessment of multi-
hazards is incorporated in the design of PHVCAs (see Figure 5.2).  Designing tools to address 
risks through a DRR or CCA lens negates the claim that they naturally capture all hazards. 
The process of assessment is highly qualitative and adopts a fairly short-term perspective, 
owing to the reliance upon community knowledge.  Moreover, hazard prioritisation is based 
upon what is perceived to be the greatest threat relative to the community and NGO’s 
capacities to address it.  As such, there is a balance between ensuring actionable results and 
safeguarding sufficiently rigorous analysis; however, it was apparent that the balance would 
often shift in favour of action at the expense of thorough analysis of multi-hazards.  
Participatory research is designed to be unstructured and emergent, yet this creates difficulties 
for the NGO in the sense that they are managing a tension between the influences of the 
donor, their own organisation’s remits and capacity to address the range of threats the 
community identify, as well as ensuring that the process is led by the community. 
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Figure 5.2 A stacked Venn diagram demonstrating the influences on the process of multi-hazard 
assessment, which range from the donor driven need to address DRR or CCA, the remit of organisations 
and the biases and assumptions of toolkit developers, implementers and communities that all influence 
the extent to which multi-hazards will be sufficiently assessed.  These factors influence the extent to 
which science and appropriate analytical scales are adopted. 
 
The PHVCA approach might be suitable for participatory action research, which focuses upon 
ownership by the community and transformative results, but there is perhaps a need to 
question whether primarily social science research methods allow for a sufficiently thorough 
assessment of multi-hazards and scenarios for occurrence.  The emphasis upon qualitative 
approaches is embedded within the social science research methods adopted, but, it is 
misleading to liken participatory approaches solely with qualitative data (see Chambers, 1997: 
135).  Furthermore, the Kenyan representative from INGO C noted that partners were asking 
for more quantitative methods to conduct PHVCA.  Whilst there is concern that the process of 
assessment does not become too focused on data collection45, coping strategies are affected 
by the physical characteristic of hazards, thus detailed hazard (e.g. flood depth) and 
vulnerability (e.g. height of home foundations) data are required (McCall and Peters-Guarin, 
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 DRR Consultant 
Institutional 
influences and 
paradigms  
Organisational 
remits 
Biases and 
assumptions 
Multi-hazard 
assessments 
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2012).  Five46 of the interviewees in the Philippines noted the need for detailed analysis and 
the avoidance of collecting very general information.   
One interviewee47 noted that it is not possible to develop a tool that addresses everything; so, 
given the reliance on good facilitation, perhaps emphasis needs to be upon identifying what 
skills and training staff require to conduct multi-hazard assessments.  This was partly 
recognised by the Conservation INGO in their decision to develop a training package rather 
than a toolkit and the fact that some in-country interviewees emphasised the process of 
PHVCA rather than tools.  Head Office interviewees noted that training on tools is important; 
however these interviewees noted that budgets and allocation of time for this has been 
overlooked in the past.  Periods of training were described as ranging from a couple of days to 
ten days, with agencies describing varying experiences, including an instance when partners 
refused training48.   
Lastly, interviewees were reflexive and very mindful of the different sources of influence and 
bias upon the PHVCA.  These influences were either noted by the interviewees or observed by 
the interviewer can be divided into four sources: the organisation, partners, individual staff 
(e.g. toolkit developers, project managers, etc.) and communities.  At the same time, in all but 
a few cases interviewees were less aware of how they might adversely affect the process 
because of what they were failing to provide.  NGOs were noted to be generally comprised of 
social, rather than physical or natural, scientists and therefore might not be in a position to 
provide the community with the additional information they require in order for them to 
identify and prioritise hazard risk.  The acknowledgement of this was reflected by the fact that 
Philippine NGO staff emphasised the need to engage with the scientific community. 
                                                          
46
 WASH-DRR Coordinator (INGO Ph1); Executive Director (Local NGO Ph1); Executive Director (Local 
NGO Ph3); Adviser – DRR (INGO E) 
47
 Programme policy Management Team Member – DRR (INGO F) 
48
 Adviser – DRR (INGO B) 
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5.3.2 Sources and perceptions of knowledge 
Participatory action research is supposed to place local knowledge on equal footing with 
external scientific knowledge (McCall and Peters-Guarin, 2012), however there is an almost 
total reliance on community-based knowledge for the purposes of hazard assessment.  The 
knowledge underpinning hazard assessments comprises the past and present hazards as 
experienced by those at risk, owing to: (1) the perception that the community are the most 
knowledgeable about their situation and (2) the philosophy of participatory action research, 
which emphasises community empowerment. 
It was surprising to discover that interviewees also value natural science, but it became 
apparent during the course of the interviews that engagement with scientists and the 
utilisation of science is fairly limited and largely not incorporated in the assessment of hazards 
by those at Head Office.  Engagement with science is more accepted amongst in-country 
interviewees, particularly those interviewed in the Philippines, but is lacking owing to practical 
barriers to scientific engagement.  Therefore, in the context of the Philippines a third factor 
can be added to the above list: a lack of alternative sources of information. 
Despite the growing awareness of the value of science, scientific engagement is hindered by 
the assumptions of individuals and organisations.  Of particular note is the apparent 
uncertainty implied throughout the interviews of how to use science and, in particular, the lack 
of understanding of what science is most useful for the purposes of hazard assessment.  The 
perceptions of science shared by interviewees represent the assumptions and understanding 
of a group of largely non-scientists, a reflexive observation made by only a small number of 
interviewees.  Interviewees seemed particularly concerned about future disasters and risk, but 
their concern does not seem to embed a multi-hazard perspective owing to the assumption 
that DRR looks historically and because Head Office interviewees are making the assumption 
that emergent threats and unknown future risk are purely driven by climate change. 
197 
 
Through the tendency to discuss science solely in the context of climate change, science was 
perceived by Head Office interviewees primarily as an opportunity to better anticipate future 
climate risk rather than for the purpose of better understanding the past and current hazard 
situation, which are primarily drawn from community experience.  This was due to 
interviewees’ concerns over how to plan for a particularly uncertain future and because 
community knowledge may be redundant for this purpose.   However, couching science solely 
in terms of climate change is hindering the wider application of science for understanding and 
attributing causes of natural hazards and environmental change.  There appeared a relatively 
poor acknowledgement of other ‘science’ that might be more applicable and easier to use than 
the very uncertain and poor resolution of climate science.  Study A interviewees also appeared 
to make the assumption that future risk from geophysical hazards is more predictable, yet the 
reliance on community knowledge means that they are perhaps naïve in this assumption.   
In the Philippines, value was placed on existing scientific information, such as hazard maps and 
expert opinions, which with good communication could be transformed into something 
useable.  Thus, there is an opportunity to engage with science and scientists in more relevant 
ways.  In the Philippines, they acknowledged that scientific information is not often at the 
scale required for community-based analysis but by sharing information provided by the 
communities, scientists could help determine why disasters occur.  Although more appreciated 
by in-country staff (across studies A and B), the integration of science is limited owing to 
problems related to access to and availability of useful science along with the politics involved 
regarding sharing information and the source of science.  Likewise, the science does not 
appear to be coming to NGOs; it is largely up to the initiative of individuals, through their 
informal contacts, to access the information required.  
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It was emphasised in all but one case49 that the PHVCA process should begin with community 
knowledge before being compared with the science.  However, this sequencing of knowledge 
needs to ensure an unbiased inclusion of science (i.e. that it does not serve to simply justify 
the hazards that have been prioritised) and, as identified by one interviewee, adopt an 
iterative approach.  Whilst the application of scientific expertise in the context of identifying 
technical solutions is vital, it is imperative that the analysis of hazard is as rigorous and 
objective as possible and not preconditioned by a priori defined projects and programmes.   
Given the perception amongst Head Office interviewees that scientists should not or, in the 
case of in-country interviewees, are unlikely to visit communities, practitioners manage the 
external information and knowledge being provided for and utilised during the PHVCA process.   
As such, if they have preconceived ideas about what hazards should be considered or what 
science is actually of value, biases will emerge.  Whether they have the knowledge and skills to 
provide the necessary science was taken for granted by Head Office interviews, but one 
Philippine interviewee50 particularly emphasised that science can be communicated by non-
scientists. 
The practical (real) and perceived barriers to the integration of science are summarised in 
Table 5.3.  These are divided into the barriers perceived by the interviewees and those that the 
researcher identified as hindering the incorporation of science into NGO assessments of 
hazard.   
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 Senior Climate Change Researcher (Research Institute B) 
50
 Senior Programme Officer 1 (INGO Ph2) 
199 
 
Table 5.3 Noted and perceived constraints and barriers upon the integration and utilisation of science; 
text in italics indicates Head Office (UK) respondents, bold text represents Philippine respondents and 
bold and italicised text indicates when representatives from both groups mentioned these. 
Identifying 
body 
Ideological 
constraints 
Barriers to scientific 
engagement 
 
Barriers to utilisation of science 
Participants 
 The positivist 
approach of 
science 
 ‘North’ set-
agendas/ 
Ideologies 
 NGOs are not natural 
scientists 
 Individual/institutional 
capacity 
 The different 
approaches of scientists 
and NGOs 
 Cost 
 Limited capacity and 
resources of local 
scientists compared to 
Head Office scientists 
 Access and availability (e.g. 
outdated maps; expense; 
limited capacity of local 
government scientists) 
 Lack of scientific capacity 
within NGOs 
 Poor communication and 
understanding (e.g. science 
requires simplification; 
different objectives between 
scientists and NGOs) 
 Scientific uncertainty 
 Partners and communities 
might struggle to understand 
and utilise 
Researcher 
 There is a greater  
emphasis on 
vulnerability than 
hazard 
 Participants’ 
perception that 
science is about 
forecasting and 
predicting 
climate change 
 The participants’ 
assumptions about 
partners and 
communities’ ability and 
desire to engage with 
scientists 
 Ensuring community 
empowerment 
 A lack of knowledge as 
to what science may be 
of use 
 Contention regarding 
the source of science 
 The different scales and 
types of data and analysis 
compared with community 
level PHVCA 
 Uncertainty regarding how to 
use science 
 Not enough emphasis on the 
available science which could 
be of use  
 
5.3.3 Temporal and spatial scale of analysis 
Whilst the data resolution and uncertainty of climate science arguably hinders its applicability 
to NGO community-based risk reduction work, it does highlight the need for agencies to (1) 
use science and (2) consider larger geographical and prospective scales for the purposes of 
their risk reduction work so as to be better at anticipating the possible occurrence of disasters.  
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Furthermore, some of the examples of scientific engagement were in the context of the 
analysis of areas much larger than communities.   
Hazard interrelations are spatially and temporally determined (Kappes et al., 2011).  NGO 
assessments of hazard are, however, typically limited to the geographical scale of a small 
community and tend to reflect on past events without necessarily anticipating future change.  
Historical analysis is a strong component of the NGO claim to a multi-hazard approach to 
PHVCA because different hazards are identified through the creation of timelines (historical 
analysis) and seasonal calendars (short-term analysis).  Temporally the process of hazard 
analysis is constrained by the extent and degree to which the community can reliably 
remember disasters, especially when specific data (e.g. frequency and impact) are required, 
and their perception of risk. 
It is clear that most agencies are still grappling with the differences between CCA and DRR. 
NGOs are familiar with acting in the short-term, so they are finding it difficult to address 
adaptation because it inherently deals with an uncertain future and is reliant upon looking at 
timeframes 30 to 50 years or more from now.  Perhaps there is an opportunity for NGO staff to 
reflect on what it is they want communities to adapt to and why it is that they do not consider 
geophysical natural hazards over these same timeframes.  An absence of an anticipatory 
approach to all hazards is worrying, since communities may not have experienced multi-hazard 
disasters in the past but might be at risk from future events.   
A key component of anticipating risk is reviewing multi-hazard profiles and updating hazard 
maps and contingency plans over time, which does not appear to be embedded in the PHVCA 
process.  Hazard prioritisation is based upon an analysis of the past and, since the focus is on 
the experiences of the community, it may only reflect the more recent past and the current 
situation.  There is a methodological barrier to the successful review of hazard assessments 
that rely almost entirely upon community knowledge and qualitative measures; whilst 
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qualitative baselines can be compared over time, this only succeeds if the same community 
members are consulted since the process, if not compared with scientific measures, is based 
on their perceptions.  Twigg (2004) acknowledges this but argues that the advantages of 
participatory community assessments outweigh the limitations, as they provide a more 
detailed analysis and understanding of the communities’ situation whilst also identifying their 
capacity to deal with the situation.  Whilst this is a measure of success for any participatory 
approach, it is questionable whether identification of risk from multiple hazards and their 
interrelations by communities and NGOs can be achieved without means of prioritising and 
quantifying hazard profiles over time.   
NGO interviewees were generally concerned with the lack of local information, therefore it is 
perhaps necessary to focus multi-hazard analysis at this scale but at the same time take into 
account the wider natural (as well as socio-political) systems as the source of hazards (Lee and 
Jones, 2004) or environmental change might be beyond the boundaries of the community and 
the scope of community based risk assessments.  However, there is a lack of systematic 
appraisal of the threat from multi-hazards by international NGOs from the national to local 
scale.  This situation is accompanied by a gap in assessing the environmental processes and 
wider natural systems that may affect the incidence of natural hazards, explain changing local 
climates and help to anticipate interrelated and multiple hazard events.  There is renewed 
interest in the analysis of community risk within the context of natural systems; however 
practical implementation is not yet widely apparent.  An opportunity to address longer 
timeframes and greater spatial scales could be through collaboration with conservation 
organisations (who already work at these scales) and scientists, who can provide a wider 
overview: 
‘Dr [A] provided information on framework for river basin approach – we use that 
already, it’s a part of our advocacy framework so that’s how we tap different agencies.’ 
(Executive Director, Local NGO Ph3)  
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The discussion has highlighted a number of barriers to the adoption of larger and longer scales 
of analysis.  In a similar manner to Table 5.3, Table 5.4 summarises the barriers to the 
integration of different scales from the perspective of the interviewees and the researcher. 
Table 5.4: Summary of the constraints and barriers to the adoption of more expansive geographical and 
temporal scales by NGOs. 
Identifying 
body 
Ideological 
constraints 
Barriers to the adoption of 
larger geographical scales 
 
Barriers to the adoption of 
temporal, prospective, scales 
Participants 
n/a  NGOs do not want to lose 
the essence of 
community-based 
assessments. 
 Limited capacity of the 
organisation. 
 Communities are 
concerned with short-time 
frames. 
 Limited ability to review 
hazard assessments. 
 DRR has short-term 
perspective. 
Researcher 
 Essence of 
participatory 
processes and 
community 
empowerment
. 
 The 
contradiction 
of CCA 
(conceptually 
long-term; 
practically 
short-term – 
potentially 
causing 
confusion). 
 
 Uncertainty as to how to 
do this (need is being 
recognised but little 
action). 
 Respondents’ perception 
that science is about and 
predicting climate change. 
 Action based approaches 
addressing immediate 
needs. 
 
5.4 Implications for the second part of the research 
Chapter 3 outlined that the research was divided into two complementary parts.  The first part 
has identified that NGOs are generally not adopting a multi-hazard approach in their 
assessment of risk, so the next part of the research looks to explore an actual case of multi-
hazards and their assessment in order to compare the findings with those of part one.  There is 
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a need to take the rather conceptual term of ‘multi-hazard’ and understand the reality of the 
interrelations between hazards.   
Owing to participants’ perceptions, much of the above discussion viewed science wholly within 
the context of climate change.  Therefore, the following case study analysis not only looks to 
ground the multi-hazard conceptual framework identified in the literature review but also to 
identify how science assists in the assessment of multi-hazards.  The case study was chosen 
during the same scoping study to the Philippines (Study B, September 2010).  The case 
selected for the purpose of this multi-hazard analysis is introduced in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 6: Introduction to the case study  
 
Chapter 6 introduces the second part of the research, which comprises the analysis of a case 
study of an interrelated multi-hazard disaster: the 2006 Typhoon Reming triggered lahars at 
Mayon Volcano in the Philippines.   The chapter begins with a rationale for the case selected, 
along with an overview of the location of the case study and the multi-hazard and lahar history 
of the area.  Section 6.2 summarises the primary methods used to collect information about 
the case: semi-structured interviews, field observations and secondary data.    
6.1 Rationale for selected case study 
A conceptual framework for characterising multi-hazards was proposed in Chapter 2 from the 
review of the literature.  In Chapters 4 and 5, multi-hazards and their assessments were 
discussed mostly in general, hypothetical terms by interviewees, with only a few sharing actual 
examples.  The second part of the research therefore looks to ground the conceptual and 
abstract use of the term ‘multi-hazard’ in the context of a multi-hazard case study, in order to 
better understand the relationships and processes it suggests. 
Assessments of interrelated hazards have received less attention in the literature compared to 
the analysis of comparative hazard risk, and many multi-hazard studies have been 
implemented in developed, rather than developing, countries (where disaster databases are 
more available) and have not considered NGOs and vulnerable communities as decision-
makers (e.g. Greiving et al., 2006; Kappes et al., 2011; Marzocchi et al., 2012a).  Consequently, 
the decision was made to explore interrelated hazards using a case study of one hazard 
triggering another in the Philippines.   
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Of the four multi-hazard interrelations conceptually framed in Chapter 2, it was deemed 
appropriate to focus upon ‘causation’ (one hazard triggering another) as it was thought too 
challenging to address all four of the categories within a single case.  The choice of causation 
was because cascading hazards are commonly cited as a necessary consideration in multi-
hazard analysis (Kappes et al., 2011), but few have attempted to quantify this interrelation 
(Marzocchi et al., 2012a).  Mass movement hazards are a natural choice for the analysis of 
multi-hazard triggering owing to the fact that these are hazardous phenomenon that are often 
the consequence of other hazards and can also trigger subsequent (secondary) hazards (see 
Chapter 2).  The selection of lahar was owing to the fact that they are a product of volcanic 
settings, often as a consequence of the interaction of more than one hazard (e.g. typhoon and 
eruption), and are, therefore, intrinsically multi-hazardous.   
The case of the 2006 Typhoon Reming triggered lahars at Mayon Volcano emerged during 
interviews with NGOs, communities and local officials in Albay during the scoping study to the 
Philippines (September 2010; Chapter 5).  This disaster had left a lasting impact on the 
province and represented a case of one hazard triggering another in one of the most multi-
hazardous locations in the Philippines.  Prior to the disaster, the Philippines Institute of 
Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) had conducted and produced lahar and other hazard 
maps for the area, demonstrating that the technical knowledge for evaluating hazard at 
Mayon existed (Orense and Ikeda, 2007).  The case study, therefore, presents the opportunity 
to explore the role of science in assessing hazard interrelations.  
The focus of the study is the lahars that were triggered at Mayon.  The findings regarding this 
component of the disaster are, however, analysed within the context of the multi-hazard 
characteristics of the disaster more widely in order to give a thorough reflection of the 
considerations that have to be made prior to and during a multi-hazard disaster.   The 
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following section introduces the context of the case study, in terms of the location and history 
of lahar hazard at Mayon.  
6.2 Geographical and physical setting 
The Typhoon Reming lahars occurred at Mt Mayon volcano, which is currently the most active 
volcano in the Philippines (Aspinall et al., 2011).  Mayon is adjacent to the capital of the 
province of Albay – Legazpi City (Figures 6.1).  Albay is located in the Bicol region and is readily 
cited as one of the most disaster prone provinces in the Philippines (Citizen’s Disaster 
Response Center, 2012; Usamah and Haynes, 2012).  Figure 6.2 outlines the population 
exposure to volcanic, typhoon (wind and storm surge), flooding, landslide, lahar and tsunami 
hazards.  Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 demonstrated that Albay is within the tropical storm intensity 
zone 4, which means there is a 10% (or greater) probability of a storm of intensity 210 to 249 
km/hour striking in the next 10 years.  The province is also exposed to earthquake hazard (see 
Figure 1.1); however exposure statistics were not available.  According to the 2007 census, 
Albay has a population of 1.9 million, of which 175,843 live in Legazpi City (National Statistics 
Office, 2007).  42% of the population live below the poverty line (Usamah and Haynes, 2012).    
As a consequence of the multi-hazard setting, and in conjunction with strong political will, 
leadership and support from international donors, Albay has become one of the leading 
provinces for DRR and CCA in the Philippines (Provincial Government of Albay and CIRCA, 
2010).  Exemplary DRR policies initiated in Albay, such as the institutionalisation of a 
permanent disaster management office (the Albay Public Safety and Emergency Management 
Office, APSEMO), are now being rolled out across the country.   
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Figure 6.1 Replica of Figure 3.3: Location of the Municipalities, including Legazpi City, and the Barangays 
visited in October and November 2012.  The grey circle represents the approximate circumference of 
Mayon volcano and the dashed red circle is the 6km radius permanent danger zone (PDZ).  Source of 
data: Phil GIS (2013). 
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Figure 6.2 Population exposure by hazard type in Albay.  Source of data: APSEMO (2011). 
 
Mayon volcano is classified as a stratovolcano and its slopes are laden with eruption deposits 
comprised of lava, pyroclastic and lahar flows as well as ashfall (Ramos-Villarta et al., 1985; 
Fano et al., 2007).  The volcano stands at a height of 2462m and has a diameter of 20km and a 
circumference of 63km, encompassing the towns of Santo Domingo, Malilipot and Camalig 
(Ramos-Villarta et al., 1985).  The angle of the slope is 35-40 degrees from the summit down to 
2000m before changing to 22 degrees between 200m and 500m and finally five degrees below 
500m (Punongbayan, 1985).  PHIVOLCS has assigned a 6km permanent danger zone around 
the volcano: an area of no entry when the volcano reaches alert level 1 (see PHIVOLCS, 2001; 
Figure 6.1) – extended to 7km in the south where the crater lip is low (Orense and Ikeda, 
2007).     
From the assimilation of the major sources of historical eruptions available, Mayon appears to 
have erupted 54 times over the historical record (from 1616 – 2010; see Appendix F) or 60 
times according to Aspinall et al. (2011). Its most violent eruption killed 1,200 and destroyed 
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several towns (Aspinall et al., 2011).  The volcano poses an ongoing threat to the population of 
1 million people living across the seven municipalities and two cities around the volcano 
(PHIVOLCS, 2007a).  Many of the historical eruptions have produced pyroclastic flows and 
lahars that have devastated populated areas at the base of the volcano (Ramos-Villarta et al., 
1985; Catane et al., 2005; Aspinall et al., 2011).  Historical eruptions have typically been 
basaltic-andesitic in nature (Ramos-Villarta et al., 1985; Paguican et al., 2009; GVP, 2013) and 
have been recorded at magnitudes as great as 4 on the Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI, Newhall 
and Self, 1982; see Figure 6.3).  Many residents are reliant upon the fertile slopes of Mayon 
volcano for their livelihoods, as the dominant livelihood at Mayon is agriculture and fishing 
(Usamah and Haynes, 2012).  
 
Figure 6.3 Historical eruptions of Mayon volcano (1616 – 2010). Data sources: Rodolfo et al. (1989); 
Ramos-Villarta et al., (1985); Catane et al. (2005); PHIVOLCS (2008a); GVP (2013). 
 
The climate around Mayon belongs to the Type II climate, which has no significant dry season 
but a very pronounced maximum precipitation from October/November to January (Okkerman 
et al., 1985; Arguden and Rodolfo, 1990).  The northeast monsoon (October to late March) and 
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southwest monsoon (July to September) bring heavy rain to the area.  Most of the rain is, 
however, brought by tropical cyclones (typhoons and storms) between July and November; 
these can approach from the South China Sea or the Pacific Ocean (95% originate from the 
Pacific) and generally travel northwest (Bankoff, 2003).  Another source of rainfall is from the 
Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), which lies south of the equator from December to 
February, migrating northward from March and reaching its northernmost position (north of 
the Philippines) in August and September (Yumul et al., 2011).   The climate is also periodically 
affected by the El Niño Southern Oscillation (Bankoff, 2003; Yumul et al., 2011), which brings 
increased rainfall to the archipelago during La Niña (Bankoff, 2003). 
Since 1993, APSEMO has systematically recorded disasters which have occurred in the 
province.  Figure 6.4 illustrates the dominance of tropical cyclone related disasters during this 
short period, with Reming being the most devastating disaster to have occurred over this 18-
year record.  Given the wet climate and high incidence of typhoons it is unsurprising that 
lahars are a common occurrence during eruptions and post-eruptions.  Lahars are deemed to 
be the most destructive and persistent hazards at Mayon: they bury buildings and 
infrastructure, block drainage, raise river beds and cause flooding into adjacent areas of low 
elevation (Catane et al., 2005).  Lahars also affect the more distal populations owing to their 
run-out lengths.  They are a major hazard to the populations surrounding Mayon volcano, 
including the provincial capital. 
  
211 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 The number of Albay residents affected and killed by disaster and the economic losses by 
disaster.  ITCZ is the Intertropical Convergence Zone, which bring heavy rainfall to the province.  The pie 
charts represent the proportion of people or cost per the disaster type.  The data reflect the period 
between 1993 and 2011.    Source of data: APSEMO (2012). 
 
6.2.1 Lahar hazard at Mayon Volcano 
The term ‘lahar’ (originally Indonesian) is widely used in the volcanological and geological 
literature as a synonym for ‘volcanic mudflow or debris flow’ (Vallance, 2005).  ‘Lahar’ has 
been used to describe both the phenomenon itself (the process of flow) as well as the deposits 
left by the flow (Rodolfo and Arguden, 1991).  For the purposes of this research, the term lahar 
is used in agreement with Rodolfo and Arguden, 1991, Lavigne et al. (2000) and Vallance 
(2005) in their adoption of the definition proposed by Smith and Fritz: 
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a general term for a rapidly flowing, gravity-driven mixture of rock debris and water (other than 
normal streamflow) from a volcano (1989: 375).   
A lahar event can vary in size and speed with time and distance downstream and may 
comprise pulses and one or more flow phases, including debris-flow, hyperconcentrated-flow 
and stream flow phases (Lavigne et al., 2000; Figure 6.5).  These phases reflect the fact that the 
amount of water and rock debris lahars carry is constantly changing (Catane et al., 2005; USGS, 
2013).  A hyperconcentrated flow typically has a sediment concentration from 20% to 60% by 
volume and 40% to 60% by weight and is intermediate between debris flow and streamflow 
(see Lavigne et al., 2000).  A debris flow has high viscosity and shear strength, owing to the 
high concentration of poorly sorted solid content, allowing it to carry large boulders in 
suspension and flow at higher velocities than Newtonian fluids (Catane et al., 2005).  A typical 
debris flow sediment concentration is in excess of 60% by volume and 80% by weight (Lavigne 
et al., 2000); therefore, debris flows tend to be more destructive than hyperconcentrated 
flows.   
 
Figure 6.5 Schematic diagram for the generation of rain lahars and changes of state.  Dilution can 
reverse the sequence of streamflow to debris flow and it is possible for a lahar to go through the 
sequence more than once.  The process of lahar genesis is driven by the magnitude and intensities until 
the debris flow attains the maximum soil content (around 90 wt%).  Source: Rodolfo and Arguden (1991: 
fig. 12: 84; original caption adapted). 
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Lahars of hyperconcentrated and debris phases can be both erosional and depositional 
(Lavigne et al., 2000).  When a lahar discharge exceeds capacity of the channel, major 
avulsions occur along channel bends and constrictions (Umbal, 1986; Lavigne et al., 2000).  
These avulsions are can often be particularly devastating owing to the fact that people may be 
hit unexpectedly.     
A lahar can be classified as syn-eruptive (primary), post-eruptive (secondary) or unrelated to 
eruptions (non-eruptive; Vallance, 2005).  Studies related to Mayon have typically referred to 
lahars either primary (hot) or secondary (cold) lahars (Rodolfo, 1986; Umbal, 1986; Catane et 
al., 2005).  Mayon is an active volcano, so for the purposes of this study the terms syn- and 
post-eruptive are used.  The use of the term ‘secondary’ is restricted to the product of multi-
hazard interactions.  Table 6.1 presents a history of lahars at Mayon volcano.  The lahars 
induced by Reming are the most devastating to have occurred since the 1875 event. 
During many of Mayon's eruptions, lahars were generated either by storms or from very 
localised heavy rainfall owing to eruption updrafts of moist surface air that condense to form 
rainfall (Rodolfo, 1989).  The typical mechanism for lahar formation at Mayon is ‘intense’ and 
‘prolonged’ rainfall, as a consequence of monsoon rains or the passage of a typhoon in the 
vicinity of the volcano (PHIVOLCS et al., 2006a; Paguican et al., 2009).  The heavy rains cause 
water saturation and overland surface flow (see Figure 6.5), which can cause severe erosion 
and transportation of material downslope (Okkerman et al., 1985).  In unconsolidated 
deposits, water saturation can cause mass flow on steep slopes, but stream flow is by far the 
more important mechanism for lahar genesis on Mayon Volcano (Okkerman et al., 1985).    
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Table 6.1 History of lahars at Mayon Volcano.  The data represent those events that were described or interpreted as being associated with lahar.  Undoubtedly many 
smaller events have occurred between these dates, reflected by the fact that there are more events recorded in the last few decades owing to detailed studies and 
improved observations.  It is indicated whether the event is classed as a syn-eruptive (syn-E) or post-eruptive (post-E) event. 
Type Date Description of lahar Reference 
Post-E 1766: 23rd - 24th 
October 
A destructive non-volcanic lahar - occurred three months after the last eruption.  Heavy typhoon 
rains triggered the lahars.  Town of Malinao was completely destroyed, and Cagsaua, Budiao, 
Guinobatan, Ligao and Polangui suffered considerable damage.  Coconut and other trees were 
buried up to their crown.  Casualties amounted to 30 in Malinao and 19 in Albay (Legazpi). 
Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1814 Torrential rains were generated with the eruption clouds, and resulting lahars buried the villages 
of Bubulusan, Cagsaua, and Budiao to depths of 10-12m.  Total death toll for all villages was 
estimated to be 1200.  Large parts of Ligao, Guinobatan, Libog, Tabaco, and Tiwi were reportedly 
'burned and destroyed', but damage in those areas was mostly likely from lahars and tephra fall. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1827-1828: June to 
February 
500m column of fire for several days; lahars triggered by heavy rains on southwest slope, 
especially near Camalig.  Thousands left homeless (probably due to all impacts of eruption). 
Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1834-1835 More or less continuous eruption of 'lava'; on or before 5th May 1935 this pyroclastic flow (?) 
activity was succeeded by minor eruptions of ash and lapilli, with great steam clouds and strong 
thunder.  The airfall was in turn succeeded by numerous lahars. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1845: 19-20 or 21 
January 
Explosive pyroclastic eruptions and heavy ashfall.  Accounts of 'red hot sand' and 'lava flows 
running down the ravines' probably refer to pyroclastic flows and subsequent lahars. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1853: 13 July - 26 
August 
Major eruption; on July 27 a major lahar, as much as 4m deep in the Nasisi River, changed the 
course of that river and covered large areas of Ligao, Oas, and Polangui. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1858: January to 
December 
Primarily lava flows but lahars were reported by Neumann van Padang (1953). Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1862 A minor ash eruption with lahars (Neumann van Padang, 1953). Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1868: 17 December Ash cloud eruption and minor flow of red hot rocks; lahars reported. Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Post-E 1875: November Heavy rain triggered lahar (two years since previous eruption) killed 1500 people.  Most 
comparably devastating event to the 2006 Typhoon Reming lahars. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
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Post-E 1881-1882: 6 July to 
August 
Long eruption that began with ash and lappili; lahars occurred repeatedly throughout most of 
1881 and 1882, due to the fact that the eruptive event lasted 13 months, feeding ash to the 
slopes. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Post-E 1886-1887: 8 July to 10 
March 
Long eruption of lava; Lahars began in March 1887 and continued for more than a year. Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1893: 4 - 23&31 
October 
Minor ash, lapilli, bombs, lavas and lahars descended the eastern slopes. Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1895: 20 July - August 
and November 25 - 26 
Minor ash eruption and lahar.  Lightning and an "emission" of rainwater from the summit. Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1896: 31 August - 27 
September 
Another period of minor ash and lava eruptions, and minor lahars (Coronas, 1898). Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1897: 4 June - 23 July A hot lahar passed down the Basud River (Sto. Domingo) just after the eruption, and another hot 
lahar descended the ENE slope one month after the eruption.  Other post-eruption lahars caused 
major damage in Camalig.  The violence of the eruption left a low gap in the east rim of the crater, 
a gap which persisted until 1947 and which directed several eruptions toward Sto. Domingo. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1900: 1 - 6 March Ash and lapilli.  A hot lahar, 750m wide and 7m deep, flowed slowly down the Basud River and 
upon reaching the sea, formed large clouds of steam. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn- or 
post-E? 
1902 Minor ash eruption with lahars, or just post-1900 eruption lahars (historical record is unclear). Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Post-E 1915 Large non-volcanic lahars or "floods" occurred 15 years after eruptions in 1900 and 1902 affected 
Camalig (southeast) and Bonga and Tabaco (northeast) (Newhall, 1977). 
Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Post-E 1930: March (?) Rain-triggered lahars Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn-E 1968: 20 April - 20 May Vulcanian eruption; numerous lahars during and after the eruption. Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Post-E 1981: 30 June Typhoon triggered lahars killed 40 people [weather event actually classed as Tropical Storm – 
Daling (Kelly)]. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Syn- 
and 
post-E 
1984: 9 September - 6 
October 
Vulcanian eruption; numerous lahars during and after the eruption. Ramos-Villarta et al. (1985) 
Post-E 1985 - 1989 Periodic lahars owing to periods of heavy rain and typhoons. Rodolfo and Arguden (1991) 
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Syn-E 1993: 3 March Smell of sulphur noted five minutes prior to arrival of lahar at 15:30.  Knee-deep and warm (but 
not boiling).  Little rainfall. 
GVP (2013) citing PHIVOLCS 
Post-E 1995: 2 November Typhoon Rosing (Angela) triggered lahars. APSEMO (pers. 
communication) 
Post-E 1998: 21-22 October Typhoon Loleng (Babs) triggered typhoons. APSEMO (pers. 
communication) 
Syn-E 2000: 3 March Lahar activity Catane et al. (2005) citing 
Bornas et al. (2000) 
Post-E 2001: 21 November? Lahar triggered after several days of heavy rainfall.  Unclear if date of reporting reflects date of 
lahar, therefore this event is not included in the lahar rainfall analysis in Chapter 8. 
GVP (2013; citing PHIVOLCS) 
Post-E 2004: 1-2 December Typhoon Yoyong induced lahars.  According to a news report, strong rains brought by typhoon 
Yoyong in the Philippines caused lahars to flow down the stream channels of Mayon, particularly 
in the Padang settlement, and Legazpi City (~14 km SE of the volcano's summit). The Provincial 
Disaster Management Officer stated that the lahars would not cause damage to homes or rice 
fields, and that villagers residing near the volcano were not asked to evacuate. 
GVP (2013; citing ABS-CBN 
News 
Post-E 2006: 27 September Typhoon Milenyo (Xangsane) brought small lahars to Padang. PHIVOLCS (2007b) 
Post-E 2006: 30 November Typhoon Reming lahars killed 1266 people. Numerous sources made 
reference to throughout 
Chapter 7 
Post-E 2011: 25-26 July Tropical depression Juaning (Nock-ten). One resident (Maipon) indicates that lahars occurred from 
6am to 2pm on 25 July, initial flows dumped sediments on the northern portion of the lahar field 
but shifted south to the barangay road between 8am and 10am.  But, rainfall at Legazpi station 
not particularly heavy until the evening of the 25th and into the 26th - did lahars occur on the 
26th? 
PHIVOLCS (2011a) 
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Rodolfo and Arguden (1991) describe ‘a typical major lahar, such as the one triggered by 
Typhoon Rosing [Maury] 3 years after the [1984] eruption’ as lasting anywhere between 
several hours to two days and being mainly of a hyperconcentrated streamflow phase, 
interspersed with pulses of debris flow, each typically lasting several minutes to one hour, with 
velocities of three to six metres per second (see references within Rodolfo and Arguden, 
1991).   
Whilst rainfall is the main trigger of Mayon lahars, the availability of eruptive products plays a 
major role in the mobilisation and deposition of lahars (PHIVOLCS et al., 2006a).  It is this 
abundance of loose debris on the slopes, along with conditions for triggering, that results in 
volcanic debris flows being often a magnitude larger than debris flows in other settings 
(Vallance, 2005).  The initiation point for lahars is the upper to middle slopes, where loose and 
newly deposited pyroclastic materials are located and, when mobilised by heavy rains, flow 
along gullies and spread out to leave thick deposits and depositional fans on the lower slopes 
(Catane et al., 2005).  During eruptions, lahar initiation and genesis are not only governed by 
the prevailing weather, but also by the strength of the explosions, and by the size and duration 
of an eruption column (Arguden and Rodolfo, 1990).  In spite of the almost perfect symmetry 
of Mayon volcano, processes of aggradation and degradation are uneven (Rodolfo and 
Arguden, 1991).  Lava, pyroclastic flows and lahars form discrete deposits (Paguican et al., 
2009) and, during quiescent periods, erosional and depositional processes vary, even between 
closely spaced channels (see Rodolfo and Arguden, 1991). 
During an eruption, hot lahars are often larger, debris laden and more destructive that those 
that occur in post-eruption settings Catane et al. (2005).  It is the typhoon related post-
eruption lahars, however, that have caused more human fatalities – partly due to their size but 
also perhaps a reflection of the declining volcanic awareness of Mayon residents (Umbal, 
1986).  The lahar history at Mayon demonstrates that lahars are a relatively frequent 
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occurrence, interspersed with particularly devastating events.  The case study of Reming 
therefore presents the opportunity to analyse a commonly occurring hazard but with a less 
commonly observed impact.  Before presenting the findings of the case study analysis, it is 
necessary to mention the sources of information used in this analysis.   
6.3 Review of data collected for case study analysis 
The data were collected via four means: peer-reviewed literature, semi-structured interviews, 
observations and secondary data analysis (including the analysis of internal reports collected in 
the field).  Each of these data sources are briefly discussed below. 
6.3.1 Peer-reviewed literature 
A small number of forensic analyses of the occurrence and impact of the Typhoon Reming 
lahars have been published; these range from the analysis of the occurrence and inundation 
paths of the lahars (Orense and Ikeda, 2007; Paguican et al., 2009), to a focus upon the 
meteorological conditions during and shortly before the event (Yumul Jr et al., 2008; Yumul et 
al., 2011).  Others have focused more upon the long-term risk reduction measures (Usamah 
and Haynes, 2012).  To date, however, there has been no analysis of this disaster from the 
perspective of multi-hazards.  Furthermore, there are contradictions and controversies within 
the literature, including disagreements over the timing of the lahars (compare Orense and 
Ikeda, 2007, with Paguican et al., 2009) and claims that residents chose not to evacuate 
(Paguican et al., 2009).  There is also an absence of perspectives from NGO staff in the existing 
literature. 
Given the gaps and contradictions in the literature, it was essential to visit the site and speak 
with the key stakeholders involved in the event to ascertain what occurred.  Most of the 
literature cited eye witness accounts as a source of their information, implying that collecting 
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information from communities who were affected by the lahars is a key tool in understanding 
this disaster.   
6.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with those affected by the disaster (communities) 
and those involved prior to, during and since the disaster in terms of hazard assessment and 
response: scientists, local government and NGOs (collectively referred to as DRR stakeholders).  
The details of these interviewees are presented in Table 6.2.    
The interview guide for the stakeholders can be viewed in Appendix C.  Questions varied 
depending upon interviewees’ knowledge of the disaster.  In order to ensure anonymity, the 
NGOs and local government agencies have not been disclosed as, given the small size of the 
local agencies, it would make individuals too readily identifiable.  The NGO staff interviewed 
are described by their job title, but the three local government disaster management staff 
required the generic titles of ‘LG (local government) Disaster Manager’ as anything more 
explicit would have compromised their anonymity.  The scientific organisations are larger in 
size making ensuring anonymity easier, but these participants are referred to only by their 
organisation and scientific category (e.g. geologist) and not their job title (see Table 6.2).  Table 
6.3 provides background to the government scientific agencies that were interviewed during 
the study. 
The details of the community members were presented in Chapter 3 but can be viewed in 
greater detail in Appendix G.  The interview guide used to conduct these interviews can also be 
viewed in Appendix C.  Interviews were conducted in the municipalities of Guinobatan, 
Camalig, Daraga and Santo Domingo (Figure 6.1), which were all badly affected by lahars. 
 
 
220 
 
Table 6.2 List of DRR stakeholders interviewed.  Those with whom the case study was discussed to the greatest extent are in bold and they represent the source of the 
majority of stakeholder derived information collected about this event.   
Group Name Level Location 
Date of 
interview 
In organisation 
during Reming 
Signed 
consent Recorded 
Scientists 
International volcanologist International Santo Domingo, Albay 13/10/2012 N Y Y 
Academic Geologist 1 N/A Quezon City, Manila 17/10/2012 Y Y N 
Academic Geologist 2 N/A Quezon City, Manila 04/11/2012 Y Y N 
MGB Regional Geologist Regional Legazpi City, Albay 22/10/2012 Y Y Y 
MGB National Geologist National Legazpi City, Albay 15/10/2012 Y Y Y 
PAGASA Regional Meteorologist Local Legazpi City, Albay 24/10/2012 Y Y Y 
PAGASA STRIDE Team Leader National Quezon City, Manila 17/10/2012 Y Y Y 
PHIVOLCS Geologist 1 National Quezon City, Manila 17/10/2012 Y Y 
Y Interviewed 
together  
PHIVOLCS Geologist 2 National Quezon City, Manila 17/10/2012 Y Y Y 
PHIVOLCS Geologist 3 National Quezon City, Manila 07/11/2012 Y Y Y 
PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 Local Legazpi City, Albay 21/10/2012 Y Y Y 
PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 2 National Quezon City, Manila 07/11/2012 Y N Verbal consent 
Local 
government 
LG Disaster Manager 1 Local Santo Domingo, Albay 22/10/2012 Y Y Y 
LG Disaster Manager 2 Local Legazpi City, Albay 23/10/2012 Y Y Y 
LG Disaster Manager 3 Local Legazpi City, Albay 31/10/2012 Y Y Y 
OCD (Office of Civil Defence) 
Regional representative Regional Legazpi City, Albay 24/10/2012 N Y Y 
NGOs 
INGO A DRR Specialist International Makati City, Manila 18/10/2012 Y Y Y 
INGO A DRR Country Programme 
Adviser International Makati City, Manila 18/10/2012 Y Y Y 
INGO B Humanitarian Programme 
Coordinator International Quezon City, Manila 19/10/2012 Y Y Y 
Local Heath Volunteer Local Santo Domingo, Albay 14/10/2012 Not known Y N 
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Local NGO A R1 (Community 
organiser) Local Legazpi City, Albay 26/10/2012 Y Y 
Y/N Informal 
interview 
(26/10/2012) and 
interview with 
colleague above on 
27/10/2012 
Local NGO A R2 (DRR point 
person) [Local NGO Ph2 in 
Chapter 4] Local Legazpi City, Albay 27/10/2012 Y Y Y 
Local NGO B R1 (Programme 
staff) Local Daraga, Albay 25/10/2012 Y Y 
Y/N Informal 
interview and 
interview  with 
colleague below  
Local NGO B R2 (Executive 
Director) Local Daraga, Albay 25/10/2012 N Y Y 
Local NGO C (Researcher) Local Legazpi City, Albay 24/10/2012 Y Y Y 
National NGO (Deputy Executive 
Director) National Quezon City, Manila 15/10/2012 Y Y Y 
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Table 6.3 Government scientific agencies involved in the research. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the discussion, the NGOs, scientists and local government interviewees are collectively 
referred to as DRR stakeholders, whereas the victims of lahar are described as either 
communities or residents.  Whilst a balanced view of interviewees’ responses is endeavoured, 
it transpired during the interviews that certain participants were more knowledgeable of the 
disaster due to their having experienced it, been involved in the response or having studied 
the event since.  As a consequence these interviewees are referred to more often than other 
interviewees, which reflects the availability of information about the event rather than any 
bias. 
6.3.3 Observational techniques and secondary information collected in field 
In addition to the interviews described above, understanding and interpreting the case study 
was also reliant upon the researcher’s observations and the available secondary material. 
Photographs and field notes regarding the remains of the impacts of each of the barangays 
Agency Department Mandated hazards (hazard 
assessments and 
monitoring) 
Mines and 
Geoscience Bureau 
(MGB) 
Department for 
Environment and 
Natural Resources 
Rainfall induced landslides 
and flood maps. 
Philippine 
Atmospheric, 
Geophysical and 
Astronomical Services 
Administration 
(PAGASA) 
Department for 
Science and 
Technology 
Weather and climate; flood 
forecasting; astronomy.   
Philippine Institute of 
Volcanology and 
Seismology 
(PHIVOLCS) 
Department for 
Science and 
Technology 
Volcanoes, earthquakes, and 
associated hazards (including 
earthquake induced 
landslides); tsunamis.  Lead 
on the multi-hazard mapping 
project (READY). 
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visited were taken.  The researcher was also invited to attend two forums regarding research 
on flood risk in Manila, where she was able to observe the heated interaction between 
academic and government scientists and between local and international scientists.  
Information on the events attended is presented in Appendix A. 
Internal reports from organisations interviewed were collated and reviewed in order to better 
understand this disaster from multiple perspectives (see references within Chapters 7 and 8).  
Rainfall data were sourced from PAGASA for the purpose of comparing this with historical 
lahar events (see Chapter 8).  The data reflect the period between the beginning of 1978 and 
the end of August 2012 (the latest record available) and are limited to this period owing to 
their cost. 
6.4 Summary 
Albay is a multi-hazardous province and lahars are a persistent threat to the populations 
surrounding the volcano, with post-eruption lahars having tended to cause the most deaths.  
The 2006 Typhoon Reming lahars disaster offers the opportunity to explore a case of one 
hazard triggering another in the context of this multi-hazardous environment (Albay).  The 
case study analysis builds upon the four key sources of information: semi-structured 
interviews, secondary data (peer-reviewed literature, internal reports and rainfall data), 
participant and field observations. 
The findings from the case study analysis are presented in Chapters 7 and 8.  Chapter 7 
presents the analysis of the multi-hazard characteristics of the case and Chapter 8 discusses 
the current scientific methods adopted for assessing and anticipating this type of multi-hazard 
event at Mayon.   
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Chapter 7: The multi-hazard characteristics of the Typhoon 
Reming lahars disaster 
 
Chapter 7 presents the findings from the analysis of the Typhoon Reming lahars case study.  
The chapter begins with a review of notable events leading up to the disaster.  This is followed 
by a narrative of the case study, with particular focus given to (1) the warning and evacuation; 
(2) the anticipation of the event; and (3) the understanding amongst different stakeholders as 
to why this disaster included lahar.  The analysis comprises the combined findings from the 
literature, internal reports, field observations and semi-structured interviews that were 
implemented, with comparisons made between the perceptions of DRR stakeholders 
(scientists, local government and NGOs) and communities.  The chapter concludes with a 
summary of the multi-hazard characteristics of the Typhoon Reming triggered lahars case 
study, the key themes that emerged during the analysis and a short reflection on the lessons 
learnt from this disaster.   
7.1 Hazards and disasters leading up to Typhoon Reming 
The Philippines is one of the most multi-hazardous countries in the world and 2006 
exemplified this, with the year beginning with flooding, flashfloods and landslides as a 
consequent of La Niña (Yumul Jr et al., 2008).   A succession of small and medium-sized events 
relentlessly hit the province of Albay (Figure 7.1) and consequently placed a strain upon the 
local government1.  LG Disaster Manager 3 said that the province experienced a series of 
floods in May or June.  In August, residents surrounding Mayon volcano were affected by a 
minor (VEI 1) eruption of Mayon, which necessitated the evacuation of 95, 926 people 
(Usamah and Haynes, 2012) or 40,000 people according to Orense and Ikeda (2007).   
                                                          
1 LG Disaster Manager 3 
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 Guinsaugon landslide 
(17/02) 
 
 Tropical Storm 
Caloy 
(Chanchu) 
(11/05) 
 Eruption of 
Mayon volcano 
(13/07-01/10) 
Tropical Storm 
Henry 
(Prapiroon) 
(28/07-02/08) 
Enhanced south 
west monsoon 
Typhoon Milenyo 
(Xangsane) 
(27/09) 
 
Typhoons Paeng 
(Cimaron) (27-
31/10) and 
Queenie (Chebi) 
(08-12/10) 
Typhoon 
Reming 
(Durian) 
(30/11) 
Typhoon 
Seniang (Utor) 
(2/12) 
… Feb … May … July August Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 Inundated barangay 
Guinsaugon, Southern 
Leyte.  Occurred a few 
days after the heaviest 
rainfall had occurred and 
may have also been 
triggered by an eruption 
(see Evans et al., 2007; 
Guthrie et al., 2009). 
Relevance: demonstrated 
complexity of determining 
multi-hazard interactions, 
along with the risk from 
large mass movement 
failures, only 10 months 
before the typhoon 
Reming lahars. 
 Signal # 3 over 
Albay 
47,065 people 
evacuated; 5 
injured. 
[Might reflect 
the flooding 
recalled by LG 
Disaster 
Manager 3] 
 On the 13th July 
incandescent 
lava fragments 
appeared to be 
detaching from 
the volcanic 
dome; ash 
explosions 
continued 
throughout 
August 95,926 
people 
evacuated 
(Usamah and 
Haynes, 2012) 
Henry: Signal # 1 
over Albay 
No information 
regarding the 
impact of this on 
Albay.  
Enhancement of 
the south-west 
monsoon 
mentioned by 
Yumul et al. 
(2008). 
Signal # 3 over 
Albay 
698,460 people 
affected, 14 killed 
and 176 injured.  
Economic damage 
and power 
outages.  
Economic damage 
PhP 1.7 billion. 
Largest typhoon to 
affect Albay in 
advance of 
Reming.  May have 
made people 
complacent 
(Orense and Ikeda, 
2007). 
Paeng: Signal # 1 
over Albay 
Queenie: No 
warning for 
Albay 
Hit Luzon but 
there was 
minimal impact 
upon Albay 
Signal # 4 over 
Albay 
Typhoon 
Reming hits 
Albay and 
neighbouring 
provinces. 
Signal # 2 over 
Albay.  Minimal 
cumulative 
rainfall meant 
only muddy 
streamflows 
were observed 
along identified 
river channels 
affected during 
the Super 
Typhoon Reming 
event (PHIVOLCS, 
2006). 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Timeline of disasters triggered by natural hazards during 2006 in the Philippines.  Those which did not affect Albay are in grey.  The international name for the 
tropical storms and typhoons are included in brackets after the name used in the Philippines.  Source of information: PHIVOLCS (2006a); PAGASA (2006); Evans et al. 
(2007); Yumul et al. (2008); Guthrie et al. (2009); APSEMO (2012).
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On the 27th September, the province (along with other parts of Luzon, including Metro Manila) 
was affected by Typhoon Milenyo (international name Xangsane), which travelled over Albay 
as a PAGASA public storm warning # 3 storm signal (see Table 7.1).  Milenyo caused 14 
fatalities in Albay and injured 176 people, but its main impact was economic (1.7 billion PhP; 
US$ 33.3million APSEMO, 2006a) and infrastructure (power) damage (Yumul Jr et al., 2008).  
Typhoon Milenyo did not generally trigger lahars, apart from in a few isolated cases, but three 
DRR interviewees2  stated that Typhoon Milenyo may have increased siltation within the river 
channels on Mayon, thus making them more susceptible to lahar during Typhoon Reming (see 
also Orense and Ikeda, 2007; Usamah and Haynes, 2012).   
Table 7.1 PAGASA typhoon classification and warning criteria – note that when any Public Storm 
Warning Signal Number is initially put in effect, the corresponding meteorological conditions are not yet 
occurring over the locality.  The lead time in the subsequent issues of the warning bulletin shortens as 
the tropical cyclone comes closer.  Source of information for table and caption: PAGASA (2013). 
PAGASA Public Storm 
Warning Storm Signal 
Number 
Wind speed in knots (and km per 
hour) 
Lead time of first warning 
bulletin 
#1 16 – 32 (30 – 60) 36 hours 
#2 >32 – 54 (>60 to 100) 24 hours 
#3 >54 – 100 (>100 to 185) 18 hours 
#4 >100 (>185) 12 hours 
 
Communities were deemed to still be recovering from Typhoon Milenyo3 when Typhoon 
Reming arrived on the 30th November.  One interviewee4 said that houses were not yet strong 
enough to survive another typhoon, whilst the representative of Local NGO C mentioned that 
they were still assisting people with their recovery from Milenyo (see also Usamah and 
                                                          
2 PHVIOLCS Volcanologist; LG Disaster Managers 2 and 3 
3 PAGASA Regional Meteorologist said that because people had just had a typhoon they were not well 
prepared for another. 
4 LG Disaster Manager 1 
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Haynes, 2012).  In general, however, the communities interviewed described very little5 
damage from Typhoon Milenyo:  
Lahar during Milenyo but not so strong.  House not so heavily damaged during 
Milenyo.  Able to fix house after Milenyo. (Leja, Barangay Lidong) 
Power lines were still down and the ability of the local government to warn communities at 
risk was impaired6.  Therefore, amongst the majority of the residents interviewed, 
communities’ direct vulnerability was not increased by Typhoon Milenyo, but the ability of the 
government to communicate and respond to a subsequent event (Reming) was compromised. 
7.2 Description of the Typhoon Reming lahar disaster and its multi-
hazard impacts 
On the 30th November 2006, Typhoon Reming (international name Durian) hit the province of 
Albay.  The event was classed as a supertyphoon, owing to maximum sustained winds of 190 
kilometres per hour (kph) at its centre and gusts of up to 225 kph (Orense and Ikeda, 2007).  
Rainfall of 466mm fell between 8am and 8pm, which is almost equal to the average monthly 
rainfall for November in Albay (486mm; Orense and Ikeda, 2007).  The rainfall mobilised lahars 
of such great volume and length that were described as ‘unprecedented in the recent history 
of Mayon’ (Paguican et al., 2009: 846; PHIVOLCS, 2006a: 1).  Major flashfloods and lahars 
occurred in the lower reaches of the southern sector of Mayon (PHIVOLCS, 2006a).  The floods 
and lahars overtopped river channels, breached dikes and cut new paths (up to 100m wide and 
15m deep) through communities, rice fields and coconut plantations (Paguican et al., 2009).  
Given that the lahars were triggered by a typhoon, DRR stakeholders and communities 
described a number of different hazards that occurred in addition to lahars, including strong 
                                                          
5 Edraline said his house was ‘tilted’ (Barangay Lidong); Gemma’s house was affected by minor lahar 
(Barangay Tandarora) 
6 LG Disaster Manager 2 and 3 
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wind, landslides, flooding and storm surge7.  Most of the deaths, however, were caused by the 
lahars, which killed 1266 people (APSEMO, 2006b).  Economic losses (e.g. damage to coconut 
plantations8) were attributed to the wind9 (Table 7.2).   
Typhoon Reming was described as travelling directly through Albay, with one DRR stakeholder 
stating that the eye of the typhoon passed close to Legazpi City10 and another emphasising 
that it was the wall of the eye that passed overhead, which they deemed significant as this 
brought the most rainfall.  However, Figure 7.2 indicates that the typhoon eye tracked about 
30km north of Mayon volcano.  Table 7.2 also indicates that the typhoon brought havoc to 
most of the Bicol region, but the comparatively high number of deaths in Albay emphasises the 
significant impact of the lahars in Albay compared with the impact of the typhoon in other 
provinces. 
In Albay, Legazpi City was badly flooded and, owing to debris littering the runway, the airport 
was closed for a couple of days (Orense and Ikeda, 2007).  Many of the DRR stakeholders were 
themselves affected by flooding and so were not able to immediately respond to the lahar 
victims11.  The compounding effect of the strong winds and poor visibility during the typhoon 
meant that rescue workers could do little to help people affected by the lahars in the 
immediate aftermath (see also Orense and Ikeda, 2007).  This was made more difficult by the 
fact that the lahar was very difficult to cross: 
‘..the problem is even rescue workers cannot do anything because the wind velocity's 
enormous and the area really is difficult to cross, no vehicle can be used, and the 
                                                          
7 The following interviewees mentioned the additional hazards that occurred during the event: LG 
Disaster Manager 2 (all the hazards mentioned); DRR Point Person (Local NGO A) (flooding); Local Health 
Volunteer (landslides); interviews in Barangay Salvacion (flooding, wind and landslides); PHIVOLCS 
Geologist 2 (wind); PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 2 (wind) ; Renaldo in Barangay Lidong (combination of wind 
and rain); Maria in Barangay Tandarora (flooding and wind); interview in Anislag (strong wind); interview 
in Binitayan (flash flood); Perla in Barangay Sua (wind and heavy rain); Jerry in Barangay San Isidro (wind 
and flooding). 
8 According to International Volcanologist, these took years to recover.  
9 PHIVOLCS Geologists 1 and 2 
10 MGB Regional Geologist; PHVIOLCS Volcanologist 1 
11 LG Disaster Manager 3; DRR Point Person (Local NGO A) 
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typhoon is so strong that the visibility is too close so … it's very dangerous to go out 
during that time.  It's almost hazy because of the strong wind and rain…’ (PHIVOLCS 
Volcanologist 1) 
These compounding effects highlight the need to consider the combined effect of the different 
hazards produced during one event.  This situation also emphasises the role communities have 
as first responders to a disaster and that they have to be prepared for when the local 
government and local NGOs cannot immediately assist.  
There was significant damage to mitigation structures from both the typhoon and the lahars: 
flood controls, seawalls, drainage structures and lahar mitigation structural damage amounted 
to PhP 1.5 billion12.  Reming also caused widespread power outages in the province and 
knocked out telecommunications and transportation networks (Orense and Ikeda, 2007), 
hindering the communications during and in response to the typhoon.  The Philippine 
Government declared a ‘State of National Calamity’, which prompted an international relief 
operation in the weeks and months following the typhoon (NDCC, 2006). 
 
  
  
                                                          
12 US$1 = PhP46 according to Orense and Ikeda (2007) 
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Table 7.2 Summary of casualties, evacuees and damage from typhoon Reming across the Bicol region.  The difference in the number of deaths recorded by Orense and 
Ikeda (2007) is in part a reflection of the fact that some classed as missing in the table below will have been assigned to the deceased category at a later date.  However, 
there is still a slight shortfall between the 1266 people recorded by Orense and Ikeda (2007) and the number of deaths recorded in this data.  Source: OCD (2006). 
Province in Bicol 
Region (no. of 
municipalities and 
barangays) 
Impact on residents 
 
Damage 
 
No. of casualties No. of evacuees No. of houses damaged Agriculture (Philippine 
Pesos) 
Infrastructure 
(Philippine Pesos) Dead Injured Missing Families People Partially Totally 
Albay  
(18 municipalities;  
653 barangays) 608 1,394 605 6674 31, 085 78,272 96, 879 545,221,462 569,194,897 
Camarines Norte  
(12 municipalities;  
237  barangays) 
 [No 
figure] 2 
 [No 
figure] 
 [No 
figure]  [No figure] 10,689 904 34, 477,255  [No figure] 
Camarines Sur  
(37 municipalities;  
917  barangays) 9 199 0 5,554 29, 439 130,391 89,383 13, 548,816  [No figure] 
Catanduanes  
(11 municipalities;  
315  barangays) 16 330 0 0 0 24,580 14,304  [No figure]  [No figure] 
Masbate  
(3  municipalities;  
30  barangays) 3 1 1 
 [No 
figure]  [No figure] 4,909 2,854  [No figure]  [No figure] 
Sorsogon  
(16 municipalities;  
180  barangays) 6 18 3 277 1,602 19,690 4,812  [No figure]  [No figure] 
Total (Region wide): 642 1,944 609 12505 62,126 268,531 112257 593,247,533 569,194,897 
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Figure 7.2 Track of Typhoon Reming.  Mayon is represented by a small red triangle in the bottom image (labelled for clarity).  Source: UNOSAT (2006). 
Mayon 
The map illustrates the approximate track of Typhoon 
Durian (“Reming” in the Philippine) and the population 
density (2004) across the affected provinces of Albay, 
Camarines, Catanduanes, Quezon and Sorsogon.  Typhoon 
Durian made landfall at Catanduanes on 30/11/2006 with 
gusts of up to 225kph.  Landslides/mudflows have been 
reported near Mt. Mayon volcano in Albay province.  The 
50km buffer zone of the typhoon track is shown in yellow.  
The depiction and use of boundaries, geographic names 
and related data shown here are not warranted to be 
error-free nor do they imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations.  This map was produced 
by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research 
(UNITAR) Operational Satellite Applications Programme 
(UNOSAT).  UNOSAT provides satellite imagery and related 
geographic information to UN humanitarian and 
development agencies and their implementing partners. 
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7.2.1 Lahar characteristics and impact 
The lahars travelled well beyond the 6km PDZ (Orense and Ikeda, 2007; Figure 7.3), burying 
large areas and causing upstream flooding from debris-choked tributaries (Orense and Ikeda, 
2007).  As such, there was a spectrum of hazards from flash flooding to debris flow that 
affected communities residing in both the upper and lower reaches of the channels that 
dissect Mayon volcano.  Figure 7.3 outlines the areas of lahar deposition, the channels that 
transect Mayon’s edifice and the barangays visited during the field visit (as well as the location 
of Barangay Tagas – the pre-Reming location of the residents interviewed in Barangay Anislag).   
In spite of the lahar hazard map indicating that areas were equally prone to lahar around the 
entire edifice (see Section 7.4.1, Figure 7.14), the lahars were concentrated in the southern 
sector of Mayon volcano, specifically in the municipalities of Guinobatan, Camalig and Daraga 
as well as Barangay Padang in Legazpi City and parts of Santo Domingo (Orense and Ikeda, 
2007; Paguican et al., 2009; see Figure 7.3).  The impact also varied within the southern sector 
and Guinobatan was one of the hardest hit, with numerous houses buried under two to three 
metres of lahar (Orense and Ikeda, 2007), and Barangay Padang in Legazpi City was completely 
destroyed (see Figure 7.4).  The description of the specific impact to each of the barangays 
visited during this trip is contained in Appendix H. 
 
 233 
 
 
TANDARORA 
SUA 
BINITAYAN 
TAGAS 
PADANG 
LIDONG 
SAN ANTONIO 
SAN ISIDRO 
Figure 7.3 Map of the Typhoon Reming lahar deposits, areas of siltation, the 2006 lava flow, the gullies and rivers the lahars tend to follow, barangays and 
municipalities of interest to the study.  The map was created by digital manual tracing of elements of the December 2006 preliminary quick response team deposit 
map created on SPOT 5 imagery (from May 2005).  The original map is still partially visible.  Source: PHIVOLCS (2007a). 
 
 
PDZ 
YAWA RIVER 
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Figure 7.4 The location of what was once Barangay Padang (October 2012); all the residents have been 
relocated by the local government owing to the persistent threat of lahars, although some have 
returned to the area and are living in informal settlements.  Source: author’s own. 
 
The concentration of lahars in the southern sector of the volcano was a reflection of the recent 
activity of Mayon volcano.  Three PHIVOLCS interviewees described a notch in the south-east 
edge of the crater, which was created during the 1984 eruption: 
‘there was a notch that was created in south eastern rim of the crater.  Then the 
pyroclastic flows started going that way then they were flowing down these slopes and 
just eating up the material and by the end of the eruption the flows had produced this 
huge gully – 300m wide’ (PHIVOLCS Geologist 3) 
The deposits from the 1984 and subsequent eruptions (see Appendix F) had therefore been 
concentrated in the southern sector.  The availability of fresher deposits compared with those 
in the northern sector of the volcano meant that there was more material available for lahar 
entrainment, owing to the fact that it had not been removed by previous events or stabilised 
by vegetation growing on the slopes13 (PHIVOLCS, 2006a).  The Reming lahars are thought to 
be the remobilisation of the 2000-2001 eruption deposits (PHIVOLCS et al., 2007a).  There was 
flooding on the northern slopes of the volcano, which indicates that there was no significant 
                                                          
13 Academic Geologist 1 
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difference in the amount of rainfall that fell; so the fact that lahars only occurred in the south 
further emphasises the influence of previous eruptions on the spatial distribution of lahar 
exposure in the medium (decadal) term.   
The types of lahars varied across and within different river channels.  Residents in the 
upstream communities of Barangays Tandarora and Sua were affected by boulder laden debris 
flows (Figure 7.5).  In contrast, the flows that affected the more downstream residents of 
Binitayan and Tagas (now resident of Anislag) were hyperconcentrated (likely a result of 
debulking of the lahar flows), but these also carried some boulders (PHIVOLCS, 2006a) and still 
caused significant damage (Figure 7.6).  However, in general the different flows had different 
impacts:    
‘the hyperconcentrated flow is not so devastating…it wasn’t anywhere near the 
physical intensity of impact that there was where there was debris flow.’ International 
Volcanologist 
The spatial variation of the types and location of flows thus emphasises the need for hazard 
assessments and DRR strategies at the community level.  
 
Figure 7.5 Barangay Captain of Tandarora stands next to lahar deposition 3-4 metres high from Typhoon 
Reming (October 2012).  Source: author’s own. 
 236 
 
Figure 7.6 Ruined homes in Barangay Binitayan, which was downstream of barangays devastated by 
debris flows but was still devastated by hyperconcentrated flows and some boulder laden flows 
(September 2010).  Source: author’s own. 
 
Multi-hazard vulnerability 
As mentioned above, the disaster was a consequence of multiple hazards and the different 
impacts of each of these hazards emphasises why vulnerability assessments need to consider 
the impact of multiple hazards within a single event.  Typhoons typically bring strong wind, 
thus the perception was that concrete homes were less vulnerable than those constructed of 
indigenous materials (e.g. bamboo, sawalli, cogon and nipa; National  Statistics Office, 2007) or 
improvised materials (e.g. scrap metal; see Figures 7.7 - 7.9).  However, some community 
members were not aware that their concrete homes were also vulnerable because of the 
lahars: 
‘The most devastating was mud and debris flow and also wind.  So we saved a lot of 
people during landslide, we saved a lot of people during flood, we saved a lot of people 
during storm surge because they evacuated; but in terms of mudflow they were not 
evacuated because they were residing in the concrete houses but without 
knowing…[that] even the concrete structures will be destroyed because the turbidity 
and the strength of that flow will be higher than the flood’ (LG Disaster Manager 2) 
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Of those who did eventually evacuate, residents in indigenous or improvised homes responded 
by moving to houses made of concrete as (based upon their past experience of typhoons) they 
assumed these structures would withstand the winds14.  However, as pointed out by another 
DRR stakeholder, these evacuees did not consider the lahars:   
‘The one case of that happened in one community in Daraga…the poor people tend to 
evacuate to the big houses, concrete houses, owned by the rich people.  Near the 
Cagsawa ruins. It is owned by engineer – so they are rich – they are concrete houses.  
The poor people evacuated there but the Mayon lahar destroyed all the houses so all of 
them are affected.’ (DRR Point Person, Local NGO A) 
The above quotation also highlights that the event affected both the rich and the poor: 
‘Even if you are rich or poor for as long as you are located in the proximity of that 
impact then you are not safe.’ (LG Disaster Manager 2) 
This is an interesting point since there was a tendency amongst some NGO Head Office 
interviewees in Chapter 4 to assume the poorest are the most vulnerable.  The occurrence of 
secondary hazards highlights a need to challenge this underlying assumption.  The immediate 
impact of a multi-hazard disaster – particularly one of this magnitude – may affect everyone 
within a community. 
                                                          
14 For example, Gemma moved to Maria’s concrete house (Tandarora).  Interviewees in Binitayan said 
the lighter material homes were destroyed.  Irma and Antonio (San Antonio) stayed in their concrete 
home because they perceived to be safe and said that 15 residents joined them (home was flooded and 
lost roof, also affected by lahar). 
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Figure 7.7 Gemma’s home in Tandarora, which is made of indigenous materials.  It was damaged during 
Milenyo and completely destroyed by lahars during Reming (October 2012).  Source: author’s own. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8 Jerry’s home in San Isidro, which is made of indigenous and improvised materials.  It was 
completely destroyed by lahars during Reming (October 2012).  Source: author’s own. 
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Figure 7.9 The ruins of a concrete home in Tandarora destroyed by lahars during Reming (October 
2012).  Source: author’s own 
 
Across the barangays, those residing in homes constructed form light-weight materials 
described them as being a ‘wash out’, in other words completely destroyed by the floods or 
lahars: 
The flood was very strong.  There was lahar.  House was totally washout [destroyed].  
(Edraline, Barangay Lidong)15 
Not all of those residing in concrete homes described them as being completely destroyed – a 
resident of Tandarora said that only the kitchen at the back of her concrete home was 
devastated.  However, the intensity of the typhoon was so great that even concrete homes 
were not impervious to its wrath.  In Salvacion, (situated beyond the danger of lahars: see 
Figure 6.6) resident Myrna said that the roof of her concrete home blew off during the event.  
In general, however, it was clear from field observations in the barangays visited that the 
lahars had devastated concrete structures as the remains of ruined structures were present, 
particularly in Tandarora and Binitayan.   
                                                          
15 Translated by LG Disaster Manager 1 
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There were mitigation structures, for example earth and concrete dikes, but these were 
criticised in the literature for being designed and built in accordance with flood specifications 
and not major lahars (Paguican et al., 2009; see Fano et al., 2007).  PHIVOLCS Geologist 3 
stated that there was an apparent claim that the dike failure on the Masarawag Channel (see 
Figure 7.3) contributed to the size the lahar, but disputed this by arguing that it was too small 
to have made a significant difference to the size of the lahar.  In general, however, six DRR 
stakeholders16 either criticised or gave the impression that the dikes are not particularly 
effective owing to their design, location17 or poor construction18. 
7.2.2 Timing and duration of the lahars 
The typhoon hit the province early on the morning of the 30th November and the majority of 
residents interviewed recalled that it arrived around 8am (cf. Orense and Ikeda, 2007).  The 
accounts regarding the timing of the lahars are, however, conflicting.  Most writers place the 
first of three pulses of lahars occurring at 2pm (PHIVOLCS, 2006a and 2006b; Paguican et al., 
2009); however, interviews with residents in Lidong, Tandarora and San Antonio suggest that 
lahars and flooding occurred during the morning (see Table 7.3).  This finding is in agreement 
with the interviews conducted by Orense and Ikeda (2007), who state that witnesses observed 
‘heavy downpour, accompanied by [a] quick rise in floodwater and [that] the…lahar flow 
occurred during the period between 10am and 3pm’ (2007: 1126).  Some of the earlier times 
may reflect initial flooding, as volcanic debris flows often evolve from flood waters (Vallance, 
2005).  It is also important to be mindful of the accuracy of communities’ accounts (see 
Guthrie et al., 2009), especially six years after the event.  
                                                          
16 International volcanologist: PHIVOLCS geologist 1 and 2; LG Disaster Manager 1 and 2; MGB regional 
geologist 
17 MGB Regional Geologist 
18 LG Disaster Manager 1 
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Paguican et al. (2009) suggest that the lahar-triggering rain started sometime between 
midnight on the 29th and 6am on the 30th November and ended between 6am and noon on the 
30th November.  They interpret the 2pm arrival of the ‘massive dense flows’ at ‘all 
communities’ as evidence that dikes must have been breached at this time because this was 
‘several hours after the first lahars were initiated’ (Paguican et al., 2009: 855).  However, 
according to PAGASA’s records, the majority of the rainfall fell between 8am and 2pm on the 
30th November (Figure 7.10), which better explains the timing of the lahars rather than a 
synchronous failure of dikes just before 2pm.  Paguican et al. (2009) appear to have failed to 
adjust the Coordinated Universal Time (UTM) recorded rainfall to local time, whilst at the same 
time trying to compare these data to eye witness accounts of when the lahars occurred, which 
reflect local time.  That being the case, they mistakenly describe the event as being 18 hours 
long, whereas community interviews and other studies indicate that the typhoon lasted for 
around nine hours (from 8am until 5pm on the 30th November; see also Orense and Ikeda, 
2007; Table 7.3).   Such an error has implications for misunderstanding the lag time between 
typhoon onset and lahar occurrence and the volume and intensity of the triggering rainfall, 
which forms the current means for issuing lahar evacuation orders at Mayon (see Chapter 8).   
 
 
  
 242 
Table 7.3 Timings of Reming and the lahars as remembered by the lahar affected communities 
Barangay Interviewee 
or group 
Event start Time of 
hazard 
occurrence 
Description of 
hazard 
Event end Time of 
evacuation 
Lidong 
 
Women's 
group 
9am (already 
raining at 
7am) 
10/11am Flood/lahar  10am 
Renaldo 9am 10/11am Lahars   
Edraline 1am 1pm Lahars   
Tandarora 
 
Maria  9 to 10am 9 to 10am Flooding and 
lahar 
1pm flooding 
stopped 
1pm 
Group 
(timing of 
the event 
mostly 
described by 
one female 
resident: 
Marilu) 
9am (winds) 2pm hear 
bumps 
(Marilu 
evacuates to 
big house 
with 15 
families) 
 In afternoon 
rain 
subsides. 
9am winds 
start (Marilu 
transfers to 
bigger, 
stronger 
house) 
Binitayan 
Women's 
group 
 1pm Described a 
‘heavy flash 
flood’ but 
called it a 
lahar. 
8/9pm 2pm 
Anislag 
Women's 
group 
10am 11am/12pm 
flood? 
Described as 
lahar 
5pm  
Sua Perla 10am     
San Antonio 
Irma and 
Antonio 
9am 1-3pm 
(strongest 
occurrence) 
Started heavy 
flooding 
3pm 
(flooding 
subsided) - 
about 3pm 
you can pass 
through. 
 
San Isidro 
 
Jerry 7am (already 
strong by 
8am) 
9am    
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Figure 7.10 Accumulated rainfall during Typhoon Reming (from 2am on the 30
th
 November to 2am on 
the 1
st
 December 2006).  The six hour recording intervals reflect the highest resolution of data available 
from PAGASA.  Source of data: PAGASA (2012). 
 
The timing and impact of the typhoon and lahars reflect the challenge of mitigating, preparing 
and warning for a multi-hazard disaster.  Communities assumed they would be safe in their 
concrete homes from the impact of the typhoon; however, the compounding impact of the 
lahar meant that they were still vulnerable.   
The timing of the lahar demonstrates the lag time between the onset of the typhoon and the 
occurrence of the lahar.  It also demonstrates the importance of observations made by 
communities for the purpose of forensic analyses of disasters.  Given the lag time between the 
typhoon onset and the lahar impact, along with the fact that the Philippines has a long-
established institution for typhoon forecasting and rainfall monitoring (PAGASA), the following 
section explores the appropriateness of the warning and response to the disaster.  
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7.3 Warning for the multi-hazard disaster  
Once the typhoon entered the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR), typhoon warnings 
would have been issued by PAGASA within the lead times given in Table 7.1.  It was (and is) the 
responsibility of the provincial disaster office (APSEMO) to issue warnings to prepare or 
evacuate and these were disseminated through municipal disaster coordinators, who in turn 
informed Barangay Captains.  The Barangay Captains were responsible for disseminating this 
information to their residents.  Weather forecasts and warnings were also available online, 
through the television and via the radio, however the radio transmissions can be challenging 
for communities to understand19:   
‘Like we have a standard forecast from the weather bureau – you have meteorologist 
describing coordinates, this is the gustiness – this is the official advisory but would you 
really think this ordinary housewife would understand the coordinates of gustiness and 
this wind strength and how many kms would be the radius – these are technical that 
has to be translated to a language that would be understood by them and into actually 
indicators, or at least visible signs.’ (Executive Director, Local NGO B) 
Local NGO A also recognised this challenge and, since Reming, has trained their communities 
to conduct typhoon tracking, by mapping the coordinates of the typhoon.  In addition to this 
lack of understanding, as the following discussions shows, poor communication and 
inadequate lahar warning – brought about by confusion over the responsibility for monitoring 
and warning for the lahars – contributed to impact of the Reming disaster. 
7.3.1 Single versus multi-hazard warning systems  
Typhoon Reming first entered the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR) as a Tropical Storm 
on the morning of the 28th November 2006 (local time), 48 hours before it made landfall in 
Albay (Figure 7.11).  The PAGASA warning bulletin issued at 11am on the 29th November 
contained a statement cautioning those residing in  coastal regions of the threat of storm 
                                                          
19 They just give the coordinates of the typhoon, rather than place names (Executive Director, Local NGO 
B) 
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surge and those in mountainous areas of the threat of landslides and flash floods, but did not 
make specific reference to lahars (see PAGASA, 2006).  However, in general, it appears that the 
major problem with warning was that it was largely single event focused (i.e. for a typhoon) as 
well as single hazard focused (i.e. designed to reflect wind speed; Table 7.1). 
 
Figure 7.11 Track of Typhoon Reming produced by PAGASA.  The location of Mayon is indicated by the 
red triangle and the PAR is delineated by the green dashed line.  Source: PAGASA (2007). 
 
In Chapter 4, one of the identified constraints on adopting a multi-hazard approach by NGOs is 
their silo approach to their work.  What emerged during typhoon Reming is that these silos 
also relate to hazard scientists and can cause confusion regarding the monitoring and 
anticipation of secondary hazards.  Whilst initiatives like the multi-hazard READY project (see 
Benson, 2009) have gone some way to bring about more synergistic working between 
government technical agencies, the lack of mutual understanding that emerged during Reming 
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over whose responsibility it was to warn for lahars highlighted a shortfall.   Academic Geologist 
1 said that this was because lahar warning falls under the mandate of PHIVOLCS and not 
PAGASA and this interviewee suggested that it is uncommon for lahars to occur without an 
eruption and so PHIVOLCS was more used to volcanic lahars.  PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 
admitted that although there were pre-installed trip wires (sponsored by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency, JICA) for lahar detection these were non-operational during 
Reming.  This interviewee stated that, in the past, PHIVOLCS seismographs picked up lahars 
(e.g. the 1986 large lahars; see Okkerman et al., 1985), but this does not seem to have been 
incorporated into any sort of warning system. 
In PHIVOLCS’ defence, PHIVOLCS Geologist 3 felt that PAGASA had not provided sufficient 
updates about the rainfall and had adopted a ‘business as usual approach’: 
‘People were blaming us in some way [but]…The people who were manning the Legazpi 
station knew that a typhoon was coming but didn’t make it a point to make much more 
frequent measurement of rainfall or they didn't make a point to make themselves more 
visible with information.  They were, like many in the government bureaucracy, just 
doing routine work without really thinking how it would impact lives of the people –
they were just doing the usual six hour periodic measurement of rainfall - this is for 
Legazpi station.  Even the weather bureau here [Manila] didn’t make it a point to issue 
bulletin much more [often] than every six hours’ (PHIVOLCS Geologist 3) 
Thus, part of the problem then seems to have been a lack of sharing of information between 
the warning agencies.  Whilst it was not possible to interview a PAGASA representative at the 
national level20, an interview with a representative of the Bicol regional team indicates 
PAGASA’s view that lahar warning is the responsibility of PHIVOLCS:  
‘Because we just give the rainfall but the amount of lahar that will flow is not in our 
agency; it is in Philippine volcanology – they are the one in charge.’ (PAGASA Regional 
Meteorologist) 
                                                          
20 The personnel were too busy. 
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However, a number of changes have been made to the way PAGASA communicates 
information; updates have gone from six hourly to hourly and they now provide local weather 
reports on their website.   Whether this is an acknowledgement of their accountability during 
Reming or at least recognition of the need for improvement can only be speculated. 
In terms of key decision-makers, the local NGOs interviewed as well as LG Disaster Manager 2 
criticised the typhoon warning for not including critical information; for example, Local NGO B 
programme staff representative felt that the message was confusing and the track of the 
typhoon was unclear.  This interviewee also felt the warning lacked information about the 
volume of the lahar that could be triggered by the rainfall:   
‘Lahar was actually dislodged because of the rainfall.  If they were able to predict the 
rainfall they would be able to predict the amount of mass that would be dislodged by 
that amount of rainfall so there was no prediction.  There was a prediction at the 
bureau level but the communities were not informed.’ (Executive Director, Local NGO 
B) 
This NGO representative perceived that the government scientists should be able to predict 
the magnitude of the lahar based upon the rainfall.  Two other NGOs21 and one local 
government22 representative felt that the design of the warning message was a failure since it 
related more to the wind rather than the rainfall that would trigger the lahar: 
‘The people were focused on warning information from PAGASA about the signal 
number 1, 2, 3 that means the warning information is all about wind…and there is, 
even up to now, there is an information about the amount of rainfall but there’s no 
information about warning on flood and landslide – it’s general.’ (LG Disaster Manager 
2) 
Critical rainfall threshold triggers for lahars at Mayon were calculated in the 1980s (Rodolfo 
and Arguden, 1991) but these do not appear to have been utilised as a basis for warning by 
                                                          
21 Both interviewees from Local NGO B 
22 LG Disaster Manager 2 
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local government during Reming23.  Furthermore, it was not apparent that the NGOs 
interviewed were utilising community-based monitoring and warning based upon rainfall 
volumes, so it is unclear how NGOs and communities might have benefited from the sharing of 
this information.  Further discussion of the role of rainfall thresholds as a means of anticipating 
multi-hazards is included in Chapter 8.   
In spite of the above criticisms of the typhoon warning, three PHIVOLCS scientists24 said that 
there was a warning issued for lahars and LG Disaster Manager 1 recalls giving barangay 
captains scenarios of what might occur given the typhoon warning, which included lahars.  
Similarly OCD Regional claims that the message contained warning for lahars; however, he was 
not in the province (nor in his current job) until the day after the typhoon struck, which 
questions the validity of this statement.   
Moreover, in spite of LG Disaster Manager 2’s criticism of the lack of rainfall information in the 
typhoon warning, they stated that they had anticipated lahars but that warning the people was 
challenging owing to the damage inflicted by Typhoon Milenyo two months earlier: 
‘…almost…half of the area of the province have no electricity during Reming because 
all the electrical poles were toppled down by Typhoon Milenyo so it was very hard on 
us to communicate to them…’ (LG Disaster Manager 3) 
This situation emphasises that contingency planning and disaster preparedness have to be 
revised to reflect the impact of earlier hazards and disasters.   
7.3.2 Community receipt of and response to the warning 
During six community interviews25, residents recalled seeing or hearing the forecast for the 
typhoon, for example on the television or over the radio, with three mentioning they received 
                                                          
23 LG Disaster Manager 2 (email correspondence 7
th
 March 2014) 
24 PHIVOLCS Geologist 1; PHIVOLCS Geologist 2; PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 
25 Maria, Group and Gemma (Barangay Tandarora); Groups in Barangays Anislag and Binitayan; Jerry 
(Barangay San Isidro) 
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the warning the night before26.  These warnings do not appear to have contained information 
about the lahar: 
‘…news about the typhoon, but the lahar was a surprise for us.’ (Gemma, Barangay 
Tandarora)  
The preparations the residents made suggest that they were concerned with the wind rather 
than the lahar hazard:  
‘[We] cutted the leaves of the plants so it will not be affected by the wind so that’s the 
one [we] prepared.’ Maria (Barangay Tandarora)27 
It therefore appears that residents were not anticipating the secondary events that a typhoon 
could trigger, or at least not the potential severity of these events.  
Residents from Salvacion and the women’s group in Lidong recalled receiving a typhoon 
warning from the barangay officials, whereas other interviewees in barangays Lidong28, 
Tandarora, Binitayan, Anislag, Sua and San Isidro did not receive any warning to take action 
against a typhoon or lahar.   
In spite of the PAGASA typhoon warning being issued at least two days in advance of it arriving 
in Albay, a member of the Disaster Preparedness Committee for Barangay Sua said that they 
did not have time to warn their community of the incoming typhoon during the morning of the 
30th November: 
‘No more time for the warning signals - we were caught unaware by the incident.’ 
(Perla, Barangay Sua) 
                                                          
26 Merlihma in Barangay Salvacion (almost a day); women’s group in Barangay Lidong (received it 12 
hours beforehand, but were resistant to evacuate but then copied others); Maria in Barangay Tandarora 
- Maria (over the radio; no message about lahar), Group (warning on the evening of the 29
th
, no 
information about ‘Mayon activities’) 
27 Translated by Local NGO B programme staff representative. 
28 Apart from the women’s group. 
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The above quotation highlights a lack of anticipation of the event, demonstrating that even 
barangays with DRR training were ineffective during the event.  Four community 
interviewees29 attributed part of the problem to the last minute shift in the track of the 
typhoon.  Whilst this shift does not relate specifically to multi-hazards, it is important to 
explore since it changed people’s perceptions of their risk and indicated a limited 
understanding and/or poor communication of scientific uncertainty.  The change in track of 
the typhoon was mentioned during three group interviews (in Binitayan, Tandarora and 
Anislag), two of which (Binitayan and Anislag), along with Jerry from Barangay San Isidro, 
specifically made mention to the fact that Reming was forecast to hit Catanduanes.  
Catanduanes is approximately 60km north of Albay and the northward tracking path is 
confirmed by the warning issued by the Joint Typhoon Warning Center on the 29th November 
(Figure 7.12).  In anticipation of the typhoon path, PAGASA deployed staff in Camarines Norte 
because it was ‘predicted to be along the path of Typhoon Reming’ (PAGASA, 2007: 2).  
Catanduanes was still inundated with rain (see Figure 7.13) and even if the typhoon had 
tracked 60km north it may have still brought enough rainfall to trigger the lahars at Mayon.  
However, PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 pointed out that it was the passing of the typhoon eyewall 
close to Mayon that brought the heavy rainfall required to trigger lahars.   
Whilst this last minute shift was unexpected, the fact that communities seemed to take solace 
in the fact that the typhoon was tracking towards Catanduanes implies a limited understanding 
or poor communication of the associated uncertainty with any warning: 
Science based warnings have a lot of uncertainty – difficult to be understood by the lay 
person.  In order to understand the uncertainty, need someone to be good at 
communication. (Academic Geologist 1) 
Figure 7.12 shows the predicted typhoon path, including the uncertainty regarding the forecast 
typhoon track, which is indicated by the shaded area.  The explanation of this shaded area is 
                                                          
29 The group interviews in Binitayan, Tandarora and Anislag; interview with Jerry (Barangay San Isidro) 
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notably absent.  The original PAGASA bulletin tracking map is not available so a comparison of 
the communication of uncertainty could not be made. 
Residents taking solace in the fact that the typhoon was tracking further north was a reflection 
of the reliance on previous experiences:  
We are basing our experiences that, if the typhoon will hit the Virac [in Catanduanes] 
we’ll not be affected.’ (Rosemarie, Barangay Anislag) 
However, a report by the PAGASA STRIDE team states that the typhoon made landfall just 
south of Virac (PAGASA, 2007).  Therefore, whilst the experiences of the interviewee above 
may have assisted her the past, it is implied that these were based on the occurrence of 
smaller or less intense typhoons hitting Virac.  These past experiences therefore did not 
account for the possibility of a typhoon as powerful as Reming.  Interestingly, four DRR 
stakeholders30 mentioned the shift in the typhoon direction, but they did not mention any 
significance of this change in terms of the preparations adopted prior to the typhoon31.  This 
indicates a failure in the communication of the threat posed by the typhoon to communities.  
Communication is only effective if it is understandable and it is apparent that some 
communities did not understand the threat posed by Typhoon Reming. 
 
                                                          
30 OCD Regional; Academic Geologist 1; PHIVOLCS Geologist 3; (MGB Regional Geologist  said that it was 
going to pass close to the boundary between Camarines Sur(Sipocot) and Camarines Norte) 
31 Except for MGB Regional Geologist who said it caught her unaware (she is not part of a responding 
agency) 
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Figure 7.12 Typhoon warning at 6am UTC (2pm local time) on the 29
th
 November 2006.  The past six 
hourly cyclone positions are in black and the forecast cyclone positions are in pink.  Source: NASA (2006) 
 
Figure 7.13 Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) radar imaging of rainfall totals for the period 
between 24/11/06 and 01/12/2006.  Source: adapted from NASA (2006). 
Catanduanes 
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The majority of the communities interviewed described the typhoon as occurring very 
suddenly, reflecting the last minute shift in the typhoon as well as the lack of official warning.  
Part of the problem came down to the failure of the centralised communication system; the 
earlier damage by Typhoon Milenyo meant that once Reming began it was difficult to tell 
communities to evacuate because of damaged power lines.  The Executive Director of Local 
NGO B suggested establishing greater awareness amongst communities in case of similar 
failures in communication, whilst the other representative of NGO Local B said there is a need 
to strengthen the autonomy and capacity of local communities to monitor and warn for local 
disasters: 
‘…at the barangay there’s also a local disaster – the APSEMO doesn’t know – so you 
must teach community how to detect that certain hazard or disaster.  Not rely only to 
the information coming from APSEMO.’ (Programme staff representative, Local NGO B)  
This need is apparently recognised by several authors who, after Reming, made 
recommendations to strengthen community-based warning systems (e.g. PHIVOLCS, 2006a; 
Orense and Ikeda, 2007). 
7.3.3 Decision to evacuate  
In spite of the above criticisms of the warning system, five DRR stakeholders (scientists and 
local government) 32 said that some residents chose not to evacuate despite being warned (cf. 
Paguican et al., 2009).  However, given the DRR stakeholders felt that the risk of lahars had not 
been properly conveyed to them, it is questionable whether the true threat of the typhoon 
was fully communicated to, or understood by, residents: 
‘…[we didn’t] really expect that Reming would be that great, why? Because [we] were 
thinking that it would just be rains, rains and rains similar to the previous day.’ (Irma 
and Antonio, Barangay San Antonio)  
                                                          
32 LG Disaster Manager 1 and 2; International Scientist; PHIVOLCS Geologist 1; PAGASA Regional 
Meteorologist 
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Of the residents interviewed, a few moved to neighbours’ homes before the typhoon33, but 
the majority appear not to have attempted evacuation until after the onslaught of the 
typhoon34, but by then many were not able to owing to the intensity of the typhoon35.   
Residents’ decision not to evacuate was attributed by some DRR stakeholders as being due to 
communities’ recent experience of Milenyo36 (as observed by Orense and Ikeda, 2007): 
‘One of the things that we heard over and over again was people, even though they 
were warned about Reming, they were warned to get out of the way, many people did 
not and what they said was: “well we got warned during typhoon Milenyo too and 
nothing happened, we were okay, so we just assumed that it would be the same.”’ 
(International Volcanologist) 
Milenyo (and perhaps previous typhoons) had arguably created a ‘normalisation bias’ 
(Johnston et al., 1999) which is when residents perceive their recent experiences of disasters 
to be indicative of the future, resulting in their being less attentive to hazard information and 
less responsive to warnings.  During interviews with communities, it was difficult to determine 
whether this normalisation bias was truly present37, but given community interviewees’ 
relatively passive reaction to the typhoon warning, the lack of enhancement of their regular 
preparedness measures and the fact that many made comments comparing Reming to 
previous experiences38 it is a plausible suggestion:   
‘We stayed here [unclear].  Because we know that it’s only a regular typhoon, typhoon 
is - we used to it.’ (Maria, Barangay Tandarora) 
                                                          
33 Gemma (Barangay Tandarora) 
34 For example, Myrna (Barangay Salvacion); Leja, women’s group and Edraline (Barangay Lidong); Maria 
(Barangay Tandarora); women’s group (Barangay Anislag) 
35 For example Perla (Barangay Sua) 
36 International Volcanologist; PHIVOLCS Geologist 1 and 2; LG Disaster Manager 2; Local Health 
Volunteer 
37 Myrna (Barangay Salvacion) stated that Milenyo did not make her complacent, but she was not 
affected by lahar 
38 Rosemarie (Barangay Anislag); Irma and Antonio (Barangay San Antonio) 
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Given the trauma communities endured during Reming39,  as well as the heightened awareness 
they now appear to have, it was likely difficult for communities to reflect on whether they had 
been complacent prior to Reming or not.  Nevertheless, the concept of normalisation bias has 
highlighted the need to include the social influences of previous hazards within vulnerability 
frameworks looking to address multi-hazard risk.  This example also reemphasises the limits of 
community knowledge in terms of anticipating hazards. 
PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 felt that Milenyo had more of an impact in terms of communities’ 
ability to evacuate rather than any influence on their perception of risk.  This interviewee 
stated that communities’ awareness of the risk was reasonably high but that because the 
‘strong typhoon [Milenyo] prior to Reming’ had destroyed evacuation centres people chose to 
stay at home, where they felt safer (see also Usamah and Haynes, 2012), although this 
interviewee tended to defend PHIVOLCS’ position and actions and those of the residents of 
Albay when answering questions40.  Three DRR stakeholders attributed the reluctance to 
evacuate to more generic factors, including the fear of losing possessions and due to poor 
conditions in the evacuation centre41.   
Residents’ perceptions of risk had also been shaped by the many other typhoons and disasters 
they have experienced.  According to one interviewee42, residents chose not to evacuate 
because they assumed they could wait until they saw lahars and make the decision then.   This 
observation indicates that they perceived the lahar to be very much like the recent 2006 lava 
flow (see Orense and Ikeda, 2007) and perhaps, having been evacuated during that event, they 
felt safe enough not to evacuate again.   
                                                          
39 E.g. Women’s group in Barangay Binitayan 
40 This stance probably reflects their key role in restoring faith in PHIVOLCS amongst local residents after 
they were blamed for the deaths of 77 people during the 1993 eruption.   
41 PAGASA STRIDE Team Leader; Deputy Executive Director (National NGO); LG Disaster Manager 3 
42 LG Disaster Manager 2 
 256 
The criticism of the typhoon and lahar warning reflects (1) the institutional gap in monitoring 
and warning for secondary hazards (in this case lahars that occur without an volcanic eruption) 
and (2) the lack of communication between scientists, local government, NGOs and 
communities.  Communities generally felt that they did not receive a warning, the decision-
makers (NGOs and local government) felt that the critical information had not been shared and 
the scientists appear to defend their own actions and blame each other.   In the aftermath of 
the disaster it is easy to say that lahars were expected and to criticise others for the lack of 
detailed information that could have improved preparing for this event (cf. Tweed and Walker, 
2011).  However, it is apparent that scientists, local government, NGOs and communities alike 
were surprised by this event, particularly in terms of the magnitude of the lahars, emphasising 
a general lack of anticipation of this secondary hazard.   
7.4 Anticipating lahars: an unexpected occurrence of a common 
hazard 
In spite of an ongoing programme of hazard mapping at Mayon volcano by PHIVOLCS, the 
previous discussion implies that the disaster caught DRR stakeholders and communities by 
surprise.  The following discussion explores the hazard assessments – both scientific and 
community-based – conducted prior to the disaster, along with changes in the environment 
(e.g. channel migration) that retrospectively indicated increased lahar risk to communities. 
7.4.1 Scientific lahar hazard assessment 
At the time Reming occurred (November 2006) the most up to date lahar hazard map was that 
produced by PHIVOLCS in 2000 (Figure 7.14).  It depicted three classes of lahar hazard: areas 
least, moderately and highly prone to lahars, which were distributed around the volcano, with 
the highly prone areas concentrated in gullies.   
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Figure 7.14 The 2000 lahar hazard map for Mayon volcano.  Source: PHIVOLCS (2000). 
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The map included no information as how to interpret these classes and, as a consequence, the 
hazard classes are slightly ambiguous, but the implication is that highly prone areas are 
frequently affected by lahars of any size, whereas those areas least prone will only be affected 
during large events.  This has important consequences since it was the magnitude of the 
Reming lahars that particularly surprised residents and stakeholders.  The implications of trying 
to map a dynamic hazard like lahar are explored in greater detail in Chapter 8. 
PHIVOLCS printed the lahar map before Reming and had communicated this to (at least) local 
government through Information Education Campaigns (IECs)43.  LG Disaster Manager 1 
queried, however, whether the map would have actually reached the barangay residents: 
‘The barangay officials knew the area but I doubt whether those maps were really 
disseminated previously to the barangay folks and what we are now doing is to make 
those maps smaller maps and give it to the villagers’ (LG Disaster Manager 1) 
PHIVOLCS interviewees generally felt that the map had anticipated almost every area 
inundated by the Reming lahar44, with an acknowledgement that the lahars extended further 
downstream in Guinobatan and Daraga than what might have been expected: 
‘In Daraga it essentially eroded some more – just a few metres of offset or excess to the 
lahar hazard map.  Essentially people know those are areas that are threatened.  It is 
just a matter of building in an area that is hazard prone.’ (PHIVOLCS geologist 1) 
Interviewees in Binitayan and Anislag (in Daraga) were, however, very much surprised by the 
impact of lahars in their barangays: 
 ‘It [lahar] is only Reming.’ (Women interviewed in Barangay Binitayan) 
Regardless of whether or not communities had seen the PHIVOLCS hazard map45, it was 
generally perceived amongst the DRR stakeholders that the awareness levels of Mayon 
residents were relatively high, owing to their vast experience with hazards and disasters46: 
                                                          
43 International Volcanologist 
44 Also corroborated by OCD Regional 1 
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…Yes, [lahar] has certainly happened previously.  Always expect lahars after rainfall but 
[we] are praying for no more. (Leja, Barangay Lidong) 
At the same time, concern over preserving communities’ memories of this event and previous 
disasters particularly emerged during the interviews with scientists47, but was also noted by 
other DRR stakeholders48:   
‘Even with a volcano that is regularly erupting and with people experiencing very 
frequent lahars and floods this Reming event was significantly devastating because 
people tend to forget or did not have it in their experience in their lifetime that lahars 
occurred in their place.’ (PHIVOLCS Geologist 1) 
As such, communities were not anticipating the occurrence of devastating lahars, which 
suggests that their prior experience of lahar was insufficient for them to anticipate this 
disaster. 
7.4.2 Community based hazard mapping and prior experiences of the lahars  
Eight interviewees49 across five of the barangays described past experiences of lahars, whereas 
four others (including three groups) had no prior experience of lahars50.  Communities further 
up slope described these experiences in the context of historical eruptions and heavy rains51 
and two residents in Barangay San Antonio remembered lahars occurring during Typhoon 
Sisang (1987).  Nevertheless, there was a general sense that: 
‘the Reming lahars really did, as far as people were concerned, come out of the blue’ 
(International Volcanologist) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
45 PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 
46 Deputy Executive Director (National NGO); MGB Regional Geologist; PHIVOLCS volcanologist; 
Executive Director (Local NGO B) 
47 PHIVOLCS Geologist 1; International Volcanologist 
48 Deputy Executive Director (National NGO) (communities experienced this kind of activity 20 years ago 
but their memory of it has faded) 
49 Barangay Lidong: Leja, Renaldo and Mercedes; Barangay Tandarora: Maria (but not boulders), group 
(eruption lahars), Gemma (Milenyo lahar); Barangay Sua: Perla (during eruptions): Barangay San 
Antonio: Irma and Antonio (Sisang); Barangay San Isidro: Jerry 
50 Barangay Lidong: women’s group and Mercedes; Barangays Anislag and Binitayan 
51 Barangays Tandarora and Sua 
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Interviewees in Lidong, Tandarora, Anislag, Binitayan and San Antonio expressed that the 
occurrence of this event, in particular the lahar, was unexpected:  
‘[Lahar was] first time in history’ (Lolita, Barangay Anislag) 
According to PHIVOLCS (2007a), in comparison to those residing alongside other active lahar 
channels in Mayon, communities along the Masarawag Channel (Figure 7.3) had no 
recollection of even the smallest lahars affecting their communities prior to Reming.   
However, in Barangay Tandarora (located near the Masarawag) the group interviewed 
mentioned lahars during the 2000-2001 eruptions and Gemma said that she’d been affected 
by lahars, which she described as ‘flooding’, during Typhoon Milenyo, but that she was still 
surprised by the Reming lahars.   
Of the seven barangays visited during the field work, only the residents of Barangays 
Tandarora and Sua had been involved in community-based participatory mapping and disaster 
preparedness, and had established an early warning system.  These activities had come about 
through their partnership with Local NGO B with whom they had been working to address 
flood risk on Mayon volcano: 
‘even if there is no typhoon, there is no like eruption, only with like a significant amount 
of rainfall these communities get flooded.  So actually the project [we] initiated in 2004 
was a flood preparedness project in response to big floods that happened.’ (Executive 
Director, Local NGO B) 
As the above quotation highlights, flooding and lahar are almost discussed interchangeably, 
but these hazards can have very different impacts, as was demonstrated during Typhoon 
Reming.  The results of the community-based assessment of risk also indicate how risk 
perception leads the process, with the communities most concerned with addressing the 
hazard they had recently and frequently experienced (noted in Chapters 4 and 5).  In 2006 
(prior to Reming), the National NGO partner of Local NGO B conducted a review of their 
community-based risk assessments at Mayon, within which they made reference to the hazard 
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mapping conducted by PHIVOLCS and recognised the communities risk to lahar, ash and lava 
flow.  But, Local NGO B programme staff representative emphasised that the community 
mapping process relies on information provided by the community: 
‘Actually in the barangay level they are the one who knows about their surroundings, 
with their experience of course.’  (Programme staff representative, Local NGO B) 
The Executive Director of Local NGO B placed emphasis on the process of mapping rather than 
its accuracy, whereas the Deputy Executive Director of the National NGO felt that the lack of 
scientific interpretation meant that communities were unaware of the risk from large lahars: 
‘During that time, that's the weakness part because it's, most of the mapping or the 
identification of hazards being done by the community.  This is the problem they did 
not consult or get opinion from MGB then or the PHIVOLCS regarding the amount or 
how many boulders or lahar being in the mountains.’ (Deputy Executive Director, 
National NGO)  
In spite of the emphasis on community knowledge, the last interviewee stated that the 
community did identify lahar as a hazard, whereas the interviewees from Local NGO B stated 
that communities identified the volcano and the channels as sources of flooding, but that they 
did not ‘single out lahar’: 
‘[they identify] the rivers, because that’s where the flood waters, lahars.  But to single 
out lahar – I don’t know; no, I don’t think so.  Volcanic eruption – when you ask them 
the hazard they will say volcanic eruption, which sometimes they confuse with Mayon 
volcano – they will say Mayon volcano.’ (Executive Director, Local NGO B) 
Indeed, the faded 2004 hazard map created by residents in Barangay Sua makes reference only 
to ‘eruption’ and ‘flood’ hazard – although arguably lahar could fall into either of these given 
the spectrum of lahar hazards, from hyperconcentrated flow to debris flow, and its occurrence 
in syn- and post-eruptive settings.  This is reflected by the fact that communities described the 
Reming lahars in terms of flooding and material coming from the volcano (see Section 6.5).  
But, as pointed out by the Deputy Executive Director (National NGO), the lahars that were 
 262 
triggered by Reming did not represent what the community understood as possible from their 
own analysis of risk:  
‘For what I know the concept of landslide to them is far from the landslide that had 
happened.  They know that there will be landslide because it is a usual activity - 
landslide, flashflood…But in terms of imagining or giving, identifying the picture 
of...how many volumes or how many land or soil or lahar already there – that is the 
weakness that they could not really picture it...’ (Deputy Executive Director, National 
NGO) 
The last quotation emphasises a weakness in community based hazard assessments that place 
too much emphasis on previous experiences of hazards and not upon anticipating the different 
potential magnitudes of those hazards.    
As a response to Reming, the Barangay Sua hazard map in Figure 7.15 has been updated, but it 
was being stored in another barangay during the visit so it was not possible to observe the 
updates.  In response to a prompt from Executive Director (Local NGO B), residents of 
Tandarora and Sua said they were more able to cope during Reming owing to the hazard 
mapping and training they had received through their partnership with Local NGO B.  
However, in Barangay Sua the Barangay Preparedness Committee did not issue a timely 
warning and this barangay and Barangay Tandarora were badly affected by lahar. 
 263 
 
Figure 7.15 Community hazard map for Barangay Sua prepared in 2004.  Owing to the faded legend, the 
photograph has been labelled to provide clarity.  Note the earth dike in the top right corner of the 
illustration was intended to protect the community from flooding, but was destroyed during Typhoon 
Reming.  Source: author’s own. 
 
7.4.3 Enhanced risk and missed warning signs: previous clues from Typhoon 
Milenyo 
Two community interviewees in Barangays Tandarora and Lidong reported experiencing lahars 
during Milenyo, perceived to have been quite minor events, probably more reminiscent of 
sediment-rich floods rather than debris flows.  PHIVOLCS Geologist 3 also mentioned the 
occurrence of small channel confined lahars in Barangay Padang during Milenyo.  During post-
event analysis of the devastation caused by Reming lahars in Padang, it transpired that the 
Milenyo lahars were actually an indicator of increased risk to Padang.  These lahars were 
described as ‘the only sizeable lahars experienced in the Padang-Buyuan area after the 2000-
2001 eruptions and prior to Reming’ (PHIVOLCS, 2007a: 2).  The reason for the increased risk 
was postulated to be due to a small ‘bypass’ channel that developed 2km upstream of the 
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confluence between Buyuan and Padang somewhere between May and July 2004 (PHIVOLCS, 
2007a and 2007b; Figure 7.16).  Interviews conducted by PHIVOLCS with several residents of 
Padang and upstream Buyuan confirmed that lahars shifted towards the Padang Channel 
during Typhoon Milenyo, resulting in stream abandonment of the lower Buyuan Channel 
(PHIVOLCS, 2007a).  This ‘stream piracy’ increased susceptibility to lahar in the Padang Channel 
and resulted in Barangay Padang being worse affected during Reming compared to 
neighbouring barangays:  
‘this [hazard] was anticipated by the hazard map but in personal experience of people 
we didn’t really anticipate that this [Padang] would be much more dangerous area 
than this one.  There were a lot of people who died here.’ (PHIVOLCS Geologist 3) 
Localised changes like this emphasise the dynamic nature of the Mayon edifice, which makes 
mapping lahar hazard in the short to medium-term challenging.  This situation highlights the 
need for a localised approach to anticipating hazard exposure of communities through 
incorporating community observations of change.  The example from Padang illustrates that, 
with the correct interpretation, communities’ observations of the lahars during Typhoon 
Milenyo could have informed scientists of the increased threat well in advance of the Reming 
disaster.  This also demonstrates the means of integrating community knowledge and scientific 
expertise via the respective provision of information (by the community) and interpretation 
(from the scientists), which was described by NGO interviewees in Chapter 5.  In addition, the 
case of Padang also emphasises the need for communities to be aware of upstream 
environmental change that may affect them.   
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Figure 7.16 Pre-Reming (2005) SPOT5 imagery of Padang-Buyuan fan, super-imposed with the 
distribution map of the Reming lahar deposits and present-day features. Note that the bypass channel 
between the upper Buyuan and Padang Channels is already developed in this 2005 image. Active 
braided streamflow marking the new course of the lower Padang Channel runs through the centre of 
the deposit fan. Rechanneling of active flow into the old course of the lower Padang Channel is marked 
by the sand dike (light blue triangles).  The map displays contours in metres. Source of map and caption: 
(PHIVOLCS, 2007a, fig 1: 2).   
7.4.4 The unexpected magnitude of lahars 
The DRR stakeholders, in particular the scientists, stated that it was not so much the 
occurrence52 of the lahars that was a surprise but the volume and intensity of the event.  
Indeed the majority of DRR stakeholders and communities agreed that the magnitude of the 
disaster was particularly surprising53, in particular that of the lahar: 
                                                          
52 International volcanologist; PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 recalled typhoon triggered lahars in the mid-
1980s 
53 PHIVOLCS Geologist 1 and 3; PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1; MGB Regional Geologist; International 
Volcanologist (surprise where it exceeded channel capacity); Executive Director and programme staff 
representative (Local NGO B); Deputy Executive Director (National NGO) (said that the local government 
unit were not aware that the magnitude was a surprise); DRR Point Person (Local NGO A); PAGASA 
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‘[local government] would normally say in his presentations that the province was 
prepared, APSEMO was prepared, but the level of preparedness was not enough.  The 
magnitude…was unexpected’ (Executive Director, Local NGO B) 
The DRR Point Person from Local NGO A said that the government had undertaken worst-case 
scenario planning but that this had not anticipated an event as large as Reming.  This lack of 
anticipation is emphasised by the fact that, according to the MGB Regional Geologist, the local 
government was focused on evacuating people from coastal regions due to the risk from a 
storm surge, rather than evacuating residents from the slopes of the volcano.  This interviewee 
thought that the local government were probably expecting lahars, but not of such magnitude.  
Thus, the local governments’ response was shaped – similar to those of communities – by their 
experience of previous disasters and their perception of risk.  Furthermore, the resources of 
the local government were already stretched because they were still dealing with the 
aftermath of Typhoon Milenyo54.  The situation demonstrates not only a lack of anticipation 
but also a need for community-based DRR that is not fully reliant upon support from the 
government. 
This lack of anticipation shows an underestimation of the potential for large typhoon-triggered 
lahars and questions whether the underlying science behind the scenario planning was of 
utility: 
PHIVOLCS were more used to eruption lahars.  [They] realised they needed more 
studies to look at similar events…There were clearly pyroclastics on top but these had 
become vegetat[ed] and so the assumption was that they had already stabilised.  
Nobody had really looked into this event happening (Academic Geologist 1) 
The lahar hazard map had identified the majority of the areas affected by lahar, but it had 
been five years since the last eruption so it is questionable whether any DRR stakeholder was 
truly anticipating the occurrence of an event of this size.  There appeared acknowledgement 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Regional Meteorologist and Academic Geologist 2 (amount of rainfall unexpected); LG Disaster Manager 
2 (did not expect lahar would reach certain places) 
54 LG Disaster Manager 3  
 267 
that Albay was prepared but that the event was beyond what they could cope with, which 
appeared designed around a worst-case scenario which had underestimated the magnitude of 
this type of event (cf. Tweed and Walker, 2011).  This is also in spite of the fact that there have 
been large post-eruption lahars in the past, for example the 1875 lahars that killed 1500 
people (Ramos-Villarta et al., 1985).   
The lack of anticipation of this event also emphasises a weakness within NGO PHVCAs that 
focus upon what communities have experienced in the short-term.  The community based 
hazard assessments therefore need to take account of whether known hazards (such as lahar) 
might manifest as greater magnitudes or occur under different circumstances (e.g. during a 
large typhoon rather than an eruption): 
‘Before the Reming, we did not anticipate that there would be a Reming.’ (Deputy 
Executive Director, National NGO) 
However, in the context of integrating science, the scientists do not appear to have anticipated 
the magnitude of this event and the hazard map requires user interpretation to determine 
those areas that might be affected by large lahars.   
The discussions so far have highlighted many unexpected elements of the Typhoon Reming 
disaster: the shift in the typhoon track, the localised changes in some channels, the intensity of 
the rainfall and – for some – the occurrence of the lahar.  However, as previously stated, what 
appears to have been resoundingly unanticipated was the magnitude of the lahars.  This 
indicates a limit to both the community and scientific knowledge for the purposes of 
anticipating multi-hazard disasters.   Part of the problem, amongst the communities especially, 
is a lack of understanding of lahar occurrence in post-eruption settings. 
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7.5 Understanding the cause of the lahars: comparing scientific and 
community knowledge  
Chapters 4 and 5 explored the relative importance of community and scientific knowledge in 
NGO community-based risk assessments.  As has already been outlined in the present chapter, 
the Reming lahar disaster was not particularly well anticipated by either communities or 
scientists and the communities had no living memory of such an event occurring.  The 
understanding as to why Reming triggered lahars is, therefore, discussed below. 
7.5.1 Communities’ understanding 
The accounts of residents affected by the lahar enabled scientists to interpret what had 
happened (e.g. Mirabueno et al., 2006; Orense and Ikeda, 2007), particularly because ‘so much 
that actually mattered to the Reming event55 was lost in the urgency of the first month after 
the disaster’ (PHIVOLCS Geologist 3).  However, interpreting communities’ description of the 
lahar flows is challenging, as is demonstrated below. 
Given the differences in water and sediment content between and during lahars (Rodolfo and 
Arguden, 1991), it is unsurprising that the communities’ descriptions of the phenomenon 
tended to include ‘flash flood’, ‘boulders’, ‘sand’, ‘lahar’, ‘debris’, ‘materials’, ‘great 
sound…thumping…rolling boulders…shaking.’  Communities appeared to understand the event 
as different forms of floods coming down from the volcano.  The term lahar was used to 
describe the material being brought by the ‘flood’, or to describe the cause of the ‘flood’:  
 ‘Lahar is the most contributor of that flood.’ (Rosemarie, Barangay Tandarora) 
The terminology may represent a language barrier, with ‘flood’ being used to describe a largely 
fluid mass of material coming down from the volcano.  But, as noted in Section 6.2, the Reming 
disaster was accompanied by both flooding and lahars.  
                                                          
55 For example, the depositional record of the hyperconcentreated flows (PHIVOLCS Geologist 3) 
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In Daraga, PHIVOLCS Geologist 3 stated that: 
‘as far as we can tell from the description of the flows by the residents, the lahars 
occurred until Tagas [downstream of Binitayan] and everything downstream was like 
muddy stream flow.’  
Despite the comment from LG Disaster Manager 2 that it is impossible to swim in a lahar, 
residents of Tagas and Binitayan recalled seeing residents attempting to swim.  This 
observation could reflect the fact that they were initially affected by flooding from the Yawa 
River (Mirabueno et al., 2006; see Figure 7.3) before the boulder laden hyperconcentrated 
flow.  Binitayan and Tagas were particularly inundated owing to their proximity to the Yawa 
River, which has several major tributaries flowing into it. 
As mentioned previously, some residents apparently chose not to evacuate owing to the 
assumption that they could wait until they saw the lahar and make the decision then56.  Such 
an observation suggests that residents did not fully understand the difference between a fast-
flowing lahar and a slow moving lava flow57 (cf. similar confusion amongst civil protection at 
Vesuvius, Solana et al., 2008).  The implication of this confusion is clear: the mitigation, 
preparedness and response strategies differ significantly between lahars (fast) and lava (slow) 
flows.  The confusion of these terms was anticipated by the researcher owing to her 
experience of meeting with community members in Barangay Anislag during the 2010 scoping 
trip.  During that meeting communities appeared to use the terms lahar and lava to describe 
similar phenomena.  Therefore, in advance of the first community visits, the researcher asked 
four key DRR stakeholders 58 whether communities understand the term lahar and if they 
confuse it with lava flow.  The International Volcanologist said that they do use the terms 
‘interchangeably’: 
                                                          
56 LG Disaster Manager 2 
57 Indicated during a scoping visit to Barangay Anislag during the September 2010 field visit 
58 International Volcanologist; PHIVOLCS Geologist 1; LG Disaster Manager 1; Programme staff 
representative (Local NGO B) 
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‘they don’t distinguish between a lava flow and a lahar as we would – it’s just volcanic 
stuff that comes down.’  (International Volcanologist) 
However, PHIVOLCS Geologist 1 stated that the Mayon residents did know the difference, even 
if they might not use the word lava.  This was corroborated by one of the field visits in 
Tandarora; when asked whether lahar was the correct word to use, Local NGO B programme 
staff representative said that ‘they – [the community] are also using the lahar’.  But there was 
some confusion amongst NGOs as to the difference between flooding and lahar – DRR Point 
Person (Local NGO A) said that communities in Tabaco (northeast of Mayon) were surprised by 
the ‘lahar’ that inundated them, but only flashflooding and siltation occurred in this area 
(PHIVOLCS, 2006a).   
It was difficult to determine from communities what they believed caused the lahar because 
they either had trouble answering the question or became shy and embarrassed as they 
appeared to interpret the question as a test.  As a consequence, the questioning was 
abandoned in later interviews owing to it not being particularly fruitful (similar challenges 
were experienced by Bowman and White (2012) in their study at Santa Ana Volcano in El 
Salvador).  
Three community interviewees and one community group59 said that they thought the volcano 
had erupted during Reming: 
It came from the volcano – accompanied flood. (Leja, Barangay Lidong)  
‘See cause of it’s a combination of two - the Mayon eruption and the typhoon Reming.  
Two force together hitting Bicol’. (Rosemarie, Barangay Anislag)  
This is in part supported by the fact that two scientists said that they had to reassure some 
residents that the volcano had not erupted60. 
                                                          
59 Leja and women’s group (Barangay Lidong); Rosemarie (Barangay Anislag); Gemma (women’s group, 
Barangay Binitayan) 
60 PHIVOLCS Geologist 3; PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 
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The tendency to assume that the Reming lahars occurred because the volcano erupted might 
be due to the fact that, according to two scientists, people tended to not associate lahars with 
periods of low volcanic activity61 (cf. Umbal, 1986):  
‘…did I think that people did not associate lahar with typhoons?  I think the answer is 
probably yes, I think they don’t normally associate it with typhoons.  And right now 
they will because that memory is fresh but I don’t know how long that is going to last.’ 
(International Volcanologist) 
PHIVOLCS Geologist 1 recognised that residents tend to associate lahars with eruptions but 
said that PHIVOLCS emphasise to residents that there were some historical lahars that did not 
occur immediately after an eruption.  However, PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 said that the ‘lahar 
hazard maps [are] being shown during education advocacy for the eruption of Mayon’, 
implying that lahar hazard is communicated purely in association with the occurrence of an 
eruption.   Furthermore, the 2000 lahar hazard map gave no indication that lahar hazard could 
occur with or without a volcanic eruption and that it could occur during a typhoon.  Given the 
frequency of eruption lahars (see Table 6.1, Chapter 6), it is also questionable whether 
residents would have been likely to associate large lahars with non-eruption triggers.   
7.5.2 Scientific explanation of the Reming lahars: multiple factors for lahar 
initiation and distribution 
Whilst it was regarded amongst scientists that the reason for the lahars was the intense 
rainfall brought by typhoon Reming, two localised factors that affected the initiation and 
distribution of lahars require discussion: the occurrence of landslides in the Masarawag 
channel and the influence of the 2006 eruption.  These factors emphasise the dynamic nature 
of lahar hazard at Mayon volcano.   
                                                          
61 International volcanologist; MGB Regional Geologist 
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Landslides in the Masarawag Channel 
A phenomenon which was highlighted as being unexpected (and something PHIVOLCS 
Geologist 3 criticised the published papers for not mentioning) was the occurrence of 
landslides at the headwaters of the Masarawag channel (see Figure 7.17).  These resulted in 
large lahars inundating barangays Tandarora and Maipon in Guinobatan:   
‘So, if you have landslides the landslide material under heavy rain immediately 
incorporates into the flow and produces lahars immediately at the higher reaches of 
the channel. So you have [these] huge lahars already very early on.  They are just 
eating down and across the river channels and producing even larger lahars.’ 
(PHIVOLCS Geologist 3)62 
The occurrence of these landslides meant that the lahar initiation point was further upslope 
than had otherwise been anticipated.  Under heavy rain, the landslide material was 
incorporated into the flow of water thereby initiating lahars at higher reaches of the channel.  
Consequentially, the flows had a longer travel time over which they accumulated more debris 
before hitting communities.  The lahars eroded the upper Masarawag Channel and scoured a 
new course straight into Maipon and Tandarora (PHIVOLCS, 2007b).  As a consequence, the 
largest number of deaths occurred along the Masarawag channel (PHIVOLCS, 2007b).  
 
                                                          
62 International Volcanologist also said that these were significant. 
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Figure 7.17 View of the Masarawag Reming lahar deposition and buried barangays of Maipon and 
Tandarora, Guinobatan. The deposition consists of debris flow units with huge boulders.  Yellow arrows 
point to landslides in the Masarawag Channel headwaters which initiated the lahars. View is to the 
northwest (28 Aug 2007).  Source of photo and caption: adapted from PHIVOLCS (2007b: 12). 
 
The role of the 2006 eruption 
It was generally agreed by the scientists interviewed63, and mentioned by LG Disaster 
Managers 2 and 3, that the 2006 eruption did not increase the susceptibility of lahar initiation 
during Reming as it did not produce any significant additional source material.  In fact, the 6.4 
km-long lava flow erupted in 2006 was identified as actually mitigating the risk from the 
particularly high hazard Bonga-Mabinit channel by burying the 2000-2001 pyroclastic deposits 
emplaced in the Bonga Gully and Mabinit fan (Figure 7.3).  The lava flow essentially sealed off 
the channel, thereby removing risk to Legazpi City64 (PHIVOLCS, 2006 and 2007a): 
‘for a long time Bonga gully (deepest gully at the time) most of pyroclastic flows have 
been concentrating in this section – very few have been delivered to the other main 
channels.  So when the 2006 eruption occurred, which brought in mostly ash fall and 
lava flow, so it actually healed the gully and now most of the water which was 
                                                          
63 The scientists who mentioned this were International Volcanologist; PHIVOLCS Geologist 2 and 3; 
PHIVOLCS Volcanologist; MGB Regional Geologist. 
64 PHIVOLCS Geologist 1 and 2; PHIVOLCS Volcanologist; International Volcanologist 
 
Maipon 
Tandarora 
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essentially delivered here also was now shifted to some of the other river channels.’ 
(PHIVOLCS Geologist 1) 
The capping of this gully and its deposits was a significant natural mitigation and demonstrated 
how previous hazards can reduce rather than amplify the impact of subsequent disasters.  
However, two other members of local government as well as two NGO staff thought the 2006 
eruption was a contributing factor by interpreting it as a supplier of material for the 
subsequent lahars65.  This misunderstanding emphasises the importance of good 
communication and understanding between scientists and decision-makers. 
 
The discussion highlights that communities do not particularly understand lahars as a 
phenomenon in their own right, viewing them as floods or a product of an eruption of the 
volcano.  In order to anticipate their occurrence, it is therefore necessary to ensure that 
communities understand the hazards facing them and how these may be triggered by other 
hazards (e.g. volcanic eruptions or typhoons).  A thorough study of the cause of the lahars has 
been conducted by PHIVOLCS and academics, and it is clear from the PHIVOLCS analysis in 
particular that there were localised changes that influenced the manifestation and distribution 
of lahars.  These changes emphasise the challenges of lahar hazard mapping and 
communication on an active volcano. 
  
                                                          
65 OCD Regional; LG Disaster Manager 2; Deputy Executive Director (National NGO); Executive Director 
(Local NGO B) 
 275 
7.6 The multi-hazard characteristics of the disaster: summary and 
reflection 
The multi-method analysis of the case of the Typhoon Reming triggered lahars has identified 
several multi-hazard aspects to this disaster.  The occurrence of the lahars highlighted 
weaknesses in the anticipation, communication and warning for hazards that trigger secondary 
hazards.  The manifestation of the Reming lahars also demonstrates the challenge of 
anticipating a secondary hazard that might manifest as a continuum of hazards from initial 
sediment-rich flooding to boulder laden debris flows.  A summary of the multi-hazard aspects 
of this disaster were therefore the: 
 range of hazards during the event (e.g. wind, flooding, landslides, lahars and storm 
surge) and their different impacts, meaning that homes resilient to one hazard were 
vulnerable to another (also observed in analysis of the Tōhoku earthquake triggered 
lahar disaster in Japan, Tweed and Walker, 2011); 
 fact that lahars represent a continuum of hazards; 
 confusion caused by a single-hazard (typhoon) and single parameter (wind) warning 
system; 
 inability to communicate warnings owing to the damage inflicted by Typhoon Milenyo 
two months prior to Typhoon Reming; 
 influence of different hazards over space and time on both the physical manifestation 
and spatial concentration of lahars, as well as on DRR stakeholders and communities’ 
perception of risk from Reming; 
 fact that it was the secondary hazard (the lahar) that caused the most deaths and not 
the primary, better anticipated, hazard (the typhoon). 
The disaster demonstrates that hazard analyses have to account for the influence of previous 
hazards in terms of how they may have amplified or created conditions of susceptibility to 
subsequent hazards.   The disaster also demonstrated the limits of communities’ memories of 
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previous lahar events as a means of anticipating this disaster.  At the same time, however, it 
challenged the utility of the available scientific mapping and expertise, since scientists were 
also surprised by the size of this event.  Given that the findings reflect the views of a range of 
stakeholders, a summary of the different views of the four interviewee groups is presented in 
Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 A summary of the main sub-sections of the case study analysis and discussion, reflecting each 
group of interviewees. 
Interviewee 
groups 
Was there a warning 
for lahar? 
Did communities 
evacuate? 
Was the event 
unexpected? 
Did this group 
understand why 
the lahar 
occurred? 
Communities No warning for lahar; 
some felt that the 
typhoon was not a 
threat because it was 
heading for 
Catanduanes. 
At most, moved to 
a neighbour or 
family members 
concrete home but 
many decided to 
stay at home. 
 
Some surprised 
about lahar 
altogether, very 
different to what 
they expect of a 
‘landslide’ or 
‘flooding’. 
Difficult to 
determine, but 
communities tend 
to associate large 
lahars more with 
eruptions. 
NGOs No information about 
the rainfall, confusion 
about the tracking; 
feel that the bureaus 
did not share the lahar 
‘prediction’. 
[Did not specify, but 
mentioned in 
general terms that 
communities do not 
like to evacuate.] 
Did not expect the 
magnitude of the 
lahar that 
occurred. 
Mixed – some 
misunderstood it 
as being a 
consequence of 
the 2006 eruption; 
some did not 
specify. 
Local 
government 
Gave scenarios to 
Barangay Captains 
that included lahars.  
Feel the problem was 
that the typhoon 
warning did not 
include the rainfall. 
Despite trying to 
warn communities, 
some decided not 
to evacuate. 
Mixed – 
essentially beyond 
the scenarios 
being adopted 
Mixed – two 
misunderstood it 
as being a 
consequence of 
the 2006 eruption, 
whereas the 
others did not. 
Scientists PHIVOLCS: yes there 
was a lahar warning 
but PAGASA should 
have given more 
information about the 
rainfall.  PAGASA: the 
responsibility for lahar 
warning lies with 
PHIVOLCS. 
International 
volcanologist stated 
that  people stayed 
in their homes (cf. 
Paguican et al., 
2009). 
Expected lahars 
but not of the 
magnitude that 
occurred. 
Yes – the rainfall 
and PHIVOLCS 
conducted 
extensive analysis 
into the additional 
local factors that 
caused the lahar. 
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The following discussion summarises two key themes from the analysis, which are the 
emergence of interrelated hazards over space and time and the anticipation of the event.  The 
chapter concludes with a summary of lessons from the Reming lahars disaster. 
7.6.1 The emergence of interrelated hazards over space and time 
An objective of part two of the research is to refine the multi-hazard conceptual framework 
outlined in Chapter 2.   Whilst the case study was adopted to explore the hazard interrelation 
termed ‘causation’, elements of the three other multi-hazard characteristics emerged during 
the analysis.  This emergence reinforces the interdependency of these categories and that 
multi-hazard assessments need to consider the possibility (if not probability) of these 
enhancing hazards and subsequent risk.   
Whilst there were many socio-economic and political factors that resulted in this disaster, the 
conceptual framework is largely concerned with the physical influence of previous and 
simultaneously occurring hazards on conditions of lahar susceptibility.  The four categories of 
hazard interrelations identified in Chapter 2 are compared with the evidence from the Reming 
in Table 7.5.  The findings from the case study emphasise that multi-hazard assessments 
should not only comprise how hazards might interact to trigger secondary hazards but require 
the assessment of how hazards in the past have created conditions of increased exposure 
(volcanic activity concentrated in the south), likelihood (siltation of channels by Typhoon 
Milenyo) and magnitude (availability of eruptive materials) of future events.  These conditions 
link strongly to the basis of anticipation of geophysical hazards: location, timing and severity 
(Rees et al., 2012). 
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Table 7.5 The hazard interrelations identified in the analysis of the Typhoon Reming lahars compared 
with the conceptual definition of each of these in Chapter 2.  The underlined text indicates an update to 
one of the categories. 
Hazard interrelation and definition Characteristics of Reming 
Causation: hazards that generate secondary 
events, which may occur immediately or 
shortly after the primary hazard.  
The typhoon rains triggered the lahars. 
Amplification or alleviation: hazards that 
exacerbate or reduce future hazards. 
Two hazards earlier that year respectively amplified 
and reduced the physical manifestation of the 
typhoon Reming lahars: (1) Typhoon Milenyo 
increased siltation; (2) The 2006 eruption of Mayon 
actually reduced risk in an area.  
 
The 1984 eruption changed the directivity of future 
eruptions thereby concentrating pyroclastic flows and 
lahar deposits in the southern sector of the volcano. 
 
[Social characteristics of interacting hazards; Milenyo 
may have reduced residents’ perception of their own 
risk, ultimately exacerbating the impact of subsequent 
Reming.] 
Association: hazards that increase the 
probability of a secondary event, but which 
are difficult to quantify. 
The 2000-2001 eruptions supplied the loose volcanic 
material (PHIVOLCS, 2006a), thereby increasingly the 
probability of lahars. 
 
 
Coincidence: the simultaneous occurrence of 
hazards in space and/or time resulting in 
compounded effects or secondary hazards. 
The fact that there were high winds at the same time 
as lahars (i.e. the fact that it was triggered by a strong 
typhoon and not a heavy rainfall episode) hampered 
relief efforts, thereby compounding the impact of the 
event.  
 
[The disaster also highlights the need to consider the 
possible future coincidental occurrence of a large 
typhoon and a volcanic eruption and the subsequent 
lahars this would trigger (see Chapter 8)]  
 
The evidence from Reming particularly reinforces why community-based assessments of risk 
must consider time-frames beyond recent memory and geographical analyses that consider 
influences beyond the community; for instance, the changes in channel configuration 
upstream of Barangay Padang.  The analysis also indicates the role of environmental change 
and ‘non-hazardous’ processes on lahar susceptibility.  For example, the channel migration 
 279 
upstream of Barangay Padang does not constitute a hazard in itself, but it is a change in the 
environment that must be taken into context in any hazard and risk analysis.  What this case 
study has reinforced, is why hazard assessments must be reviewed and updated, especially 
community assessments, since the number of updates required to reflect changes in the 
official lahar hazard map may be beyond the resources of the government.  The change in risk 
at Barangay Padang occurred between the creation of the 2000 lahar hazard map and the 
2006 Reming lahars. 
The case study challenged one of the multi-hazard processes identified from the literature 
review.  Amplification is the process by which previous hazards amplify the magnitude and 
impact of subsequent events (see Table 7.5).  However, the 2006 eruption reduced the threat 
of lahars within a particular channel and largely prevented significant lahar inundation in 
Legazpi City.  As a consequence, the multi-hazard framework should be revised, replacing the 
term ‘amplification’ with the duality of ‘amplification or alleviation’.   
Finally, not only were the lahars triggered by a hazard (typhoon), the disaster also 
demonstrates the challenge of preparing for and mitigating a secondary hazard that represents 
a spectrum of hazards from debris flows to more dilute hyperconcentrated flows (a 
‘compounding event’, Lee and Jones, 2004).  Communities appeared to perceive lahar as any 
fast-flowing sediment laden flow coming down from the volcano and prior to Reming some 
communities were quoted as having believed that they could wait until the flows arrived 
before deciding whether they could evacuate (Orense and Ikeda, 2007).  An important part of 
DRR in active volcanic areas is therefore ensuring that communities understand that lahars 
might manifest as highly destructive debris flows (and not simply as ‘floods’) and that they may 
occur without an eruption. 
The above discussion demonstrates that the characteristics of multi-hazards only emerge by 
analysing hazard interrelations over different spatial and temporal scales.  The findings 
 280 
therefore emphasise that a holistic assessment of multi-hazards requires the analysis of hazard 
interrelations over space and time.  Anticipating these emerged as a major theme within the 
analysis of the case study and its importance with regard to hazard assessment is discussed 
below. 
7.6.2 Anticipation of the event: the role and limits of community knowledge and 
available science  
In spite of the frequent occurrence of lahars, the magnitude of the lahar disaster surprised 
communities and DRR stakeholders alike.  The fact that the secondary hazard (lahar) was not 
fully anticipated is of particular significance to this research. 
Albay is a multi-hazardous province and, consequently, community awareness of hazard and 
risk was perceived by DRR stakeholders to be high.  What Typhoon Reming demonstrates is 
that community knowledge alone is insufficient for capturing all the dimensions of 
anticipation: communities had no experience of an event this devastating and therefore had 
no contingency plan for addressing it.  In terms of comparable events, the most recent event 
of similar impact was the 1875 lahar that inundated the settlement of Cagsawa, which is 
beyond the living memory of community members.  However, 40 people were killed by 
typhoon (or tropical storm) induced post-eruptions lahars in 1981 (Table 6.1; Chapter 6).  As 
such, the Reming lahars should not have been unexpected, perhaps just deemed unlikely.  The 
findings suggest that Typhoon Milenyo created a ‘normalisation bias’ amongst residents (and 
perhaps DRR stakeholders), meaning that were not considering the threat of large lahars from 
typhoons.  It is therefore necessary to consider how communities’ (and DRR stakeholders’) 
experiences of earlier hazards and disasters impinges on their ability to perceive that a 
previously experienced hazard (in this case typhoon) might occur at a greater magnitude than 
formerly experienced, as well as appreciating the fact that typhoons are capable of bringing 
large lahars.   The occurrence of secondary hazards also emphasises why it is important for 
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communities to understand, at least in general terms, the cause of events and that a large 
lahar might occur without a simultaneous volcanic eruption.  Whilst communities are more 
aware after Reming, the International Volcanologist expressed their concern that it is 
challenging to maintain this awareness. 
As discussed above, there were a number of means by which earlier hazards and 
environmental processes increased or decreased the conditions required for the 2006 lahars to 
occur, which were particularly apparent at the local level.  Monitoring these changes 
necessitates community observers: by communicating these observed changes, areas of 
increased risk could be identified in a timely manner.  There is therefore a need for 
reciprocated engagement between communities and scientists, so that they alike can 
understand why risk is either increasing or decreasing. 
The case study emphasises the challenge for communities to understand, prepare for and 
respond to a secondary hazard that represents a spectrum of processes that depend upon the 
rainfall and conditions of susceptibility (i.e. availability of loose material).  As noted earlier, the 
National NGO representative stated that communities’ understanding of the concept of 
‘landslide’ is far from the actual event that occurred.  The use of the term ‘lahar’, therefore, 
might be misleading as it is understood by communities as any water and debris related flow.  
Anticipation, however, requires a determination of the type of hazard, its location, timing and 
severity (Rees et al., 2012). 
Lastly, the PHIVOLCS scientists might have been more expectant of lahars but they too were 
surprised by the sheer scale of this event and the fact that certain areas (like Barangay Padang) 
would be more gravely affected than others.  Part of the problem, as discussed below, was the 
poor communication of the rainfall, which (it is assumed) they would have used to make an 
inference about the potential for large lahars.  In light of Reming, the role science has to play in 
the assessment of lahars is further explored in the following chapter. 
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7.6.3 Lessons from Typhoon Reming 
As with any disaster, the Typhoon Reming event illustrates a number of problems that could 
relate to single as well as multi-hazard disasters; for example the failure of the 
communications systems and the residents reluctance to evacuate.  Moreover, it 
demonstrates how different groups blamed each other for the lack of anticipation and impact 
of the disaster (Table 7.4).   
However, the event also demonstrates that what makes multi-hazard disasters unique is the 
requirement for DRR systems to anticipate, prepare for and respond to more than one hazard 
simultaneously, whilst also accounting for how previous different hazards might have 
amplified or reduced the location, timing and severity (cf. Rees et al., 2012) of the anticipated 
event.  DRR in multi-hazard environments therefore needs to be dynamic and flexible as well 
as regularly reviewed to reflect changes in the environment, along with human factors that 
influence vulnerability. 
The disaster revealed that the typhoon warning system was not particularly well designed to 
deal with secondary hazards and was criticised for focusing upon only one parameter of the 
typhoon – the wind.   Furthermore, the government’s system for monitoring and warning for 
different hazards is institutionalised and is consequently not well designed to deal with 
secondary hazards that overlap the mandates of different agencies.  Whilst the government 
agencies are trying to work more succinctly, there was an apparent poor communication and 
sharing of rainfall information between PAGASA and PHIVOLCS and with the local government, 
NGOs and communities.   
The problem appears to be that post-eruption lahars fall into a gap between volcanic and flood 
hazards, at least to some extent, both in terms of awareness and institutional responsibility for 
monitoring and warning.  Furthermore, the fact that the event occurred five years after the 
last significant eruption means that large lahars were not on the radar of even the DRR 
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stakeholders.  Indeed, similar to local communities, it appeared as though the local 
government officials based their preparedness measures for the typhoon on their past 
experiences of dealing with these events. 
In the aftermath of Typhoon Reming, PHIVOLCS recommended, amongst other things, that 
there was a need to ‘review and reassess future lahar and flood hazards based on impacts of 
the Super Typhoon Reming…and develop…[or] strengthen…community-based early warning 
system[s]’ (PHIVOLCS, 2006a: 19).  Additional recommendations included engineering 
interventions, evacuation procedures, resettlement of high risk communities, land use zoning 
and the improved resilience of the communication systems for warning PHIVOLCS, 2006a).  
Complementing and in addition to these, the analysis of the case study in this chapter has 
identified the need for:  
 local level hazard assessments; 
 constant review of hazard assessments; 
 lahar hazard assessments that count for multi-hazard triggers of lahars; 
 awareness raising amongst communities and some decision-makers as to the cause of 
lahars and the factors that influence susceptibility to lahar; 
 improved anticipation of the magnitude of lahar events. 
Underpinning each of these recommendations is the rigorous assessment of lahar hazard and 
the timely anticipation of lahar events.  The following chapter explores the methods of lahar 
hazard evaluation and whether they incorporate the recommendations above, as well as a 
multi-hazard approach. 
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Chapter 8: An evaluation of scientific methods for assessing 
lahar hazard at Mayon 
 
Chapter 8 presents a critical evaluation of the current methods utilised for scientifically 
assessing and anticipating lahars at Mayon volcano.  The objectives of the evaluation are to 
identify the extent to which these methods (1) anticipate future lahars and (2) adopt a multi-
hazard approach.  The reason for carrying out this evaluation was owing to the emphasis on 
anticipation within the case study analysis.  Furthermore, the earlier chapters have 
emphasised the need for, and barriers to, the integration of science, so the opportunity to 
evaluate the available science (using the example of lahars at Mayon) builds on these findings.  
The chapter does not represent an exhaustive critical evaluation, but instead an interpretation 
of the secondary information regarding lahar hazard assessments made available during the 
field work.  The analysis is supplemented where possible by interview data; however it 
primarily represents the researcher’s interpretation of the available maps and rainfall data, 
based on the information provided alongside these. 
The chapter begins with an introduction to lahar hazard assessments, before critically 
evaluating the two primary methods adopted for lahar assessment at Mayon: lahar hazard 
mapping and critical rainfall threshold analysis.  The evaluation of the lahar hazard assessment 
is followed by a review of the general level of engagement between NGOs and scientists, 
informed by the analysis of interviews conducted during the October-November 2012 field 
visit.  The chapter concludes with a summary of the utility of current scientific methods for 
anticipating lahar hazard in the context of multi-hazards. 
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8.1 Assessing lahar hazard at Mayon Volcano 
The Reming lahars disaster indicated the need to better anticipate the severity of possible 
lahar disasters.  It also illustrated that the worst-case scenario planning by the government 
scientists and local government had not accounted for an event similar to the magnitude of 
the Reming lahars.  Since the disaster, the lahar hazard map has been reviewed, the 
government has begun utilising a critical rainfall threshold approach to the issuing of 
evacuations and a number of communities have been relocated away from the hazard zones 
identified in the lahar hazard assessment (e.g. the residents interviewed in Barangay Anislag).     
8.1.1 Introduction to lahar hazard assessments 
The conditions that increase the likelihood of mass movements can be grouped into three 
types of factors (Lee and Jones, 2004): 
(1) preconditioning factors (e.g. slope steepness) 
(2) preparatory factors (e.g. abundant unconsolidated debris and an adequate water 
source) 
(3) triggering factors (e.g. heavy rainfall) 
The first two factors create conditions of susceptibility, whereas the third is what triggers the 
(in this case) lahar event.  Each of the three factors may be influenced by other hazards; for 
example the rainfall triggering might be associated with a typhoon.  Lahar hazard assessments 
should therefore incorporate the analysis of multi-hazard processes and interrelations when 
considering each of these factors. 
Lahars and mass movements in general are assessed in terms of the identification of areas of 
different levels of threat and the location, timing and magnitude and character of individual 
events (Lee and Jones, 2004; Vallance, 2005; Rees et al., 2012).  Anticipating individual events 
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relies heavily on monitoring and modelling and is the basis for developing early-warning 
systems (Lee and Jones, 2004); it also includes the anticipation of the events that trigger 
lahars, for example volcanic eruptions and heavy rainfall (Vallance, 2005).  Areas susceptible to 
lahars are identified by the mapping of existing deposits and by applying theoretical models of 
lahar inundation (Vallance, 2005).  More recently, lahar and mass movement hazard and risk 
assessments have become increasingly probabilistic in their approach to the determination of 
occurrence and magnitude of these hazards (Jakob, 2005;  Hincks et al., 2013).   
After the 1984 eruption, numerous studies of lahar initiation were carried out at Mayon (see 
Okkerman et al., 1985; Umbal, 1986; Rodolfo et al., 1989; Arguden and Rodolfo, 1990; Rodolfo 
and Arguden, 1991).  Since then, the two main approaches to scientific lahar hazard 
assessment are lahar hazard mapping (and modelling) and critical rainfall threshold analysis.  
These approaches are evaluated in turn below. 
8.1.2 Lahar hazard mapping and modelling at Mayon 
In their description of the lahar hazard map, PHIVOLCS (2006a) note that: 
The PHIVOLCS lahar hazards assessment aims to determine where and when future lahars will 
occur and their potential severity. Its end products are lahar hazard maps that “strive to 
present severe but reasonable prediction for planning purposes” (Pierson et. al., 1992 in 
PHIVOLCS, 2006a: 1). 
The implication in the above quotation is that the hazard map contain all three components of 
anticipation given the emphasis on ‘where’ (location) and ‘when’ (timing) lahars might occur, 
as well as their ‘potential severity’ (magnitude).  However, as noted in Chapter 7, the map 
indicates areas that are relatively more or less prone to lahar inundation, but determining 
when these might occur and how severe they might be is down to user interpretation since 
return periods are not stated (see Figure 7.14; Chapter 7).  The implication is that areas of low 
proneness are expected to be affected only by high-magnitude (Reming sized) lahars, but this 
is not explicitly stated in the map.  In contrast, for example, the volcanic risk map for Taranaki 
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volcano in New Zealand provides clarification for its low risk areas by describing them as being 
‘affected by lahars and debris avalanches during huge isolated events’ (Taranaki Regional 
Council, 2014).  The challenge of mapping areas that are inundated by high magnitude, low 
probability events means that a degree of expert judgement is required: 
‘it [the map] has a lot of other…shall we say expert additions … it is very difficult to 
model the low hazard…that can only become susceptible, vulnerable to lahars when 
there are extremely large, very rare events – like lahars that are produced by Reming, 
rainfall that exceed the hundred year or maybe two hundred year…so we make 
reasonable assumptions on where these areas are.’ (PHIVOLCS Geologist 3) 
PHIVOLCS Geologists 1 and 2 described the basis of lahar mapping as the combination of 
mapping ‘geology, geomorphology…and historical events’.  PHIVOLCS state that they 
frequently update hazard mapping and assessment, particularly after a major volcanic eruption 
or lahar (PHIVOLCS, 2006a).  In 2011, the lahar hazard map was updated to reflect changes in 
topography (Figure 8.1).  The revised hazard map incorporates deterministic modelling of lahar 
hazard utilising the LAHARZ programme.  The fact that it only requires one input parameter – 
lahar volume – and a reliable digital elevation model (DEM) makes it an appealing means of 
modelling lahars in countries where resources for science are limited:   
‘typically a full hazard scenario would involve…frequency maybe or some form of 
weight based on several factors like availability of source material, morphology of the 
slopes, the proximity of the river bed to erodible material, so many others things, 
vegetation cover, possibility of tributary change or transition in the upper slopes; and 
you could probable come up with hazards map – but who has time to do all of these 
assessments?’  (PHIVOLCS Geologist 3) 
The LAHARZ software is based on the statistical analyses of 27 lahar-inundation paths from 
nine volcanoes across the world (including Mayon), which resulted in semi-empirical equations 
that predict the valley cross-sectional area (A) and planimetric area (B) inundated by lahars of 
a given various volume (V) (Iverson et al., 1998): 
 
288 
 
 A = 0.05V2/3 (1) 
 B = 200V2/3 (2) 
The software runs with a Geographical Information System (GIS) using these equations to 
provide an automated method to estimate areas of potential lahar inundation (Schilling, 1998).  
Using a DEM and several user-defined lahar volumes, LAHARZ applies equations (1) and (2) to 
user-selected stream drainages to generate a series of nested lahar inundation zones (Schilling, 
1998).  The volume of lahar (V) is specified by the user and LAHARZ constructs the paths of 
lahar-inundation that extend to where the energy line intersects with topography (Schilling, 
1998). The energy line describes how the initial potential energy of a lahar is consumed by 
friction during travel.  Measured from the top of the unstable slope, the energy line intersects 
the ground where the potential energy has been consumed and the lahar comes to rest.  The 
value of the energy line is determined by means of the ratio between the vertical drop (H) and 
horizontal runout (L) (Schilling, 1998). 
LAHARZ is not designed to account for gradual rainfall triggered lahars, only ‘sudden-onset’ 
lahars including those that evolve from ice avalanches, pyroclastic flows or lake-breakout 
floods originating high on the volcano flanks (Iverson et al., 1998).  It also tends to display 
‘ragged’ lahar zone edges owing to the built-in working assumption that the initial lahar 
volume remains constant, thus not accounting for the bulking and debulking that characterises 
lahars in motion (Muñoz-Salinas et al., 2009).  In spite of these limitations, LAHARZ has been 
used to model lahars at Mayon to include the Reming lahars as ‘one of the worst historical 
[scenarios]’ (PHIVOLCS Geologist 2).  LAHARZ cannot account for lahar mitigation, but 
PHIVOLCS Geologist 2 said that they assume that the dikes fail during these types of events 
regardless. 
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   Figure 8.1 Revised lahar hazard map (2011) incorporating LAHARZ modelling.  Source: PHIVOLCS (2011b). 
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One of the PHIVOLCS interviewees made it clear that the map update was not an admission of 
any fault during Reming: 
‘it was after Reming, well we didn’t do it as a revision per se because we feel that our 
maps are not sufficient, we were just applying present day topography to find out if 
there will be significant changes to where the delivery of flows were and in fact it didn’t 
change.’  (PHIVOLCS Geologist 1) 
Comparing the 2011 map with the previous update in 2000, the areas threatened by lahar 
hazard largely remain the same; however the ‘highly prone’ areas have expanded to include 
some of the downstream areas that were affected by the 2006 lahars (Figure 8.2).  By making 
these areas highly prone, there is an underlying assumption that they will be frequently 
inundated by lahar.  However, these areas were only hit during Reming because the lahars and 
associated flooding were of sufficient size to affect areas far downstream.  For instance, the 
mouth of the Yawa River (D; Figure 8.2) was not included in the 2000 hazard zonation because 
it was ‘off the radar screen’ (International Volcanologist, 2012).  Likewise, as observed by 
PHIVOLCS Geologist 3, there were some areas covered by the map that the scientists did not 
anticipate would actually be more dangerous than neighbouring areas, for example Barangay 
Padang.  The highly prone zones have been extended in these areas, as well as downstream of 
Guinobatan, Daraga and Camalig (Figure 8.2).  From the interpretation of the map, three 
possible reasons for these adjustments are postulated; the first might be due to the utilisation 
of LAHARZ and, consequently, a 10m DEM (ALOS was used according to PHIVOLCS Geologist 2) 
and concentrated modelling in the southern sector owing to the availability of volcanic 
material from recent eruptions compared with the northern sector.  The second reason might 
be owing to the hazard interrelation of ‘amplification’, where the influence of the Reming 
lahars on the topography has altered channel configuration meaning that some areas are now 
much more susceptible to future lahars; for example, the new path for lahar flows directly into 
Padang.  However, as discussed in the following section, these localised changes in drainage 
can be short-lived, whereas the map is designed to reflect the long-term hazard.   
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The third reason for extending the areas highly prone to lahar might also be owing to the 
adoption of a conservative approach, which may be a consequence of the controversy 
surrounding the institutional responsibility for warning communities about the impending 
lahars during Reming.  Some barangays re-classed as highly prone are described as at risk from 
‘possible’ avulsion and some of these areas include Barangays at risk from secondary events 
triggered by lahar.  For example, Barangay Libod in Camalig (Figure 8.1; B) is now within the 
high proneness area yet it is described as only being at risk from ‘potential flooding and 
siltation from related lahar events; possible washout along riverbanks’ (PHIVOLCS, 2006a: 9).  
During Reming, this barangay was affected by flash-flooding and siltation driven by the lahars, 
but was not directly inundated by lahars, (PHIVOLCS, 2006a).  It appears, then, that this 
Barangay is actually at risk from flooding caused by lahars, but possibly only during extreme 
events, which makes the classification of ‘highly prone’ ambiguous.  Owing to limited 
resources, it may be necessary to adopt this conservative approach to hazard mapping, rather 
than try to maintain the frequency of required updates. 
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Figure 8.2 Comparison of the 2000 and 2011 hazard maps.  The black circles indicate the areas where the zones of high proneness to lahar hazard have increased.  A: 
downstream areas of Guinobatan; B: downstream Camalig; C: upstream Daraga; D: the mouth of the Yawa River; E: Barangays Padang, Lidong and San Isidro. Source: maps 
cropped and adapted from PHIVOLCS’ original maps (2000 and 2011b). 
A A 
B 
C D 
E 
B 
C D 
E 
2000 2011 
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As observed in the analysis of Reming, a major challenge in mapping a dynamic environment 
like Mayon is that lahar proneness changes in the short-term and that it might not be possible 
to reflect this in a long-term hazard map.  For example, PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 felt that the 
risk of lahar had actually lessened after Reming owing to the fact that most of the loose 
volcanic material is now in the depositional area and the recent eruptions have not provided 
much replenishment.  In contrast, a representative of local government perceived the ‘2006’ 
and ‘2010’ eruptions as having replenished source material for lahar generation.  The 
difference in opinion between these two interviewees demonstrates the need to communicate 
how factors in the short to medium-term might increase or reduce risk.  This emphasises why 
engagement between scientists, decision-makers and communities is essential.  As was 
identified in Chapter 4, communities and NGOs are especially concerned with hazard, 
vulnerability and risk at the local level.  The following section describes the measures that have 
been adopted in order to map lahar hazard at this local scale. 
Community-scale maps 
Preparing maps of lahar hazard at an active volcano is complicated by the fact that eruptions 
do not replenish the volcanic edifice equally with new source material in the short to medium-
term (years to decades; Rodolfo and Arguden, 1991), which are the scales of concern to local 
communities (see Chapter 4).  The challenge of updating the map is also owing to the fact that: 
‘…the current topography, by the way, of the volcano…is always changing!’  (PHIVOLCS 
Geologist 3) 
Together, the changing patterns of drainage1 as well as fluctuations in the availability of source 
material for lahars mean that hazard is spatially diverse in the short- to medium-term.  The 
lahar hazard map depicts lahar proneness in the long-term; it is thus most appropriate for 
long-term planning and maintaining awareness amongst residents around the volcano but 
                                                          
1
 Also noted by LG Disaster Manager 2 
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perhaps less so for preparedness activities in the short-term. Indeed, the 2000 map contains 
the following caveat:  
Hazard zonation is subject to change in the event of change(s) in the configuration of the crater 
rim.  Hazard zone limits are approximated based on data from historical medium-scale 
eruptions and may be exceeded during larger-scale Plinian eruptions (PHIVOLCS, 2000). 
However this statement is deliberately vague because, as noted by PHIVOLCS Geologist 3, it is 
impossible to determine what the change might be.  The 2000 map did indicate a segment 
where, owing to the notch in the crater edge, there is increased susceptibility of ‘pyroclastic 
flow-generating events’ in this area.    
Over time, communities may need to be reminded of the relative differences in hazard 
proneness, which may not be reflected in the hazard map over the short- to medium-term.  It 
is speculated that such information may be expressed during Information Education 
Campaigns (IECs), however PHIVOLCS Geologist 1 described these events as targeting Barangay 
Captains, Mayors and Governors and did not mention NGOs or wider community members.  
Local-scale mapping provides an opportunity to evaluate and communicate short-term 
changes in lahar hazard.   The large-scale hazard maps that have subsequently been produced 
have focused on the southern sector, which suggests concerns regarding the current greater 
availability of source material in this sector.   
A review of hazards at regular intervals is a key, but often overlooked, component of NGO 
community-based hazard assessment (see Chapters 4 and 5) and the Reming disaster 
emphasises why this revision is so important.  Following the 2006 lahars, PHIVOLCS conducted 
detailed mapping of Camalig, Daraga and Legazpi City at a 1:75,000 scale (PHIVOLCS, 2007).  
The mapping was supported by modelling with LAHARZ and indicated increased risk to 
barangays in the vicinity of the Mabinit Lahar fan (Figure 8.3).  The analysis identified that 
future lahar scenarios in the Buyuan-Padang Channel will bypass Buyuan and flow into 
Barangay Padang and, also, that the dredging works are increasing risk to the unaffected 
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barangays adjacent to the new fan of lahar deposits. Such local analysis provided insightful 
information to ‘aid in risk reduction and land use planning activities of the local government 
and other concerned organisations’ (PHIVOLCS, 2007: 16).  In addition, PHIVOLCS conducted 
hazard surveys across eight municipalities around the volcano (see PHIVOLCS, 2006a).  The 
report outlining these surveys is, however, an internal PHIVOLCS document shared with the 
researcher, which implies that it may not automatically be available to an NGO or community 
without a specific request.        
 
Figure 8.3 Lahar hazard map for Camalig, Daraga and Legazpi City.  Source: PHIVOLCS (2008b). 
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After Reming, localised lahar hazard mapping was also commissioned by a consortium of 
NGOs, implemented by Manila Observatory (MO) and the University of the Philippines 
National Institute of Geological Sciences (UPNIGS).  They prepared lahar hazard and risk maps 
of barangays on the southern sector of Mayon (Figures 8.4 and 8.5). 
The map scores zones of lahar hazard as a function of the area of the lahar deposits and 
proximity to the lahar path, weighted depending upon the type of lahar zone, such as  whether 
the area is within a historical lahar path or at predefined distances from this path and at slopes 
<30o in angle (MO and NIGS, 2009).  Risk is determined by combining this score with exposure 
data (population density) and a vulnerability factor based upon poverty.  When combined with 
these data, some of the areas of very low hazard average as being at high risk (Figure 8.5).  The 
map states that areas of high risk equate to both high exposure and high poverty.  However, as 
Reming demonstrated, high-magnitude lahar events impact both the rich and the poor and so 
questioning whether poverty is too simplistic as a measure of vulnerability.    The differences 
between the hazard and risk maps illustrate why communication of the hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability behind the map is so essential.   
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Figure 8.4 Barangay scale lahar hazard map created by a consortium of international NGOs and local scientists from the University of the Philippines National Institute of 
Geological Sciences (UPNIGS) and the Manila Observatory (MO).  Grey box indicates the mouth of the Yawa River.  Source: MO and UPNIGS (2009). 
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Figure 8.5 Barangay scale lahar risk map created by a consortium of international NGOs and local scientists from the University of the Philippines National Institute of 
Geological Sciences (UPNIGS) and the Manila Observatory (MO).  Source: MO and UPNIGS (2009). 
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The MO-UPNIGS lahar hazard map (Figure 8.4) does not extend the high hazard zonation to 
the lower reaches of some of the channels, for example the Yawa River, compared with the 
2011 PHIVOLCS map.  The PHIVOLCS map therefore appears to adopt a more conservative 
approach, and may explain why PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 2 expressed concern over the utility 
and utilisation of maps that they have not created.  However, the MO-UPNIGS maps provide a 
lot more explanation regarding how they were created, whereas the PHIVOLCS maps leave 
much to the interpretation of the user.  When asked whether they had seen and were using 
the MO-UPNIGS maps, PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 and LG Disaster Manager 2 recognised its 
contribution but said that it was not being used: 
‘the hazard map that NIGS and Manila Observatory is being offered to Albay but Albay 
rejected – they did not use it, maybe they accepted but they are not using it because 
they [NIGS and Manila Observatory] are not the mandated government agency to do 
it.’ (PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1) 
Additionally, LG Disaster Manager 2 stated that the MO-UPNIGS map is ‘already outdated’.  
PHIVOLCS Geologist 3 also voiced some frustration about this work, particularly because they 
had not collaborated with PHIVOLCS:  
‘we were beaten to [publishing about Reming] by a consortium of the University of the 
Philippines and two NGOs – Oxfam and Manila Observatory – so they were doing… the 
kind of work that we were doing, and they came up with an entirely different set of 
data that they immediately published.  …that work could have been done much better 
if they had sought collaboration with us…because they actually had no recent 
experience in Mayon.  …we're quite familiar with what the volcano looked like before 
and after this event so this is kind of a shame.  And of course, yes this conclusion that 
the dikes contributed to the hazard and the impacts is absolutely not true.’ (PHIVOLCS 
Geologist 3)   
The availability of different maps emphasises the need for NGOs (and decision-makers) to be 
able to make an informed decision regarding the suitability (and credibility) of the science they 
are applying to their work.  Understanding these maps might necessitate consultation with 
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scientists; however there is contention regarding the source of that science: whether it is 
government or non-government.   
Anticipating lahar hazard through mapping and modelling: reflection 
A critical evaluation of lahar hazard (and risk) mapping for Mayon has identified seven main 
points.  First, the 2011 lahar hazard map for Mayon volcano adopts a long-term relative 
ranking of hazard approach, but does not attempt to quantify the return period or likelihood of 
lahar occurrence or impact.  The classes of hazards may be confusing for end-users, 
particularly the class of low lahar proneness, since these areas might not be often affected but 
when they are it is likely to be devastating.  Mapping lahar and volcanic hazards is generally 
challenging owing to the number 
 of factors that require assessment and the uncertainty regarding changes in the morphology 
of the volcanic crater and, therefore, the primary direction of pyroclastic and lahar flows and, 
likewise, when these might be resupplied.  Owing to these challenges, it appears that a largely 
conservative approach to hazard mapping has been adopted, although this does not appear to 
have been based on scenarios greater than the Reming lahars.  Expert judgement is required 
to map the low hazard areas for extreme lahar events – like those triggered by Reming – 
therefore decision-makers might need to consult with these experts in order to fully 
understand local levels of hazard.  The challenge of monitoring changes in lahar proneness 
across channels (as occurred prior to Reming) emphasises the need for scientists to 
communicate with local government, NGOs and communities, as well as for communities to 
share their observations of changes in their environment with scientists.    
The analysis has revealed problems owing to lack of collaboration between academic and 
government scientists (and NGOs), issues of trust across these groups and the challenge of 
ensuring that non-scientific decision-makers utilise credible science when at least three 
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different lahar maps exist: two hazard maps and one risk map.  These concerns need to be 
addressed in the context of ensuring improved engagement between scientists and NGOs. 
The PHIVOLCS map serves as means for long-term planning and designing policies of relocating 
high-risk communities.  However, hazard proneness is not only dictated by topography and the 
availability of source material, but also the occurrence of a sufficient intensity of rainfall, which 
can vary from catchment to catchment, particularly during regional storms (Rodolfo and 
Arguden, 1991).  As noted by PHIVOLCS Geologist 2, LAHARZ utilises the volume of previous 
lahars, but does not reflect the triggering rainfall.  The 2011 lahar hazard map largely considers 
preparatory factors (i.e. topography), but not preconditioning factors (e.g. the availability of 
volcanic material) or triggering factors (e.g. intensity of rainfall).  Although the increased areas 
of proneness in the southern sector indicate that the availability of volcanic material may have 
been considered in the 2011 update.  Furthermore, in the context of multi-hazard 
assessments, the lahar hazard does not explicitly state the threat of lahars during periods of 
repose. 
Disconnect exists between the anticipation of location and severity of lahar hazard and its 
triggering mechanism.  Three scientists2 noted that it is not necessary to map more than one 
hazard (cf. Kappes et al., 2012): 
‘eruption with typhoon: that will take care of the lahar because it covers water related-
hazard.  Don’t really show a map [of] lahar induced by typhoons.’ (PHIVOLCS Geologist 
2) 
Nevertheless, it is important to ensure a link between known rainfall and scenarios for lahar 
inundation.  Many residents have been allocated housing in the relocation barangays, but they 
still depend on areas in the high hazard areas for their livelihoods and will continue to return3 
(Usamah and Haynes, 2012).  In order to maintain their ‘zero casualty’ target, the government 
                                                          
2
 MGB Regional Geologist; PHIVOLCS Geologists 1 and 2 
3
 Also mentioned by Perla (Barangay Sua)and interviews with residents in Barangay Tandarora 
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implement pre-emptive evacuation and, as such, timely warning of rainfall-triggers of lahar is 
an integral part of anticipating lahar hazard in the short-term.  The following section evaluates 
this method. 
8.1.3 Critical rainfall intensity thresholds: anticipation of lahar triggers and timing 
The timing of lahar occurrence in the short term at Mayon is primarily anticipated using critical 
rainfall thresholds.  The volume of rain required to trigger a lahar is dependent upon whether 
the deposits are wet or dry, the porosity of the deposits, the angle of slope, the vegetative 
cover and the intensity of the rainfall (Okkerman et al., 1985; Yumul et al., 2011).  The 
following discussion focuses upon rainfall intensity, since it is this parameter which is used as a 
basis for lahar evacuation at Mayon volcano. 
Introduction to critical rainfall thresholds 
Rainfall thresholds are frequently used to anticipate the occurrence of shallow landslides and 
debris flows (Guzzetti, et al. 2008).  Caine (1980) was the first to model average rainfall 
intensity-duration thresholds (Guzzetti et al., 2008) and, using data from several locations 
around the world, proposed a general relation between rainfall intensity (I; mm/hour) and 
duration (D; hours) of the form: 
 I = aD-b (3) 
Where the constants a and b describe the particular data set analysed.  In Caine (1980)’s study 
the critical threshold was described by: 
 I = 14.82D-0.39 (4) 
The premise behind Caine’s work is that a triggering rainfall threshold is defined by the total 
depth of rainfall and the instantaneous rainfall intensity.  Caine used the record of rainfall 
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intensities and durations that triggered 73 debris flows on previously undisturbed slopes (the 
locations of which are not specified); however, rainfall conditions that did not trigger 
landslides were not considered, so the derived threshold incorporates only part of the 
evidence (Wieczorek and Glade, 2005). 
A similar analysis was carried at Mayon volcano in the 1980s.  Rodolfo and Arguden (1991) 
recorded 79 rainfall events across the two channels (23 in the Mabinit Channel from 1986 and 
1987 and 56 within both the Basud and Mabinit Channels in 1988 and 1989; see Figure 7.3 for 
channel locations) and 14 of these rainfall events triggered a total of 16 debris flows (see 
Figure 8.6).  These all represent post-eruption lahars (the most recent eruption had occurred in 
1984). 
The study by Rodolfo and Arguden (1991) is based on significantly fewer data points than 
Caine’s analysis.  In order to determine a rainfall intensity-duration threshold the authors 
plotted the data on a log-log graph, determined the least-squares regression line for the 14 
events (in dots; Figure 8.6), and then drew a line parallel to it through the five minima.  
Manually tracing these relationships is common practice, but this method has recently been 
criticised in favour of more probabilistic approaches (see Berti et al., 2012).  Nevertheless, the 
data show that, for a given duration of rainfall, debris flows are expected in the Basud or 
Mabinit channels when the rainfall intensity exceeds critical values: 
 I = 27.3D-0.38 (5) 
This suggests that the coefficient b in equation (5) is almost double the value postulated by 
Caine (1980).  Rainfall intensity is the average rate of rainfall that fell over the entire triggering 
event (the rainfall that falls up until the failure of the slope), whereas the maximum 
accumulation over a 10 minute period is a measure of maximum short-term rainfall intensity.   
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Based upon the pattern of the 14 rainfall events that triggered debris flows, Rodolfo and 
Arguden (1991) proposed that the following additional criteria needed to be satisfied before 
debris flows were triggered (Figure 8.6): 
 rainfall of 40 mm in 1.4 hours or longer  and 
 a minimum of 40 mm of rain delivered at an overall rate of at least 11 mm/hour,  
 with 10 mm or more falling during the most intense 10 minutes (Okkerman et al., 
1985; Lavigne et al., 2000) 
However, as demonstrated in Figure 8.6, meeting these criteria does not mean that a debris 
flow will be initiated as both hyperconcentrated and flooding events (and, in the case of 40mm 
in 1.4 hours criterion, ‘no flows’) were also recorded above these thresholds.  Since Rodolfo 
and Arguden (1991) have given no indication of the effect of the passage of time in their 
figure, it can only be speculated that these events may represent the depletion of available 
volcanic material.  Those events that required the greatest volumes or intensities of rainfall 
tended to be debris flows. 
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Figure 8.6 Critical rainfall parameters that resulted in debris flows in the Mabinit and Basud Channels.  
The coloured lines were added to illustrate the additional rainfall criteria noted by Rodolfo and Arguden 
(1991).  Source: adapted from Rodolfo and Arguden (1991, fig.4: 76). 
 
After Reming, the local government began utilising critical rainfall thresholds for lahars4 (in 
addition to landslides and flooding):   
‘And the only official authority on warning is PAGASA – we are not authorised – but in 
the absence of PAGASA we will do it.’ (LG Disaster Manager 2) 
                                                          
4
 LG Disaster Manager 2 (email correspondence,7
th
 March 2014) 
Minimum 
of 40mm 
40mm in 
1.4 hours 
10mm in 
10 minutes 
11mm/hr 
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There are two thresholds for lahars: one for evacuation and one for lahar initiation.  The utility 
of these thresholds depends on the forecast and monitoring of hourly rainfall intensities.  The 
critical rainfall threshold for lahar occurrence is 150 mm of accumulated rainfall at a rate of 60 
mm/hour (with extreme events occurring at 68 mm/hour), but residents will be evacuated if 
the threshold reaches 40-45 mm/hour in order to ensure a ‘lead time of one to two hours’ (LG 
Disaster Manager 2).  LG Disaster Manager 2 stated that the threshold was based on studies by 
meteorologists, geologists the interviewees’ experience of previous events.  What is perceived 
to be most important is the intensity threshold: 
‘But if it is continuous but not as big as the threshold of mudflow, even if it is 
continuous, without reaching...50 or 60mm per hour there's no lahar…because the 
volume cannot guarantee for the mobilisation of it.’ (LG Disaster Manager 2) 
In addition to the threshold being adopted by the provincial government, PHIVOLCS also have 
their own threshold criteria: 200 mm of accumulated rainfall in 24 hours (PHIVOLCS, 2006a).  
According to PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1:  
‘What [the local government] use is what PHIVOLCS [are] using based on experiment of 
Rodolfo….’ (PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1) 
In terms of the PHIVOLCS threshold, applying Rodolfo and Arguden’s (1991) equation (5) to a 
24 hour period gives a critical mean intensity of 8.16 mm/hour which, over 24 hours, yields a 
rainfall volume of 196mm.  If the local government’s threshold is also based on Rodolfo and 
Arguden (1991)’s analysis, it is postulated that the value of 60 mm/hour is derived from the 
criterion that 10 mm (or more) must fall within the most intense ten minutes (see Rodolfo and 
Arguden, 1991).  However, 60 mm/hour is beyond any of the rainfall intensities that were 
required to trigger the 14 debris flows studied by Rodolfo and Arguden (1991).  More 
importantly, the 10 mm/10 min represents the short-term intensity (most intense ten 
minutes), not the average intensity over the entire triggering rainfall that is generally applied 
in rainfall threshold analyses (e.g. Caine, 1980; Guzzetti et al., 2008).  As such, the 10 mm/ 
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10min does not equate to an average triggering rainfall intensity of 60 mm/hour.  It is 
therefore perhaps an overestimation of the rainfall intensity required to trigger lahar at 
Mayon.  In order to understand the derivation of this threshold, and more importantly, why 
40-45 mm/hour is a suitable threshold for evacuation, it is necessary to compare this critical 
threshold with the available rainfall and lahar data.   
Analysis of the rainfall threshold 
Ideally a triggering rainfall event should be described by its duration (D) and amount of 
precipitation (E), which can be used to calculate intensity (I) (Berti et al., 2012).  The greatest 
uncertainty in these types of analysis is owing to the difficulty of identifying the start of the 
triggering rainfall and the timing of the landslide (the end of the triggering rainfall; Brunetti et 
al., 2010). 
No readily accessible detailed historical database of modern lahar events for Mayon exists, so 
one had to be assimilated from the available reports, interviews and the published literature 
(Appendix I).  In order to compare lahars with rainfall, only events that were described as 
occurring on a particular day (rather than over a period of several days) could be included in 
the analysis.  The recorded events were constrained to the 34-year period of available rainfall 
data from 1978 to August 2012 (Chapter 5).  Of the 46 events in Appendix I, only four of the 
records (including the Reming event) include times of lahar initiation and two of these timings 
appear not to correspond with the recorded rainfall.  The record contains eruption and post-
eruption lahars, of which 11 were described as being triggered by typhoons.  For the purpose 
of this analysis, it was not possible to compare the local government’s rainfall intensity with 
the entire 34-year rainfall record as the completeness of the lahar record could not be verified.  
Lastly, there is little information available to categorise the lahars based on their size, 
therefore it is not possible to differentiate them by size. 
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A second limitation is the resolution and suitability of the rainfall data.  The available rainfall 
data is recorded over 6 hour intervals so it is not possible to determine peak hourly rainfalls.  
The PAGASA rain gauge at Legazpi City airport is the closest to Mayon volcano and sits at a 
height of 18 metres above sea level.  Rodolfo and Arguden (1991) found that rainfall falling on 
the volcano (Bonga and Basud pyroclastic fans, 600m above sea level) can be significantly 
higher than the rainfall falling on Legazpi City during the same event (see Figure 8.7).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.7 Total daily rainfall above the apex of the Bonga Fan, on the Basud Fan above Santo Domingo 
(both 600m above sea level), and at Legazpi airport (18 above sea level), from October 22 to November 
22, 1988.  Source: Rodolfo and Arguden (1991: fig. 3: 75). 
 
The difference in rainfall prompted the local government to install a number of rain gauges 
within communities on the volcano: 
‘…it would be advisable for us to install it upslope of the volcano because their situation 
that it’s raining heavy in Mayon area; here is very sunny.  So from there we can already 
get the amount of rainfall and we can have an estimate as to the water that will come 
down from the slope.’ (LG Disaster Manager 3) 
The programme of installation began in 2010 and these rain gauges present an opportunity for 
community-based monitoring and warning.  LG Disaster Manager 2 said they teach 
communities how to use the rainfall threshold, who then record hourly rainfall except during 
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‘normal periods’5.  As such, the record is not continuous but it is implied that the periods when 
no rainfall was recorded represent the occurrence of insignificant or no rainfall.  The records 
are then transmitted to the local government, where they are combined with data from 
PAGASA for a more comprehensive analysis: 
‘We train them, some of the barangay captains, barangay…on how to read record of 
rain gauge and...when they send us their reading we compare it with the reading of the 
PAGASA and, from there, we come into a decision, so once we have a decision we 
communicate and once we communicated it to the community then they are the one 
who will mobilise for evacuation’ (LG Disaster Manager 3) 
Although the procedure for issuing a warning remains (quite) centralised, the communities are 
more informed about what volumes of rainfall might trigger lahar and the, in part, 
implementation of one of the recommendations after Reming, which was to establish 
community-based warnings (Chapter 7).  Unfortunately, data from the local rain gauges were 
not available for application to this work. 
Before carrying out the rainfall threshold analysis, it is necessary to explain the definitions 
adopted and the assumptions that were made.  Rodolfo and Arguden (1991) defined triggering 
rainfall as a ‘rainfall event that includes no pauses longer than an hour…[and] only refers to the 
accumulation and time elapsed up until a flow starts’ (Rodolfo and Arguden, 1991: 75).  This 
definition is similar to that for the ‘cumulative rainfall’, which is measured from the beginning 
of the rainfall event to the time of failure (Berti et al., 2012).  The critical ‘accumulation’ rainfall 
(150 mm) being utilised by the local government is thus inferred to equate to the ‘triggering 
rainfall’ or ‘cumulative rainfall’ defined here.  Without knowing the time of failure, however, it 
is impossible to determine the accumulated rainfall volume and hence to determine the 
average intensity of the triggering rainfall. Because of these problems and given the fact that 
the 60 mm/hour threshold appears to be derived from Rodolfo and Arguden’s (1991) measure 
                                                          
55
 LG Disaster Manager 2 
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of the most intense rainfall, the decision was made to focus on the rainfall thresholds over 
much shorter recording intervals.   
Rainfall intensity was calculated from the average hourly rate of rainfall over the peak six hour 
rainfall recorded for each of the 46 lahar events in Appendix I.  These intensities of rainfall 
were plotted alongside the hourly rainfall intensity calculated from the peak 12 hour rainfall 
for the same 46 events, as well as over the 24-hour period on the date the lahar(s) occurred 
(see rainfall data in Appendix I).  These data points are presented in Figure 8.8.  The graph 
compares the data with the minimum and maximum evacuation threshold along with equation 
(5) from Rodolfo and Arguden’s (1991) analysis.  Lahars that occurred during and after 
eruptions are differentiated, with a distinction made between post-eruption lahars less than 
one year after an eruption (i.e. those that occurred on any date following the end of the 
previous eruption up until one year) and those that occurred over a year since the last 
eruption.  The low rainfall intensities recorded during eruption lahars reflect very localised 
heavy rainfall owing to eruption updrafts of moist surface air that condense to form rainfall 
(Rodolfo, 1989), which may not have been recorded at the PAGASA rain gauge.   The low 
intensities of rainfall required to trigger post-eruption lahars that have occurred less than one 
year since the last eruption are assumed to be owing to the availability of loose, 
unconsolidated volcanic material from the recent eruption.   
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Figure 8.8 Rainfall intensities for eruption lahars (EL) and post-eruption lahars (PEL) occurring either less 
than or more than one year since the last significant eruption.  The data represent the rainfall intensities 
for each of the 46 events are calculated over their 6, 12 and 24 hour rainfall durations.  Source of rainfall 
data: (PAGASA, 2012); source of eruption information: PHIVOLCS (2012). 
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The events triggered by the highest intensities of rainfall all occurred more than a year after 
the last eruption.  However the lahars that occurred more than a year after the last eruption 
were also observed to be triggered by rainfall intensities recorded as low as 2 mm/hour 
(discounting the one event which apparently coincided with no recorded rainfall and is 
therefore assumed to be erroneous) and as high as 47.5 mm/hour.  There appears, therefore, 
to be no obvious relationship between the average rainfall intensity and lahars triggered more 
than a year since the last eruption.  The existence of ten of these events below Rodolfo and 
Arguden’s (1991) correlation suggests that their threshold does not apply to every post-
eruption event. 
The 60 mm/hour threshold for lahar triggering surpasses all of the rainfall intensities 
calculated for the 46 lahar events, including the one that occurred after Reming (during 
Tropical Storm Juaning, 2011).  Furthermore, only the Reming rainfall intensity crossed the 
minimum threshold for evacuation.  The key finding from the rainfall intensity analysis is that 
rainfall intensity measured over a constant duration differs between lahar events, thus 
questioning the applicability of a single threshold for lahar initiation.  Furthermore, there is 
also the concern that the 60 mm/hour rainfall threshold misrepresents the study by Rodolfo 
and Arguden (1991) since the assumption is made that their criteria of 10 mm or more rainfall 
falling in the most intense 10 minutes can be scaled up to 60 mm/hour (as mentioned earlier).  
One reason for this discrepancy could be that the 60 mm/hour only applies to the triggering of 
large lahars.  LG Disaster Manager 2 said that 100 mm/hour fell during Reming, however this 
cannot be verified with the data available.  Furthermore, it is ambiguous whether the 60 
mm/hour rainfall intensity reflects the anticipation of large lahars.  LG Disaster Manager 2 
implied during an interview that this rainfall would bring about ‘destructive lahar’,  but in 
follow up correspondence they suggested that 60 mm/hour represents ‘the start of small lahar 
and if rainfall increases lahar becomes more destructive.’  This interviewee clarified that ‘small 
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lahars are just confined along the river channels, non-destructive’ (LG Disaster Manager 2, 
email correspondence, 3rd March to 7th March 2014).  Furthermore, during an interview in 
October (2012), the interviewee described the 68 mm/hour rainfall at the threshold for a 
destructive lahars.  Rodolfo and Arguden (1991) defined lahar triggering rainfall as rainfall that 
results in a ‘flow of water and debris in any proportion, of any magnitude and duration, in 
Basud or Mabinit’ (Rodolfo and Arguden, 1991: 75).  This suggests that warnings based upon 
their study give no indication of the magnitude (and duration) of the lahar, and that this 
threshold only relates to the Basud and Mabinit channels, which produced very small lahars 
during Reming (Paguican et al., 2009).  As the 60 mm/hour threshold appears to be based on 
this study, the assumption is that it is designed to reflect the initiation of lahars of any 
magnitude (i.e. small or large) that occur at Mayon. 
A second reason for the observed variability of the rainfall intensities could be due to the 
influence of the last eruption.  According to LG Disaster Manager 2, the critical rainfall intensity 
threshold of 60 mm/hour should be adjusted based upon the time since the last eruption: 
 ‘…it’s only a matter of changing the warning criteria - if after eruption maybe 
evacuation procedure will be done at maybe 40 mm[/hour] of rainfall but without fresh 
eruption will go back to the criteria that we evacuate for lahar at 60 mm/hour 
because…the threshold of lahar will be at 60 mm/hour.’ (LG Disaster Manager 2) 
The above quotation suggests that the 60 mm/hour is designed for post-eruption lahars, which 
was also mentioned by PHIVOLCS Geologist 3 (‘somewhere between post-eruption to non-
eruption lahars’), although they did not clarify at what point lahars become ‘non-eruption’.  
Although these statements provide a reason for why the 60 mm/hour threshold far exceeds 
the rainfall intensities for eruption lahars and post-eruption lahars that occurred within twelve 
months of the last eruption (Figure 8.8), these two statements also imply that experience, 
judgement (and perhaps guesswork) are used to adjust the rainfall threshold.   
314 
 
In order to explore the reliability of these judgements, Figure 8.9 presents a chronology of the 
rainfall intensities of the lahar events and eruption volumes over the 34 year period.  This 
chronology includes six eruptions: 1978, 1984, 1993, 1999, 2001 (two events) and 2009 (see 
Appendix F).  The 2006 eruption is not included owing to its insignificant contribution to 
available source material (see Chapter 7).  There are two scales on the x-axis: on the left is 
rainfall intensity and on the right is the volume of material erupted (in million cubic metres).  
The limitations of this analysis include the fact that the figure of volume of material erupted 
includes tephra, pyroclastic flow and lava flow and so does not reflect the precise volume of 
material available for lahar entrainment.  The total volume of ejecta had to be utilised since it 
was the only consistently recorded volume for each of the eruptions, however Table 8.1 gives 
some indication of which were the more explosive (rather than effusive) eruptions.  Lastly, the 
rate at which this material is depleted over time is also unknown. 
Table 8.1 Volume of volcanic material erupted over the 34-year period.  Source: PHIVOLCS (2011c). 
Year of 
eruption  
Total volume of 
erupted material 
(million m
3
) 
Pyroclastic flow 
(million m
3
) 
Lava flow  (million 
m
3
) 
Tephra fall (million 
m
3
) 
1978 20  ***  ***  ***  
1984 70  ***  ***  ***  
1993 50  5  45 undetermined  
2000 28.6  13.91  11.95  2.69  
Jun-01 15.5  7.29  7.62  0.57  
Jul-01 10.2  5.49 3.8  0.87  
Jul-Oct 
2006  80  ***  ~80  minimal ash  
Jul-Dec 
2009  37.1  ***  ~37  minimal ash  
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Figure 8.9 Chronology of the peak average rainfall intensity of eruption lahars (EL) and post-eruption lahars (PEL) events and the occurrence eruptions and their volumes of 
ejecta over the 34 year study period.  Source of rainfall data: PAGASA (2012); source of eruption data: PHIVOLCS (2012). 
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In spite of the limits of the data, Figure 8.9 shows no strong correlation between rainfall 
intensity and the time since the last eruption.  It is observed that lahar events that were 
triggered by particularly intense rainfall tended to occur at least a couple of years after the last 
eruption.  There is a concentration of events following the 1984 eruption (the largest over the 
34 year period) but this might partly be a consequence of the many in-depth studies of lahars 
were conducted over this time.  In spite limitations, the results suggest that adjusting the 
threshold over time is largely down to guess work or is perhaps, in fact, inappropriate and that 
more data are required to refine how this threshold should be adjusted.  Given the range of 
rainfall intensities presented in Figure 8.8, in particular those lahars that occurred more than a 
year after the last eruption, it is questionable whether it is possible to implement a rainfall 
threshold for warning for lahars.    There are also other factors that might influence the rainfall 
threshold.  In a study of debris flows in Taiwan, it was found that the rainfall intensity-duration 
threshold for debris flow initiation reduced after the 1999 earthquake (ML 7.13) loosened 
material on slopes (Jan and Chen, 2005).  Albay is seismically active, thus the influence of this 
hazard should be a consideration.  In the context of typhoons, some scientists and local 
government interviewees indicated that it was because the rainfall was associated with a 
typhoon that it was intense enough to trigger the lahar (see Chapter 7).  Eleven of the 46 lahar 
events in Appendix I are believed to have been triggered by typhoons, although there is 
uncertainty as to whether the 1981 event was triggered by a typhoon or tropical storm.   
Two of typhoons (Milenyo and Reming) brought the highest recorded intensities of rainfall and 
the two most deadly events (the 1981 lahars, which killed 40 people, and Reming) were both 
post-eruptive and triggered by typhoons (or in the case of the 1981 event possibly a tropical 
storm).   It is difficult to evaluate in detail the significance of typhoon associated rainfall owing 
to the small number of records and the need for an analysis of all typhoons that have occurred 
over this period, as well as information on the magnitude and destructiveness of the lahars 
produced.   
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The discrepancies in the lahar records and the thresholds for evacuation and lahar initiation 
outlined in the analysis above could reflect the problems with the data.  The rainfall intensities 
that were calculated for this analysis represent an average of rainfall recorded over six hours, 
so this averaging may underestimate the peak occurrences of rainfall.  Furthermore, the 
government’s 60 mm/hour threshold may be utilised because it better reflects the intensity of 
rainfall that triggers lahars on the slopes of the volcano, compared with data used here from 
the PAGASA rainfall records collected at Legazpi City airport.  Only the PAGASA records were 
available for analysis and so a comparison of the data with that being recorded on the slopes 
of Mayon is a goal for future research.  At the same time, however, the rain gauges established 
by the local government have only been in operation from 2010 and, therefore, represent only 
a short-period of monitoring.  It is recommended that the local government’s barangay 
monitoring of rainfall be expanded and designed to ensure periodic measurements of rainfall 
to improve the baseline of representative rainfall data.  Furthermore, monitoring by local 
communities of small lahars could enhance future records.  The limits of this analysis are 
mentioned for transparency and to highlight the difficulty of deriving these thresholds.  
However, these limitations should not understate the findings from the analysis of the critical 
rainfall intensity, which has highlighted some limitations in this approach and important 
considerations for decision-makers.   
Limitations of the rainfall threshold utilised at Mayon  
Rodolfo and Arguden (1991) suggest limitations of their analysis, including the fact that it is 
based on only 16 debris flow events.  Furthermore, their study focused on two channels 
(Mabinit and Basud) that are now no longer a major source of lahar.  PHIVOLCS Geologist 3 
argued that specific thresholds are required for each channel owing to the different 
distribution of pyroclastic material, however further studies are required to verify this.  If this 
is the case and, moreover, given the fact that the rainfall threshold for lahar initiation appears 
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to vary between events (Figure 8.8), decision-makers (be it local government or NGOs) need to 
be aware that the threshold cannot be universally applied.  Academic Geologist 1 said that, 
from her experience in other mass movement prone areas, NGOs tend to apply the same 
threshold to wide areas.  This situation emphasises the importance of the community-based 
warning system and consideration of the local environmental processes and the influences of 
upstream rainfall.  Such systems can only be successful through good communication of the 
underlying science behind the warning:  
‘they [Mayon residents] broadly know that if there’s a really heavy rain there is a 
chance of having a lahar.  But they don’t know anything about the threshold.  They’re 
really relying on people like, you know, the weather bureau and [APSEMO] to come and 
tell them when to get out.’ (International Volcanologist) 
LG Disaster Manager 2 stated that they have explained the threshold to some Barangay 
Captains, but the process of decision-making is still centralised.  LG Disaster Manager 2 said 
that Barangay Officials have to provide the local government with the threshold figure, who 
then decide whether to issue a warning or an evacuation order6. 
The need to anticipate magnitude 
The Reming lahars case study emphasised that it is the anticipation of destructive lahars that is 
of greatest concern to communities and emergency responders7.  For example, the Executive 
Director of Local NGO B felt that the government scientists should have predicted the volume 
of lahar based on the rainfall forecast for Reming (see Chapter 7).  However, the ambiguity 
regarding the magnitude of lahars that will be triggered by certain rainfall intensities implies 
that it is not possible to provide this level of ‘prediction’ to communities.  This emphasises a 
need to manage expectations of what science can offer, but also consider how to strengthen 
the anticipatory components of lahar hazard analysis. 
                                                          
6
 LG Disaster Manager 2 
7
 PHIVOLCS Volcanologist, Local NGOs A and B and National NGO are particularly concerned with the 
volume of material available for entrainment. 
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Accounting for debris-flow volume necessitates determining the volume of initiation failure or 
failures, as well as the material that is entrained and lost as the lahar travels (Jakob, 2005).  
Such data are rarely available before a lahar is triggered.  PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 said that 
they give advance information to the local government regarding the availability of volcanic 
material that might lead to lahars; however Figure 8.9 indicates that there is not a clear 
correlation between the size of the last eruption and rainfall intensity.  However, it might be 
possible to quantify potential lahar volume in terms of triggering parameters if the database of 
lahars created in this study is augmented with continuous studies of rainfall and lahar events 
to determine critical thresholds for different magnitudes of events.  For instance, somewhere 
between the rainfall that fell during Milenyo and the rainfall that fell during Reming is a critical 
threshold where lahars not only occur, but do so at a catastrophic scale.   
The short-term (reactive) approach  
Reliance upon real-time monitoring of typhoon rainfall is a short-term approach to anticipating 
lahar occurrence.  Whilst the early warning system is necessary (owing to the fact that 
communities still reside or return to work in high hazard zones), probabilistic analysis of longer 
term risk, especially that which is linked to occurrence and severity (see Jakob, 2005), might 
help with long-term planning.   
The recurrence interval of the triggering rainfall intensity has been suggested as a means of 
estimating the long-term probability of landslide and debris flow occurrence (e.g. Hincks et al., 
2013), however this assumes that the threshold rainfall intensity is (1) constant and (2) will 
always trigger an event, which is not the case at Mayon.  Furthermore, the typhoon Reming 
case study demonstrated that it is necessary to look beyond the recurrence interval of rainfall 
intensity and consider what phenomenon might bring this rainfall, for example a 
supertyphoon.  As such, critical rainfall thresholds should be accompanied with scenario-
planning, which might only be possible through expert judgement (e.g. Lacasse et al. 2008).  
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Summary of critical rainfall thresholds for anticipating lahar occurrence 
Whilst the rainfall threshold being utilised does not apply to all events, it was successfully 
implemented during the recent Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan, November 2013):   
‘Albay was only affected by more than 100 kph wind and rainfall of an average of 29 
mm per hour so we did not evacuate people from Mayon Volcano as it did not reach 
the threshold. Our evacuation was related to coastal flooding, wind, flood and 
landslides then not much on mudflow.’ (LG Disaster Manager 2, email correspondence 
5th December 2013) 
Furthermore, at the time of interview, several government scientists stated that (through 
collaboration with Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, JAXA) a thorough analysis of critical 
rainfall thresholds at Mayon was soon to commence.   
There were, however, a number of points raised in the above analysis that are of concern.  The 
thresholds for lahar occurrence and evacuation are much higher than the rainfall hypothesised 
to have triggered any of the 46 lahars analysed in this study.  This reflects either a 
misinterpretation of Rodolfo and Arguden’s (1991) work or the limits of the lahar and rainfall 
data analysed in this chapter.  There is no strong correlation between the time since the last 
eruption and the intensity of triggering rainfall.  However, the different rainfall triggering 
thresholds for the 46 lahar events emphasises how lahar hazard changes over space and time 
at Mayon volcano.  Decision-makers need to be aware that the rainfall threshold has to be 
updated to reflect changes in conditions of susceptibility, but that it might not be possible to 
anticipate the degree to which the threshold will change.  Seeing as both the local government 
and scientists appear to rely on experience and their own judgement to make these 
adjustments, it is essential for NGOs to engage with them directly.   
Given the differences in rainfall between the PAGASA rain gauge and that recorded on the 
slopes, there is clear justification for a local level approach, which should be decentralised in 
order to give autonomy of warning and evacuation to local communities.  Community-based 
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monitoring and observation of lahars could help to enhance lahar databases, especially with 
regard to their timing and approximate size.  There is also a need to estimate the potential 
volume of lahar (even qualitatively) that might be triggered based on, for example, different 
thresholds of rainfall.  The data limitations observed within this analysis emphasise why the 
associated uncertainty with critical rainfall intensity thresholds needs to be well 
communicated to, for example, NGOs who might be considering implementing this approach. 
Finally, the approach focuses on anticipation in the short-term, which is necessary for the 
evacuation of those still residing in high risk areas.  However, probabilistic, long-term 
approaches should be explored – especially those anticipating whether rainfall might occur in 
close proximity to large volcanic eruptions.  Given the problems with regard to data in the 
context of this analysis, it may be more likely that a scenario based approach is adopted.  
Preparedness and mitigation strategies need to be informed by scenarios of lahar inundation 
accompanied by other hazards (e.g. typhoons). 
8.1.4 Anticipating multi-hazard lahar disasters: the role of scenario planning 
It has been suggested that during quiescent periods, scientists should undertake (1) the 
analysis of individual scenarios and (2) consider a range of possible hazard events with their 
probabilities of occurrence (Hill et al., 2013).  Although the scientists, local government and 
NGOs (and some communities) might have expected the Typhoon Reming lahars, the 
magnitude of these was generally unexpected.  As such, anticipating the likelihood of scenarios 
similar to or more extreme than the Reming lahars is a necessary means of bolstering the 
multi-hazard approaches being adopted in the province: 
‘although the main hazard is typhoon the secondary hazard could be flooding, we have 
the debris flow from Mayon so it's sort of multi-hazard.  Of course, complex scenario it 
is not far-fetched that we can experience a strong or super typhoon whilst Mayon 
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volcano is erupting - that's not impossible - it could happen anytime’ (LG Disaster 
Manager 3) 
The above interviewee said that, in light of this situation occurring, they had developed 
contingency planning based on the ‘worst-case scenario’, although the details of this are not 
available for this study.  PHIVOLCS Geologist 1 and 2 also referred to the modelling of Typhoon 
Reming in the lahar hazard map as ‘a worst-case scenario.’  Similarly, one NGO interviewee8 
noted that the local government’s ‘worst-case scenario’ planning prior to Reming did not 
account for an event on the scale of Reming.  These assertions indicate a scenario based 
approach to anticipating lahar disasters that relies on worst-case scenario planning and also 
that this approach essentially failed as Reming was not anticipated.  The choice of labelling the 
scenario as ‘worst’ implicitly defines the acceptable risk that is beyond the capabilities of 
scientists (Marzocchi et al., 2012b).   
Given that many changes in the revised (2011) lahar hazard map (Figure 8.2) generally reflect 
the spatial extent of the Reming lahars, it questionable whether scenarios of greater impact 
than Reming have been considered.  Two PHIVOLCS scientists did emphasise that PAGASA 
defined the flooding from Typhoon Reming as a 1 in 40 year flood (PHIVOLCS, 2006a), with one 
noting that Reming did not occur close to a significant, recent eruption: 
‘...if we had that [Reming] kind of rainfall after the eruption [2000-2001] then we 
would have seen really massive lahars.’ (PHIVOLCS geologist 3) 
Anticipating the impact of this type of event relies on both long- and short-term anticipation.  
Planning scenarios in advance and then updating them as real-time information becomes 
available, for example the volume of recently erupted material and the intensity of the 
typhoon and associated rainfall, requires some initial statistical analysis of the likelihood of 
occurrence of this type of event.  In recent years, the philsophy underpinning risk assessments 
across a number of fields, including volcanology, landslide and earthquake, has moved from 
                                                          
8
 DRR Point Person (Local NGO A) 
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reliance on conceptualisation and deterministic evaluations to probabilistic assessment and 
modelling in order to characterise intrinsic uncertainties (Martí et al., 2008; Neri et al., 2008; 
Hincks et al., 2013).  At the same time, however, probabilities are not always understood by 
decision-makers (Martí et al., 2008; Solana et al., 2008).  In preparing for a Reming-style event, 
the local government are apparently more concerned with typhoon hazard in the short-term: 
‘Actually we don’t have a problem about the probability of occurring because we have 
the forecast information.  So our preparation is not only typhoon.  Even preparing for 
Tropical Convergence Zone, cold front, active low pressure area, tropical depression, 
tropical storm – they have rain with similar impact [as] typhoon.’ (LG Disaster Manager 
2) 
This implies a predominantly reactive strategy to lahar risk reduction.  However, their 
approach does acknowledge the range of hazards that might affect communities within a 
single event: 
‘Actually our plan is scenario based but hazard is specific because for areas around 
Mayon volcano that must be a different scenario.  For coastal, it must be different one 
although we’re talking about the same hazard (the same typhoon) so it must be hazard 
specific’ (LG Disaster Manager 2) 
Identifying and quantifying scenarios for multi-hazards is reliant on the availability of data and 
the resources and knowledge available to determine these.    However, given the multi-hazard 
exposure of the province, including the frequent occurrence of typhoons and the observed 
cycles of eruptions (Punongbayan, 1985) it is necessary to ensure that the scenario plan has 
considered alternative scenarios in so far as possible.  Clear communication of the uncertainty 
surrounding these scenarios is also essential. 
The fact that elements of the hazard map and rainfall thresholds rely upon expert judgement 
and experience means that engagement with these experts is an essential means of truly 
understanding, within the limits of uncertainty, the lahar hazard at Mayon.  The following 
discussion briefly explores the extent and barriers to this type of engagement, drawing upon 
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the interviews with NGOs and scientists (government and academic) conducted in the 
Philippines from October-November 2012. 
8.2 Engagement between scientists and NGOs: capacity, trust and 
contention 
As part of the October-November 2012 visit to the Philippines, six NGO representatives and 
ten scientists were asked, or brought it up themselves, whether they have worked with 
scientists or NGOs respectively.  The views reflect experiences from Albay and beyond and so 
the analysis of these experiences helps to build on the general discussion of engagement 
between NGOs and scientists initiated in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Government and academic scientists appeared to recognise the need for engagement at the 
local scale.  This was acknowledged by one NGO interviewee9 who stated that both academic 
and government scientific groups are increasingly willing to share their information with 
communities, but there is a need to facilitate the engagement between scientists and 
communities.   Indeed, the process of engaging with communities and NGOs is apparently in 
one direction, with the scientists sharing information but viewing it as their, not the 
communities’, role to assess hazards: 
[Referring to the EngD research] ‘But methods for scientific multi-hazard assessment 
will not be done the community, right?’ (PHIVOLCS Geologist 1) 
The PHIVOLCS (and other government) scientists channel their communications through 
government structures, for example IECs with the local government (see Chapter 7).  However, 
PHIVOLCS Geologist 1 implied that sustaining the adoption of science might be more 
achievable through direct engagement with communities rather than local government, owing 
to staff turnover of the latter at the end of each electoral term: 
                                                          
9
 Deputy Executive Director (National NGO) 
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‘…the community based early warning system that we generated for tsunami related to 
that event we seen that there are a lot of Barangay Captains and local Mayors who 
were already changed and so the information stopped…but the community early based 
warning system…that pilot community reacted properly as far as the earthquake was 
concerned’ (PHIVOLCS Geologist 1) 
Furthermore, three scientists10 did identify NGOs as opportunities for engaging with 
communities and sustaining the impact of their science, and two of these interviewees 
respectively noted that this is because NGOs have good links with and are trusted by the 
community.  PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 2 perceived NGOs as filling a gap in the limited reach of 
scientific agencies:  
Government and NGOs have increasingly realised that they need one another – for 
PHIVOLCS/government, it’s about how to convince NGOs that we have information – 
we have to advertise. (International Volcanologist 2) 
Above all other concerns NGO interviewees emphasised that the information will only be 
utilised if it is made understandable11 and accessible to those who need it12 (cf. Basher, 2013).  
Two NGO representatives felt that the available science is not at an appropriate scale13, others 
felt that it was expensive to access14 and another pointed out that scientific research tends to 
be conducted in the same areas15.  This last point emphasises the need for communication and 
collaboration between NGOs and scientists, since NGOs might be able to advertise to scientists 
where the greatest need is.  However, the interviews demonstrated that scientists are also 
constrained in their ability and willingness to assist.   
                                                          
10
 Academic Geologist 1; PHIVOLCS Volcanologists 1 and 2 
11
 DRR Specialist (INGO A); Executive Director (Local NGO B); DRR Point Person (Local NGO A); 
Humanitarian Programme Coordinator (INGO B) 
12
 International Volcanologist 1 
13
 DRR Specialist (INGO A); Humanitarian Programme Coordinator (INGO B); 
14
 Executive Director (Local NGO B) DRR Specialist (INGO A); Humanitarian Programme Coordinator 
(International NGO B) 
15
 DRR Country Programme Advisor (International NGO A) 
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8.2.1 Access to scientists and availability of information 
There appears to be a lack of guidance regarding, in particular, how engagements between 
government scientists and NGOs should be managed.  PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 2 suggested 
that NGOs rely upon community experiences for hazard mapping because they do not 
approach scientists or because the hazard map is not available.  However, as noted above, 
several interviewees commented upon varying experiences of being charged for government 
science across different agencies.  One scientist said that PHIVOLCS will provide (within limits) 
a free service16 and another17 said they can provide data to those NGOs who are not able to 
fund PHIVOLCS to conduct the analysis.  The Executive Director of Local NGO B recalled being 
charged by PAGASA for basic data, which surprised the interviewee, whilst being given 
electronic geohazard maps for free from the MGB18.  Justifying this cost to management was 
noted by one interviewee as a major blockade to engage civil society with science more 
widely19.  Another NGO representative said that the local government will provide them 
science for free because ‘they know we are church’20.   
As highlighted in Chapter 5, informal partnerships often form the basis of engagement 
between scientists and NGOs, particularly when funds are not available: 
‘Well we try to access materials from Manila Observatory, for example, for free…This is 
the informal partnership that happens except that, again, if you look at scale, that's 
national scale and not really municipal or even barangay scale.’ (Humanitarian 
Programme Coordinator, International NGO B)  
However, this quotation indicates that these free materials may not be applicable to 
community-based DRR and the information that NGOs require might necessitate funding (e.g. 
the MO-UPNIGS, 2009, maps).  Examples of informal access to science through family 
                                                          
16
 PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 
17
 PHIVOLCS Geologist 1 
18
 The member of staff from Local NGO B said the geohazard maps are too expensive. 
19
 DRR Specialist (INGO A) 
20
 Researcher (Local NGO C) 
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members21, former colleagues22 and well established relationships with individuals within 
agencies were presented23.  However, without institutional partnership, the sustainability of 
these engagements depends upon personal contacts, and if these are lost then the 
engagement may also be ended:  
‘You know these people who died in the helicopter crash from PHIVOLCS?  We had a lot 
of tie up with NGOs through them…’ (PHIVOLCS Geologist 3) 
Limited capacity within government institutions was identified by NGOs as a key difficulty in 
accessing science and scientists.  Likewise, four scientists and one local government 
interviewee24 noted the inadequate coverage and systems in place for the purpose of 
gathering data and monitoring of hazards across the Philippines, the consequence of which 
was noted by one NGO representative: 
‘those rain gauges, those early warning systems [were] either stolen or ..not 
maintained.  The maps were not updated … it’s because there was only one …old man 
who works for PAGASA and …he said…: “I couldn’t possibly look after all of that – I 
couldn’t possibly accomplish updating the maps and everything.”  … it really becomes a 
challenge when you go down…to the local government units because they don’t have 
enough resources to maintain and to keep things updated.’ (Humanitarian Programme 
Coordinator, International NGO B) 
Despite high capacity and political will in Albay, resources are still an issue for government 
scientists; for example, the local government have had to augment the PAGASA rain gauge 
network with their own system.  International and national investment in volcanic monitoring 
in the province has proven to have generated trust between NGOs and the scientists.  After 
the 1993 eruption (which killed 77 people), PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 did a lot to restore faith 
amongst the community, which was reflected in one local NGOs description of him: 
                                                          
21
 LG Disaster Manager 1’s son produced hazard maps for the municipality. 
22
 LG Disaster Manager 2 used to be the head of Local NGO C 
23
 Local NGO B referred to PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 by his first name and imply that they will just ask 
him whenever they need information 
24
 International Volcanologist; PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1; PHIVOLCS Geologist 3; MGB National 
Geologist; LG Disaster Manager 2 
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‘the resident volcanologist, very kind…man, so we make use of their data.  It’s really 
helpful and it’s technical…it’s understandable…it’s just that we cannot give it directly to 
the community.’ (Executive Director – Local NGO B) 
This quotation also implies that the success of their engagement with this scientist is owing to 
his ability to communicate the science, at least in a manner that is meaningful to the NGO.  
Limited capacity and resources were not unique to the local level; PHIVOLCS national level 
scientists highlighted times when they had lost key personnel through tragedy on the job25. 
MGB Regional Geologist noted the lure of more profitable endeavours abroad, illustrating the 
fragility of the scientific population within the government (and academic) sectors:   
‘we had problems with people –  we lost a lot of geologists who transferred to 
exploration companies – so only three of us were left out of, I think, eleven geologists - 
only three were left to do the work.’ (MGB Regional Geologist) 
The creation and maintenance of scientific knowledge is a big problem for the Philippines (see 
Rodolfo, 1995), and undoubtedly in similar or lower income countries.  Given the limited 
capacity and resources of the government scientists, NGOs have tried to access information 
from other sources, for example academia.  As indicated in Section 7.1, there are numerous 
power struggles related to the source of the science that is utilised. 
8.2.2 Sourcing science: overlapping mandates and turf wars 
In spite of a recent joint university and government real-time weather warning project – 
National Assessment of Hazards, NOAH – described by Academic Geologist 2,  engagement 
between government and academic scientists has historically been contentious.  There 
appears to be a mutual sense of frustration between academics and government agencies; 
several examples from PHIVOLCS were shared regarding irresponsible mapping26 and hazard 
analysis27 undertaken by academics, as well as their being beaten to publishing and being 
                                                          
25
 PHIVOLCS Geologist 1 
26
 PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 2 
27
 PHIVOLCS Geologist 1 
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unhappy with what the academics published28.  In the defence of academics, Academic 
Geologist 1 stated that they are under pressure to produce papers and this interviewee could 
not understand why there is so much tension between academic and government scientists 
since they face similar problems: 
The links between government, academia, and the private sector are not strong/good.  
The reason being the different mandates and turfing/stepping on toes – don’t really 
know why this is the case since we have such few workers; competition; jealously.  Also, 
[it is] a problem of [lack of] time. (Academic Geologist 1) 
NGOs thus have the difficult task of accessing the data, information and expertise they need, 
without becoming embroiled in these politics.  There was an apparent sense amongst the 
government agencies that it is their mandate29 and, therefore, responsibility to produce and 
disseminate the science30.  But given the fact that the government scientists (and local 
government) are resource constrained, one practitioner questioned whether the work of 
government scientists is always credible: 
‘The scientists working in the government, there are only a few of them.  …And they are 
also tasked with many things and they cannot just cover a lot of our higher risk areas… 
even when they did the assessment in St Bernard, there were a lot of questions.  How 
come were they able to come up with these high risk areas, moderate risk areas when 
they were there only for a few days?  …So this is why MO, UPNIGS and other scientists 
– we must make a way for them to be able to reach those high risk areas.’  (DRR 
Specialist, International NGO A) 
What the last quotation emphasises is the role of NGOs in enabling these scientists to reach 
the areas where need is greatest.  The concerns of the last interviewee were also supported by 
Academic Geologist 1’s unease regarding the fact that (reflecting on MGB maps) the 
government maps are not peer-reviewed and that the invitation to review these maps is more 
a validation exercise based on the presence of academics at these events, rather than them 
being able to critically evaluate the maps.   
                                                          
28
 PHIVOLCS Geologist 3 (this particularly relates to Reming) 
29
 Executive Director (Local NGO B) 
30
 PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 2 
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The tension between different scientific groups may make it difficult for NGOs to know what 
science to use and what to trust.  This is undoubtedly not a situation unique to the Philippines 
and, thus, emphasises the need for NGOs to understand the context of science in the country 
within which they are working.  At the same time, three PHIVOLCS scientists31 referred to their 
negative experiences of working with certain INGOs, which appeared to have made them 
distrustful of these agencies.   
The tension and distrust also extended to the relationships between government scientific 
agencies. The institutional approaches of hazard assessment, monitoring and warning in the 
government32 were highlighted as a major problem in the run up to and during Reming: there 
was an apparent lack of agreement as to whose responsibility it was for anticipating this event.  
The different mandates of government agencies may also not be clear to NGOs wishing to use 
their data.  PHIVOLCS Geologist 2 highlighted the confusion that arises over the difference 
between their and the MGB’s fault maps: 
‘MGB have its fault map but not all of them are active, so PHIVOLCS we publish only 
active fault maps so that's also a source of confusion amongst NGOs: ‘how come we 
have fault here but you don’t have fault here’.  They think it's the same but they don't 
know that some faults of MGB are…inactive or geological lineament, or structures.  But 
for us it's the active faults.  So we have less [fault] lines compared to MGB.’ (PHIVOLCS 
Geologist 2) 
If NGOs wish to utilise science, they need to be aware if the science they are utilising is 
appropriate.  Scientists also need to be aware of how their information might be used and 
communicated, beyond what they had originally envisaged33.  PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 1 
emphasised that it is important to communicate that science will not ‘solve 100%’, which is 
well exemplified in the case of lahar risk at Mayon.  A good and final example of the challenge 
of anticipation, even with scientific analysis, in the context of multi-hazards was shared by one 
                                                          
31
 PHIVOLCS Geologist 3; PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 2; International Volcanologist 
32
 Noted by PHIVOLCS Geologist 1 and 3 
33
 PHIVOLCS Volcanologist 2 
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NGO interviewee.  The example emphasises the importance of managing the expectations 
amongst NGOs and communities as to the limits of scientific assessments: 
‘The community they even ask [for science] because they assess their land based on 
their five senses and they would want to further develop this, that’s why they ask for 
opinion from the science community.  Incidentally the UP [University of the Philippines] 
colleagues…are also conducting a study related to landslide and we facilitated, we 
introduced to them this community [and]…they went and did this study …after the 
study, they presented this to the community, even to the Mayor, and from that…the 
community, already drafted and came up their own counter disaster plan.  …once there 
will be a typhoon or rain, will happen, they know the landslide, where it will be and 
how many and the possible scenarios will happen once there will be a typhoon.  
Incidentally, the sad event that happened…an earthquake happened last February 6th, 
with 6.8 magnitude and the epicentre is just two hours away from the community and 
because of this earthquake landslide happened and cost 40 lives in the community, and 
…more than half of the community – had been buried because of these landslide.  
…PHIVOLCS had been asked: “why the earthquake happened – is there a fault or a 
trench identified in the area?”  Before the earthquake happened, in the data from the 
PHIVOLCS they could not find any fault or trench in that perimeter…  The area is not 
earthquake prone.  …it came out that there is a hidden fault in the area but previously 
satellite they could not find; even other instruments they could not find that there will 
be a possible earthquake in that area...’ (Deputy Director, National NGO)    
 
8.3 Summary 
In a dynamic environment such as Mayon, the changes in lahar hazard over the short and long-
term emphasise why NGOs need to encourage the review of community-based hazard 
assessments over time.  The two scientific strategies for assessing and anticipating the timing, 
location and occurrence of lahars respectively address the long- and short-term hazard.   
The long-term approach to anticipating lahars is via hazard mapping (Figure 8.1) and, given the 
finite resources of scientists to make and disseminate map updates, the government scientists 
appear to have adopted a conservative approach to lahar mapping.  The map requires some 
interpretation by the user but essentially it implies proneness to lahars in the long-term, with 
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an indication of increased proneness in the southern sector of the volcano.  In the short-term, 
the areas highly prone to lahar will appear to be under a greater threat of lahars than those in 
areas of low proneness.  However, in the long-term, those in the low proneness areas are also 
highly threatened because they are exposed to high-magnitude (low-frequency) lahars.  This 
distinction emphasises why it is important to anticipate both the timing and the magnitude of 
the event. Without having some sort of quantification of recurrence interval of lahars of 
different magnitude, it is difficult to see how NGOs and decision-makers alike can make 
informed decisions regarding long-term strategies (see Newhall and Hoblitt, 2002).  
Furthermore, it emphasises why communication of science is essential in order for residents to 
understand the threat posed by lahars. 
Many of the areas affected by Typhoon Reming have been re-classed as highly prone in in the 
updated lahar hazard map (2011).  This is in spite of this event being a high magnitude, low 
frequency event.  This amendment could represent the utilisation of modelling, changes in 
topography and channel configuration due to Reming (resulting in these areas being more 
prone to frequent lahars) or a conservative approach to mapping.   At the same time, however, 
the map has not obviously considered an event larger than the Reming lahars.   
In the short-term, the anticipation of lahars relies on the utilisation of rainfall thresholds.  
Rather than adopting the conservative approach observed in the mapping, the critical rainfall 
intensity threshold for lahar initiation is much higher than the rainfall recorded for the 34-year 
history of lahar events.  This threshold may better reflect the rainfall that actually falls on the 
slopes of Mayon, but it also appears to incorrectly assume that Rodolfo and Arguden’s (1991) 
measure of at least 10 mm of rainfall in 10 minutes equates to a threshold of 60 mm/hour.  
Although limited, the lahar record available in this study demonstrates that the threshold for 
lahar initiation varies between events and further investigation of this, as well as the influence 
of previous eruptions on this threshold, is required. 
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Furthermore, as illustrated during Reming, it is not sufficient to simply rely on a threshold; the 
threshold needs to be accompanied by an appropriate scenario in order for stakeholders to 
prepare for the disaster.  The Reming disaster illustrates why communication of uncertainty is 
essential because the utilisation of ‘worst-case’ scenarios creates unrealistic expectations of 
scientists.  Furthermore, it is not enough to know that this case might happen: being 
anticipatory means determining the likelihood of it occurring; however there is an apparent 
lack of probabilistic analysis of these types of scenarios at Mayon. 
Table 8.2 summarises how the three components of anticipation (location, timing and severity) 
have been addressed by the lahar hazard mapping and critical rainfall intensity threshold, as 
well as the extent to which these two methods have considered the influence of other hazards.  
Generally, the map depicts relative levels of hazard whilst the rainfall threshold reflects 
absolute hazard.  In regard to both strategies, it appears that the weakest link in the 
anticipation chain is severity, which is implied in the hazard map but this assumes that users 
can interpret the different levels of lahar threat.  Studies in other volcanic settings, however, 
have suggested that communities often find it difficult to interpret maps (Haynes et al., 2007).  
In the context of the rainfall threshold, the link to severity is more ambiguous.  Figure 8.10 
presents how the links between the components of anticipation are reflected in the short and 
medium term.  This diagram emphasises that the weakest component is severity (magnitude). 
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Table 8.2 Methods for anticipating the location, severity and timing of lahar. 
Assessment 
method 
Anticipation of lahar hazard Consideration of 
multi-hazards? Location Severity Timing 
Lahar hazard 
map 
Yes Implied but 
requires 
interpretation 
Relative 
(i.e. higher 
or lower 
proneness) 
The map cannot 
reflect the rainfall 
trigger and, 
importantly, does 
not state that lahars 
can occur without an 
eruption. 
Critical 
rainfall 
intensity 
threshold 
Applicable to the whole 
volcano, rather than individual 
channels.  Location can be 
anticipated by using this 
threshold alongside the 
hazard map and knowledge of 
recent eruptions. 
Ambiguous – 
more research 
required 
Absolute  Real-time monitoring 
of weather system; 
adjustment of 
threshold based 
upon time since last 
eruption. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.10 Venn diagram of the overlapping components of anticipation and how these link in the short 
and the long-term through the assessment methods adopted for lahars at Mayon.  The blue arrows refer 
to the long-term (hazard map) and the black arrows to the short-term (critical rainfall intensity 
threshold). 
 
Location 
Severity Timing 
Implied but 
ambiguous 
Implied but 
ambiguous 
 
Relative 
? 
Forecasts & 
recent 
eruptions?  
? 
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In order to account for how hazards and changes in the environment influence the lahar 
hazard profile over time and space, both the hazard map and critical rainfall intensity 
threshold have to be updated to (for example) reflect the influence of recent volcanic 
eruptions.  Making these changes appears to rely, in part, on the experience and judgement of 
scientists and local government.  This chapter, however, demonstrates why it is important for 
NGO practitioners not to simply accept the science that is available, but to critically evaluate its 
applicability and identify its limitations, especially in instances when these are not well 
communicated.  Good communication between NGOs and experts is also an essential means 
of ensuring that NGOs and the communities they represent are aware of the uncertainty and 
limits of the available information. 
From the sample of interviews analysed, it appears that, when compared with the scoping 
study to the Philippines in September 2010, engagement between scientists and NGOs is 
growing.  In the context of the government scientists, this engagement is still one way, with 
few collaborative approaches to scientific hazard research involving NGOs and communities 
compared to the approaches of academic and not for profit scientific organisations (e.g. the 
Manila Observatory).  Whilst scientists are more open to sharing their information and 
engaging with NGOs, it is up to NGOs to approach scientists, but scientists (across government 
and academia) are not always easy to access owing to their resource constraints, limited 
capacity and the cost of purchasing scientific information.  The added complication when 
addressing multi-hazards is the institutional division of hazards across the government 
scientific agencies.  
In addition, there is perhaps a need for government scientists to better appreciate the role of 
communities in the ‘coproduction’ of knowledge rather than just being recipients of scientific 
information (see Landström et al., 2011).   Records of lahar events could be enhanced through 
the monitoring of the incidence of small lahars and notable changes in channels by local 
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communities.  The local government of Albay appear to recognise the role of communities in 
monitoring rain gauges and rainfall critical thresholds, however they appear to approach it 
through existing government structures (Barangay Captains) rather than necessarily engaging 
with those most vulnerable.   
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Chapter 9: Synthesis of research findings  
 
The objective of this final chapter is to synthesise the findings from parts one and two of the 
research.  The chapter begins with an overview of the research, which identifies the major 
themes that emerged.  This overview is followed by discussion of the two main components of 
the research question, which are (1) multi-hazard concepts and their assessment and (2) multi-
hazard knowledge: the role of science and community knowledge.  The wider implications of 
the research relating to the literature, policy and practice are then discussed.  The chapter 
ends with a series of conclusions and recommendations for NGO practitioners and for future 
research accompanied by a list of contributions this research has made to NGO risk reduction 
work and multi-hazard research. 
9.1 Overview of the research 
The aim of the EngD research was to determine the extent to which NGOs do and can 
implement multi-hazard assessments and whether they use science for this purpose.  Three 
research objectives were outlined in Chapter 1, the first of which was to determine a 
conceptual framework for multi-hazards (see Chapter 2), which proposes that the term multi-
hazard comprises more than one hazard and the interrelations between hazards.  In Chapters 
4 and 5, this understanding of multi-hazards was used to establish whether NGOs are adopting 
a multi-hazard approach in their community-based assessments (the second objective).  The 
findings indicated that although NGOs tend to assume their methods assess multi-hazards they 
may not account for all the hazards in a location and even less so for the interrelations 
between hazards.  This situation was owing to a number of factors discussed in Sections 9.2 
and 9.3, including a lack of integration of science, particularly amongst Head Office 
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interviewees, and constrained spatial and temporal scales of assessment.  Building on these 
findings, the third objective looked to examine the reality of multi-hazards – [particularly the 
interrelations between hazards owing to their notable absence in NGO approaches] – in the 
context of an actual case of multi-hazards (Chapter 7).  Given the emphasis on the integration 
of science throughout the research, in Chapter 8 the role of science in assessing multi-hazards 
was explored using the example of anticipating lahar hazard at Mayon Volcano.  Chapter 8 also 
build on earlier findings from Chapter 5 by further exploring the engagement between 
scientists and NGOs in the Philippines. 
In order to satisfy the aim and objectives, the research adopted an interdisciplinary approach.  
The data collection and analysis were divided into two parts, comprising a total of three 
studies, which involved mostly qualitative methods and involved a number of stakeholders 
(see Table 3.11). The purpose of the first part was to determine current approaches to hazard 
assessment across the NGO sector and whether these incorporate a multi-hazard approach.  
The second part was to explore the reality of multi-hazards and the application of community 
and scientific knowledge in anticipating these, within an actual case.  The order of studies 
reflects the progression of research from an initial exploratory approach to a more specific and 
contextualised understanding of a case, informed by the preceding studies.  The research was 
pursued in this sequence to ensure that the approaches of NGOs were at the forefront of the 
research, since they represented the partner, end-user and focus of the research.  As 
emphasised in Chapter 3, applied research was the driving philosophy behind the 
methodology.  It was advantageous to base studies B and C in the Philippines, standing its 
status as a truly multi-hazardous environment, as well as a developing country, where a 
number of NGOs work, including CAFOD at the research commencement. 
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The research was designed to explore the concept of multi-hazard and the application of multi-
hazard assessments in the context of NGO risk reduction work.  Through this analysis, three 
additional key interrelated themes emerged: multi-hazard knowledge, scale of analysis and 
anticipation of multi-hazard disasters.  Combined with the theme of multi-hazard, these 
encapsulate the four major thematic areas within the research, which are discussed within the 
following two sections: 
 in order to be anticipatory, it is necessary to adopt a multi-hazard approach; 
 multiple hazards and the interrelations between hazards were observed to emerge 
over different spatial and temporal scales; 
 in order to identify multi-hazards over these scales it is necessary to integrate  
community and scientific knowledge and expertise;  
 ensuring the inclusion of this relevant knowledge is therefore essential for the purpose 
of anticipating disasters. 
Whilst the limits of generalising from qualitative research are acknowledged (see Chapter 3), 
by synthesising the results from the three-study multi-methods research project, it is possible 
to propose wider implications of the research findings that are applicable beyond the context 
of this research.  Where possible, these findings are compared to other studies in order to 
support or challenge the findings from the research (Bazeley, 2007).  In the following 
discussions ‘Head Office interviewee(s)’ refers solely to those interviewed at NGO Head Office 
in the UK during Study A.  ‘In-country interviewee(s)’ applies to any NGO interviewee based in 
countries where their organisation is implementing projects, so this also applies to the 
Philippines participants and, therefore, Studies A and B. 
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9.2 Multi-hazard concepts and multi-hazard assessments 
Historically, policymakers have emphasised the need for a multi-hazard approach (UNEP, 1992; 
UNISDR, 2005), but there has been little exploration of the meaning of this term in the context 
of DRR and humanitarian and development NGO work.  However, in light of recent disasters 
(namely the Tōhoku earthquake-tsunami disaster), there has been growing recognition that 
DRR strategies have to be able to address the interrelations between hazards (Ashdown, 2011; 
UNISDR 2011).  The literature review identified that different terminology is often used 
interchangeably to describe these interrelations, with some terms – such as ‘interacting’ – 
causing confusion.  The research therefore has major implications for how the term multi-
hazard is defined and framed within policy directed towards practitioners, as it is widely 
recognised that practitioners often get frustrated with the academic language used within DRR 
terminology (Twigg, 2007).   
9.2.1 A conceptual framework for multi-hazards 
In this research, the framework has been informed by both literature and an actual case of 
multi-hazards.  From the review of the literature, two components of multi-hazard were 
identified: (1) more than one hazard and (2) the interrelations between hazards.  The concept 
of hazard interrelations was divided into four interdependent processes or characteristics 
(Table 9.1). 
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Table 9.1 Summary of the types of hazard interrelation identified from the literature and analysis of the 
Reming lahars case study. 
Causation Amplification or alleviation 
Hazards that generate secondary 
events, which may occur 
immediately or shortly after the 
primary hazard (including 
cascading hazards). 
Hazards that exacerbate or reduce 
future hazards (applies to the same 
or different hazards). 
Coincidence Association 
The simultaneous occurrence of 
hazards in space and/or time, 
resulting in compounding effects 
or secondary hazards. 
Hazards that increase the 
probability of a secondary event, 
but which are difficult to quantify. 
 
Each of these interrelations emerged (to varying degrees) during the analysis of the Typhoon 
Reming lahars disaster to the extent that the characteristic termed ‘amplification’ had to be 
revised to reflect the fact that previous hazards can alleviate, as well as exacerbate, the impact 
of future hazards; for example, the August 2006 lava flow shielded the provincial capital from 
the Reming lahars.  The hazard interrelations are summarised in Table 9.1. 
In the analysis of the Reming lahars, it was apparent that the location, timing and magnitude of 
the lahars were owing to the combined influence of different hazards over space and time.  
The case also demonstrated that a type of hazard (e.g. lahar) might manifest along a spectrum 
of hazards (Lee and Jones, 2004), which may have different destructive qualities but are 
perceived to be the same phenomenon by communities. This continuum of mass movement 
hazards has been observed in other cases.  For example, the transition from rock slide to 
debris avalanche to debris flow during the landslide that destroyed Barangay Guinsaugon in 
Southern Leyte (Philippines, 2006; Guthrie et al., 2009).  Debris flows often have long-run out 
distances and the result was the total inundation of Guinsaugon.  
The Reming lahars disaster emphasises that anticipation in multi-hazard settings needs to 
account for hazards occurring simultaneously or in close succession, whilst also considering 
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how hazards in the past might have exacerbated conditions for future hazards.  The disaster 
also demonstrates why it is crucial to anticipate the occurrence of secondary hazards, since the 
resulting impact was greater than the aggregation of the individual risks (Marzocchi et al., 
2009).  If the typhoon had occurred without triggering lahar, then the disaster would have 
resulted in a very low number of deaths since the majority of these were a consequence of the 
lahar.   
Non-hazardous processes, for example the migration of channels (e.g. upstream of Barangay 
Padang; see Chapter 7), also exacerbated the impact of Reming.  The links between the local 
natural environment and hazards are well recognised in the literature (Woo, 1999).  There are 
two reasons for mentioning these non-hazardous processes.  The first is because Chapter 4 
indicated that Head Office NGOs tend not to account for local environmental processes, or 
simply attribute these to the influence of climate change.  The second reason is so as to avoid 
confusion amongst practitioners regarding what constitutes a hazard interrelationship and 
what simply applies to the analysis of hazards more generally.   
Some writers consider the instances when non-hazardous processes, for example heavy 
rainfall, trigger more than one hazard in their definition of interrelated hazards (e.g. Kappes et 
al., 2012).  Essentially, this equates to coincidence in Table 9.2.  However, in the case of the 
Reming lahars, it was the fact that the lahars (and floods) were triggered during a typhoon 
(and not just heavy rainfall) that was of interest.  This distinction is important, since the 
typhoon also brought strong winds and storm surge, thus compounding the impact and 
hampering the relief efforts to reach lahar affected residents.  However, what is important to 
emphasise to practitioners is that assessing or anticipating the occurrence of hazard 
interrelations cannot be divorced from the factors that influence the occurrence of hazards 
more generally, which includes the non-hazardous processes like, in the case of mass 
movements for example, heavy rainfall and deforestation. 
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The categories in Table 9.1 are a useful means of labelling hazard interrelationships.  However, 
during the research it was apparent that a number of general aspects of hazard assessment  
require emphasis because they are perhaps not being readily accounted for in NGO hazard 
assessments.  The points listed below emphasise multiple hazards, the dynamics of hazards 
and their interrelations and are supported with examples from the case study: 
 many areas are exposed to more than one hazard (e.g. Albay); 
 one hazard might trigger a cascade (sequence) of hazards (e.g. Typhoon Reming 
triggered lahars); 
 independent hazards may occur simultaneously or in close succession and, in doing so, 
may trigger secondary hazards (e.g. the possibility of a Mayon eruption and typhoon 
occurring simultaneously); 
 the occurrence, magnitude and impact of hazards might change owing to the influence 
of previous and, possibly, different hazards that have occurred (e.g. influence of 
previous eruptions and Typhoon Milenyo prior to Reming); 
 the source of the hazard may be beyond the geographical boundary of the community 
(e.g. upstream lahar initiation); 
 unexpected hazards might be manifestations of frequently occurring hazards (e.g. in 
the case of Mayon, the Reming lahars were much larger than what was expected from 
a typhoon). 
In the Reming case study, it was also observed that previous hazards and disasters might 
influence the impact of future disasters by altering the risk perceptions of decision-makers and 
residents so that, particularly in the case of communities, they do not adequately prepare 
(Johnston et al., 1999).  Part of the problem is owing to the reliance on past experience and 
the fact that community knowledge did not account for lahars of this size during a typhoon. 
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In all three studies, the two factors that emerged as being essential to the assessment of multi-
hazards were (1) the consideration of appropriate spatial and temporal scales of analysis and 
(2) the range of knowledge utilised in the assessment.  The limited application of these 
comprises one of the main reasons why NGO practitioners are struggling to address multi-
hazards in their assessments. 
9.2.2 NGO hazard assessments: constraints on a multi-hazard approach 
In the context of NGOs, the results of the interview analysis echo the findings of the 2011 HFA 
mid-term review (Louw et al., 2011) and the Chair's Summary (2011) of the 2011 Global 
Platform for DRR, which found that practitioners are not adopting a multi-hazard approach to 
their DRR work.  The following discussion summarises the constraints upon a multi-hazard 
approach to hazard assessment by NGOs. 
There are a number of methods within PHVCAs that allow for the identification of more than 
one hazard, for example hazard mapping, time-lines, hazard prioritisation and focus group 
discussions.  The extent to which these successfully identify the range of hazards and their 
interrelations in a given place is in part reliant on the scales that are considered and the 
balance of external and internal information and knowledge.  These two considerations are 
undermined by institutional (funding), organisational (capacity) and individual (assumptions, 
biases and skills of facilitation) influences on the PHVCA design and process.    
In spite of the perception that the PHVCA tools adopt a multi-hazard approach, it was apparent 
that they are constrained by their design (selection of top three hazards) and the adoption of 
an analytical ‘lens’ (e.g. DRR and CCA).  These lenses appear to be associated with 
preconceived ideas regarding which hazard is of greatest concern and how hazards might 
change over time, the emphasis being on climate change.  The implications of these are 
significant, since NGO interviewees (in particular those at Head Office) had preconceptions 
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that climate hazards and climate change necessitate a consideration of future hazards and 
risks, whereas DRR is historical and deals with ‘known’ hazards1 (cf. Sperling and Szekely, 
2005).  However, the case of the Reming lahars demonstrated that ‘known’ hazards might 
manifest in ways unanticipated by communities (and to some extent scientists).   
The strong climate change narrative was particularly apparent during interviews with UK Head 
Office NGO participants.  In the Philippines, the influence of CCA was evident but with less 
emphasis and representatives of three agencies emphasised the local context, implying that 
climate change may not fully explain the changes in hazards being observed on the ground.    
This may have been owing to the fact that these interviewees were still determining how to 
address climate change.  However, two of the in-country interviewees from Study A also 
appeared less concerned with the labels of DRR and CCA which were deemed to come from 
‘the north’.  Furthermore, from interviews with environmental stakeholders in Moorea, French 
Polynesia, Walker et al. (2014) also found that the circumscribed CCA narrative amongst NGOs 
was a mismatch with the local perceptions and understanding of environmental change.   
The fact that NGO interviewees emphasised that their PHVCA tools adopt a multi-hazard 
approach suggests they assume that methods are neutral and will identify the full range of 
concerns; however, this assumption has been demonstrated in this and other studies to be 
questionable (e.g. Wallace, 1997; Twigg, In press).  Some Head Office NGO interviewees did 
acknowledge possible bias within the CCA narrative, as well as potential prejudices within the 
PHVCA process; for example, hazard prioritisation is based on the communities’ perception of 
hazards, which might be influenced by the seasonality of the events and the prioritised hazard 
might reflect the remit or capacity of the NGO supporting the project (cf. Bowman and White; 
2012, Twigg, In press).  A few interviewees also observed that communities were more 
                                                          
 
1
 Policy coordinator – DRR (HD INGO G) 
346 
 
concerned with their day to day problems, rather than the potential threat of future disasters, 
which was also identified during the interviews with communities affected by the Reming 
lahars: ‘the threat of hunger is more real than the threat of a lahar flow’ (Executive Director, 
Local NGO Ph3).   The analytical lenses are, therefore, partly to help constrain and manage the 
number of concerns the communities might want to consider, which may be beyond the scope 
of the funding and the capacity of the NGO (cf. Twigg and Bottomley, 2011).  It is essential, 
however, to ensure that this approach is not influenced by preconceived notions regarding the 
types and natures of different hazards, as was observed in Chapter 2.   
The challenge of ensuring the implementation of rigorous multi-hazard assessments is also 
compounded by the need to maintain a balance between analysis and action.  As emphasised 
in Chapter 2, the PHVCA process is underpinned by the philosophy of participatory action 
research, which emphasises the need for actionable results (Mercer, 2012; Peters-Guarin et 
al., 2012).  In terms of the foundations of participatory hazard assessment, Anderson and 
Woodrow (1998: 45) state that focus should be on ‘gathering the ‘right’ information quickly 
but that too often the ‘wrong’ (or unnecessary) information is gathered too slowly’.  As such, 
there is a balance between ensuring actionable results and safeguarding sufficiently objective 
and rigorous analysis.  However, there was a sense from the interviews in Chapters 4 and 5 
that the balance would sometimes shift in favour of action at the expense of thorough analysis 
of risk of multi-hazards, particularly given the urgency Head Office interviewees placed on 
addressing climate change.   There is therefore perhaps a need for NGOs to acknowledge the 
time required to implement a multi-hazard assessment. 
Head Office interviewees emphasised that their tools are flexible and some Philippines NGO 
interviewees stressed the importance of the process of PHVCA over the tools.  However, the 
emphasis on tools was apparent by the fact that the majority of NGOs in Study A had 
developed their own tools (despite them all being fairly similar) and that there was also an 
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urgency to create tools to specifically view things through a ‘climate lens’.  In Study B, staff of 
Local NGO Ph3 shared some of their experiences of attempting to adapt and adopt too many 
tools to the extent that (in the end) they did not fully understand the PHVCA process.  It was 
apparent from Chapters 4 and 5 that the success of the PHVCA process relies heavily on the 
skill of the facilitator.  In the context of multi-hazards, the onus is on the facilitator to ensure 
that the community make the connections between, for example, hazards and their 
environment.  There was little questioning, however, of whether facilitators have the 
necessary skills to make the links between hazards or whether they have the technical 
expertise to bring additional (scientific) insight (see Section 9.3). 
Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that community-based multi-hazard assessments are constrained by 
the limited spatial (community) and temporal (community memory) scales of analysis.  At the 
same time, however, during the analysis of the Reming lahars it emerged that the 
interrelations between hazards were most apparent at the community level.  For example, the 
influence of landslides upstream of the Masarawag channel and the capping of potential lahars 
by the 2006 lava flow created a varied impact of lahars across the lahar affected southern 
sector.  The channel switching upstream of Barangay Padang is not a hazard interrelationship, 
but it also emphasises the need for community assessments to consider (1) change in the 
environment over the short-term (years) and (2) the need to consider processes upstream of 
the community (Lee and Jones, 2004).  Therefore, whilst the findings from the Reming lahars 
case study support the recommendation that multi-hazard assessments should reflect NGOs’ 
requirements of a community-based approach to multi-hazard assessment (see Marzocchi et 
al.’s, 2009 and Kappes et al.’s, 2012 emphasis on end-user requirements), these analyses have 
to be situated within an understanding of the natural system.  However, the results from 
Chapter 4 indicated that, in terms of larger (e.g. national or regional) analytical scales, NGOs 
are typically concerned with socio-political systems and the wider institutional setting, rather 
than hazards and risks.  A few NGO interviewees in the UK and Philippines noted either the 
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need to include these scales of hazard and risk assessment or that they were considering 
broadening their scope to account for larger natural systems (e.g. water basins), but this was 
mostly in the context of climate change.  Furthermore, the pervasiveness of community-based 
approaches and a lack of capacity to implement larger geographical assessments mean that 
these are not widely being applied.   
Using the example of lahar hazards, the changing frequency, location and magnitude of lahar 
hazards over the short and long-term emphasises why NGOs must encourage systematic 
review of hazards and risks in terms of changes in the local environment and not just because 
of the acknowledgement that societies are dynamic (cf. Anderson and Woodrow, 1998) or 
driven by the narrative of climate change.  It was acknowledged by some Head Office 
interviewees that DRR PHVCAs have tended to focus too much on the past and have not been 
particularly anticipatory.  The absence of an anticipatory approach to all hazards (and not just 
those related to climate change) is of concern.  Head Office Interviewees suggested that 
reviewing hazard profiles over time either did not occur or was a weaker component of the 
PHVCA process.  Generally the NGO interviewees in the Philippines acknowledged more than 
interviewees at Head Office that hazards, vulnerabilities and risks change over time, but the 
noted practical challenges of ensuring communities or local government would support 
reviewing the hazard assessment questions whether such review would actually occur (see 
Chapter 5).  NGO interviewees, particularly at Head Office but also in the Philippines, were 
particularly concerned with what the future might bring and so were acknowledging the need 
to utilise climate science in order to anticipate what future threats.  The climate change 
discourse emphasises the need to address emergent and unanticipated risks (CCCD, 2009); 
however the case of the Reming lahars demonstrated that strengthening anticipation is 
required across risk reduction.  The role of both science and community knowledge in 
anticipating and assessing multi-hazard threats is explored below. 
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9.3 Multi-hazard knowledge: the role of science and community 
knowledge 
The execution of this research and its findings support the proposition that multi-hazard 
assessment requires an interdisciplinary approach (Ritchey, 2006; Tweed and Walker, 2011).  
There is also an expectation that science can assist in anticipating multi-hazard disasters 
(Ashdown, 2011).  However the assessment of hazard interrelations is not widely embedded 
within hazard science and is published within academic journals or written in scientific 
language that is not readily transferrable to a non-scientific audience (cf. Solana et al., 2008).  
A number of studies are also confined to case studies in developed countries (e.g. De Pippo et 
al., 2008; Marzocchi et al., 2009; Kappes et al., 2010, 2011), where data on past disasters tends 
to be more plentiful compared with that in developing countries (Rodolfo and Arguden, 1991).  
In these contexts, knowledge from the community is essential since it might be the only 
information available to scientists regarding the hazard context (Mercer, 2012).   
During interviews with Head Office participants, it was apparent that the inclusion of science 
was the exception, whereas it was more readily applied in the Philippines, albeit to a limited 
extent.  Lack of understanding, relevance and cost were all identified as current barriers to the 
integration of science, particularly in the Philippines.  The following discussion emphasises that 
a combination of barriers, including the perceptions and assumptions of NGOs about science 
and scientific engagement, are preventing the integration of science with community 
knowledge for the purpose of NGO assessments of hazards. 
9.3.1 Perceptions of science and community knowledge 
All the NGOs interviewed emphasised the importance of community knowledge in the PHVCA 
process owing to the emphasis on community participation and ownership (see also Twigg and 
Bottomley, 2011) and, particularly in the Philippines, the fact that the knowledge residing 
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within communities might be the only information available.  Whilst there is the opportunity 
to include outside expertise through key informant interviews or via secondary information 
(Twigg, 2004), in general Head Office interviewees noted that key informants would not tend 
to include hazard scientists.  The need for direct engagement with scientists emerged more 
strongly during the interviewees with Philippines NGO staff, however it was noted that 
scientists are unlikely to come to the community level and, as such, the NGO staff have a key 
role in resourcing and communicating science to communities.  In contrast, amongst Head 
Office NGO interviewees there was mixed opinion as to whether communities and scientists 
would directly engage, but some appeared dismissive of this level of engagement and the 
emphasis was generally on secondary information.  There appeared to be an underlying 
assumption that facilitators (e.g. NGO staff) could provide this role in their capacity as 
educators (cf. Cronin et al., 2004).  A small number of NGO interviewees at Head Office and in 
the Philippines noted that NGOs are primarily comprised of social scientists rather than natural 
scientists or hazard experts.  As such, this implies that they might not be in a position to 
provide the community with the additional information they require in order for them to 
identify and prioritise hazard risk.  However, experiences from the Philippines suggest that 
NGOs have an essential role in instigating and brokering the engagement between scientists 
and communities, as well as sourcing and translating science for use by communities.  A key 
aspect of training of facilitators and staff should therefore be the enhancement of these skills 
in order for practitioners to be able to critically evaluate the science that is available (see 
Chapter 8), which is discussed further in section 9.4.2.   
Furthermore, the results from this study suggest that NGOs are not necessarily aware of what 
science is of use to them.  The findings from Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated that there is a 
tendency to couch science solely within the context of climate change owing to the concern 
with anticipating climate change and climate risk. With limited exceptions, this tendency was 
particularly apparent amongst the Head Office NGO participants.  In practice, however, the 
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few examples of integrating climate science within PHVCA pertained more to climate 
variability (cf. Tanner and Mitchell, 2007), owing to the mismatch between the temporal and 
spatial scales of their analysis (cf. Birkmann and von Teichman, 2010).  The emphasis on 
climate change has highlighted the need for NGOs to use science, however it is also unhelpful 
because it associates science primarily with information that is not typically at the resolution 
of local communities and which is particularly complex.  Moreover, it removes the focus from 
considering the local factors that might drive environmental change and exacerbations of 
hazards and risks by assuming that these are caused by global phenomenon (cf. Walker et al., 
2014).  
Part of the problem appears owing to an uncertainty amongst NGOs regarding what science 
might be of use and, at points, a hesitancy and reluctance from Head Office interviewees to 
integrate science for fear of it removing emphasis from vulnerability and undermining the 
legitimacy of the participatory process.  Some writers have, referring specifically to 
participatory action research within DRR, acknowledged the contribution of both scientific and 
local knowledge (e.g. Cronin et al., 2004; Mercer et al., 2010; Peters-Guarin et al., 2012).  
However, the traditional discourse underpinning participatory risk assessments has tended to 
be critical of outsider perspectives, instead emphasising community knowledge (e.g. 
Chambers, 1997; Anderson and Woodrow, 1998).   
In origin, PHVCA was not designed as a substitute for scientific analysis nor as the single source 
of information, rather it was a method for communities to identify their own risks and 
solutions to alleviate those risks (Chambers, 1997; Peters-Guarin et al., 2012).  Over time, 
however, PHVCAs have come to represent the entirety of NGO hazard assessment for DRR 
projects, rather than being supported and integrated with natural science.  There is therefore a 
need to question the perceived purpose of NGO multi-hazard assessments and whether it is 
possible to have one integrated assessment that brings together natural science and local and 
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indigenous knowledge.  In the Philippines, NGO practitioners appeared to be integrating 
science to a greater extent, but were constrained by a series of practical barriers. 
9.3.2 Lessons from the Philippines 
The Philippines is a multi-hazardous country, thus the findings from the interviews conducted 
there provide essential understanding of the integration of science in the context of multi-
hazard assessments.  Given the findings of the interviews with Head Office staff in Chapter 4, it 
was surprising to discern that science was being used by NGOs in the Philippines.  15 NGO 
representatives representing 11 agencies (five international, two national and four local) 
across studies A and B discussed, to varying extents, the incorporation of science into their 
community-based hazard assessments most of them unprompted by the researcher.  Some of 
these interviewees couched science in the context of climate change, but they also spoke of its 
application in risk reduction more generally, making specific reference to comparing the 
findings from the community with scientific information during the PHVCA process.  During 
Study B, interviewees emphasised that the process should begin with the communities’ 
knowledge before comparing it with a scientific perspective.  This sequencing has been 
endorsed by others who have attempted to integrate science into participatory risk 
assessments (e.g. Cronin et al., 2004).  However, whether such sequencing allows for an 
impartial assessment of hazard, or simply endorses the hazards preselected by focusing on 
technical strategies to reduce risk, needs to be resolved.  One NGO interviewee emphasised 
that the process of integrating science should be iterative.  The fact that information and 
knowledge need to be constantly reviewed and assessed (which parallels the emphasis within 
this thesis on updating hazard assessments and hazard profiles over time) during and beyond a 
project cycle needs to be stressed (see Duncan et al., 2014).   
What was most strikingly different between the Head Office and Philippines NGO interviewees 
was that the latter did not hold the same preconceptions, hesitancy and reluctance to 
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incorporate science in the PHVCA process.  They also encouraged rather than dismissed the 
direct engagement between scientists and communities.  The Filipino interviewees instead 
referred more to the practical barriers of integrating science and implied that their reliance on 
community knowledge was partly due to the fact that there was often no scientific information 
available.  Barriers to integrating science related to accessibility (including the high cost), 
availability (its relevance and whether it is up to date) and communication.  Informal 
relationships between NGOs and scientists are generally the norm in the Philippines, 
particularly owing to the lack of resources to spend on science and a lack of scientists.  From 
the interviews, and more particularly from the informal meetings and participant observations, 
it emerged that there is contention over the source of science, particularly whether it is from 
the official government source or from academia or non-profit research groups.  It was, 
however, noted by NGOs that the government scientists have limited capacity at the local 
level, so there is a need to engage with other scientific groups.  From the small sample of 
scientists interviewed, there appeared some concern amongst government scientists as to the 
trustworthiness and credibility of non-government science, whilst both an NGO representative 
and an academic queried the credibility of government landslide assessments.  Three 
government scientists also noted some negative experiences of working with NGOs, of which 
the majority appeared to be international NGOs.  Further research is required to determine 
whether one scientific group is more generally utilised by NGOs than the other and to further 
ascertain the perspectives of scientists regarding engaging with NGOs.  
A further notable lesson from the Philippines studies relates to recent emphasis on using 
science to anticipate disasters (see Ashdown, 2011).  The analysis of the Reming lahars 
provided the opportunity to explore this assertion in the context of a multi-hazard disaster.  
The three components of the anticipation of geophysical hazards are location, timing and 
severity (Rees et al., 2012).  Lahars are a persistent threat at Mayon, but it was the magnitude 
of the lahars that was most surprising.  The Typhoon Reming lahars disaster emphasised that 
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these are interdependent components since the lahars were a low-frequency high-magnitude 
event that, consequently, inundated some areas not regularly affected by lahars.  Some 
affected communities had no memory of lahars (e.g. Barangays Binitayan and Tagas2), which 
emphasises that community knowledge was insufficient for the purpose of anticipating this 
event.  The disaster also challenged the assumption that NGOs can provide additional 
information to communities that ‘they’ve just not had the opportunity to get informed about’ 
(Policy Advisor – Climate Change, Development NGO) because the NGOs had also not 
appreciated the fact that a typhoon could bring lahars as large as those that occurred during 
Reming.   However, the scientists were also surprised by this event, despite having previously 
identified most of the areas that were impacted as being prone to lahar in their 2000 hazard 
map (Figure 7.14; Chapter 7).  PHIVOLCS scientists and one member of the local government 
felt that the problem was owing to a lack of communication of the forecast and real-time 
rainfall that fell during Reming, which meant that they were not anticipating lahars of that 
magnitude.  The problem was compounded by the fact that it was underdetermined which 
technical agency should be responsible for typhoon triggered post-eruption lahars, since they 
fall into the category of both volcanic and weather-related hazards.  Furthermore, the worst-
case scenario, which was utilised by the local government at the time, was an underestimation 
of the Reming event.  Similarly, the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake multi-hazard disaster was much 
larger than the worst officially expected scenario in that area (Marzocchi et al., 2012b).    Both 
these disasters emphasise the importance of anticipating cascading hazards and the need to 
ensure that the magnitude of these events is sufficiently accounted for.  Therefore, whilst it is 
essential to integrate science for the purpose of multi-hazard assessment, it is also important 
for NGOs to be aware of its limitations and where it needs to be enhanced. 
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The evaluation of lahar hazard assessments in Chapter 8 demonstrated why it is important for 
NGOs to evaluate the available science and not just accept it.  Information pertaining to the 
critical rainfall threshold was derived from interviews with scientists and local government and 
then compared with the available data.  The findings suggest that the applicability of critical 
rainfall intensity thresholds in dynamic volcanic environments needs further investigation, 
particularly the high value of the rainfall threshold and the influence of previous eruptions on 
this threshold value.  It is acknowledged that the findings from the analysis are limited by the 
lack of representative rainfall data and information regarding the timing and magnitude of 
previous lahars, which emphasises the need for further studies.  The absence of representative 
data also emphasises why science integration may rely on direct engagement with scientists 
based on their expertise, rather than readily available information.  
The evaluation of the lahar hazard map identified two concerns.  The first related to the 
difficulty of communicating lahar hazard based on a long-term map; fundamentally the map is 
not incorrect, it simply cannot reflect the short- to medium-term changes in lahar hazard that 
might affect communities, which were observed to have occurred between the production of 
2000 lahar map and the occurrence of the Typhoon Reming lahars in 2006.  The second 
concern relates to the existence of more than one map of the same phenomenon, but with 
different results.  Non-scientists must be able to initially interpret these maps but also be 
aware of the analysis behind them in order to determine which one is most credible.  In the 
context of the PHIVOLCS map (Figure 8.1; Chapter 8) this might be challenging since the lahar 
hazard zones are not accompanied by any explanation and it appears up to the user to 
interpret the map (cf. Haynes et al., 2007). 
What appears weakest, and was also a notable problem during Typhoon Reming, is the 
anticipation of lahar magnitudes.  In acknowledging the limited data for lahar analysis at 
Mayon, it might not be possible to predict or determine the probability of every outcome so 
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emphasis should be on identifying the circumstances that limit or encourage future 
possibilities, an idea emphasised in systems thinking (see Allen, 1988; Gunderson and Holling, 
2002; Tweed and Walker, 2011).  A recommendation for future research on Mayon lahars is to 
explore the possibility of critical rainfall intensity thresholds that reflect the potential size of 
the lahar that might be triggered, whilst at the same time managing the expectations of what 
science can deliver.   
Many of the influences of previous hazards and disasters (e.g. increased siltation from 
Typhoon Milenyo) were undoubtedly easier to identify after the Reming disaster (cf. Tweed 
and Walker, 2011). The difficulty of mapping lahar hazard in a dynamic environment like 
Mayon highlights an opportunity for engagement between communities and scientists.  
Systematic monitoring of lahars by local communities could help to enhance the lahar 
database and observations of changes in the environment could inform scientists of increased 
levels of risk.  Other opportunities for engagement between communities and scientists and 
the integration of their knowledge are discussed below. 
Opportunities for integrating science and local knowledge 
In Chapters 4 and 5, it was emphasised that community are aware of their situation, but they 
need assistance in interpreting and making links, for example, between changes in their 
environment and their hazard profile.  Facilitators in the PHVCA process were identified as 
providing that assistance, but in the Philippines it was also identified that scientists can 
similarly help to interpret the observations being made by communities and provide insight 
beyond what the NGOs can provide.  In the context of the Philippines, three opportunities for 
integrating science with information or knowledge from local communities were observed: 
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(1) community information and scientific data (e.g. eye witness accounts of the Reming 
lahars compared with rainfall collected at the PAGASA rain gauge (PHIVOLCS, 2006a; 
Orense and Ikeda, 2007)); 
(2) community information and scientific information (e.g. NGO interviewees described 
comparing the PHVCA findings with scientific hazard maps); 
(3) community information and scientific knowledge (e.g. observations of heightened 
occurrence of lahar in Barangay Padang were interpreted by scientists as increased risk 
to Padang, albeit retrospectively; PHIVOLCS, 2007a). 
NGO interviewees noted that communities can provide the detailed information relating to 
their hazards and the scientists provide the interpretation and explanation for the phenomena 
communities are experiencing.  Information and observations from communities could be 
enhanced through more systematic means of monitoring phenomena (e.g. the community-
based rain gauge programme at Mayon).  Monitoring of lahars by communities needs to be 
managed and informed, as there have been instances at other volcanoes where these types of 
engagement have not worked well.  For example, communities at Santa Ana (Ilamatepec) 
Volcano in El Salvador criticised the local NGO’s selection of lahar observers, on the grounds 
that that their homes were too far down slope (Bowman and White, 2012).  This emphasises 
that if NGOs want to encourage monitoring and observation by communities, they need to 
ensure that they are sufficiently informed of the most appropriate approach. 
NGO interviewees emphasised that communities know their situation best and, in the 
Philippines, it was particularly emphasised that scientists need information from the 
communities (cf. Anderson and Woodrow, 1998), owing to a lack of scientific monitoring in 
certain areas.  Furthermore, from the observations made of scientists speaking during events 
attended by the researcher (see Appendix A) and from their descriptions of the types of public 
engagement they are involved in (e.g. IECs), it appears the engagement between scientists, 
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NGOs and communities is typically one way, driven by top-down science.  Across the 
interviewees, it was emphasised that, with assistance, communities can interpret the 
phenomenon they are experiencing.  Perhaps, therefore, there is an opportunity to adopt a 
more collaborative approach encompassing a fourth type of engagement: (4) ‘community 
knowledge and scientific knowledge’ and an emphasis on the co-production of knowledge (e.g. 
Landström et al., 2011).  
The integration of community and scientific knowledge presents an opportunity to assess 
multi-hazards, however there are a number of barriers that need to be overcome in order to 
utilise scientific information and expertise.  The findings from the research have important 
implications relating to DRR and current policy for science integration. 
9.4 Implications for policy and practice 
Since the research commenced, there has been growing emphasis in the DRR discourse on the 
need to adopt an all risks approach, coupled with concern over the growing complexity of 
disasters and the need to consider ‘simultaneous’, ‘sequential’ and ‘synchronous’ events 
(UNISDR, 2011).  These recommendations are accompanied with advocacy for the utilisation of 
science for risk assessments and anticipating disasters (Ashdown, 2011; UKCDS, 2013; 
Southgate et al., 2013).   The following discussion is, therefore, divided into two parts; the first 
part addresses DRR practice and policy and the second relates to knowledge transfer and 
academic partnerships.   
9.4.1 Disaster risk reduction policy and practice 
Whilst the research had a largely practical focus, the research conclusion comes at a critical 
time for DRR policy.  In March 2015, the UNISDR will launch their post-2015 framework for 
DRR, which will replace the HFA.  At the same time, the post-2015 sustainable development 
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agenda and climate change agreement are being finalised and there is great emphasis on the 
synergies and complementary overlaps across these agreements (UNISDR, 2014b).  The new 
DRR framework is likely to greatly emphasis the integration of DRR and CCA (UNISDR 2013, 
2014b).  However, the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that, in spite of existing ideological 
moves to more integrated approaches, there appears a dominance of climate change, which is 
maintained by assumptions regarding the nature of hazards and risks and the role of science in 
assessing them.  CCA is deemed to be more anticipatory (concerned with future, unknown, 
threats; cf. Venton and LaTrobe, 2008; McBean and Ajbade, 2009), more scientific and (at 
times) more urgent than the hazards traditionally associated with DRR.  In spite of a literature 
supporting the need for (at least partial) integration (see Chapter 2), practical implementation 
is more divided, except in the case of those in-country interviewees who felt that these were 
one and the same.  These findings have major implications for the successful implementation 
of a multi-hazard approach since assumptions are being made prior to analysis regarding the 
relative threat of different hazards.  Furthermore, it highlights the discrepancies between 
NGOs in developed countries and those they fund (cf. Thompson, 2012), since it is actually 
those on the ground in this research who appear less driven by climate change discourse and 
more aware of the need to integrate science across hazard assessments than those in Head 
Office.  This finding emphasises the importance of activities on the ground informing policy. 
The fact that DRR is perceived by some NGO interviewees to be less anticipatory than CCA 
illustrates why an integrated approach is so critical.  The Typhoon Reming lahars disaster 
demonstrated dramatically the need for greater anticipation of multi-hazard disasters related 
to both climate and geophysical hazards.  The research has thus emphasised that approaches 
which account for all hazards and their interrelations are essential for the purposes of reducing 
risk.  The absence of a true multi-hazard approach within NGO hazard assessments is, 
therefore, a matter of concern and questions whether NGOs are succeeding to adopt an 
accountable and ‘do not harm’ approach to their community-based DRR (cf. Benson et al, 
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2001).  Placing emphasis on one hazard at the expense of another may inadvertently create 
vulnerability within communities.   
What is also troubling is that recent updates regarding the post-2015 framework have made 
no reference to the term multi-hazard (UNISDR 2013, 2014b).  This is in contrast to the HFA, 
within which it was noted that ‘an integrated multi-hazard approach to disaster risk reduction 
should be factored into policies, planning and programming’ (UNISDR, 2005: 4).  The concern is 
that there is an assumption at the UNISDR that the multi-hazard problem has been 
satisfactorily addressed.  The evidence presented here would counter this and recommend 
that policy makers and DRR practitioners advocate the importance of a multi-hazard approach 
(see UKCDS, 2013), whilst also providing guidance within the post-2015 framework as to what 
such an approach entails.   
The HFA included risk assessment as a key priority for DRR and the UNISDR argue that 
significant progress has been made in risk assessment (UNISDR, 2014b).  In contrast, the 
research presented here and the findings of others (e.g. Louw, et al. 2011; Shepard et al., 
2013; UKCDS, 2013) suggest that more needs to be done to improve the quality and coverage 
of hazard and risk assessments, particularly ensuring that these adopt a multi-hazard approach 
(UKCDS, 2013).  Two methods by which a greater emphasis on multi-hazards could be achieved 
are (1) emphasising its importance in the integration of DRR and CCA and (2) linking it with the 
notable emphasis on resilience within these draft frameworks. 
The theory and application of resilience has grown in importance in recent years (e.g. 
Ashdown, 2012; Mitchell and Harris, 2012; Alexander, 2013; Turnball et al., 2013).  Whilst the 
definition of resilience is contested (see Chapter 2), it has been likened with many aspects 
which also relate to the study and assessment of multi-hazards: 
 dynamic systems (i.e. that risks and hazards are dynamic); 
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 the interconnectivity of systems (e.g. Walker and Salt, 2006); 
 the need for interdisciplinary knowledge, including science (e.g. Bahadur et al., 2010; 
Interagency Resilience Working Group, 2012; Southgate et al., 2013); 
 anticipating change and disasters (e.g. Bahadur et al., 2010; Ashdown, 2011; 
Interagency Resilience Working Group, 2012). 
Resilience is proposed as a key component in the post-2015 framework for DRR (UNISDR, 
2013).  Thus, there is an opportunity to re-emphasise the need for a multi-hazard approach in 
all aspects of DRR, but particularly risk assessment and anticipation. 
The research addresses the multi-hazard problem in the context of a key stakeholder group 
(NGOs) who have not been included to any significant extent in, or contributed to, the 
discourse regarding multi-hazards and their assessment.  In Chapter 2, it was highlighted that 
NGOs have been increasingly recognised as key actors in efforts to alleviate poverty and 
reduce risk.  If the role of NGOs in DRR is truly recognised by international and local 
governments and donors (cf. Jennings and Barrow, 2001), then DRR policy-makers must 
acknowledge the limited capacity within these agencies to implement some of the associated 
recommendations, including the integration of science.  The UNISDR recognise the need to 
‘strengthen the technical and scientific capacity’ at the national and local level (UNISDR, 
2014b); however whether efforts to strengthen this capacity are to be directed at NGOs (and 
not just presumably government) is not stated.  The recent advocacy in DRR policy for more 
scientifically informed risk assessments for anticipating disasters presents an opportunity to 
encourage greater integration of science within NGOs; but, ensuring this policy is put into 
practice requires addressing the barriers to, and shortfalls in, integrating science into NGO DRR 
work identified in this thesis.   
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9.4.2 Knowledge transfer and NGO-academic partnerships 
The implications of the research findings in the context of knowledge transfer and NGO-
academic partnerships are drawn from both the research findings as well as the reflexive 
position of the researcher.  The research process embodied knowledge transfer (between the 
researcher and NGO partner) as well as an academic-NGO partnership.   
The post-2015 framework for DRR is likely to emphasis the role of science within DRR.  The 
UNISDR (2014: 12) emphasise that ‘the scientific and technical committee should be revitalized 
as an international science advocacy mechanism…to [amongst other things] promote and 
support the availability and application of science to decision-makers’.  The variable levels of 
scientific understanding amongst non-scientist decision-makers is widely recognised (Martí et 
al., 2008; Solana et al., 2008) and, using the example of NGOs, the knowledge transfer 
approach being advocated by the UNISDR is hindered by a number of barriers.  Furthermore, 
given the recognised need for an interdisciplinary approach to addressing multi-hazards, there 
is a need to question what is currently achievable within the humanitarian and development 
sector, given the constraints identified in this research. 
In the ‘pre-zero’ post-2015 framework draft, academia and research are encouraged to:   
focus on the evolving nature of risk and scenarios in the medium and long terms; increase 
research for local application and support to local communities and authorities’ action; and 
support the interface policy-science for effective decision making (UNISDR, 2014b: 14). 
Anticipating the aforementioned scenarios requires a multi-hazard approach, but this thesis 
has demonstrated that NGOs do not always adopt this approach or long-term perspectives, 
which emphasises the need for partnerships with academia and research institutions.  
Furthermore, the implication is that academia and research institutions should work with 
NGOs in order to reach ‘local communities’, since NGOs work closely with them.  Lastly, the 
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research has highlighted the absence of practical guidance alongside multi-hazards and science 
policy for practitioners, which is addressed in the following section.    
The partnership with CAFOD was based on an existing interest in science from the CCA and 
DRR.  The results in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that NGOs do value this type of engagement, but 
that there are both practical barriers and, particularly at the Head Office level, ideological 
barriers, such as the perception that DRR is a more practical, less scientific approach than CCA, 
that have to be overcome. 
Changing attitudes and providing guidance for science integration  
In his review of science and technology for disaster risk reduction, Basher (2013: 3) argues:  
that policy makers and the disaster risk reduction community will readily accept scientific and 
technical information when it is understandable, relevant to the interest of those involved and 
affordable…However, achieving this in practice can be difficult where political processes and 
decision-making are influenced by interest groups that do not share these values and priorities. 
Reflecting on both the findings from the interviews in Chapter 4, along with the researcher’s 
experience of participating in the sector, the research is in agreement with Basher’s statement 
that science needs to be accessible, relevant and affordable; but the findings also suggest that 
science will not necessarily be adopted in practice, even if these conditions are met (cf. 
Fischer, 2000).  Amongst the Head Office interviewees in particular, misconceptions about the 
role of science, as well as the emphasis on community knowledge and the concern that science 
(and hazard) will overshadow vulnerability, suggests that more needs to be done to encourage 
the uptake of science.  This relates to the sociological analysis of public understanding of 
science briefly reviewed in Chapter 2, where science might be consciously ignored because it is 
perceived to be peripheral (Irwin and Michael, 2003).  Furthermore, many NGO interviewees 
emphasised that the community know their situation best, therefore it is questionable 
whether NGO practitioners truly perceive a need to integrate other sources of knowledge and 
information.  Lastly, the fact that practitioners tend to link science with climate change is a key 
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finding for policy makers and knowledge transfer researchers, since it emphasises the 
importance of ensuring science is effectively communicated and understood. 
In spite of the concern that attitudes may not be easily to changed, since commencement of 
this research, there has been increasing interest from both the academic and NGO sector for 
better integration of science (e.g. Green, 2013).  For instance, in June 2012 the researcher 
participated in the Interagency Resilience Working Group workshop on integrating science, 
participants of which included the technical advisors of many UK based international NGOs 
(see Appendix J).  The feedback survey requested that participants share their opinions of the 
‘three core barriers to assessing multi-hazards’.  Ten workshop participants answered this 
question and, in spite of the small sample size, these answers support some of the findings of 
the research (see Figure 9.1).  The emphasis on knowledge, and particularly science, as well as 
the admission of the lack of multi-hazard approaches within agencies and capacity to 
undertake these, reflects the need to provide guidance and resources for addressing these 
needs.   The examples of scientific engagement shared in Chapters 4 and 5 pertained more to 
the initiative of individuals to integrate science rather than a decision at the organisation level 
that scientific integration was required, which emphasises why it is important that the 
technical advisors quoted in Figure 9.1 are recognising lack of scientific capacity as a barrier to 
multi-hazard assessments.  This reflexive stance was not generally adopted during the 
interviews with similar Head Office staff in Chapter 4, perhaps implying a shifting attitude to 
awareness of a lack of science within hazard assessments.   
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Figure 9.1 Summary of the barriers identified by ten participants of the Interagency Resilience Working Group workshop in June 2010.  The original answers can be 
observed in Appendix J. 
0 1 2 3
Resources
Low capacity to do multi-hazard assessments
Lack of capacity to access, interpret and utilise and integrate science
Scientific information is too general
Silo of knowledge and expertise
Destruction of local knowledge
Political will and governance
Complexity
Not a priority
Reactive approach of NGOs/focus on most recent event
Short-term/most salient risk community-driven approach
Single-hazard approach
Number of times mentioned 
Core barriers to assessing multi-hazards identified by workshop participants 
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In order to address the short-fall in guidance regarding the integration of science, this EngD 
research was used to inform a set of guidelines for the integration of science in humanitarian 
and development planning and practice for NGO practitioners (see Duncan et al., 2014).  The 
aim of these guidelines is to enable practitioners to ask the questions that will ultimately help 
them to apply science in their planning and operational decision-making (a copy of the 
guidelines is available in Appendix K).   
The guidelines address a number of concerns related to science integration identified in this 
research, including the conceptualisation and understanding of science, access to and 
availability of science and how to determine the credibility of scientific information.  The 
document emphasises the importance of multi-stakeholder co-production of knowledge, the 
need to build scientific capacity within NGOs, the importance of partnering with scientific 
agencies in advance of crises and how to overcome certain pitfalls practitioners face when 
integrating science into their activities.  The guidelines could therefore arguably be used to 
increase professionalism within NGOs (cf. Benson et al., 2001). 
The document illustrates that integrating science requires an iterative and flexible approach, 
thereby ensuring that the inclusion of science does not serve to simply support predefined 
outcomes (a concern noted in Chapter 5).  There are five key components, which may have to 
be revisited several times over the course of a project or engagement (see Figure 9.2).  Given 
the emphasis on the skills of the facilitator in participatory approaches to community-based 
hazard assessment, the guidelines provide to facilitators a basis from which to consider science 
within community-based hazard assessments. 
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Figure 9.2 The five components of integrating science addressed in the guidelines.  Source: Duncan et al. 
(2014; fig. 3: 5). 
 
The research found a slight preoccupation amongst Head Office NGOs with the development 
of toolkits for implementing their work.  Therefore the guidelines are classed as a ‘toolkit’ and 
are not designed to be exhaustive.  Instead, they embody a key methodological 
recommendation from this research: it is not possible to design a tool to fully address the 
problem of multi-hazard assessments, since the problem relates to wider concerns regarding 
the lack of scientific engagement and perceptions of DRR and CCA amongst individuals and 
organisations.  The guidelines serve as an initial step in addressing scientific integration across 
DRR and CCA.  
The guidelines are a useful document for both those who have made the decision to engage 
with science and those who are yet to be convinced, since it justifies why science might be of 
use and emphasises the importance of evaluating the impact of science.  Whilst the impact of 
science is beyond the scope of the EngD research, it emerged in the context of practitioner’s 
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concern that their work (as opposed to scientists’) assists those in poverty and that they need 
to justify, for example to management, why they should invest in science.  
The research reflects the challenges from the perspective of NGOs, but it also identified some 
barriers facing scientists and academics looking to engage with NGOs (see Chapter 8).  In the 
context of interdisciplinary multi-hazard research, the challenge of integrating science is 
attributable in part owing to the traditional reductionist approaches to scientific endeavour 
(Chambers, 1997), which was partly echoed in the institutional approaches to addressing 
different hazards in the Philippines.  Definitions of science within risk reduction are shifting to 
compensate this (e.g. ICSU, 2008; UNISDR, 2009c) and the need for application of science is 
being emphasised (e.g. Southgate et al., 2013; UNISDR, 2014b).   However, Irwin and Michael 
(2003: 37) note that those scientists who engage in ‘causes’ run the risk of abandoning their 
identities as ‘proper scientists’.  The challenge of the EngD was balancing the need to deliver 
academic rigour against ensuring usable outputs for CAFOD and the wider NGO sector, most of 
whom do not traditionally undertake substantial long-term research projects.  The researcher 
had to gain acceptance from both academics and NGOs, who have different concerns and 
expectations.  
9.4.3 Reflections on the interdisciplinary and NGO-academic partnership-based 
approach 
Being critical of a sector that also represents a research partner was always going to be 
challenging (see Mercer, 2006), but a necessary means of ensuring the implementation of 
rigorous research.  The fortunate position of being in the partnership with CAFOD meant that 
the researcher had access to the wider NGO sector and was thus able to evaluate its methods 
generally.  The research therefore embodies findings from across the sector, rather than a 
critique of individual agencies.   
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The research addressed the need presented by CAFOD, which was to explore the method of 
multi-hazard assessment.  However, after the commencement of the project, it quickly 
emerged that this need was driven by a concern within individuals at CAFOD as to the lack of 
scientific appraisal of their work.  As a result, the research required adaptation to address both 
these concerns.     
Conducting research within a dynamic sector was insightful.  At project commencement, 
CAFOD were one of the few UK based NGOs investing in scientific enquiry.  However, during 
the research the policy and institutional arena began advocating the utility of science for DRR, 
as well as the need for NGOs to underpin their work with evidence (Green, 2013).  There were 
two levels to the EngD research endeavour: the first was the topic of research (multi-hazards) 
and the second was the context of the research (the changing context of the NGO sector).  The 
EngD research was therefore situated within the partnership, the trends that emerge within 
the humanitarian and development sector and the overarching paradigms of risk reduction.    
It was challenging to keep abreast of these changes and also not to be swayed by the trends 
within the sector.  Above all, the emphasis was on maintaining a balance between academic 
research and practical application, which in a sense echoes the difficult balance PHVCA 
facilitators have to maintain between multi-hazard analysis and action (see Section 9.2.2).  
Conducting research with NGOs as subjects, end users and partners allowed for the unique 
opportunity to have both an ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ perspective into NGOs; but it also 
highlighted the need to ensure that expectations of the NGO, the university and the student 
reflect what is achievable in this type of engagement (see Roper, 2002).  Initially the research 
was solution-driven rather than analysis-driven, with the initial focus on multi-hazard 
assessment tools for implementation at the community level, but without prior questioning of 
what a multi-hazard approach to assessment really entailed. However, due to good 
communication between the partners, it was soon agreed that the project had to address the 
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problem rather than solely focus on the solution.  These experiences have implications for 
future NGO-academic partnership based doctoral research.  
9.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
The thesis has explored the concept of multi-hazards, their assessment by NGOs and the 
application of community and scientific knowledge in the context of a multi-hazard disaster 
case study.  An overarching message from the research is that humanitarian actors can only 
achieve an anticipatory approach to DRR if they consider the multi-hazard context of their 
operations.  Considering multi-hazards requires scientific as well as community knowledge and 
the analysis of hazard interrelations over different spatial and temporal scales.  Consequently, 
the concluding points are structured around the three main concerns.  These are followed by 
recommendations for future research and NGO practitioners and a summary of the main 
thesis contributions. 
9.5.1 The characteristics of multi-hazards and their assessment 
In spite of the fact that multi-hazard approaches have been emphasised within development, 
environmental and DRR literature for several decades, there lacks clear guidance on what such 
an approach entails.  The conceptual framework for multi-hazards presented in the thesis 
provides agencies with the means of adopting a ‘multi-hazard lens’ to their analysis.    
Multi-hazard assessments necessitate the consideration of more than one hazard but also the 
interrelations between hazards.  At present there is a lack of widely agreed terminology to 
describe these interrelations, but for the purpose of this research they are considered as four 
interdependent processes: amplification, association, causation and coincidence.   
Of importance is the consideration of how hazards over different spatial and temporal scales 
are interrelated and consequently cause or exacerbate future hazards.  The case study of the 
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Typhoon Reming lahars emphasises the need to anticipate, prepare for and respond to the 
simultaneous occurrence of different hazards, whilst also determining how previous hazards 
might have amplified or reduced the location, timing and severity of the anticipated event.     
9.5.2 Current NGO approaches to multi-hazard assessment 
NGOs assume their toolkits address multi-hazards.  In reality, the extent to which multi-
hazards are incorporated is constrained by preconceived ideas about risk, the capacity of NGOs 
and communities to address these different hazards and the emphasis on community 
knowledge at the expense of the entire range of knowledge (including scientific) required for 
multi-hazard analysis.  Moreover, current methods focus more on multiple hazards than the 
interrelations between hazards.   
There is a need for NGOs to recognise that multi-hazards cannot be assessed by adopting a 
single-lens (e.g. DRR), a single methodology (PHVCA) or a single source of expertise 
(communities).  Rather than developing a tool, the emphasis should be on ensuring that those 
facilitating the process of assessment have the skills and training to identify multi-hazards and 
the information and expertise that could assist in the assessment of these hazards.     
9.5.3 Factors constraining a multi-hazard approach: knowledge and scale 
The research demonstrated that the two major determinants of multi-hazard assessment are 
knowledge and scale.  It is only through the consideration of scales beyond the level of 
communities (both temporally and spatially) and the inclusion of multi-stakeholder knowledge 
(beyond the community and NGO) that multiple hazards and their interrelations can be 
assessed and anticipated.    
The identification of the interrelations between hazards necessitates the consideration of 
hazards over different spatial and temporal scales (Kappes et al., 2011).  There was a tendency 
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amongst Head Office interviewees in particular to consider future and dynamic risk solely in 
the context of climate change, with other (‘DRR’) hazards perceived to be ‘known’.  The 
Typhoon Reming lahars disaster emphasises that consideration of emergent and unanticipated 
hazards and risks must go beyond climate change.  In the case of the Reming lahars, the 
disaster represented an unexpected manifestation and magnitude of a known hazard, which 
emphasises the importance of scenario planning and DRR strategies that adopt a multi-hazard 
approach and account for all three components of anticipation: location, timing and severity 
(see Rees et al., 2012).  The frequently changing environment and levels of risk from lahars at 
Mayon also serves to emphasise why it is essential that NGO practitioners encourage 
communities to periodically review their risk and that scientists and communities collaborate 
in order to stay abreast of these changes and their implications for risk.  
Despite greater integration of science by NGOs in the Philippines, there are a number of 
perceived and real barriers to the integration of science by NGOs and, as a consequence, to 
the successful implementation of a multi-hazard approach.  At the same time, the evaluation 
of lahar hazard assessment at Mayon demonstrates that the available science might not 
always be communicated, understood or provide the level of information required to fully 
anticipate multi-hazard disasters.  If NGOs are serious about adopting a multi-hazard 
approach, they need the skills to evaluate the appropriateness of the science they choose to 
integrate or assistance from someone who does.  Furthermore, owing to the uncertainty 
surrounding the assessment of hazards and the degree of expert judgement that might be 
required in making these assessments (e.g. Mayon lahar hazard map), it may be necessary to 
directly consult with the scientist regarding the level of risk rather than simply accept the 
available information. 
Given the findings of the research, the growing policy on the utility of science needs to 
acknowledge that (1) NGOs might be users of science and (2) that they might not yet be 
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sufficiently capacitated to begin utilising it.  Given the lack of capacity, these policy statements 
need to be accompanied by practical guidance, particularly to address the gap regarding the 
uncertainty of what science to use and how to use (e.g. Duncan et al., 2014; Appendix K). 
9.5.4 Recommendations for future research  
Interdisciplinary research was a necessary means of addressing the topic of research, but it 
was challenging to address the breadth of the problem within the constraints of the time and 
resources allocated to doctoral research.  The scope of research question allowed the study to 
address the context of the end-user (NGOs) and the concept of multi-hazards and the reality of 
their assessment.  On reflection, both of these comprised a research project in itself.  However 
it was necessary to address both owing to a relative lack of literature regarding each of these 
at the time of project commencement.  Consequently, this research has provided the first step 
in the field of NGO related multi-hazard research and application.  A suggestion for future 
research would be to address the context of NGO multi-hazard assessments and the study of 
multi-hazards within separate research projects by building on the analysis contained here.    
The case study was selected on the grounds that it would help inform the developing theory of 
multi-hazards, rather than necessarily confirm it.  The researcher therefore recommends that 
future research looks to other cases in order to build case understanding in this field.  Given 
that practitioners in the Philippines are particularly engaging with science, it would be of 
benefit to explore cases outside of the Philippines, but still in developing countries, to build on 
the limited number of interrelated hazard case studies in this context. 
Only a small number of scientists were consulted in this research with regard to their 
engagement with NGOs so future research should look to explore some of the initial findings 
from this research, such as the dominance of top-down science and some of the negative 
experiences of their working with NGOs.  Related to this is the need to address in more depth 
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the power struggles between scientific groups and whether NGOs are more able to access 
science from certain sources rather than others.   
Specific to the research endeavour, areas for improvement include sourcing a dedicated 
translator for community interviews.  Furthermore, with hindsight, longer engagement with 
some of the DRR stakeholders would have been beneficial because they required more time to 
build up a relationship with the researcher before sharing critical information. 
Finally, the focus of this research has been on the ‘hazard’ element of the risk equation.  As a 
consequence, future research should look to incorporate the analysis of hazard interrelations 
within vulnerability and risk analysis. 
9.5.5 Recommendations for NGO practitioners 
Throughout the thesis, but particularly within this final chapter, a number of recommendations 
for NGOs have been emphasised.  Here, they are re-emphasised for clarity. 
Whilst it is acknowledged that NGOs work in challenging environments and under the 
constraints of institutional funding, there are a number of ways in which they can begin to 
address some of the practical concerns regarding multi-hazard assessments.   NGOs need to 
increase their engagement with scientists, but also their own ability to identify what science is 
of use and to critically evaluate its suitability.  Some of the greatest initiatives regarding the 
assessment of multi-hazards and the utilisation of science for this purpose were observed to 
be attributable to key individuals in agencies.  This emphasises the need for agencies to 
employ people with the appropriate skills and the ability to recognise when external assistance 
is required.  It should also be acknowledged that accessing science and scientific information 
may require funding.  However, in the absence of the availability of scientific monitoring, 
communities can have a key role in observing and recording environment change, hazards and 
disasters.  This information can be interpreted together with scientists in order to determine 
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current and changing hazard profiles.  Implementing means of systematically recording this 
information will strengthen baselines of hazard information.   
There is a need for hazard assessments to better incorporate the visualisation of hazards and 
risk over space and time to help identify multi-hazards.  Assessments should emphasise the 
dynamic nature of hazards, that past events are not always an indication of the future and that 
there is a need to review and reassess hazard risk overtime. 
Although it is acknowledged that these are in part driven by institutional funding, there is a 
need to remove the circumscribed analytical lenses (e.g. CCA), since these appear to limit the 
analysis of multi-hazards.  This is not to suggest that climate change is not considered, but 
instead that it is considered alongside the wider hazard and risk profile of communities.  It is 
recommended that NGOs utilise the recent emphasis on resilience as a means of re-
emphasising and highlighting to donors the facets of a multi-hazard approach and the support 
agencies need in order to sufficiently anticipate multi-hazard disasters.  The Post-2015 
Framework for DRR could also be an opportunity to emphasise this message.  
9.5.6 Thesis contributions 
A number of findings from this research are of application to the humanitarian and 
development sector and multi-hazard research.  In addition to providing the basis for further 
analysis of the field, the thesis has made several key contributions to the academic and 
practitioner sectors.  Firstly, the research has addressed the absence of a conceptual 
framework for understanding multi-hazards for the humanitarian and development NGO 
sector.  The case of the Typhoon Reming lahars has contributed to this and the wider academic 
understanding of interrelated hazards.  Evidence has also been provided, primarily from 
interviews with UK Head Office NGO staff and international, national and local NGOs in the 
Philippines that both supports and challenges the assumption that NGOs are not utilising 
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science for the purposes of hazard assessment.  The research has also encompassed the first 
academic critical evaluation of NGO (multi-)hazards assessments and the utilisation of science 
for this purpose.   As mentioned earlier, the research has been instrumental in informing a set 
of guidelines for NGO practitioners on how to integrate science into their work (see Duncan et 
al., 2014; Appendix K).  These guidelines, entitled ‘integrating science into humanitarian and 
development planning and practice for enhancing community resilience’, have addressed the 
gap in the advocacy for greater use of science that is unaccompanied by guidance for NGO 
practitioners.  Although designed for NGO practitioners, the guidelines have practical 
application for other decision-makers.   
In the context of the science of multi-hazards, the research has contributed to the 
understanding of rainfall triggered lahars at Mayon, involving the creation of a lahar database 
of the last 34 years of lahars.   Finally, the research has led to collaborations with other multi-
hazard researchers, resulting in the facilitation and co-organisation and running of the first 
workshop on interacting natural hazards, which was held in February 2014 at University 
College London (see Budimir et al., 2013). 
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Appendix A: Events attended during the EngD as observer, participant, facilitator or convenor that were either hosted 
by or included humanitarian and development organisations 
Table 1 presents the events attended in the UK and Table 2 presents the events attended in the Philippines.  Note that this only includes academic 
conferences that were attended by NGOs. 
Table 1 UK Events 
Event Date Host Location Role Details 
CAFOD Humanitarian 
Seminar 
22/10/2009 CAFOD Brighton Participant The first aim of the seminar was to help CAFOD strengthen 
its humanitarian work by developing a strong and coherent 
strategy for the next five years.  The second aim was to 
enable participants to better understand the challenges 
they are facing as they develop their work under the key 
headings of protecting civilians, reducing risks to people's 
lives and providing strong and effective assistance to men, 
women and children during crises.  The researcher 
participated in group discussions, met different 
stakeholders and observed the event. 
Disaster Risk Reduction 
for Natural Hazards: 
Putting Research into 
Practice 
4-6/11/2009 UCL London Participant Academic conference deliberately targeted at decision-
makers, including NGOs.  The researcher presented a 
poster and identified participants for interviews. 
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CEDRA Workshop 19-
21/04/2010 
Tearfund London Participant Participatory workshop designed to help organisations to 
assess the impacts of climate change and environmental 
degradation at organisational level and to choose the most 
effective adaptation options across all sectors that they 
work in. The researcher presented the UCL-CAFOD 
partnership, received training on a toolkit and met with key 
NGO stakeholders. 
World Vision-UCL 
Microinsurance 
brainstorm 
26/04/2010 University 
College London 
(UCL) 
London Facilitator Workshop to explore the opportunities for establishing 
partnerships between Insurance Providers, Academic 
Institutions and International NGOs in order to provide 
disaster risk insurance for the vulnerable poor.  The 
researcher acted as a note taker. 
Strengthening Climate 
Resilience (SCR) UK 
Consultation 
27/05/2010 Department for 
International 
Development 
(DFID) 
London Participant Opportunity for agencies working on the issue of 
integrating climate change into disaster risk management 
work to learn from others.  It was designed to provide the 
needed space for practitioners, policy makers and 
academics to share their knowledge and expertise with a 
view to improving current and future practice. The 
consultation was designed to provide a space to consider 
and share approaches to integrated working in order to 
improve disasters and development programming more 
broadly.  The researcher took part in the discussions and 
met key NGO stakeholders. 
Community-Based 
Adaptation Workshop 
12/07/2010 Practical Action London Observer As part of the Global Initiative for Community Based 
Adaptation, Practical Action organised this event to draw 
together mainly UK based practitioners in an ongoing 
narrative amongst the international CBA community.  The 
researcher observed this event. 
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Disasters: Improving the 
evidence base for 
prevention, resilience 
and emergency 
response 
13/10/2010 The Royal 
Society 
London Observer As part of International Day for Natural Disaster Reduction 
2010, this one day conference aimed to create an 
environment in which the UK 'disasters community’, 
whether from private sector, academia, non-governmental 
organisations or government, can learn about existing 
initiatives, share their work and discover better ways to 
coordinate and collaborate with each other.  The day was 
primarily comprised of presentations with little opportunity 
for discussion. 
Innovation in DRR 27/01/2011 Christian Aid London Observer This event was organised to share and discuss the learning 
from innovation in DRR with a wide range of DRR and 
climate change practitioners. The researcher was primarily 
an observer but had the opportunity to meet with key NGO 
stakeholders. 
Humanitarian Futures 
Programme Roundtable 
Discussion 
13/05/2011 King's College 
London 
London Facilitator The review of learning on science humanitarian‐policy 
dialogue.  The researcher participated in and facilitated the 
group discussions. 
Interagency Resilience 
Working Group 
Workshop - Integrating 
Science into 
humanitarian and 
development work to 
enhance resilience, 
linking science and 
traditional community 
knowledge 
21/06/2012 Catholic Agency 
for Overseas 
Development 
(CAFOD) 
London Participant The workshop focused on linking climate and natural 
hazards science with traditional community knowledge. 
Alongside Help Age International, CAFOD drew together 
over 30 representatives from International NGOs and 
leading researchers from the top universities in the UK.  
The learning event was part of a series of workshops being 
organised by the Programme Partnership Arrangements 
(PPA) learning group on resilience of which CAFOD is a core 
member.  Researchers presented on current challenges in 
using scientific information and applying uncertainty in the 
NGO sector, as well as sharing good practice examples of 
using scientific information and traditional knowledge.   
The researcher presented the concept of multi-hazards and 
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then participated in the group discussions, observing NGO 
staffs’ engagement with hazard science. 
Disaster Risk 
Management in the 
Post-2015 
04/07/2012 Overseas 
Development 
Institute (ODI) 
and UK 
Collaborative on 
Development 
Sciences 
(UKCDS) 
London Participant This workshop was an early opportunity for stakeholders to 
come together to debate the key features of disaster risk 
management in an international policy landscape beyond 
2015.  The researcher participated in the group discussions. 
Tsunami Disasters: How 
Effective has Science 
Been For Mitigation 
Planning and Disaster 
Relief? 
06/09/2012 UCL London Observer An interdisciplinary workshop for disaster practitioners and 
tsunami scientists to identify how science can be used 
more effectively in tsunami mitigation, planning and relief.  
The researcher primarily observed. 
Resilience workshop 20-
21/09/2012 
CAFOD London Observer For advisors, regional and international managers to 
discuss and decide what resilience means for CAFOD’s work 
and practical ways forward.  The researcher primarily 
observed. 
NGO-Academic-Business 
Collaborations for 
Enhancing disaster risk 
reduction, response and 
relief 
08/02/2013 Aon Benfield London Facilitator Innovative one-day workshop organised by the Aon 
Benfield UCL Hazard Centre at University College London in 
partnership with Aon Benfield, CAFOD and HelpAge 
International. It will present an opportunity to investigate 
the practical applications of risk mapping and modelling 
tools, the roles of research and training, and the benefits of 
knowledge exchange partnerships.  The researcher 
facilitated one of the group discussions, took notes 
throughout the day and formed links with DFID in the 
context of multi-hazards. 
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Interacting and 
cascading natural 
hazards 
14/02/2013 UCL London Convenor This workshop brought together those with an interest in 
the field to evaluate the practical applications of current 
research and to define key directions for future 
investigations into the interaction of natural hazards.  Co-
organised and co-convened with Mirianna Budimir 
(University of Southampton) and Joel Gill (King's College 
London).  The researcher also presented the Typhoon 
Reming lahars case study to participants. 
Identifying concrete 
opportunities for further 
integrating science 
across humanitarian 
and development 
planning to support 
community resilience 
02/07/2013 UKCDS London Facilitator The objectives of the workshop were to discuss 
opportunities and mechanisms for a more systematic 
integration of science across existing humanitarian and 
development planning processes.  The workshop 
represented a collaboration between the University of 
Reading, CAFOD, UKCDS, British Geological Survey, HFP 
amongst others.  The researcher produced the workshop 
report and lead on the guidelines for integrating science, 
which were written after this event. 
Useful Science Initiative 09/12/2013 University of 
Oxford 
Oxford Participant The purpose of attending was to review this initiative for 
making scientific publications accessible and 
understandable to non-scientists.  The researcher 
participated in group discussions. 
DRR Policy Lab 14/02/2012 The Royal 
Society 
London Observer The aim of the event was to bring together researchers and 
policy-makers who work on disaster risk reduction. The 
purpose was a two-fold: (1) to increase the use of relevant 
science in DRR policy and action, and (2) to encourage 
further development of science for DRR amongst 
researchers within the UK, regionally and globally. 
Participants discussed whether better partnerships are 
needed between scientists and practitioners, whether 
there is a need for better education on both sides and 
whether incentives and rewards are required.  The 
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guidelines for integrating science were presented at this 
event. 
 
Table 2 Philippines Events 
Event Date Host Location Role Details 
Exchange of Southeast 
Asian CAFOD Partners 
on  
Climate Change 
Adaptation and Disaster 
Risk Reduction in 
Land Use Planning and 
Management 
18 -  
25/09/2010 
CAFOD Iligan City 
and Osamiz, 
Mindanao 
Participant Training for CAFOD’s southeast Asian partners on DRR and 
CCA.  Attendees included participants from Timor-Leste, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Cambodia and Indonesia.  
The researcher presented working concepts on multi-
hazards based on her experiences from her earlier visit to 
Albay.   
[Name unknown] 23/09/2012 PAGASA Quezon City, 
Metro 
Manila 
Observer After an interview with a member of staff from PAGASA, 
the researcher was invited to attend this presentation of 
flood modelling for the Marikina River (the watershed that 
often causes flooding in Manila).  Whilst not directly 
related to the research, the researcher learned about the 
current scientific interest in flooding in Manila, interpreted 
as being a response to the 2009 flooding. 
Case Study for Disaster 
Risk Reduction and 
Management in Metro 
Manila: Research 
Presentation 
19/10/2012 Christian 
Aid/Ateneo De 
Manila 
University 
Quezon City, 
Metro 
Manila 
Observer Opportunity to observe the dynamics between academic 
scientists, the Manila Observatory and government 
technical agencies. 
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A forum on Child-
Centered Disaster Risk 
Reduction (DRR) and 
Climate Change 
Adaptation (CCA) 
16 -  
17/10/2012 
The United 
Nations 
Children’s Fund 
Intramuros, 
Manila 
Observer The Orientation Workshop on Child-Centered Disaster Risk 
Reduction (CCDRR) aimed to enhance the 
knowledge of civil society organizations and other 
stakeholders on what CCDRR is so that future efforts and 
plans on DRR could further integrate the engagement of 
children.  The researcher was invited to attended by one of 
her interviewees.  She was primarily an observer but met 
with NGO stakeholders and made opportunities for 
interviews with NGOs. 
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Appendix B: Interview guide for interviews in Studies A and B 
Interview questions, illustrating the key lines of enquiry and the questions asked (some of 
which were used as prompts). 
Background 
a. Job title 
b. Main responsibilities (v. briefly) 
c. How long in the organisation. 
d. Previous jobs (this and other organisations). 
e. Technical expertise, background, training. 
DRR/CCA 
1. Could you please give me a brief history of DRR (and CCA) in your organisation?  
2. Is there any overlap between DRR and CCA? 
Toolkit adoption and application 
3. Could you give me an overview of the tools or methods you use for (hazard, 
vulnerability and) risk assessment?  For CCA?  
4. Were these developed by other organisations?  Why were these adopted? 
5. How have these assessments changed over time? 
6. What is the scale of assessments? Used to identify hotspots/high risk?   
7. What environment are these used in: rural and/or urban?  
Tool development 
1. What would you say the drivers are (top-down/ bottom-up) that lead to the 
development of a tool(s) such as this? 
2. Are tools designed for a specific purpose/issue? 
3. Expertise pulled/external consultations? 
4. External funding? 
 
Process for assessing hazards, vulnerability and risk 
5. How do you use this tool for hazard assessments and vulnerability assessments?  
6. Who uses the tool? 
7. Do they consider multi-hazard environments? 
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8. What information is important to include? 
9. Where/ who is the source of information on hazards?   
10. Would these ever involve hazard experts or scientists – anyone like that?   
11. Are community members seen as the best source on information on hazards?   
a. Managing scientific v. local info conflict? 
12. Is there a method for prioritising hazards? 
13. What are the outputs of these assessments and what is the information (outputs) used 
for? 
14. Are/ how often are these repeated? 
 
Capacity to use tools 
15. What training is given to users of the tool? 
16. Have you had feedback/what is your feedback on experiences of using tools?  
 
Effectiveness 
17. How do you evaluate the effectiveness of hazard assessment tools?  Pilots? 
18. How long must the project run before an evaluation of its effectiveness can be made?   
 
Close 
19. Can science help in implementing DRR? 
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Appendix C: Case study interview guides for scientists and local 
government, for NGOs and for local communities 
The following interview guides acted as a prompt for the interviewer and were adapted 
depending upon the progression of the interview.  The aim was for the participant to express 
their views with minimal prompting from the interviewee. 
 
Interview guide for scientists and local government 
 
Personal details 
 Role and background 
 
History/experience of event 
 In your own words, please describe to me the disaster which occurred on 30th 
November 2006 (and your involvement in this event) 
o How long it lasted for, hazards, amount of rainfall, etc. 
o Events that led up to it 
 Was the area you work in mostly affected by the typhoon, lahars or both?   
o Combined effect or one more dominant? 
o What hazards were most damaging? 
 What was the reason for the occurrence of lahars? 
o What was the trigger? 
o What were the causes?  Previous disasters; human activity; previous rainfall; 
role of Milenyo  
o Did the most recent eruption (2006) influence the occurrence and paths taken 
by the lahars? 
 Why was there the observed spatial distribution of lahars and the number of lahars?  
o Were the flows all the same – speed, onset etc.?  What were their 
characteristics? 
 What was the impact?   
o Where was it focused? 
o What was the exposure and vulnerability?   
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o Why were these areas hit and not others?  
o Did you/your organisation know that these areas were at risk? 
  Why was the disaster so devastating? 
o What were the characteristics of lahars? 
o Were preparedness and warnings more focused upon typhoon?  Was there a 
lack of consideration of lahar risk? 
o Mitigation: what was the role of the dikes?  Did they help?   
o Warning: was a warning issued? 
o Evacuation: did people evacuate?  Was there complacency or a lack of 
understanding?  Typhoon Milenyo?  Need for better communication?  
o What level of communication and understanding of volcanic hazard (beyond 
eruptions) exists? 
o Who were most affected – the most poor, vulnerable? 
 Were [insert other groups] aware of the risk? 
o Communities affected [were they still recovering from typhoon Milenyo or 
complacent?] 
o Emergency responders 
o Local government 
 
Anticipation of the event 
 Adequacy of slope instability risk assessments: 
o Were the areas affected identified in previous lahar risk assessments? 
o When was the last lahar risk assessment carried out prior to this disaster? 
o How was this assessed?  Inclusion of typhoon trigger? 
o Did the assessments identify the areas subsequently affected by the Reming 
lahar? 
o Were these assessments communicated/utilised? 
 Have methods of assessing hazard risk changed since this disaster? 
o Have they been updated since?  [influence of compounding hazards] 
 Was there anything unexpected about this disaster? (i.e. it’s trigger/lag time/impact) 
 Have there been previous lahars of this size?   
o Rainfall triggered?  During eruptions? 
o Are the same areas affected?  
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Learning from this event 
 Has anything changed in the way you work since this event? 
o What did you learn as an organisation? 
 What measures have you put in place to prevent a similar disaster happening again?   
o E.g. a full assessment of hazard risk, relocation, monitoring by the community? 
o Do these measures include the threat of other hazards? 
o Is the emphasis upon the lahar or the triggering hazard? 
 
Understanding and perceptions of the event/hazard 
 What are the hazards that affect this area?  
 What is the typical mechanism of failure of slopes? 
o Tend to be debris flows?  Can other types of landslide occur? 
 How is the incidence of lahars affected by the occurrence of other hazards?  In terms 
of: 
o Susceptibility 
o Trigger 
 Always rainfall and always immediately after?  Intensity/magnitude? 
 Earthquake?  How strong?   
 Volcanic eruption?  Strength and type? 
 How frequently do [damaging] lahars occur?  [and any other types of mass movement] 
o Typical time of occurrence? 
o Has there been a change in the number and/or impact of lahars? 
o Communities at risk/responders associate with volcano or typhoon – prior to 
Reming and now since? 
 Which areas tend to be affected? 
o Does it vary? 
o Why do people stay? 
o History of impact? 
 Is your assessment of hazard or risk?   
 What knowledge is it based upon? 
o Science – academia or government?   
o Community knowledge? 
 Are trigger hazards included? 
 Are communities more concerned during periods of heavy rainfall since Reming? 
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 Do you implement scenario planning or probabilistic assessments?   
o Might these help? 
o How do these bring in multi-hazards? 
 Is the risk of typhoon greater, less or the same since Reming? 
 Do you update hazard assessments?   
o After every disaster?  
o Just communicate that situation could have changed? 
 
Extra: NGO-scientists engagement: 
 Have you ever worked with NGOs and on what type of projects? 
 
Interview guide for NGOs 
Personal details 
 Role and background 
 
Experience of event 
 In your own words, please describe to me the disaster which occurred on 30th 
November 2006 [or your involvement] 
o How long it lasted for, hazards – amount of rainfall, etc. 
o Describe events that led up to it. 
o Describe as multi-hazard event? 
 Was the area you work in mostly affected by the typhoon, lahars, or both?   
o Combined effect or one more dominant? 
o What hazards were most damaging? 
 What was the reason for the occurrence of the lahars?  
o What was the trigger? 
o What were the causes?  Previous disasters; human activity; previous rainfall; 
role of Milenyo  
o Did the most recent eruption (2006) influence the occurrence and paths taken 
by the lahars? 
 Why was there the observed spatial distribution of lahars and the number of lahars?  
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o Were the flows all the same – speed, onset etc.?  What were their 
characteristics? 
 What was the impact?   
o Where was it focused? 
o What was the exposure and vulnerability?   
o Why were these areas hit and not others?  
o Did you/your organisation know that these areas were at risk? 
 Why was the disaster so devastating? 
o What were the characteristics of lahars? 
o Were preparedness and warnings more focused upon typhoon?  Was there a 
lack of consideration of lahar risk? 
o Mitigation: what was the role of the dikes?  Did they help?   
o Warning: was a warning issued?  Did you/communities receive it? 
o Evacuation: did people evacuate?  Was there complacency or a lack of 
understanding?  Typhoon Milenyo?  Need for better communication?  
o What level of communication and understanding of volcanic hazard (beyond 
eruptions) exists? 
o Who were most affected – the most poor, vulnerable? 
 Were [insert other groups] aware of the risk? 
o Communities affected [were they still recovering from typhoon Milenyo or 
complacent?] 
o Emergency responders 
o Local government 
 
Anticipation of the event 
 Were you/your organisation aware of the risk from lahars?  
o Did the event come as a surprise? 
o Was the risk from lahars communicated to you/communities?   
o Had your communities conducted risk assessments? (PHVCAs) 
o Was the risk assessment helpful/adequate?  Highlight areas affected or miss 
some out? 
o Did it include the fact that lahar could be triggered by eruption and typhoon?  
[were lahars included in your/others assessment of typhoon hazard?] 
o How could it have been improved? 
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o Have they been updated?  Methods changed? 
 Have methods of assessing hazard risk changed since this disaster? 
o Have they been updated since?  [influence of compounding hazards] 
 Was there anything unexpected about this disaster? (i.e. it’s trigger/lag time/impact) 
 Have there been previous lahars of this size?   
o Rainfall triggered?  During eruptions? 
o Are the same areas affected?  
 
Learning from this event 
 Has anything changed in the way you work since this event? 
o What did you learn as an organisation? 
 What measures have you put in place to prevent a similar disaster happening again?   
o E.g. a full assessment of hazard risk, relocation, monitoring by the community? 
o Do these measures include the threat of other hazards? 
o Is the emphasis upon the lahar or the triggering hazard? 
 
Understanding and perceptions of the event/hazard 
 What are the hazards that affect this area?  
 What is the typical mechanism of failure of slopes? 
o Tend to be debris flows?  Can other types of landslide occur? 
 How is the incidence of lahars affected by the occurrence of other hazards?  In terms 
of: 
o Susceptibility 
o Trigger 
 Always rainfall and always immediately after?  Intensity/magnitude? 
 Earthquake?  How strong?   
 Volcanic eruption?  Strength and type? 
 How frequently do [damaging] lahars occur?  [and any other types of mass movement] 
o Typical time of occurrence? 
o Has there been a change in the number and/or impact of lahars? 
o Communities at risk/responders associate with volcano or typhoon – prior to 
Reming and now since? 
 Which areas tend to be affected? 
o Does it vary? 
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o Why do people stay? 
o History of impact? 
 Is your assessment of hazard or risk?   
o Science – academia or government?  Can you go to them for advice?  Do you 
use scientific information?  Are the scientists willing to share? 
o Community knowledge? 
 Are you/communities more, or less, concerned about lahars after periods of heavy 
rainfall since the 2006?   
 Is the risk of typhoon greater, less or the same since Reming? 
 Do the community update hazard assessments?   
o After every disaster?  
 
Extra: NGO-scientists engagement: 
 Have you ever worked with scientists and on what type of projects? 
 
Interview guide for communities 
 Personal details: name, age, marital status, number of children, occupation and 
partners’ occupation, and length of time in current Barangay 
 Can you please describe what happened during typhoon Reming? 
o When did is start? 
o What time did it stop? 
o How did it affect you? 
o Was there strong wind?  Heavy rain?  Flooding? 
o Can you describe the lahar (speed, materials, destruction) 
o Had it been raining much in the days and weeks beforehand? 
o What was the effect from earlier typhoons, e.g. Milenyo?  Damage?  Did they 
bring lahars? 
o Why did Reming bring lahars?   
o Had there been any other disasters in 2006? 
 Warning and preparedness 
o Did you receive a warning? 
o How did you receive it and who from? 
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o What did you do after receiving the warning? 
o As what time did you receive it? 
o What did it tell you?  Anything about rain/flooding/lahar? 
o Were you monitoring anything?  Changes in animal behaviour?  Rain gauges?  
River levels? 
o How did you prepare? 
o Did you evacuate?  Why?  When? 
o Did you know what might happen if you stayed? 
 Experience and learning 
o Had you experienced typhoons before Reming? 
o How did these compare? 
o Have there been lahars here before? 
o What made Reming different/unexpected? 
o Are do you worry more/less/the same about typhoon/lahars since Reming? 
o What other hazards affect this area? 
o Which one are you most worried about? 
o When did the volcano last erupt? 
o Were there lahars? 
o Does anyone provide you with information on these hazards and how to 
prepare?  Does it help? 
o Have you done hazard mapping?  Before/after Reming? 
 Current initiatives and risk perception 
o Is there any monitoring of hazards in the community?  E.g. rainfall? 
o Since Reming, have you made any changes to the way you prepare for 
typhoons? 
o How important is preparing for disasters compared with day to day life? 
o How worries are you about disasters compared with day to day life? 
o Are there any actions which could be taken to make you feel safer? 
o Would you evacuate? 
o Would you relocate? 
o How do you feel about pre-emptive evacuation and relocation? 
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Appendix D: Reflexive ‘diary’ extracts from the research 
The following extracts outline my reflexive stance in the EngD research: 
March 2014: 
Up until my Masters dissertation, I had never utilised nor rigorously studied the philosophies 
and methodologies of social science research.  My interests and, consequently, training had 
focused upon the natural and physical sciences owing to interest in natural hazards.  This 
interest made me a suitable candidate for this research, owing to the fact that its remit was 
natural hazard (rather than risk) assessment.  However, it quickly became apparent to me that 
there was a need to understand the context of the problem from those involved and, as such, I 
adopted a qualitative approach to the majority of this research.  I have always regarded the 
value of the scientific method in terms of its principles of rigour and falsification and thus 
adjusting to qualitative research, which has highly contested theoretical underpinnings and 
lacks clarity in terms of validating the research, was daunting.  Undoubtedly my initial 
scepticism of qualitative research will have influenced my approach.  Furthermore, conducting 
interviews was largely beyond my comfort zone and some of this apprehension may have 
influenced my conduct of interviews.  In admitting these influences, however, I was able to 
learn from and adjust my approaches so as to reduce their influence upon subsequent 
interviews.  These influences were also in the forefront of my mind during data analysis, 
ensuring that I had an open view to the identification of key themes from the interview 
findings. 
November 2013: 
Being a young, white, British and female researcher meant that it was difficult not to feel like 
an outsider in the Philippines.  I was certainly a curious sight in the eyes of the interviewee as 
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(experienced both during this and the previous trip to the Philippines) participants were quite 
shocked when they discovered I was travelling alone.   My experience of Filipinos is of a very 
welcoming and hospitable people, so (despite my obvious differences) there were only a couple 
of times when I perceived that the interviewee was feeling that I was imposing on their time.   
My being an outsider appeared to influence interviewees’ ability to be totally honest with me: 
few were willing to criticise with true conviction, especially across government departments.  
However, the international NGOs tended to be more open with their criticism of other 
stakeholders and some of the scientists were also willing to open up to me about their 
frustrations regarding the typhoon Reming disaster and beyond.  The least open with their 
criticism tended to be the local government representatives.  I realised that it was my influence, 
and not just a cultural tendency not to criticise, when I observed some of the open criticism 
between academics and government scientists during my observations (see Appendix A). 
It was difficult not to perceive that some interviewees were regarding the interview questions 
as a test, especially when I asked the more obvious questions regarding the event.  Indeed, one 
or two interviewees answered in such a way that it sounded as though they were trying to 
reduce my ignorance.  This was most likely due to my being an outsider and unfortunately it 
contributed to the persistence of one NGO interpreter to try to ‘educate’ me rather than allow 
the community to answer. 
I felt particularly conspicuous when I visited the communities.  I was treated like a celebrity 
with children following me as I made my visits around the community.  In spite of my lack of 
blonde hair, the children in Barangay Tandarora called me ‘Barbie’ and when it came to the 
group photo the women were keen to stand next to me.  I also realised that my being there was 
of greater significance than my research alone; one local NGO told me that the community 
enjoy the visits and actually get jealous when foreign visitors are taken to other barangays 
instead of their own.   
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I was also conscious of my relative wealth compared to those I was interviewing; a particularly 
uncomfortable moment was when a community member asked me on the local Jeepney1 to 
Anislag and, thus, in front of about 30 others, how much it cost me to fly to the Philippines.  I 
was honest, but could not help but feel that it created an air of separation between us 
thereafter.   
It was only after the process that I realised that my style of interview altered depending on the 
purpose of the meeting and who I was interviewing.  At times this was natural – I had met with 
some of the participants to I unconsciously adopted a more conversational approach to the 
interview.  Other interviews were more formal.  This appears to be an artefact of the ease at 
which some interviewees made me feel; Filipinos have a strong sense of humour and it was not 
uncommon to share a joke during the interview.  One memorable example came from the 
women interviewed in Barangay Anislag who, on reflecting upon the aftermath of Typhoon 
Reming, noted that they lost everything, even ‘panties!’ 
 
                                                          
1 A Jeepney is a local bus. 
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Appendix E: Information Sheets and Consent forms 
This appendix includes the information sheet and consent forms used for both parts of the 
research.  The first two forms were for the interviews conducted with NGOs and humanitarian 
and development practitioners in the UK and Philippines regarding NGO methods for hazard 
assessment.  The final four forms were utilised for the purpose of the case study research 
(there is a different information sheet for communities and DRR stakeholders). 
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Part 1 (Studies A and B) 
 
Information Sheet for NGO participants in Research Studies 
Title of Project: Multi-hazard assessment for building sustainable and 
resilient communities in the Philippines 
Researcher:  
 
Melanie Duncan  
Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Reseach Centre 
University College London 
Gower Street 
London WC1E 6BT 
UK 
 
You are invited to participate in the research project: multi-hazard assessment for 
building sutainable and resilient communities in the Philippines.  Details of the project 
and its proposed outcomes are given below.  Please ask if anything is not clear or if 
you would like more information.  
 
Details of study 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
 
The aim of this research is to adapt/ develop methods for multi-hazard (including 
climate change) assessment which can be used by NGOs and their partners to inform 
decision-making based on both scientific analysis and local and indigenous knowledge.  
 
The benefits of this research are for the wider NGO community. 
 
Who is organising this research? 
 
This study is being conducted by me under the supervision of Dr Stephen Edwards, Dr 
John Twigg, Dr Christopher Kilburn and Dr Tiziana Rossetto at University College 
London, and Dr Jessica Mercer and Dr Mike Edwards at CAFOD.  It forms part of my 
doctoral research.   
What does this study involve? 
 
Background: There is a general consensus that natural hazards and climate change 
will have increasing impacts in the future. That said, the timescales, magnitudes and 
interactions of these impacts are poorly constrained and this uncertainty limits the 
effectiveness of strategies for disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. 
One of the greatest challenges facing these strategies, and their future development, is 
their need to rigorously assess and quantify the impacts of natural events and climate 
change in complex multi-hazard environments, and for this knowledge to then be used 
by decision-makers to devise and implement responsible practical solutions.  
 
This research is in partnership with CAFOD (working closely with Jessica Mercer and 
Mike Edwards) and my aim is to develop/adapt methods for scientific multi-hazard 
assessment to incorporate climate change and inputs from local knowledge.  The 
developed method will be useable by NGOs and their partners and aims to be of 
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benefit to the wider NGO community.  Such assessments will inform decision-making 
for building community resilience and should fit well into development programmes and 
humanitarian work.   
 
As part of my PhD research, I conducted a study involving interviews with a variety of 
NGOs in the UK and some of their partners, in order to determine how NGOs assess 
hazards and acquire information on hazards, and how this information is used to 
reduce risk and adapt to climate change.  The next part of the research involves 
interviewing those on the ground who have experience in implementing the tools for 
DRR/CCA.   
 
The primary objective of this trip to the Philippines is to visit a variety of field sites and 
speak to key informants with regard to deciding where to base the PhD field work and 
to interview NGOs with experience of implementing hazard assessments for 
DRR/CCA.  Note, the final decision as to where to carry out the field work may be 
made several weeks/ months after the scoping exercise depending on how much 
further analysis and correspondence is required with key informants.   
 
Secondary objectives:  
a. To establish relationships with key stakeholders. 
b. To determine potential location and living arrangement for longer term 
fieldwork placement 
c. Identify security issues for discussion upon return 
d. To gain an understanding of the context and the environment within which I will 
work 
e. Establish where other agencies are working 
 
Where will the meetings/ interviews take place? 
 
In agreeing to take part, I shall arrange a time around your work schedule for me to 
come to your office and conduct the interview.   
 
What will happen during the interviews? 
 
If you are happy for me to do so, I will also record the interviews.  This is to ensure that 
I don’t miss any information during the interview.  A copy of your interview recording 
can be made for you and you will be required to sign a consent form.  I will be asking 
questions related to your work on DRR and/or climate change adaptation.  
 
All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
 
What happens to the information gathered from the interviews? 
 
The interviews will form a report on NGO tools and assessments and all participants 
will be kept anonymous.  This report may also form part of my final PhD thesis.  You 
will be provided with a copy of the report. 
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Consent Form for NGOs in Research Studies 
Title of Project: Multi-hazard assessment for building sustainable 
and resilient communities in the Philippines 
 
Researcher:  
 
Melanie Duncan  
Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Reseach Centre 
University College London 
Gower Street 
London WC1E 6BT 
UK 
 
If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or the explanation already 
given to you, please ask me before you consent to participate in this research.  You will 
be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep for your reference. 
 
Participant’s Statement: 
 
Please tick the following that apply: 
 
□ I agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my 
satisfaction, I have read the information sheet, and I agree to take part in this 
study. 
□ I understand that if I decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part in this 
research, I can notify Melanie Duncan and withdraw immediately. 
□ I understand that my participation in this research will be kept anonymous. 
□ I am happy for this interview to be recorded and am aware of and consent to, 
any use Melanie Duncan intends to make of the recordings during and after the 
research. 
□ I understand that information I have submitted will be included in a report and I 
will be sent a copy.  I shall remain anonymous and reference will only be made 
to my organisation.   
□ I agree that the information I provide may be used by others for future research.   
 
 
Name (please print): ___________________________ 
Signature: ____________________________________ Date: ________________ 
Researcher’s signature:  _______________________ Date: ________________
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Part two (Study C) 
 
Information Sheet for DRR practitioners and experts in Research Studies 
 
Title of Project: Multi-hazard assessment for building resilient 
communities in the Philippines 
 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID 
Number): 2192/001. 
Researcher:  
 
Melanie Duncan  
Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Centre 
University College London 
Gower Street 
London WC1E 6BT 
UK 
 
You are invited to participate in the research project: multi-hazard assessment for 
building resilient communities in the Philippines.  Details of the project and its proposed 
outcomes are given below.                
 
Details of study 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
 
The aim of this research is to develop a method for multi-hazard assessment which can 
be used by NGOs and their partners to inform decision-making based on both scientific 
analysis and local and indigenous knowledge, and to field test that method in the 
Philippines. 
 
Who is organising this research? 
 
This study is being conducted by me under the supervision of Dr Stephen Edwards, Dr 
Christopher Kilburn, and Dr John Twigg at University College London (UCL), and Dr 
Kate Crowley at the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD).     
 
What does this study involve? 
 
Background: One of the greatest challenges facing DRR strategies is the need to 
rigorously assess and quantify the impacts of natural events in complex multi-hazard 
environments, and for this knowledge to then be used by decision-makers to devise 
and implement responsible practical solutions. Landslides constitute both a primary 
and secondary hazard as well as a cause of subsequent hazards and are thus central 
to the understanding of multi-hazard risk. 
 
The objective of this trip to the Philippines is to visit a variety of field sites where 
landslides have occurred in recent years and speak to key informants about their 
experience of the landslide and their perceptions of landslide and other hazard risks.  I 
will also be field testing a tool for assessing multi-hazard risk, using the example of 
landslides.   
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Benefits: This research is in partnership with CAFOD and my aim is to develop 
methods for scientific multi-hazard assessment to assess the interactions between 
hazards, build scenarios of these interactions, whilst incorporating inputs from local 
knowledge.  The developed method will be useable by NGOs and their partners and 
thus should be of benefit to the wider NGO community since such assessments will 
inform decision-making for building community resilience and should fit well into 
development programmes and humanitarian work.   
 
 
Where will the meetings/interviews take place? 
 
In agreeing to take part, I shall arrange a time around your work schedule for me to 
come to your office and conduct the interview.   
 
What will happen during the interviews? 
 
I will be asking questions related to your work on DRR in the context of the 30th 
November 2006 Mt Mayon lahars and future risk of lahars and other multi-hazards in 
this area. If you are happy for me to do so, I will also record the interviews.  This is to 
ensure that I don’t miss any information during the interview.  A copy of your interview 
recording can be made for you and you will be required to sign a consent form.   
 
 
What happens to the information gathered from the interviews? 
 
The information you provide will be included in my PhD thesis, and you have the option 
to remain anonymous within this report.  I am happy to provide you with a copy of the 
completed thesis if you wish.  The information you provide may also be used to inform 
additional reports and published papers.  The information may also be shared with my 
supervisors at UCL and CAFOD (mentioned above) for the purposes of helping me 
write my PhD thesis.   
 
The information you provide will assist NGOs, like CAFOD, in their understanding and 
assessment of multi-hazard risk so that they are better able to help reduce the risk from 
disasters. 
 
 
 
Please discuss the information above with others if you wish or ask me if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  
 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not; choosing not to take part will not 
disadvantage you in any way. If you do decide to take part you are still free to withdraw 
at any time and without giving a reason.   
 
All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the UK Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
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Information Sheet for community participants in Research Studies 
Title of Project: Multi-hazard assessment for building resilient communities in 
the Philippines 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID 
Number): 2192/001. 
 
Researcher:  
 
Melanie Duncan  
Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Centre 
University College London 
Gower Street 
London WC1E 6BT 
UK 
 
You are invited to participate in the research project: multi-hazard assessment for 
building resilient communities in the Philippines.  Details of the project and its proposed 
outcomes are given below.   
 
Details of study 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
 
The aim of this research is to develop a method for multi-hazard assessment which can 
be used by NGOs and their partners to inform decision-making based on both scientific 
analysis and local and indigenous knowledge, and to field test that method in the 
Philippines. 
 
Who is organising this research? 
 
This study is being conducted by me under the supervision of Dr Stephen Edwards, Dr 
Christopher Kilburn, and Dr John Twigg at University College London (UCL), and Dr 
Kate Crowley at the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD).     
 
What does this study involve? 
 
I am from University College London in the United Kingdom and am working with a UK 
based NGO called the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) and I am 
visiting the Philippines in order to pilot a method for assessing multi-hazards using the 
example of landslide risk.  I am visiting areas where landslides have occurred in recent 
years in order to interview people with experience of the landslide and their perceptions 
of landslide and other hazard risks.   
 
Where will the meetings/interviews take place? 
 
In agreeing to take part, I shall arrange a time and place that is convenient for you. 
 
 
 
What will happen during the interviews? 
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If you are happy for me to do so, I will ask you a series of questions about your 
experience of the 30th November 2006 Mt Mayon lahars and your knowledge of lahar 
and multi-hazard risk, as well as some personal details including your name, age, 
occupation, marital status, whether you have children, and how long you have lived in 
this area.  If you feel uncomfortable with answering any of the questions please let me 
know.   
If you are happy for me to do so, I will record the interviews.  This is to ensure that I 
don’t miss any information during the interview.  A copy of your interview recording or 
transcript can be made for you and you will be required to sign a consent form.   
 
Benefits: the results from this research should help to reduce disaster risk from 
multiple hazards. 
 
 
What happens to the information gathered from the interviews? 
 
The information you provide will be included in my PhD thesis, and you have the option 
to remain anonymous within this report.  I am happy to provide you with a copy of the 
completed thesis if you wish.  The information you provide may also be used to inform 
additional reports and published papers.  The information may also be shared with my 
supervisors at UCL and CAFOD (mentioned above) for the purposes of helping me 
write my PhD thesis.   
 
The information you provide will assist NGOs, like CAFOD, in their understanding and 
assessment of multi-hazard risk so that they are better able to help reduce the risk from 
disasters. 
 
 
Please discuss the information above with others if you wish or ask us if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  
 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not; choosing not to take part will not 
disadvantage you in any way. If you do decide to take part you are still free to withdraw 
at any time and without giving a reason.   
 
All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the UK Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
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Informed consent form for participants in Research Studies 
 
Title of Project: Multi-hazard assessment for building resilient 
communities in the Philippines 
 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID 
number): 2192/001 
Researcher:  
 
Melanie Duncan  
Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Centre 
University College London 
Gower Street 
London WC1E 6BT 
UK 
 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research.  Before you agree to take 
part, the person organising the research must explain the project to you. 
 
If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or the explanation already 
given to you, please ask me before you consent to participate in this research.  You will 
be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep for your reference. 
 
Participant’s Statement: 
 
I   _______________________     
 
 agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my 
satisfaction, I have read the information sheet, and I agree to take part in this 
study. 
 understand that if I decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part in this 
research, I can notify Melanie Duncan and withdraw immediately. 
 am happy for this interview to be recorded and am aware of and consent to, the 
use of this recording for the purpose of this and any future research. 
 agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my 
satisfaction and I agree to take part in this study.  
 understand that any information I have submitted will be included in Melanie 
Duncan’s PhD thesis and I will be sent a copy.   
 understand that any data recorded will be handled in accordance with the 
provisions of the United Kingdom’s Data Protection Act 1998. 
 [Please delete as appropriate] wish/do not wish to remain anonymous in 
Melanie Duncan’s thesis and any reports regarding this research. 
 agree that the information I provide may be used by others for future research.   
 
 
Signature: ____________________________________ Date: ________________ 
Researcher’s signature:  _______________________ Date: ________________ 
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Appendix: F Historical eruptions of Mayon volcano 
The following table presents the historical eruptions (1616-2010) of Mayon volcano taken from a variety of sources indicated in the far right column.  The 
abbreviations used below are as follows: Y = year; M = month; D = day; VEI = volcanic explosivity index; AF = ashfall; TF = tephra fall; PF = pyroclastic flow; LF 
= lava flow; L = lahar; RS = rock slide; VL = volcanic lightening and EQ = earthquake (Ramos-Villarta et al., 1985). 
Start date End date Type of 
Eruption 
VEI Type of Activity 
Associated 
Activity 
Places Affected Impact Sources Y M D Y M D   AF TF PF LF L RS VL EQ 
3100 
BCE ± 
300 
years 
        
                          GVP (2013) 
470 ± 
75 
years 
          
                        GVP (2013) 
1616 2 19 1616 2 23   3 X X X X ?     X     
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1766 7 20 1766 7 25 VULC 3 X   X X X       AF, PF and LF - East   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1800 10 30 1800 10 31 VULC 2 X X X           Cagsua, Budiao, etc. 
Fatality details 
unknown. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
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1814 2 1 1814 2 1 PLIN 4 X X X   X X X   
PF - southern slopes 
Camalig, Cagsaua, 
Budio, Guinobatan, half 
of Albay; L - Cagsaua & 
Budiao; AF/L? - Ligao, 
Guinobatan, Libog (St. 
Domingo), Tabaco & 
Tiwi 1200 fatalities 
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1827 6   1828 2   VULC 2 X X X   X   X X L - Camalig   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985) 
1834 5(?) ? 1835 ? ? VULC 3 X X X? X X X         
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); PHIVOLCS 
(2013) 
1839             2 X                   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1845 1 
21 (+/- 
1) 1845 1 
21 
(or 
30 
+/- 
1) VULC 3 X X X   X X     
AF - southwest Camalig, 
Guinobatan & Ligao   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1846 5 11 1846 5 11 VULC 3 X   X?   X?       Camalig - 12 cm ash.   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985) (discrepancies 
with PHIVOLCS (2013) 
data - ?) 
1851 5 26 1851 6 ?   1 X             X     
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
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1853 7 13 1853 8 26 VULC 3 X   X   X       
PF - Camalig, 
Guinobatan; L - Ligao, 
Oas, Polangui; AF - 
Malilipot, Bacacay, 
Libog (Sto. Domingo), 
Guinobatan, Camalig, 
Albay, Cagsaua. 
33 fatalities (Sapper, 
Faustino) or 35 (Saderra 
Maso). Deaths caused 
by incandescent rocks 
rolling down from the 
summit, destroying 
many houses and their 
occupants (Faustino). 
Major lahar 27th July.  
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1855 3 22 ? ? ?   2 X     X             
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1857 ? ? ? ? ?   2 X                   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1858 1 ? ? 12 ? SRRM 2 X   X? X X     X   
Many people died from 
malnutrition and poor 
sanitation in the 
evacuation centres. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1861             1                     
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1862             2 X       X           
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
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1868 12 17       VULC 2 X X X   X X         
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1871 12 8 1872 1   VULC 3 X X X     X X X 
PF - S to SE; Albay, 
Legazpi; AF - Camalig, 
Guinobatan (SW) 
Property damage.  
Deaths by nuées 
ardentes. In the "vista" 
of Boctong, two 
persons were 
suffocated and in 
Buyuan, one was 
burned. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1872 9 5 1872 9 9   1 X     X   X         
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013) 
1873 6 20 1873 7 22   2 X     X             
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1876 4           1 X                   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1876 11 26         1 X                   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985) have the two 
1976 events down as 
separate events in the 
text, as do the 
Smithsonian (2013).  
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
(2013). 
1881 7 6 1882 8   STRM 3 X   X X X       
AF - Camalig & 
Guinobatan; LF - S, SE, & 
SW slopes   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1885 11 21 1885 12 2   2 X     X         
LF - SSW, W & SSE 
slopes   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
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1886 7 8 1887 3 10 STRM 3 X   X X X       
AF - Camalig, 
Guinobatan & Libog 
[Sto. Domingo] 
20-hour ash eruption at 
end of 9-month 
eruption deposited 8 
cm of ash on roofs in 
Guinobatan and Libog. 
Collapse of roofs killed 
15. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1888 12 15 ? ? ?   1 X         X         
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1890 9 10 1890 9 30 
VULC - 
STRM 2 X     X         
LF - threatened Libog 
[Sto. Domingo]   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1891 10 3 1891 12 3   ? X     X         LF - S & SW   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013) 
1892 2 3 1892 2 29 VULC 2 X X X X   X     
PF - E & SE slopes 
(PHIVOLCS (2013): Libog 
[Sto. Domingo] and 
Camalig)   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1893 10 4 1893 10 31   1 X X   X X X   X LF - eastern slopes   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1895 7 20 1895 11 26   2 X     X X X X X     
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1896 8 31 1896 9 27   2 X     X X           
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
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1897 6 4 1897 7 23 
Strong 
VULC 4 X X X X X X X X 
PF - seashore of Sto. 
Domingo, barrios of Sto. 
Nino, San Isidro, San 
Roque, San Antonio, 
Sta. Misericordia, Ligao 
& parts of Bigaa; San 
Fernando, Legazpi 
overwhelmed; L - Basud 
River [Sto. Domingo] 
ENE, Camalig; AF - 
Tabaco, Camalig, Libog 
[Sto. Domingo], Bacacay 
and Malilipot, Tiwi.  
At least 226 causalities 
were caused by the 
large pyroclastic flow 
that destroyed the 
barrios of Sto. 
Domingo.  Total death 
toll from 25-27th June 
estimated to be 350.  1 
death at Bulwan  
caused by lahar 
(Smithsonian).  
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1900 3 1 1900 3 6 VULC 2 X X X X X X X X 
LF - Legazpi & Libog; AF - 
Ligao, Guinobatan, 
Tabaco, Libog [Sto. 
Domingo] & Camalig   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1902             1   X     X X         
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1928 1 ? 1928 8 ? VULC 3 X   X X         
PF - San Antonio, 
Malilipot; AF - San 
Antonio, Tabaco; Amtic, 
Ligao; TF - Bonga, 
Bacacay; LF - Libog [Sto. 
Domingo] 
Pyroclastic flows 
between June 25 and 
Aug 7 killed at least 
one.  
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
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1938 6 5     2 VULC 2 X   X X         
Foothill barrios of 
Legazpi & Libog [Sto. 
Domingo]; AF - 
Guinobatan, Ligao, 
Camalig, Daraga & 
Tabaco; LF - Sto. 
Domingo 
Fatality details 
unknown. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1939 8 21 1939 ? ?   1 X                   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1941 9 13 1941 ? ?   1 X                   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1943 ? ? 1943 ? ?   1 X                   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1947 1 8 1947 2 ? VULC 2 X   X X         
LF - Sto. Domingo; 
Calbayog, Malilipot; PF - 
San Vicente, Malilipot; 
AF - Masarawag, 
Guinobatan, ankle-deep 
ash. 
Fatality details 
unknown. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1968 4 20 1968 5 20 VULC 3 X   X X X       
AF - Camalig & 
Guinobatan [and 
Legazpi]; LF - Camalig; 
PF - Tinobran, 
Quirangay, Miisi, Bonga. 
One death by lahar in 
Aug or Oct, the others 
during the eruption.  
Moore and Melson 
1969 list at least 6 as of 
15 May 1968. 
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1978 5 3 1978 7 4 STRM 2 X X   X   X   X 
LF - Camalig [PHIVOLCS 
(2013) says ashfall].   
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
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1984 9 9 1984 10 6 VULC 3 X X X X X X X X 
LF - Camalig; AF - Sto. 
Domingo, parts of 
Legazpi; PF - SE & E; 
Bonga, Sto. Domingo. 
1 person killed by lahar.  
Reports of unsanitary 
conditions in 
evacuation centres 
leading to deaths of 
children GVP, 2013). 
Ramos-Villarta et al. 
(1985); GVP (2013); 
PHIVOLCS (2013) 
1993 2 2 1993 4 4 
VULC - 
STRM 2 X X X X X X   X 
PF - Mabinit, Bonga; AF - 
Camalig, Sto. Domingo, 
Legazpi; LF and L 
confined to gullies. 
77  killed, 5 injured 
(GVP (2013) quotes 100 
injuries).  >45,000 
persons fled homes 
following the 
pyroclastic flow of 
February 2.  12,000 
persons evacuated 
when Strombolian 
activity began March 
19-21 GVP (2013). 
Catane et al. (2005); 
PHIVOLCS (2013); GVP 
(2013). 
1999 6 22 2000 3 19 
STRM - 
VULC 3 X   X X   X   X 
AF - Guinobatan, Ligao, 
Camalig; LF and PF 
confined to gullies.   
Recorded by BGVN 
(GVP, 2013).  PHIVOLCS 
(2013) 
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2001 1 8/9 2001 8 8 
STRM - 
VULC 3 X X X X X X   X 
PF - Bonga, Basud, Miisi, 
Anoling; AF - Camalig, 
Guinobatan, Daraga, 
Legazpi, Sto. Domingo; 
LF and L confined to 
gullies.   Catane et al. (2005) 
2003 3 17 2003 5 14   2 X                   
PHIVOLCS (2013); GVP 
(2013). 
2004 7 21 2004 7 21   1 X                   GVP (2013) 
2005 8 17 ? ? ?   0?                     
Unconfirmed - not in 
PHIVOLCS (2013) online 
catalogue.  GVP (2013)  
2006 2 21 2006 2 23   1 X             X     
Unconfirmed - not in 
PHIVOLCS (2013) online 
catalogue.; GVP (2013)  
2006 7 
14 
[13?] 2006 10 1   1 X   X X         
LF - Bonga valley, 
Mabinit channel 
50,000 people 
evacuated. GVP (2013)  
2008 8 10 2008 8 10   1 X                   GVP (2013)  
2009 9 15 2010 1 ?   2 X   X X   X       
More than 47,000 
people from 30 villages 
were in evacuation 
centres across Albay 
province. GVP (2013) 
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Appendix G: Community interview participants 
The following tables provide background to the communities interviewed in each of the municipalities.  In the context of the group interviews, those 
participants highlighted in bold represent those who contributed the most to the interview. 
Municipality: Camalig 
Barangay Sua 
Barangay Date of 
interview 
Name Sex Age Job Spouse's job Length of 
time living 
in current 
barangay 
Recorded Consent 
from 
signed 
Type of interview 
Sua 29/10/2012 Perla F 56 
Barangay secretary and Disaster 
Preparedness Committee  
presiding officer 
n/a Since birth Y Y One to one 
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Municipality: Daraga 
Barangays Binitayan and Tagas (residents of the latter barangay are now residing in Barangay Anislag) 
Barangay Date of 
interview 
Name Sex Age Job Spouse's job 
Length of time living 
in current barangay 
Recorded Consent 
from 
signed 
Type of 
interview 
Binitayan 26/10/2012 Imelda  F 48 Food vendor [Did not state]  25 Y Y Group 
Gloria  F 53 Barangay 
kagawad 
(councillor) 
labourer   Y Y 
Rowena  F 36 Housewife Driver 12 Y Y 
Laticia  F 56 [Did not state]  Barangay Tanod 
(police) 
4 Y Y 
Gemma  F 42 Housewife Driver 35 Y Y 
Marcibel  F 46 Housewife Driver 18 Y Y 
Jezzabell  F 31 Housewife Plumber 18 Y Y 
Trinidad  F 54 Wala – None [Did not state]  [Did not state]  Y Y 
Sylvia  F 55 Housewife [Did not state]  [Did not state]  Y Y 
Jenifer  F [Did not 
state]  
Food vendor [Did not state]  35 Y Y 
Elizabeth  F 33 Housewife Vendor [Did not state]  Y Y 
Anislag 
(formally 
Tagas) 
26/10/2012 Jacqueline  F 32 None [Did not state]  [Did not state]  Y Y Group 
Norma  F 46 None [Did not state]   [Did not state] Y Y Group 
Rosemarie F 47 Self-employed [Did not state]  5 (7 resettlement 
site) 
Y Y Group 
Dominga  F 64 Self-employed [Did not state]  5 (7 resettlement 
site) 
Y Y Group 
Nita F 38 Housewife [Did not state]  5 (7 resettlement Y Y Group 
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site) 
Lolita  F 54 Housewife and 
barangay 
health water 
(and 
psychologist?) 
[Did not state]  18 (6 resettlement 
site) 
Y Y Group 
 
Municipality: Guinobatan 
Barangay: Tandarora 
Barangay 
Date of 
interview 
Name Sex Age Job Spouse's job 
Length of time 
living in current 
barangay 
Recorded 
Consent 
from 
signed 
Type of interview 
Tandarora 
25/10/2012 
Maria  F 76 Housewife Farmer 12 Y Y One to one 
Marivic  F 36 
Barangay 
Kagawad 
(councillor) OFW 34 Y Y Group 
Jimmy  M 59 
Barangay 
Kagawad 
(councillor) House wife 44 Y N Group 
Nilda  F 49 Housewife 
Tanod (police)/ 
farmer 22 Y Y Group 
Enemicia  F 74 Housewife Farmer 74 Y Y Group 
Marites  F 41 
Barangay 
captain PNR employee 41 Y Y Group 
Jean F 36 None Fish vendor 36 Y Y Group 
Marilu F 41 Housewife Farmer 17 Y Y Group 
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Gemma  F 37 Housewife Farmer 9 Y Y Group and one to one 
Monina  F 49 Housewife [Did not state] 22 Y Y Group 
Lorafe  F 23 Housewife Baker 4 Y Y Group 
Erma  F 36 Housewife Farmer 36 Y Y Group 
Francia F 53 Housewife Farmer 53 Y Y Group 
Estrella  F 49 Housewife [Did not state] 22 Y Y Group 
Gloria  F 38 Housewife [Did not state] ? Y Y Group 
 
Municipality: Santo Domingo 
Barangay Lidong, San Antonio and San Isidro 
Barangay 
Date of 
interview 
Name Sex Age Job Spouse's job 
Length of time 
living in current 
barangay 
Recorded Consent from signed Type of interview 
Lidong 22/10/2012 
Leja F 29 [Housewife] Farmer Whole life N 
N (LG signed form to 
confirm oral consent) 
One to one 
Group of 
10 
women 
F 
late 
20s-
70s 
Handicraft 
Factory 
workers/construc
tion/furniture 
making/quarrying 
but the majority 
are farmers 
Always and want 
to stay 
N 
N (LG signed form to 
confirm oral consent) 
Group 
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Renaldo M 63 
Carpenter 
(recently suffered 
from a stroke) 
Didn't say Not specified N 
N (LG signed form to 
confirm oral consent) 
Interview with wife 
Mercedes F 58 Didn’t say 
Carpenter 
(recently suffered 
from a stroke) 
Not specified N 
N (LG signed form to 
confirm oral consent) 
Interview with 
husband 
Edraline M 38 Rice farmer Didn't say Whole life   
N (LG signed form to 
confirm oral consent) 
One to one 
San 
Antonio 
30/10/2012 
Irma F 55 Housewife Quarrying 20 Y Y 
Interview with 
husband (below) 
Antonio  M 59 Quarryman House wife 6 Y Y 
Interview with wife 
(above) 
San Isidro 30/10/2012 Jerry  M 38 
Unemployed 
(usually machine 
operator) - 
previously worked 
in Manila 
n/a Since birth Y Y  One to one 
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Non-lahar affected community 
Municipality: Santo Domingo 
Barangay Salvacion 
Barangay 
Date of 
interview 
Name Sex Age Job Spouse's job 
How long lived 
in this 
barangay 
Recorded Consent from signed Type of interview 
Salvacion 12/10/2012 
Merlinda F ? Shop attendant Tricycle driver 15 N   One to one 
Myrna F 47 Seamstress 
Construction 
worker/farmer 25 N Y Group 
Hilda F 54 Seamstress Farmer Since birth N Y Group 
Adele F 75 Seamstress [Did not say] 60 N Y Group 
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Appendix H: Reming lahars impact on barangays visited in October 2012 
The following are specific details from field observations and interviews regarding the damage 
to their barangays, supplemented with findings from PHIVOLCS reports.  Appendix G provides 
the background details to the residents mentioned below.   
Barangay Lidong, Santo Domingo   
Leja lives next to the river channel.  She explained that her home was completely destroyed 
and that 20 houses were destroyed in this barangay.  It was not only homes, but livelihoods 
that were badly affected, including destroyed rice fields (concurred by the women’s group) 
and loss of chickens.  Renaldo and Mercedes described the damage to their home as being 
caused by the wind, lahar and the flood.  They live in a concrete home and only lost their 
kitchen extension at the back of the home.  Edraline’s home was similarly constructed to Leja’s 
(bamboo, scrap material) and was - again - completely destroyed.  Hyperconcentrated flows 
and flood deposits of 0.5m and 1m affected this barangay (PHIVOLCS, 2006a). 
Barangay Tandarora, Guinobatan 
The entrance to Tandarora is an obvious marker of the amount of material deposited by the 
lahar; the arch that marks the entrance to the barangay is several metres shorter than it 
previously was.  There are large (several metres in diameter) boulders scattered about the 
place and ruins of houses on entry to the barangay.  On the road up to Tandarora, there are 
still ruined homes.  I visited the home of Maria (a large concrete house) who told me that 
there was a 1-1.5 metre depth of lahar surrounding her home which was completely flooded 
and the kitchen at the back was damaged; the lahars are reported to have deposited 2-4 
metres of material (PHIVOLCS., 2007a).  According to PHIVOLCS (2007b), the lahars occurred in 
three sudden episodes, as dark slurry flows fronted with boulders and assorted debris.  Maria 
said they were affected by the flood, the water and the flooding, and the lahar, ‘the sand’ and 
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the wind.  During a meeting with residents in the barangay hall, the women described their 
husbands going back to the barangay after the typhoon and seeing bodies.  Again, they felt the 
effects of all dimensions of the typhoon: the water, wind and the lahar.   Eleven people died in 
this village and two were unrecovered.  Gemma’s very light framed house was actually lifted 
up by the wind.  Members of this barangay were (and still are) working with Local NGO B 
before typhoon Reming.  Further downstream along the Maipon-Masarawag Channel the lahar 
exposures transition to hyperconcentrated streamflow deposits as a consequence of possible 
debulking of the debris flows (Bornas et al., 2007b). 
Barangay Anislag (formally residents of Barangay Tagas), Daraga  
The women’s group said ‘the flood’ and ‘the lahar’ destroyed all the houses and their 
belongings.  There was flooding and 0.5 metres of deposition but that the potential for future 
lahars and avulsion was high and, as such, the residents were relocated (PHIVOLCS, 2006a).  
Residents evacuated during the event and were unable to change their clothes for four days: 
‘four days no changing of clothes, no panties’ (Lolita) 
Whilst this was said in good humour it also reflected how painful this experience was; people 
were residing in evacuation centres, unable to wash and clean their clothing, which is culturally 
difficult in the Philippines because cleanliness is observed stringently.  After 10 months in the 
evacuation centre and temporary accommodation they were transferred to Barangay Anislag 
(the resettlement site) where they described many of the same problems described by 
(Usamah and Haynes, 2012) including lack of basic services and livelihood options; although 
there have been recent improvements.  After Typhoon Reming, they partnered with Local NGO 
A as part of their building disaster resilient communities campaign and have since conducted 
hazard seminars and DRR training. 
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Barangay Binitayan, Daraga 
Similarly in Binitayan, the notion of not having clean underwear (and the mixture of jest and 
distress that surrounds this memory) was shared, however the women emphasised the trauma 
of this event - loss of relatives, livelihoods, homes, appliances and even panties.  Flash flood 
and lahar were remembered as the hazards that caused greatest damage.  Orense and Ikeda 
(2007) note that it was the lahar that caused the flood; the lahar sediments filled the Yawa 
River channel causing it to flood nearby.  According to PHIVOLCS, Binitayan was buried by 
debris (PHIVOLCS, 2006b).  The interviews were conducted in the home of Gloria Miranda, 
who described the lahar as reaching the ceiling of the house.  The researcher visited this 
barangay during the scoping visit in 2010 and during that visit and had the opportunity to 
wander round and observe the damage caused by this event.   The residents said that they 
spent 10 months in the evacuation centre after Reming.  After this typhoon, they also 
partnered with Local NGO A as part of their building disaster resilient communities campaign.  
They have conducted DRR training including participatory vulnerability and capacity 
assessments and typhoon tracking.   
Binitayan was one of areas worst affected by high discharge and overtopping of the Yawa 
River. The resulting 2-3 metres deposit is black, massive with clasts consisting of cobbles to 
boulders in coarse sandy matrix (PHIVOLCS, 2006b).  
Barangay Sua, Camalig 
This barangay is the closest to the volcano with one Purok (6) actually sitting within the 6km 
permanent danger zone.  Perla is a member of the Disaster Preparedness Committee and was 
so during typhoon Reming.  Given her role, she reflected on the barangay as a whole 
describing three casualties, property damage, homelessness, damaged farms and dead animals 
as some of the major impacts.  Personally, she was affected by heavy rains and wind her, 
whilst her neighbours (Purok 1) were affected by lahar.  Sua was affected by lahar deposition 
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and is at high risk from future lahar as a consequence of possible avulsion and flooding 
upstream (PHIVOLCS, 2006a).  Residents affected by the typhoon spent three months in the 
evacuation centre.  Members of this barangay were (and still are) working with Local NGO B 
before Typhoon Reming, along with a number of other international NGOs. 
Barangay San Antonio, Santo Domingo 
Irma and Antonio said that they were affected by the lahar but, whilst the roof was blown off 
their home, the concrete structure remained, however they lost a granddaughter during the 
disaster.  They live along the road perpendicular to the main channel.  It was observed from 
the edge of the channel that boulders of different sizes and the remnants of an earth dike that 
had a cement veneer one on one side but that had been breached remain.   According to 
PHIVOLCS, San Antonio was affected by hyperconcentrated flow and flood deposition of 
between 0.5m and 1m (PHIVOLCS, 2006a).  During typhoon Reming, 15 residents along the 
road sheltered in Irma and Antonio’s home.  They mentioned that they received no assistance 
with which to repair their home after the lahars.   
Barangay San Isidro, Santo Domingo 
Jerry said that his house (made of wood and reclaimed material) was blown over by the wind 
and completely destroyed by ‘the flood’ and he was briefly knocked unconscious by flying 
debris.  According to PHIVOLCS (2006a), San Isidro was affected by hyperconcentrated flow 
and flood deposition of between 3m and 4m.  He lives adjacent to an outwash plain where the 
rest of the barangay downstream was also badly affected by the lahar.  The flow that 
inundated here reached the sea.  He and his father returned after spending a day in an 
evacuation centre to rebuild their home.  They were given no help to do so and Jerry felt that 
the downstream residents badly affected by the lahar were seen as more of a priority by the 
barangay officials for resettlement than he and his father.    
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Appendix I: Mayon lahar database and associated rainfall 
 
Two tables containing details of the lahars studied for the purpose of evaluating the critical rainfall intensity threshold in Chapter 7.  Table 1 outlines the 
available data regarding the lahars and table 2 presents the data used in the analysis – the lahars, rainfall and time since the last eruption.  The 2001 lahar 
event mentioned in Table 6.1 (Chapter 6) is not included as its true date of occurrence could not be determined. 
 
Table 1 Lahars that have occurred between 1978 and the end of 2011. 
 
Event date 
Syn- or 
post-
eruptive 
Description of 
flow 
Duration Details Timing Location/impact 
General 
impact 
Velocity 
Volume/ 
Area 
Type of 
weather 
event 
Source of 
information 
30/06/1981 
Non-
eruptive Mudflows   
Heavy rain triggered 
lahars. 
Approx. 
20:00 
Mudflows triggered 
by continuous rains 
wept villages in the 
S and E sectors of 
Mayon.  40 killed, 9 
injured and 7 
missing.  Other 
casualties reported 
from the typhoon 
itself.       
Typhoon (or 
tropical 
storm?) 
Ramos-
Villarta et al. 
(1985); 
Smithsonian 
(O. Peña, 
COMVOL, 
Quezon City) 
13/09/1984 
Eruptive 
First debris flow 
pulse       
Maninila channel.  
[Not sure when but 
the lone casualty 
caused by the 
eruption was from a 
lahar; Umbal     
Total 
volume and 
area of 
inundation 
of the 1984 
lahars as   
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
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(1986)] estimated 
by Umbal 
(1986) as 
10^6m^3 
over an 
area 
3.9km^2 
(Rodolfo, 
1986) 
14/09/1984 
Eruptive 
Hot lahar 
(destructive 
mudflows) 
Estimates 
from half 
an hour to 
one to 
two hours 
or even 12 
hours. 
Followed by 12 hot 
lahars.   
S and SW sectors, 
inundated several 
barrios, destroyed 
the Padang and 
Lidong bridges, and 
spread a thin sheet 
of mudflow 
deposits over 
10,000 hectares of 
farmland around 
the base of the 
volcano.   2-5m/s - 
Ramos-
Villarta et al. 
(1985); 
Corpuz, 1985; 
Umbal (1985) 
16/09/1984 
Eruptive                 Corpuz (1985) 
18/09/1984 
(to 
19/09/1984
?) 
Eruptive                 Corpuz (1985) 
23/09/1984 
Eruptive 
Debris 
flow/mudflows/
stream flow   
23-24 three fluxes at 
3 hour intervals in 
Sto. Domingo Golg 
Couse channel 
(Okkerman et al., 
1985)   
Subsequent 
mudflows followed 
radiating gullies in 
the SE and E sectors 
where most 
pyroclastics were 
distributed as a 
result mainly of the 
23 and 25 
September 
eruptions.       Corpuz (1985) 
25/09/1984
-
26/09/1984 
Eruptive         
Subsequent 
mudflows followed 
radiating gullies in 
the SE and E sectors       Corpuz (1985) 
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where most 
pyroclastics were 
distributed as a 
result mainly of the 
23 and 25 
September 
eruptions. 
27/09/1984 
Eruptive     At least 5 flows   
Destroyed three 
sections of Legazpi-
Santo Domingo 
highway (8km SE 
volcano); two 
bridges along 
Mailipot-Santo 
Domingo highway 
(8km E volcano).        
Bulletin of 
Volcanic 
Eruptions 
(1987) 
11/10/84 Post-
eruptive Debris flow 1hr 5 min Debris flow signal   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel. 
Oct/Nov/Dec 
recorded as 
Misericorida 
SE Mayon).  
Cumulative 
area of 3.9km 
squared was 
affected 
between 
1984-1986.  
8000 hectares 
of arable land 
was destroyed 
resulting in 42 
million pesos 
worth of crop 
damage.  158 
houses were 
destroyed.  
Poisoning of 
    
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
12/10/84 Post-
eruptive Debris flow 1hr 10min 
Weak debris flow 
signal   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.     
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
14/10/84 Post-
eruptive Debris flow 1hr 10min 
Medium intensity 
debris flow signal   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.     
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
16/10/84 Post-
eruptive Debris flow 1hr 35min 
Weak debris flow 
signal   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.     
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
17/10/84 
Post-
eruptive Debris flow 1hr 20min     
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.     
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
19/10/84 Post-
eruptive Debris flow 1hr 20min 
Medium intensity 
debris flow signal?   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.     
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
20/10/84 
Post-
eruptive Debris flow 1hr 40min 
Strong debris flow 
signal   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.     
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
22/10/1984 
Post-
eruptive Debris flow 1hr 
Very strong debris 
flow   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.     
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
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28/10/84 
Post-
eruptive Debris flow 
Low 
intensity: 
40 min, 
50min; 
not 
stated: 
50min, 
40min 
4 flows: 2 weak; 2 not 
mentioned   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel. 
fruit bearing 
trees that 
survived flows 
(Umbal, 
1986).  
According to, 
Abundant 
loose ash and 
coarser ejecta 
in upper and 
middle slopes 
mobilised by 
intense 
rainfall into 
67 lahars.  
South-eastern 
sector lahars - 
as supply of 
loose 
volcaniclastic 
debris 
depleted, 
steady 
decrease of 
frequency of 
lahars.  Along 
32 gullies and 
channels in all 
sectors of the 
volcano; no 
casualties 
(Bulleting of 
Volcanic 
Eruptions, 
1987). 
    
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
05/11/84 
Post-
eruptive Mudflow 2hr 
Low intensity 
mudflow signal   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.     
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
09/11/84 
Post-
eruptive Debris flow 
1hr 
10min; 
>2hr 
(strong 
signal) 
2 flows (one strong 
signal)   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.     
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
10/11/84 
Post-
eruptive Debris flow 1hr 15min Signal detected   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.     
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
1/12/84 
Post-
eruptive Debris flow 30min Signal detected   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.     
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
30/12/84 
Post-
eruptive Debris flow >2hr 
Very strong debris 
flow   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.       
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
16/01/85 
Post-
eruptive Debris flow 1hr 15min Low intensity   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.       
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
26/01/85 
Post-
eruptive Debris flow 
1hr 30 
min 
Very strong debris 
flow signal   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.       
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
27/01/85 
Post-
eruptive Debris flow 
1hr for 
strong 
2 flows (very strong 
signal and low 
intensity)   
Basud pyroclastic 
fan/channel.       
Okkerman et 
al. (1985) 
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18/10/1985 
Post-
eruptive 
Lahar (debris 
flow) 
Lasted 9 
hours 
(according 
to 
residents) 
- 
unknown 
which 
proportio
ns were 
normal 
streamflo
w, 
hyperconc
entrated 
streamflo
w and 
debris 
flow. 
Typhoon Dot (Saling 
I).     
Generated debris 
flows that avulsed 
from the middle 
stretch of Mabinit 
Channel and buried 
large areas that had 
been unaffected by 
lahars since well 
before the 1984 
eruption.  Debris 
flows that avulsed 
from the middle 
stretch of the 
Mabinit Channel 
(over topped the 
lower reaches).  
Enhanced definition 
of the channels so 
that some of the 
cold flows were 
notably deeper 
than the hot debris 
of 1984 and thus 
overtopped in the 
lower reaches of 
the Mabinit channel 
where it was about 
5m deep.  
Minimum 
estimate 
of 3.8m/s 
(calculate
d utilising 
tendency 
of fluid 
flows to 
reach 
higher 
elevations 
on outside 
of the 
channel 
[Mabinit] 
bend) 
(Rodolfo 
et al., 
1989) 
[2.5-
4.75m/s - 
Rodolfo 
and 
Arguden 
(1990) 
(200000m^
2 x average 
1m thick)  Typhoon 
Rodolfo 
(1989); 
Rodolfo et al. 
(1989); 
Arguden and 
Rodolfo 
(1990); 
Rodolfo and 
Arguden 
(1991). 
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14/11/87-
15/11/87 
Non-
eruptive 
Lahar (major 
debris flow 
phase) ? 
Tropical storm 
Rosing.  Enhanced 
definition of the 
channels so that 
some of the cold 
flows were notably 
deeper than the hot 
debris of 1984 and 
thus overtopped in 
the lower reaches of 
the Mabinit channel 
where it was about 
5m deep.   
Mabinit Channel.  
[Not sure this is the 
correct record: 
Maximum of 45 
metres of lateral 
erosion and 2.5 
metres of vertical 
erosion during the 
passage of 
'Typhoon Rosing 
lahars']   
2-4 m/s 
(Arguden 
and 
Rodolfo, 
1990)   Tropical storm 
Rodolfo and 
Arguden 
(1991) 
20/11/1987 
Non-
eruptive 
Lahar (major 
debris flow 
phase)   
Exceptional heavy 
monsoon.  Major 
debris flow phase 
that caused large-
scale channel 
modification.   
Same site as Saling 
(275-268m) - minor 
avulsion.       Monsoon 
Rodolfo and 
Arguden 
(1991) 
14/08/1988 
Eruptive 
(increas
ed 
activity) Lahar   Lahar moved SE. 
Approx. 
21:00 
Basud, Matanag, 
and Mabinit gullies 
and was recorded 
on the Santa 
Misericordia Station 
(SMS) about 8 km E 
of the crater (figure 
4). Field 
observations 
indicated that the 
lahar eroded 1.3 m 
of the Matanag 
gully near the 
Buyuan-Matanag 
road.  Major 
overtopping 
extending to the 
Mabinit-Bonga road 
(2.8x10^5m^2)         
Smithsonian 
(PHIVOLCS) 
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area. 
29/09/1988 Increase
d 
activity Lahar   
Steaming; mudflow 
with a velocity of 2.3 
m/s   Basud gully         
Smithsonian 
(PHIVOLCS) 
12/10/1988 
Increase
d 
activity 
(VE) Lahar   
Mudflows detected 
by seismographs and 
mapping team.  
Basud lahar moved at 
2.5m/s. 
Between 
2347 and 
0141 the 
next 
morning 
(13th 
October) Basud gully         
Smithsonian 
(PHIVOLCS) 
23/10/1988 
Increase
d 
activity 
(VE) 
Lahar (major 
debris flow 
phase)   
Typhoon Ruby 
(Unsang) mudflows 
detected (by 
seismographs and by 
a lahar mapping 
team)       
2.75m/s 
(Arguden 
and 
Rodolfo, 
1990)   Typhoon 
Smithsonian 
(PHIVOLCS) 
04/11/1988 
Increase
d 
activity 
(VE) 
Lahar (major 
debris flow 
phase)   
Typhoon Skip 
(Yoning) may have 
brought the rainfall. 
Lahars detected (by 
seismographs and by 
a lahar mapping 
team)   SE and SW slopes       Typhoon? 
Smithsonian 
(PHIVOLCS); 
Rodolfo and 
Arguden 
(1991) - ref to 
Skip 
06/11/1988 Increase
d 
activity 
(VE) Lahar   
Lahar detected by 
seismographs and 
mapping team   SE and SW slopes       
From above 
typhoon? 
Smithsonian 
(PHIVOLCS) 
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20/11/1988 
Increase
d 
activity 
(VE) 
Lahar (major 
debris flow 
phase)   
Monsoon triggered 
mudflows detected 
by seismographs and 
mapping team   SE and SW slopes       
Monsoon 
(five days of 
antecedent 
rainfall that 
may be 
significant?) 
Smithsonian 
(PHIVOLCS); 
Rodolfo and 
Arguden 
(1991) 
21/11/1988 Increase
d 
activity 
(VE) Lahar   
Mudflows detected 
by seismographs and 
mapping team   SE and SW slopes         
Smithsonian 
(PHIVOLCS) 
14/02/1989 
Non-
eruptive 
Lahar (major 
debris flow 
phase)   
Monsoon triggered 
lahar with major 
debris flow phase.  
Major debris flow 
phase that caused 
large-scale channel 
modification.           Monsoon 
Rodolfo and 
Arguden 
(1991) 
10/10/1989 
(date of 
typhoon) 
Non-
eruptive 
Lahar (major 
debris flow 
phase)   
Typhoon Dan (Saling 
II)            Typhoon 
Smithsonian 
(PHIVOLCS); 
Rodolfo and 
Arguden 
(1991) 
18/02/1993
-
23/02/1993 
(reports of 
eruption 
ending in 
March 1993 
and 
04/04/1993
) 
Eruptive Hot lahars   
Hot lahars; last half of 
Feb, moderate to 
heavy rains on the SE 
flank remobilised the 
new pyroclastic 
deposits and 
generated small 
lahars.   Confined to gullies.         
Smithsonian 
(PHIVOLCS) 
  
433 
 
03/03/1993 
Eruptive Lahar   
Smell of sulphur 
noted five minutes 
prior to arrival of 
lahar at 15:30.  Knee-
deep and warm (but 
not boiling).  Little 
rainfall. 15:30           
Smithsonian 
(PHIVOLCS) 
02/11/1995 
Post-
eruptive Lahar   
Lahars generated by 
Typhoon Angela 
(Rosing).             Typhoon APSEMO 
21/10/1998
-
22/10/1998 Post-
eruptive     
Typhoon Babs 
(Loleng)   Unknown       Typhoon APSEMO 
03/03/2000 
Eruptive Lahar activity       
Anoling-Salvacion, 
Tumpa, Quirangay 
and Maninila 
Channels         
Catane et al. 
(2005) 
referencing 
Bornas et al. 
(2000) 
01/12/2004
-
02/12/2004 
Post-
eruptive Lahar   
Typhoon Yoyong 
induced lahars.  
According to a news 
report, strong rains 
brought by typhoon 
Yoyong in the 
Philippines caused 
lahars to flow down 
the stream channels 
of Mayon, particularly 
in the Padang 
settlement, and 
Legazpi City (~14 km 
SE of the volcano's 
summit). The 
Provincial Disaster 
Management Officer 
stated that the lahars   Padang and Legazpi       Typhoon 
Smithsonian 
(ABS-CBN 
News) 
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would not cause 
damage to homes or 
rice fields, and that 
villagers residing near 
the volcano were not 
asked to evacuate 
(GVP, 2004). 
27/09/2006 
Post-
eruptive 
Debris or 
hyperconcentra
ted?   
Typhoon Xangsane 
(Milenyo).     
Lidong and Padang 
(the occurrence in 
Padang highlighting 
the increased risk 
due to the stream 
piracy).       Typhoon 
PHIVOLCS 
(2007a and 
2007b) 
30/11/2006 
Post-
eruptive 
Debris flow and 
hyperconcentra
ted flows 
Until 
around 
5pm? 
Typhoon Durian 
(Reming).  Two to 
three pulses of debris 
flows and 
hyperconcentrated 
flows. 
(10:00 
and) 
14:00 
Guinobatan, 
Camalig, Daraga, 
Legazpi, Padang, 
Sto. Domingo.  Over 
100 deaths.       Typhoon 
Smithsonian 
(PHIVOLCS) 
25/07/2011
-
26/07/2011 
Post-
eruptive Lahar   
Tropical depression. One resident 
(Maipon) indicates that lahars 
occurred from 6am to 2pm on 25 
July, initial flows dumped 
sediments on the northern portion 
of the lahar field but shifted south 
to the barangay road between 8am 
and 10am.  But, rainfall at Legazpi 
station not particularly heavy until 
the evening of the 25th and into 
the 26th - did lahars occur on the 
Masarawag, 
Padang, Nabonton, 
and Basud Channels 
as well as in a new 
reactivated channel 
along the Legaspi-
Sto. Domingo 
Border.       
Tropical 
depression 
PHIVOLCS 
(2011a) 
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26th? 
 
 
Table 2 Lahars that have occurred between 1978 and the end of 2011, with the associated rainfall and time since the last eruption. 
 
Discrete event 
Syn, post or 
non-eruptive 
Type of weather event 
Time since last eruption 
(months) 
VEI of 
last 
eruption 
Volume of 
last eruption 
(million m
3
) 
Hourly rainfall intensity 
24 hours 12 hours 6 hours 
30/06/1981 Non-eruptive Typhoon 23.93 2 20 8.80 16.42 23.33 
13/09/1984 Eruptive   0.00 3   0.00 0.00 0.00 
14/09/1984 Eruptive 
 
0.00 3   T T 0.00 
16/09/1984 Eruptive   0.00 3   0.23 0.45 0.90 
18/09/1984 Eruptive   0.00 3   0.16 0.27 0.37 
23/09/1984 Eruptive   0.00 3   0.05 0.08 0.13 
25/09/1984-
26/09/1984 Eruptive   0.00 3   0.21 0.43 0.83 
27/09/1984 Eruptive   0.00 3   0.39 0.75 1.33 
11/10/1984 Post-eruptive   0.20 3 70 2.27 4.53 9.07 
12/10/1984 Post-eruptive   0.23 3 70 0.38 0.75 1.50 
14/10/1984 Post-eruptive   0.30 3 70 0.31 0.62 0.97 
16/10/1984 Post-eruptive   0.36 3 70 1.33 2.67 5.33 
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17/10/1984 Post-eruptive   0.39 3 70 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19/10/1984 Post-eruptive   0.46 3 70 2.18 2.50 3.70 
20/10/1984 Post-eruptive   0.49 3 70 1.78 3.50 6.83 
22/10/1984 Post-eruptive   0.56 3 70 0.59 1.03 1.97 
28/10/1984 Post-eruptive   0.76 3 70 2.93 5.48 6.13 
05/11/1984 Post-eruptive   1.02 3 70 0.55 1.10 2.03 
09/11/1984 Post-eruptive   1.15 3 70 2.79 4.30 5.33 
10/11/1984 Post-eruptive   1.18 3 70 0.37 0.55 1.10 
1/12/1984 Post-eruptive   1.87 3 70 0.91 1.28 2.03 
30/12/1984 Post-eruptive   2.83 3 70 1.47 2.83 4.87 
16/01/1985 Post-eruptive   3.39 3 70 2.06 4.02 5.67 
26/01/1985 Post-eruptive   3.71 3 70 1.73 2.62 3.07 
27/01/1985 Post-eruptive   3.75 3 70 2.41 3.15 3.63 
18/10/1985 Post-eruptive Typhoon 12.43 3 70 3.43 6.37 9.00 
14/11/1987-
15/11/1987 Non-eruptive Tropical storm 35.34 3 70 3.12 4.37 5.00 
20/11/1987 Non-eruptive Monsoon 35.54 3 70 0.95 3.60 3.80 
14/08/1988 Eruptive 
(increased 
activity)   44.35 3 70 0.02 0.03 0.07 
29/09/1988 Increased 
activity   45.86 3 70 0.03 0.05 0.07 
12/10/1988 Increased 
activity (VE)   46.29 3 70 3.53 5.60 8.50 
23/10/1988 Increased 
activity (VE) Typhoon 46.65 3 70 3.31 5.57 8.03 
04/11/1988 Increased 
activity (VE) Typhoon? 47.04 3 70 4.57 5.73 8.07 
06/11/1988 Increased 
activity (VE) From above typhoon? 47.11 3 70 6.66 18.27 11.00 
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20/11/1988 Increased 
activity (VE) Monsoon 47.57 3 70 7.66 11.55 17.13 
21/11/1988 Increased 
activity (VE)   47.60 3 70 2.35 3.22 4.10 
14/02/1989 Non-eruptive Monsoon 50.43 3 70 12.84 18.47 20.30 
10/10/1989 (date of 
typhoon) Non-eruptive Typhoon 58.25 3 70 4.47 6.68 7.97 
03/03/1993 Eruptive   0.00 2   1.25 2.31 2.55 
02/11/1995 Non-eruptive Typhoon 33.07 2 50 14.42 18.67 28.33 
21/10/1998-
22/10/1998 Non-eruptive Typhoon 68.74 2 50 13.08 15.18 20.00 
03/03/2000 Eruptive   0.00 3   1.39 1.84 3.68 
01/12/2004-
02/12/2004 Non-eruptive Typhoon 39.88 3 54.3 5.76 9.75 10.20 
27/09/2006 Non-eruptive Typhoon 61.74 3 54.3 9.83 16.53 25.00 
30/11/2006 Non-eruptive Typhoon 62.82 3 54.3 20.38 38.83 47.50 
25/07/2011 Non-eruptive Tropical depression 18.74 3 54.3 7.13 3.27 2.03 
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Appendix J: Data from multi-hazard feedback questionnaire 
The following information is from the 11 responses (A-1), including the ‘no response’, to the 
question: In your experience please list three core barriers to assessing multi-hazards.  This 
question comprised part of a feedback form from the 21st June 2012 Interagency Resilience 
Working Group Workshop - Integrating Science into humanitarian and development work to 
enhance resilience, linking science and traditional community knowledge.  See Appendix A for 
more details of this event. 
 
In your experience please list three core barriers to assessing multi-hazards 
A 
(1) Short-term thinking. 
(2) Not seen as a priority. 
(3) Lack of understanding. 
B 
(4) The lack of scientific knowledge within organisation. 
(5) Resource constraints for multi-hazard approach 
C 
[NO ANSWER] 
D 
(1) Local knowledge of where to access relevant scientific knowledge 
(2) Challenge of interpreting that information 
(3) Lack of capacity in country (and UK) project teams to do the above 
E 
(1) Silos of expertise (different tables echo this) 
(2) PCVAs – good for comprehensive approaches but not necessarily easy to bring in 
science. 
(3) Related – community driven – focusing on most salient risks. 
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F 
(1) Understanding the full system(s) – political, social, economic, environmental – they 
occur in. 
(2) NGO culture and dependency culture destroying local knowledge 
(3) Political will to address real underlying issues/causes. 
G 
(1) The way knowledge is often ‘siloed’ – lack of integration. 
H 
(1) Lack of organisational interest 
(2) Difficulty of getting funds to doing multi-hazard assessments 
(3) We are reactive organisations; contingency planning has a chequered history in NGOs 
I 
(1) Tendency to focus on the most recent event 
(2) Not able to cope with the complexity of multiple hazards 
(3) Looking at different hazards in isolation rather than understanding the interplay 
between them 
J 
(1) Scientific info too general (covers large area). 
(2) Translating local knowledge (sometime too localised). 
(3) Linking various disciplines in country. 
K 
(1) Lack of knowledge and awareness of multi-hazard analysis. 
(2) For NGO, many times assessments are donor-driven, therefore focus on specific issues. 
 
 
 
440 
 
Appendix K: Guidelines for integrating science 
The following pages (441 to 490) contain a copy of the guidelines for ‘integrating science into 
humanitarian and development planning and practice for enhancing community resilience’ by 
Duncan et al. (2014). The copy of the guidelines includes its original page numbering. 
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Full guidelines 
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Co-authors: Kate Crowley (CAFOD), Ros Cornforth (AfClix), Stephen Edwards (UCL), Richard 
Ewbank (Christian Aid), Parisa Karbassi (CAFOD), Charlie McLaren (UKCDS), Jose Luis Penya 
(Christian Aid), Alice Obrecht (HFP), Susanne Sargeant (BGS), Emma Visman (HFP)  
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Cover photo: Dr Megan French of University College London (UCL) collects samples for water quality analysis in the Bolivian 
Altiplano with Efrain Blanco Coariti of the Instituto de Investigaciones Químicas, Universidad Mayor de San Andres, Bolivia, 
a local partner of the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD).  The research is coordinated by the UCL-CAFOD 
partnership.  Source: M. French, February 2013. 
Purpose of the guidelines 
These guidelines are for humanitarian and development practitioners looking to effectively integrate relevant 
scientific understandings of risk within their humanitarian/development planning and practice, for the purpose 
of enhancing community resilience.  Beginning with an introduction to what science is and how it might be 
used, followed by a breakdown of the key components for integrating science these guidelines encourage 
practitioners to think about the types of scientific information and expertise that they may need, how to 
access and use them, and how to ensure that they are applied in an ethical and accountable manner. Each 
section concludes with a checklist of key questions practitioners should consider throughout the process. 
These guidelines are not exhaustive or prescriptive instead the aim is to enable practitioners to ask useful 
questions that will ultimately help them to apply science in their planning and operational decision-making.  
While the authors acknowledge that invaluable knowledge resides in communities at risk, the draft guidelines 
are about how to utilise scientific and technical expertise from external institutions. 
The intended audience is those practitioners looking to integrate science information at any stage of the 
project cycle.  Discussed are the wider scale application of science and some of the organisational challenges in 
fostering partnerships with scientists, thus this document is also of interest for management and across 
different departments within an organisation.   
The objectives of the guidelines are as follows: 
 to describe what science is and how it can be applied to humanitarian and development planning and 
practice in order to build resilience; 
 to provide some initial guidance to NGO practitioners upon how they can access and use science; 
 to demonstrate that engagement with scientists is through multi-stakeholder co-production of 
knowledge; 
 to emphasise the need for ethical, credible and mutually beneficial engagement with science and 
scientists; 
 to emphasise the need to monitor and evaluate the impact of integrating science; 
 to highlight how to overcome the common pitfalls NGOs face when integrating science into their 
activities and how to overcome them.   
The internalisation of science within NGOs is important; thus it is the recommendation of the authors that to 
complement the guidelines, NGOs need to incorporate scientific training within the professional development 
of relevant staff.   
The authors acknowledge that a paired document for scientists to better understand how practitioners can 
receive, understand and influence scientific research is also required. 
 
 
 iv | P a g e  
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction: What is science and why is it useful? ........................................................................... 1 
Case study 1: Integrating science at different scales – reflections from Bangladesh ..................... 3 
Where is the entry point for integrating science? ........................................................................... 4 
Section 1: Defining the problem to be addressed .............................................................................. 6 
What is the problem to be addressed? ........................................................................................... 7 
Where are the current knowledge gaps? ........................................................................................ 7 
What information is needed? ......................................................................................................... 8 
Section 2: Access to scientists and availability of data, information and knowledge ........................ 9 
Open-source materials .................................................................................................................. 10 
Asking an expert ............................................................................................................................ 11 
Collaborative research projects and formal partnerships ............................................................. 12 
Section 3: Understanding science and assessing its credibility ........................................................ 16 
Qualitative versus quantitative ..................................................................................................... 17 
Quality and credibility ................................................................................................................... 17 
Section 4: Applying scientific information and methods .................................................................. 24 
Opportunities for applying science ............................................................................................... 25 
Ethics and accountability .............................................................................................................. 31 
Section 5: Measuring the impact of science integration .................................................................. 34 
What do we mean by the impact of science? ............................................................................... 34 
Why do we want to measure the impact of integrating science? ................................................ 35 
When is impact measured? ........................................................................................................... 37 
How do we measure the impact of science? ................................................................................. 37 
Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 40 
References ............................................................................................................................................ 41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v | P a g e  
 
Executive summary 
There has been an increased emphasis upon the application of science for humanitarian and 
development planning, decision-making and practice; particularly in the context of understanding, 
assessing and anticipating risk (e.g. HERR, 2011).  However, there remains very little guidance for 
practitioners on how to integrate sciences they may have had little contact with in the past (e.g. 
climate).  This has led to confusion as to which ‘science’ might be of use and how it would be best 
utilised.  Furthermore, since this integration has stemmed from a need to be more predictive, 
agencies are struggling with the problems associated with uncertainty and probability.   
Whilst a range of expertise is required to build resilience, these guidelines focus solely upon the 
relevant information, knowledge and perspective which scientists can provide, that typically lie 
outside of current humanitarian and development NGO approaches.  However, the process of 
building resilience involves the communication and co-production of knowledge across a number of 
stakeholders, including the community knowledge of the risks they face.  The process of integration 
of science should, therefore, be mutually beneficial to all stakeholders.  
Integrating science requires an iterative process of engagement through the continual revisiting of 
the components of five activities: 
1. Defining the problem to be addressed:  
 
Do you (the practitioner) 
know what sort of 
information you require? 
Begin by identifying and defining the problem to be addressed.  This 
will help establish an aim and set of objectives to determine what sort 
of information is necessary and, thus, know what questions to ask of 
scientists.  Knowing what questions to ask is a key enabler in obtaining 
access to scientists: it is easier to build a dialogue around an initial set 
of questions, rather than a vague concept.  Having a clear aim and a 
set of objectives will also help in monitoring and evaluating the success 
or failure of the integration of science. 
 
2. Accessing the scientific information, knowledge and expertise:  
 
Do you know where and 
how to access scientific 
information?   
Science can be accessed both through open-sources and directly with 
scientists. A particularly effective mechanism of engagement is 
through partnerships with scientific organisations.  Engagement with 
local scientists helps to ensure sustainability of this knowledge 
exchange and the process of integration should aim to be inclusive of 
all relevant stakeholders and experts. Partnerships take time, 
commitment and resources to build and they may take time to deliver 
benefit.  However, by proactively setting up a partnership that 
involves good communication with scientists, a relationship will exist 
in advance of immediate needs and, as such, scientists are more likely 
to be available in the event of a demand for information under short 
time constraints. 
 
3. Understanding the science and assessing its credibility:  
 
Do you, your partners and 
the communities you work 
Practitioners and other users of science need skills to determine the 
credibility and uncertainty of the science they are using and whether 
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with understand the 
science?   
or not it is fit for purpose.  There are basic measures that can be 
adopted to ensure the scientific information is trustworthy and 
representative of the real world. Seeking out more than one source of 
information and appreciating scientific debate are just some of the 
ways in which the quality and relevance of scientific information can 
be verified. 
4. Applying scientific information and methods:  
 
Do you know how to apply 
scientific information and 
methods in an ethical and 
accountable manner? 
Whilst scientists and NGOs are both bound by ethical/accountability 
frameworks alike, it is important to have an agreed set of values prior 
to meeting with a community.  Accountability mechanisms should be 
put in place to protect scientists, NGOs and communities.  
 
5. Measuring the impact of the science integration:  
 
Do you know how to 
measure the impact of 
science integration within 
your project? 
The impact of integrating science can be measured in order to 
determine whether there has been a positive (or negative) change to a 
vulnerable communities’ situation.  This can be achieved throughout 
the programme cycle but requires the monitoring of science 
integration within the project or programme framework from the 
start.  
 
Key considerations when integrating and using science: 
Managing expectations: Being aware of the limits of science and scientists will help to facilitate 
partnerships with scientists, who should also be aware of the 
expectations of communities, and the constraints upon them that may 
affect their ability to participate. 
 
Knowing the suitable 
entry point: 
Ideally science (just as with any other relevant knowledge) should be 
used to inform the analysis for and design of any implementation 
activity.  However there may be instances where it is more appropriate 
to introduce different types of science later in the project cycle. 
 
Science integration should 
be a positive and 
beneficial process for all 
parties involved:   
Using science should not be burdensome if the process of engagement 
is well managed and a proactive approach to accessing the science is 
adopted.  Practitioners should not be put off by uncertainty as all 
decisions are based on a degree of uncertainty, which should stimulate 
debate that leads to improved decision making.  
 
Communities are 
interested in and can 
understand science:   
If well communicated, communities can deal with a number of 
scientific concepts and uncertainty and make well informed decisions 
based on this and their own knowledge and understanding.  They can 
also inform the science and participate in scientific research. 
 
 
In conclusion being able to evaluate the credibility of the information and co-produce the 
knowledge to inform decision-making and action through partnerships with scientists and good 
communication and understanding of the science will improve projects and build an evidence base 
to inform future research strategies and influence donor funding for this type of work. 
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Definitions 
Community: a group of people living in the same area or close to the same risks and/or with common 
interests, values, activities and structures.  Communities are, however, complex and not always 
united. They have socio-economic differentiations, linkages and dynamics that contribute to 
vulnerability.  Communities do not exist in isolation – a level of a community’s resilience is also 
influenced by capacities outside the community1.  For the purposes of this document, we use the term 
‘community’ to refer to ‘community at risk’. 
Integrated science: the incorporation of all the relevant, available and credible sources of natural 
and social scientific information and knowledge deemed essential for solving a 
humanitarian/development problem and thereby contributing to increased resilience. 
Resilience: the capacity of an individual, household, population group or system to anticipate, absorb 
and recover from shocks and stresses without compromising long term prospects. Resilience is not a 
fixed end state, but is a dynamic set of conditions and processes2. 
Science:  pursuit and application of knowledge and understanding of the natural and social world 
following a systematic methodology based on evidence3. 
Scientist: a person who works in the advancement of science, either natural or social, typically 
working within a specific scientific discipline.  In the context of this document, a scientist is seen as 
someone with knowledge and expertise that have potential application to resilience building. 
Practitioner: a person who applies their expert knowledge to a certain profession, in these guidelines 
this refers primarily to the development and humanitarian sector. 
                                                          
1
 Modified from Twigg, J. 2007.  Characteristics of a disaster resilient community: A guidance note.  DFID Disaster Risk 
2
 Modified from Turnball et al., 2013.  Towards Resilience. Emergency Capacity Building Project. 
3
 Science Council, 2013.  What is science? Available online: http://www.sciencecouncil.org/definition 
 
Most of the fundamental ideas of science are essentially 
simple, and may, as a rule, be expressed in a language 
comprehensible to everyone – Professor Albert Einstein  
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Introduction: What is science and why is it useful? 
  
Science is the ‘pursuit of knowledge and understanding of the natural and social world following a 
systematic methodology based on evidence’4.  Natural science is comprised of those branches of 
science that attempt to understand the rules that govern the natural world, typically through 
quantitative scientific methods, whilst social science is the study of people and society and typically 
adopts qualitative as well as quantitative approaches to data collection and analysis (see section 3 
for an explanation of qualitative and quantitative data).  Through scientific research, theories and 
models are constantly refined so that they become closer to reality.  However, it is important to 
remember that these will never fully represent the real world and that there will always be 
uncertainty.   
In terms of building resilience ‘science’ and ‘technology’ are very much complementary, but they are 
not the same; technology (along with engineering) refers more to the application of scientific 
knowledge5. 
Science is often used indiscriminately to refer to data, information, knowledge, expertise and 
research.  Data are the observations made (raw facts) that are of little usable value, until the actor 
inserts meaning6 and refines the data into information, which is ultimately transformed (through 
individual experience and values) into knowledge, by trading and evaluating information through 
dialogue7.   
The aspiration of science integration should be the co-production and co-application of knowledge 
for the purposes of building resilience: 
‘Seeing information and knowledge as components of adaptive capacity would 
encourage actors to put more emphasis on giving people a wider range of 
information, appropriate to a much wider range of circumstances and future 
scenarios; giving people the tools to find information for themselves; and turning 
information into knowledge by supporting people’s ability to use the information for 
decision-making.’ (Levine et al., 2011: viii). 
In order to be useful scientific information must be based upon rigorous methodologies and 
research principles, so as to ensure the credible collection and robust analysis and reporting of data.  
These principles include making sound observations and conducting experiments, so that one 
researcher could replicate the experiment and findings of another.  Furthermore, scientists 
continually challenge and ask questions of existing theories in order to improve and progress 
scientific understanding.   
In terms of humanitarian and development planning and practice and decision-making, scientific 
information and methods can help inform decision-making in many ways: 
                                                          
4
 Science Council, 2013.  What is science? Available online: http://www.sciencecouncil.org/definition 
5
 Conway, G. and Waage, J., 2010.  Science and Innovation for Development.  UK Collaborative on Development Sciences. 
6
 Davenport, T. H. and Prusak, L., 1998. Working Knowledge. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Massachusetts. 
7
 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 2005.  World Disaster Report, 2005.  Focus on 
information in disasters.     
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 scientists use theories and techniques for modelling (creating visual representation of 
situations or scenarios) and extrapolation (making conclusions when there no data); 
 models can be used to build scenarios and make predictions in order to anticipate risk, as 
well as explain environmental change and human behaviour, within varying degrees of 
certainty;  
 science can be used to support or validate other sources of knowledge (e.g. local knowledge) 
and the two can inform each other;  
 scientific information and understanding can help to interpret processes at many scales, 
from local level flooding to global climate change that may affect communities;  
 the scientific approach encompasses a set of methods that can help to ensure the credible 
and accountable collection, analysis and reporting of data, as well as rigorous methods with 
which to tackle a problem (e.g. hypothesis testing). 
In terms of project cycle management (PCM)8, scientific information and knowledge can be of great 
assistance during the analysis phase, helping to shape the project design and intervention strategy. 
In the long-run, this will save time, resources and reduce the possibility of oversights.  Where 
possible, science should therefore be included from the outset of the PCM process with engagement 
continuing throughout the duration of the project.  The impact of science integration should, 
therefore, be continuously monitored and reviewed throughout the project or programme, with 
methods for monitoring established from the outset.    
 
Figure 1: The inner circle represents the PCM stages, whilst the outer circle represents the stages of science production. Source: adapted 
from the EC manual: project cycle management 2001 
                                                          
8
 Turnball et al., 2013.  Towards Resilience. Emergency Capacity Building Project. 
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Science integration 
 
For the purpose of these guidelines, we define science integration as the incorporation of all the 
relevant, available and credible sources of natural and social scientific information and knowledge 
deemed essential for solving a humanitarian/development problem and thereby contributing to 
increased resilience.  Science can be applied at a number of scales, even within a single project or 
activity.  Reflections from a knowledge-exchange partnership project in Bangladesh demonstrate 
some of these multi-scale opportunities for engaging with science (see case study 1).  
 
Case study 1: Integrating science at different scales – reflections from Bangladesh 
In terms of building resilience, Bangladesh faces many challenges, not least because of the range of hazards, 
both natural and man-made, to which it is exposed; a single community could be exposed to arsenic 
contamination, cyclones, flooding and earthquakes. Although Bangladesh is particularly known for its exposure 
to weather- and water-related hazards, it also has a history of very large earthquakes – some as large as 
magnitude 8; however, there have been no earthquakes greater than magnitude 7 since the 1930s, and there is 
no community memory of such events.  
 
For practitioners, this is where integrating science into projects can be extremely valuable and supplement the 
community understanding of risk (here, for raising community awareness of the threat in general and for 
informing operational decisions for a particular scenario). Other examples include using scientific understanding 
of arsenic contamination to identify safe water sources. One of the challenges here is to build resilience to 
hazards with different annual probabilities (i.e. cyclones happen relatively frequently but large earthquakes are 
comparatively more rare). 
 
Scientific information is available at the international, national, sub-national and community scale and research 
and monitoring are being undertaken by local and international scientists, often working together. However, 
available information is often fragmented, and may not be easily accessed or found in peer-reviewed journals 
(because the research has been commissioned specifically for a particular purpose).  
 
 National Sub-national Local 
Risk assessment: 
understanding the source 
and nature of the problem 
and anticipating disasters 
with confidence. 
National and 
international scientists 
are involved in 
developing information 
to inform the national 
Comprehensive 
Disaster Management 
Programme 
National and 
international scientists 
have developed 
earthquake scenarios for 
Dhaka, Sylhet and 
Chittagong and there are 
plans to extend this to 
other cities 
Provision of daily/seasonal 
weather forecasts to farmers; 
locally relevant data; basic 
earthquake information is 
available from the 
Meteorological Department 
Awareness raising and 
education 
  Education about disasters from 
unsafe drinking water to what to 
do during an earthquake 
Technology  Developing low-cost 
sanitation techniques 
applicable to context 
ICTs to provide market 
information to local farmers to 
inform decision-making 
Communication Knowledge 
dissemination to 
policy-makers. 
  
Table 1: Examples of the integration of science for different purposes and scales in Bangladesh 
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Figure 2: caritas Bangladesh worked with the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology to survey salinity levels in the soil 
and test a solar powered water purification system. This has created a new long term relationship between scientists and practitioner, 
in addition to enabling new innovations and ideas to improve the health of families such as Kakoli and her son Ruhan pictured here. 
Source: Kate Crowley, CAFOD. 
Where is the entry point for integrating science? 
Any project, programme or strategy should be informed by a rigorous analysis of the problem using 
all available relevant information and data, and yet there is a tendency to bring in science at the end 
of this analysis (or not at all).  Ideally, integrating science should occur throughout a NGO’s way of 
working; however this requires strategic decision-making and even a degree of organisational 
change.  A natural existing entry/starting point for integrating science is via projects.  Evidence of 
impact through integrating science within projects can be used to inform management about the 
benefits and limits of integrating science, which could shape strategic planning9.  Similarly, through 
engagement with NGOs, communities and other users of science, scientists can gain a better 
understanding of what research is required and, therefore, help to better inform future research 
strategies. 
Consulting with scientists from the very outset can help to ensure that the range of risk is fully 
considered.  In reality, however, some expertise or information may only be recognised as necessary 
further down the line.  Close consideration of the entry point for science is necessary in order to 
manage expectations of all stakeholders as well as, in the case of community participation, ensuring 
empowerment of and co-ownership of the process by the community.   
                                                          
9
 See ELRHA case study 3: A research and knowledge sharing partnership between UCL and CAFOD 
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Integrating science is not simply about the application of science but, through the process of 
engaging with science, the learning that is acquired and the integration of all relevant information in 
order to co-produce knowledge between stakeholders (e.g. scientists, NGOs and communities) of 
the risks communities face and what they must do to address these. 
For the purpose of these guidelines, the integration of science should be considered as an iterative 
process within a cycle that can be subdivided into five components: 
 
Figure 3: The five components of integrating science. 
In the cycle, the implementation of one activity may necessitate going round this cycle several times 
as the scientific information changes and is updated.  For example, you may feel that the problem 
has been identified from the outset, however it may only become apparent on engaging with 
scientists and trying to apply the science what the true or underlying problem really is.  The purpose 
of describing the process of integrating science as a series of components is simply to frame the 
main areas for consideration and demonstrate how to address them with evidence from existing 
case studies in Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Philippines, as well 
as fictional examples.  At the beginning of each section there is a checklist of the key questions you 
as a practitioner need to consider when integrating science. 
 
1. Definition 
of the 
problem 
2. Accessing 
science 
3. Understand-
ing the science 
4. Applying 
the science 
5. Evaluating 
the impact 
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Section 1: Defining the problem to be solved and the purpose of integrating 
science 
 
There are a number of scientific disciplines that can assist in building resilience; therefore it is 
important to clearly define the problem to be solved and the information and expertise that will 
be required.  It is understandable that it may not always be possible to know which science is 
required, so it is advisable to consult with experts either within (e.g. technical advisors) or external 
(e.g. academics in universities or national scientific agencies) to you organisation.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The type of scientific information, knowledge and methods required will vary across projects and 
programmes depending on the problem needing to be addressed.  By first identifying and defining 
the problem you (and the community) will have a clearer understanding of the purpose of 
integrating scientific information and knowledge and, as such:   
 An initial understanding of what scientific information is required, which will help you to 
know what relevant and focused questions should be asked of a scientist.   
 A reference point against which you can monitor the process and impact of integrating 
science from the outset of engagement. 
Have you clearly defined the problem to be addressed?  
Do you have a clear purpose for applying science? 
How will the application of science benefit the community/the project 
objectives? 
Do you have an initial understanding of what data, information and 
knowledge is required? 
Have you thought of some initial questions to ask of scientists?  
Have you considered what you need to be monitoring to ensure that 
you measure the impact of integrating science from the outset?  
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It is important to be flexible in defining a problem (setting out the purpose of integrating science), as 
this is likely to alter once you start to gather the necessary scientific information.  Communities’ may 
have a perception of what the problem is, but additional information may highlight other concerns 
that they were previously unaware of. Furthermore, where possible be proactive and anticipate 
what you may have to address before the onset of a humanitarian crisis. 
The questions below and in the checklist above are designed to help you think through the purpose 
of integrating science and are exemplified using a fictional example of a project. 
What is the problem to be addressed?  
Say, for example, that the community are describing an increase in the frequency and severity of 
flooding.  You wonder whether it might be due to changing climate but you do not have any 
evidence to support this.  You suspect that there might be other local influences on the frequency 
and severity of flooding but the evidence presented by the community gives little indication of this.  
You hope that, by using what science is available, you/the community will be able to identify the 
triggers for flooding and therefore take the appropriate action to reduce local vulnerability.  In this 
example, the aim of integrating science could be: 
 To determine the cause of increased frequency and severity of flooding and inform local 
communities to enable them to adapt their Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) strategies 
accordingly. 
In order to realise this aim, a set of objectives might include: 
 investigate relevant and credible10 background scientific information services (e.g. from the 
web, scientific journals); 
 seek advice from an appropriate scientist or scientific institution; 
 conduct an analysis to determine the frequency and severity of flooding with the scientist’s 
and community’s knowledge; 
 hold a workshop for disseminating the results of this analysis; 
 promote DRR strategies that utilise this information. 
Before seeking out scientific information and expertise, it is useful to think about what the current 
knowledge and information gaps are, in order to help determine with whom might be the best 
person to consult.  
Where are the current knowledge gaps? 
Continuing with the above example, the community may recollect several periods where flooding 
was more frequent but not nearly as bad as it is now.  One family show you the height of the most 
recent flood which left a watermark against the outside wall of their house and indicate the floods 
20 years ago only reached half this height.   
                                                          
10
 See section 3 
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Figure 4: Community members pointing out the depth of flood waters during 2011 in Mongla, Bangladesh. Source: Kate Crowley, 
CAFOD. 
You estimate the recent flood height as two metres above the current river height.  Only one or two 
members of the community are able to evidence the change in flood height, the rest discuss it 
relatively (higher or lower than before); but all agree there has been an increase in the number and 
severity of floods.  They describe different types of flood (e.g. fast, slow; from the river or from 
rainfall) but using their own descriptions and language.  You want to compare this to changes in 
rainfall but you do not have access to records for the area or do not know where to get them.  You 
are not aware of any maps to show how land use planning may have changed and consequently 
affected flooding (e.g. deforestation); although the community are unaware of any local changes.    
What information is needed? 
You deem it necessary to determine whether there is any supporting information that could help 
check the information provided by the community as well as explain the reasons for the changes in 
flood frequency and severity.  In the long-term, it would be useful to establish a systematic method 
of measuring flood levels and rainfall; for example measuring the flood level at the same location 
using a river level gauge or predefined marker against a building each time it floods would ensure a 
reliable baseline of data are being gathered.  In the short-term, more information on changes in local 
land use planning, along with information on previous floods, rainfall records and any available flood 
hazard maps would prove useful.  An expert in water basin management could help to determine 
whether factors beyond the reach of the community, for example engineering structures upstream, 
are influencing the occurrence of flooding here.  It is at this stage that you realise that you need to 
seek some advice upon which information is available and can be utilised for your purpose.  The next 
section explores how to access this information. 
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Section 2: Access to scientists and availability of data, information and 
knowledge 
 
Integration can only be successful if usable, credible and context relevant science is available and 
accessible.  Whether you can find the information and whether the information is fit for purpose 
will vary according to the nature of the problem being addressed and the country where it is being 
applied.  
There are a number of opportunities through which you and your organisation may access science, 
ranging from accessing information that is readily available (e.g. on the internet) to establishing a 
formalised partnership with a scientific organisation.  The level of engagement will depend upon 
the context of the problem being addressed; however we advocate the use of partnerships as a 
key mechanism for delivering the scientific information to those who most need it.  It is important 
to recognise that engaging with science does not necessarily involve new research; there is an 
abundance of existing information and knowledge that could prove useful to NGOs and 
communities. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
What level engagement with science will help address the problem? 
Does your organisation already partner/work closely with a 
university? 
Do you know where the sources of science are within the country 
you are working? 
Have you conducted a power analysis of science sources? 
Is the available scientific information suited to your purpose? 
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Open-source materials 
In the first instance, you may look for whatever science there is to hand through open-source11  
materials, such as websites, reports and some academic journals. The analysis of secondary data12 is 
a necessary preparatory step in participatory capacity and vulnerability assessments (PCVA)13.  This 
being the case, there may be a number of relevant sources of information including: 
 Maps: hazard, vulnerability and risk maps; land use maps; geological maps; conservation 
maps (e.g. native species mapping), etc. 
 Risk assessments e.g. national geological survey reports 
 Online databases e.g. EM-DAT http://www.emdat.be/  
 Environmental information e.g. water quality, deforestation, land use, etc. 
 Historical records e.g. historical narratives, databases of previous disasters; information on 
previous agricultural techniques and mitigation methods 
The benefit of open-source materials is that they are free and often quick to access – useful under 
time constraints and limited resources.  The drawback is that it is up to you, as the user, to assess 
the credibility of the information available.  Scientific information published in academic journals is 
subject to peer-review, in other words assessed for its credibility and robustness by other scientists.  
Not all the information online is subject to such scrutiny and some may reflect the opinions of those 
writing it, rather than having any factual basis.  Many of the reports available online are classed as 
grey literature - information produced by government, academia, business and industry and NGOs in 
both print and electronic formats that is not controlled by commercial publishers (i.e. where 
publishing is not the primary activity of the producing body)14.  It is also necessary to determine 
whether the information is suited to purpose and it is important to be aware that:  
 Information may not be at the appropriate geographic scale – maps may exaggerate or 
‘hide’ local differences in (for example) poverty levels; the data used to create the map may 
be coarse (limited data averaged over large geographical areas) that is impossible to 
downscale the information to the community level e.g. national or global scale maps. 
 Data, maps or models may be out of date.  Scientific understanding is advancing constantly 
and sometimes these advances can be significant.  It is therefore important to try to 
ascertain when the information was developed. 
 There may be a requirement to convert the science into non-technical language in order to 
communicate it to other stakeholders, including the community. 
 The most readily available, understandable and attractive information may not necessarily 
be the best. 
 You need the knowledge and skills to assess whether the information available is credible 
(see section 3 for credibility). 
                                                          
11
 Information that is freely available compared with information that must be subscribed to (e.g. a number of academic 
journals). 
12
 Primary data is collected and analysed by you, whilst secondary data is collected by others examples of secondary data 
sources include newspapers, journal articles and other publications. 
13
 For example ACF’s Participatory Risk, Capacity & Vulnerability Analysis 
14
 Schopfel J. and Farace D.J., Grey literature. In: Bates M.J. and Maack M.N. (eds.) Encyclopedia of Library and Information 
Sciences. 3rd ed., London  England: CRC Press; 2010:2029–2039. 
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Asking a science expert 
Knowing who to ask may not always be obvious but there are a number of organisations local or 
international that may be able to provide expertise: 
 
Initial consultation with an expert is likely to be informal, and dependent on your and their 
availability.  You should be aware that there are differences in partnership approaches between 
those scientists work within a university (often referred to as academics), and those who work for 
institutions (public and private) such as national meteorological agencies or geological surveys. 
Differences include but are not limited to institutional or personal reputations, approach to taking 
on new work, contracts and administrative requirements, and flexibility.  Whilst some scientists may 
be happy to engage others may not because of: 
 a lack of time (or not timely enough); 
 a lack of willingness to engage (not willing or able to share information); 
 a reluctance to engage owing to concerns over whether they may be held accountable for 
use/misuse of the information they provide; 
 a lack of understanding of how they can communicate their science. 
The capacity and knowledge of local scientists will vary from country to country.  Politics can 
influence the integrity of scientists, how science is used and whether it is made available; corruption 
and bias within science can pose a challenge, and in some contexts it may not be possible to work 
with local scientists in government or academia or to trust them or the information they provide.  It 
is recommended that NGOs conduct a power analysis15 of science to help determine levels of 
corruption and power dynamics that could affect the credibility of the available science.  
Asking a science expert is useful for more ad hoc engagements, particularly when relying upon 
existing information and knowledge.  However you may identify the need for information to be 
tailored to support a specific project or decision making process or new research in order to address 
                                                          
15
 For information on power analysis in general, please refer to the World Bank’s PSIA Sourcebook. 
• e.g. volcanic, seismic and meteorological Local observatories 
• e.g. mapping and environment agencies Geological surveys 
• e.g. geology, geography, engineering, earth 
science departments 
Universities 
• e.g. scientific and technical departments, social 
welfare departments, disaster management 
offices/office of civil defence and extension 
services 
National or local government 
• e.g. local organisations or technical specialist 
organisations  
Environmental, conservation 
and engineering NGOs 
• e.g. insurance companies Private sector  
• e.g. accredited academic and practitioner 
networks 
Professional societies  
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the problem (e.g. the study of water availability, quality and management across a watershed shared 
by a number of communities).  In these instances, you may decide that a formal research project is 
required.  
Collaborative research projects and formal partnerships 
In instances where research is required, it is essential to adopt a collaborative approach that 
includes the participation of all relevant stakeholders.  The benefits of a collaborative research 
project include: 
 
Figure 5: Some of the benefits of collaborative projects.  
The objectives, ways of working and value systems of science and scientists may differ from those 
of humanitarian agencies (e.g. the primary objective of scientists may be the advancement of that 
science rather than the reduction in vulnerability).  Clear and frequent communication is essential to 
the success of any collaborative research project, along with co-created and shared learning.  Where 
appropriate, collaborative research projects should adopt the principles of participatory action 
research, meaning that those who are researched should be involved as equal partners in the 
process16.  
Short term engagements may be difficult to sustain as they may rely upon the good will and 
available time of the scientist (except in the case of paid consultants). It is important to consider a 
long term relationship between organisations rather than individual relationships to ensure the 
institutional memory of science. 
                                                          
16
 Institute of Development Studies (IDS).  Participatory Methods: Research and Analysis.  Available online: 
http://www.participatorymethods.org/task/research-and-analyse 
Collaboration 
involvement 
of a wide 
range of 
expertise 
co-production 
of a research 
question and 
knowledge 
mutual 
ownership of 
a project and 
shared 
accountability 
access to 
supporting 
funding 
resources 
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Engaging with scientists should not necessarily be a one off 
process and there is growing evidence to suggest that the 
successful delivery of science is through formal partnerships with 
scientists (see case study 2: UCL-CAFOD partnership).  
Partnerships may begin informally, for example building upon 
initial consultations with experts or nurtured through previous 
colleagues who have moved from academia to an NGO (or vice 
versa), but these necessitate a degree of formulisation in order 
to ensure accountability and protection to all stakeholders.   
In addition to the benefits of collaborative research outlined 
above, the benefits of a well-established partnership include:  
 access to a greater range of expertise beyond your initial 
contact; 
 opportunities for capacity building; 
 long-term engagement to support sustainable projects; 
 rapid access to knowledge and expertise in response to 
short deadlines; 
 the development of mutual understandings, agendas 
and language. 
As with any partnership, project design, learning and knowledge 
production should be mutual; whilst scientists can contribute a 
lot of knowledge and research, NGOs have vast experience and 
communities can share their knowledge of the risks they face.   
Partnerships should also be inclusive of all stakeholders, 
engaging (where possible) with local scientists and other 
relevant actors to encourage long-term sustainability within 
country and to avoid any possible conflict.  However, there are 
often numerous challenges to conducting scientific research in 
developing countries, from limited material and financial 
resources to poor infrastructure17; as such, the type of 
partnership may also reflect the circumstances of the country in 
question.  
 Christian Aid has established a successful partnership with a 
local scientific organisation in the Philippines18; and in the 
Eastern DRC, NGOs have consulted the Goma Volcano 
Observatory which operates in challenging conditions but is 
supported by international scientists: 
                                                          
17
 Harris, E., 2004. Building scientific capacity in developing countries, European Molecular Biology Organization Reports, 5 
(1), 7-11. 
18
 For an example of their work see Big River Rising, 
http://www.preventionweb.net/english/multimedia/v.php?id=29335&hid=62 
Top tips for partnerships with 
scientists: 
 Partnerships may not just be 
about the people who are the easiest to 
work with – they are also about gaining 
access to those with the best 
information; 
 Often the necessary scientific 
expertise will vary depending on the 
nature of the problem being addressed; 
although the entry point to a 
partnership may be through an 
individual in the long term it is 
advisable to partner with an 
organisation, whilst also having an 
organisational lead on the partnership 
within the NGO and the scientific 
organisation, each of whom can 
facilitate linking practitioners with the 
relevant information and expertise; 
 It may be better to deal with 
institutions rather than an individual as 
the work will be viewed as an official 
assignment and allocated appropriate 
expertise and time; 
 Partnerships take time, 
commitment and long-term 
engagement and all stakeholders need 
to be aware that results may not be 
immediate;New research projects can 
take several years to deliver and 
scientists are constrained (in the same 
way NGOs are) by their institutions and 
the demand of their day to day job.   
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“The local volcano observatory faces numerous challenges but is able to maintain its monitoring 
and outreach capacity partly thanks to the support of some international scientists. Services that 
have been developed from international scientific research projects include provision of near 
real-time 24hr automated satellite remote sensing products which enable the observatory to 
advise on the status of the volcano even if ground monitoring equipment is compromised.”  Dr 
Susan Loughlin, British Geological Survey. 
Some of the barriers preventing NGOs from partnering with scientists include: 
 a lack of funding for collaborative research; 
 a lack of capacity (particularly in-country); 
 a differing aims, objectives and ways of working; 
 knowing who to believe amongst scientists with differing opinions; 
 a nervousness amongst scientists about willingness to engage (e.g. with regard to their 
accountability); 
 the long-time scales of carrying out research; 
 a differing technical language between NGO staff and scientists. 
Before succeeding in partnership, it is necessary to address the different objectives and perspectives 
across the scientists, NGOs and communities, as well as: 
 Address any concerns you might have over the economic and social sustainability of the 
possible applications of science. 
 Question the track record of the science they are resourcing – has it been used before 
successfully in a similar context? Is the skill of predictive science good enough to use for 
forecast-based decision-making at community level? Will scientists be open about potential 
negative impacts of applying their science? Do conflicts of interest exist (e.g. corporate 
scientists pushing their employers’ products)? 
 Combine focused scientific expertise with broader, multifaceted development objectives in 
order to ensure that the scientists serve the development objective, rather than the other 
way around. The scientific agenda is significantly influenced by what policymakers want but 
much less so by what vulnerable communities may want. 
 Match the available scientific expertise with the problems that need to be addressed from 
the community perspective, e.g. there may be significant scientific expertise on large-scale 
flooding but little on recurring, local flood or waterlogging risk.   
Whilst there are a number of challenges to establishing partnerships, there are an increasing 
number of opportunities for funding, including joint funds for large consortium programmes, co-
funded research projects and funds for project evaluations19.  The Enhancing Learning and Research 
for Humanitarian Assistance (ELRHA) Guide to Constructing Effective Partnerships is a useful tool 
for deciding whether a partnership is best approach for your agency and how to go about 
establishing one.  It is also a useful resource for those wishing to establish a collaborative research 
project with a scientist or institution. 
                                                          
19
 Two UK funding bodies with a recent interest in partnership are the NERC and ESRC (please refer to the reference list for 
their website addressed). 
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Case study 2: Academic-NGO partnership – reflecting on the partnership between University 
College London (UCL) and the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) 
The partnership between UCL and CAFOD began in 2008.  It was born out of informal discussions 
between acquaintances within the respective organisations and rapidly grew into a formal 
partnership with the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU). The founders of the 
partnership recognised the need and opportunity for rigorous analysis and research, particularly 
in the natural and environmental sciences, to underpin humanitarian and development policy and 
practice in disaster risk reduction, adaptation to climate variability and natural resource 
management1.  In addition to knowledge exchange activities, including field visits to examine in-
country risk. 
By the end of 2013 the partnership had appointed one post-doctoral research fellow and three 
PhD students to research projects, some of which have attracted funding from the UK Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council and the Natural Environment Research Council.  The 
projects are based on sound scientific research that will have impact within CAFOD, its partner 
organisation and within communities, by informing policy and practice.  Three of the projects are 
co-funded by UCL and CAFOD and all were co-developed and are co-managed by UCL, CAFOD and 
CAFOD partners.   
For CAFOD and its partners this partnership provides access to some of the world’s leading 
experts in natural hazards, natural resource management, climate change and disaster risk 
reduction, in addition  to data, information and knowledge not normally accessible to NGOs.  For 
UCL the partnership informs research, teaching and knowledge exchange, and enhances the 
training of early-career researchers. For both organisations the partnership has led to new 
relationships with universities in the countries where projects are focused, which has enhanced 
the capacity of these universities to perform and apply scientific research. More generally the 
partnership is regarded as innovative and pioneering as an example of best practice in the 
integration of science for humanitarian and development benefit. 
The collaboration has also produced important generic learning on partnerships: 
 meaningful and effective partnerships take time to build, necessitating the allocation of staff 
time by all organisations involved, and there is often a significant period of sympathetic 
learning and understanding required before projects are agreed and set in motion; 
 
 collaboration between universities and NGOs has to take into account their significant 
differences, which include ways of working, types and timescales of deliverables, contractual 
requirements, depths of analysis required in projects, and expectations of donors, funding 
bodies and partners. 
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Section 3: Understanding science and assessing its credibility 
 
Every day you are confronted with arguments that demand logical, ‘scientific’ reasoning.  
Understanding and assessing the credibility of science is no different and this section provides a 
pathway through the maze of facts in order to separate the credible from the suspicious20 so that 
you can make sensible and informed decisions. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Even when accessing and applying science through a partnership, it is necessary for practitioners to 
have a basic understanding of science in order to know: 
 What questions to ask of scientists? 
 Whether the data/information appears to be credible? 
 How to communicate the science to communities and other stakeholders - you may have a 
role as an intermediary in the communication of science, facilitating the bringing together of 
communities and scientists and communicating scientific information when scientists are 
unavailable? 
 What to monitor and evaluate in terms of the impact of science? 
                                                          
20
 Scheaffer, R. and Young, L., 2010.  Introduction to Probability and its Application.  Brooks and Cole. 
Do you/the community understand the information?  
Do you have confidence in the information? 
Is the information relevant to the problem you want to address?   
Do you know if there is uncertainty? 
Have you asked the scientist why there is uncertainty? 
Have you reviewed the credibility of the information you are using? 
Are you consulting with a credible scientist?  
Is the information good enough for your purpose?  
Are you convinced that the science is free from any conflicts of 
interest?  
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The process of integrating science is not simply about science informing NGOs who, in turn, use this 
information to assist communities; there is evidence to suggest that community members can 
benefit greatly from direct exposure to scientific information if it is properly communicated and the 
community receive some accompanying education (see case study 3):   
The provision of a comprehensive scientific training is beyond the scope of these guidelines; 
however a number of key concepts are discussed below. 
Qualitative versus quantitative 
When combining natural and social sciences, let alone applying these to humanitarian and 
development planning and practice, debates often emerge around the respective roles of 
quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis.  Some problems are suited to both 
approaches, while others to one or the other.  The term quantitative refers to information based 
upon measurable amounts that can typically be recorded numerically (e.g. the level of water in a 
river).  Qualitative research deals with problems that are not measurable, and usually emphasises 
‘words’ (descriptions) rather than counting in the collection and analysis of data21, for example an 
historical narrative of a community member’s experience of living by a river that floods. Both are 
essential to the integration of science for building resilience.   Often quantified results are a helpful 
means of building baselines for monitoring and providing evidence to advocate for change.  
Qualitative methods are especially helpful when trying to determine the less tangible causes of 
vulnerability and risk, for example communities’ perceptions of risk and the decisions and behaviour 
they adopt in the face of it. 
Quality  
In many of the countries within which you operate, there are likely to be issues relating to data 
availability and quality.  If understanding science is not challenging enough, then appreciating the 
quality of data perhaps presents an even greater challenge. Data quality refers to the resolution, 
completeness, precision and accuracy of the data.  Assessing the quality of data necessitates 
looking at: 
 Methods of collection: these should follow internationally recognised protocols and 
principles of the scientific method; 
 Resolution: how concisely and thoroughly defined the data are – a low resolution map may 
have hazard, vulnerability or risk averaged over large areas that hide the true picture risk at 
the local level;   
 Completeness: whether there are any (unexplained) gaps in the data; unless a thorough 
baseline has been collected, it is more than likely that there will be gaps in the data record 
so it is important that the science you utilise mentions whether the data are incomplete; 
 Precision: how close the data is to being exact (e.g. 2.95 is more exact than rounding up to 
3).  This has important implications for the reproducibility of a study.  It is also important to 
note that precise data are not necessarily accurate; 
 Accuracy: how close the data is to the truth.  Methods to measure accuracy include taking 
into account how old the data are (e.g. earthquakes recorded prior to the late 1800s will be 
                                                          
21
 Bryman, A., 2008.  Social Research Methods.  Oxford. 
 18 | P a g e  
 
based upon descriptive historical records, rather than technical readings from 
seismographs); any bias in the data (in terms of how it was measured); whether it has been 
consistently and validly recorded (especially when different data sets are brought together).  
 
Credibility 
The credibility of scientific information reflects the extent to which the information is believable or 
convincing; in other words if the information is a realistic representation founded on the data upon 
which it is based.  A relevant example is the skill of forecasts, i.e. how well the forecasts match 
observations.   
Practitioners need to be able to trust the information they are using in order to be accountable to 
donors and beneficiaries.  There are mechanisms for ensuring that science is credible; for example, 
most published scientific work has been peer-reviewed, which means that is has been scrutinised by 
other scientists who have assessed its quality and ensured that is has met a minimum standard.   
The difficulty is that much of this peer-reviewed literature is not freely available and it is mostly 
intended to be read by other scientists who are very familiar with the topic of the publication.  
Consequently, most scientific literature is inaccessible to the non-specialist. For this reason, there is 
a growing emphasis on knowledge transfer or exchange experts in the scientific community, whose 
role is to make the science useful to a non-specialist end-user.  Despite this move, the uptake and 
application of science by NGOs is still very limited and more effective mechanisms need to be found 
to improve this.  
We have to consider not only the credibility of the information but also that of the scientist.  As 
noted in section 2, the integrity of scientists may vary, which raises a number of additional 
challenges you should be aware of in order to ensure that the science you use is credible: 
 Scientists do not always agree and it may not always be obvious whom to believe so try to 
weigh up the balanced arguments, taking into account the uncertainty of the information 
presented. 
 The scientist needs to be qualified in the problem being addressed. 
 Science and scientists may be manipulated for political gain, again emphasising why it may 
be necessary to do a power analysis of science. 
 The way data are presented can affect their credibility, e.g. by exaggerating results or 
hiding the reality of the situation – you will rarely find a map with blank spaces representing 
missing data.  To ensure that the data are credible it is necessary to ask scientists where the 
data came from or, if this is not possible, see if the work refers to the source of the data and 
whether it gives the date when it was published. 
 In instances of data incompleteness, conclusions and recommendations may be based upon 
expert judgement, which is fine as long as the scientist has been honest about the 
For practitioners the main question should be is the information is 
good enough for the purpose at hand? 
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uncertainties and is clearly knowledgeable in the aspect being considered.  It is, therefore, 
necessary to look at what has informed the scientific information you plan to use. 
 Ultimately some studies will be based upon more data than others – credible studies will 
outline how much data they have used and the extent to which this limits the conclusions 
that can be made, others might not, so using some judgement can help. 
 
 
Uncertainty and probability 
If uncertainty can be better understood, appreciated and harnessed, then the opportunities and 
limits of utilising scientific information can be more effectively realised.   
Few findings from natural and social science are 100% certain22, owing to the fact that data and 
information are often incomplete and that scientists’ understanding of processes is incomplete.  In 
spite of this, we still have to make decisions for building resilience.  In the case of data and 
                                                          
22
 Scheaffer, R. and Young, L., 2010.  Introduction to Probability and its Application.  Brooks and Cole. 
Top tips to check credibility 
Use more than one source of information/expertise. 
Beware of information freely available on the internet - use only reputable sources. 
Where accessible, use science published in peer-reviewed journals.  
Use accredited (recognised) institutions or experts. 
Ensure that an explanation of the uncertainty of the science is included. 
Consider the amount of and quality of the data consulted. 
Conduct a political/power mapping tool of science for the country of interest. 
Where the science disagrees, consider the majority of opinions rather than the 
extremes. 
Reference and date your work (and ensure the scientific information you use is too) 
Review how much (and the quality of the ) data was used to create the information 
you want to use. 
IF IN DOUBT – SEEK ADVICE 
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information that are not certain, they should be presented with the degree of probability or 
likelihood indicated.  In general, probability can be defined as the chance that something will happen 
or that a statement is true.  Predictive science (e.g. weather forecasts) is probabilistic and, as such, 
does not give a definitive certainty but instead a range of probabilities that need to be understood 
and managed.   
Practitioners should not be apprehensive of using information that is uncertain so long as any 
decisions and actions based upon the information are made with a full understanding of the 
associated uncertainty and its implications.  It should be remembered that uncertainty will usually 
promote an analytical debate that should lead to robust decisions, which is a positive manifestation 
of uncertainty.  Facilitating a dialogue between stakeholders on science and its uncertainty is part 
of an essential process for better decision making23. Credible scientific information will also have 
any associated uncertainty clearly presented.   
Decisions should be informed by more than one information source and any uncertainty should be 
clearly communicated so as to ensure accountability.  It is important to be aware, however, that 
the provision of additional information can also increase (as well as decrease) the uncertainty.   
It is essential to manage the expectations of the recipients of science by clearly communicating the 
uncertainty and limits of the scientific information being provided in an understandable way.  The 
following case study addresses the application of probabilistic information in the context of climate 
science.  
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Visman, E., 2014. Knowledge is power: unlocking the potential of science and technology to enhance 
community resilience through knowledge exchange. Humanitarian Practice Network Paper Number 76. 
 
Natural sciences are not exact because of data sampling, area 
representation, and limited number of monitoring stations. As 
monitoring points increase the ‘facts’ are likely to change  
 Ayub Shaka Kenyan Meteorological Dept 
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Case study 3: Increasing Access to Climate Science for Small-Scale Farmers in Kenya 
In Mbeere District, Kenya, Christian Aid supported local partner Christian Community Services 
Mount Kenya East (CCSMKE) to increase access by small-scale farmers to seasonal forecasts and 
short-term weather forecasts. The basic hypothesis was that better use would enable better 
decision-making which in turn could result in a yield increment of 10-20%. The first step was to get 
the forecast from the Greater Horn Regional Climate Outlook Forum and organise training for 
implementing staff and farmer group leaders, who could then relay the scientific information 
together with agricultural recommendations back to their wider group membership. Through an 
exchange (coordinated by the Humanitarian Futures Programme at King’s College London) 
scientists from the Kenya Meteorology Department (KMD), the UK Met Office and the University of 
Sussex were involved in the initial training, with CCSMKE staff and local Ministry of Agriculture 
advisors providing follow-up and organising other channels of information, such as a text 
messaging service for the 7 day forecast through the season.  
The project was acutely aware of the need to consider farmers’ own beliefs, values, motivations 
and perceived control. Without this, efforts to increase use of science for decision-making based on 
the pursuit of scientific education alone would be unsuccessful. So the training covered a variety of 
aspects of the climate science involved as well as exploring how local indicators could be combined 
with the forecast. This and understanding how farmers have responded to climate variations in 
previous seasons added contextual information to facilitate farmers making climate-smart 
decisions for the upcoming season. 
Although the KMD forecast is released in a deterministic format, farmers were provided with the 
probabilities and training in how to interpret it. Concerns about forecast reliability were addressed 
by explaining how forecasts are compiled and how often they had proved accurate in the past 
(about 80%, so 4 seasons in 5 are successfully forecast). This was a concept familiar to farmers 
since they apply different levels of reliability and usefulness to their own indicators. Those used by 
farmers were focused primarily on when the rains would start, although their use was assessed as 
having declined in recent years. This was partly due to modern education and religious influences 
but mainly due to the loss of some local indicators, e.g. certain tree species traditionally used for 
forecasting, as land is cleared for agriculture and other uses. Initially farmers expressed 
reservations about the usefulness of forecasts, perceiving that they were only relevant to 
neighbouring districts with climate stations but not to their own, drier situation. The 7 day forecast 
was therefore tailored to reflect this concern for local relevance. The compatibility between local 
indicators and the seasonal forecast, which gave information in addition to the onset date, was 
also made clearer. 
Measuring the impact of the work over two seasons followed a basic evidence chain to get to an 
understanding of how enhanced use of forecasts might deliver the initial hypothesis (figure 5). 
Farmers confirmed that the advice they received was relevant and had largely been communicated 
effectively, although they also provided clear recommendations on how this could be improved.  
They valued direct training with a scientist most highly but recommended improved use of radio, 
barazas (local meetings) and mobile phones (through text messaging).  
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Figure 6: Basic evidence chain for the impact of climate science in the context of small-scale farmers in Kenya.  Source: Richard Ewbank, 
Christian Aid (2013). 
Their understanding and use for decision-making was demonstrated through their feedback on 
decisions they had changed as a result of receiving forecast science. These included (in order of 
importance): 
1. changing the planting date 
2. planting drought-resilient varieties of their usual crops 
3. planting more drought-resilient crops 
4. changing to conservation agriculture techniques to conserve soil moisture  
5. improving the timing of on-going operations, such as fertiliser application and pest control.  
As a result, 96% of farmers reported an increase in yield due to improved decision-making based 
on forecast use, and about two-thirds assessed the increase as in excess of 15%. Given this result, 
farmers felt the best way forward included KMD establishing a climate station in their district to 
measure climate but also provide advice, forecast training and support to assist farmer groups 
establish their own rain gauges. This would expand the network measuring key climate variables, 
engaging science users in the generation of improved science, and also facilitate a sustainable link 
to the sources of climate science support.  
 
Scientific advice is 
generated 
So 
what?  
Scientific advice is 
relevant 
So 
what?  
Scientific advice is 
communicated 
effectively 
So 
what
? 
1st Scientific advice is 
understood 
So what? 
2nd Scientific  advice is 
used to make decisions 
differently (enhancing 
human assets) 
So what?  
3rd Those decisions 
create enhanced buffers 
in other asset 
catergories (social, 
natural, physical, 
financial) which 
generates greater 
resilience 
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Training and skills development 
This guide has thus far shown that it is essential for NGOs to build a certain level of in-house 
understanding of science, so that NGO actors may act as effective intermediaries in accessing 
scientific information and resources, using them, and transferring them on to their partners and the 
communities within which they work.  There are two effective mechanisms for achieving the 
necessary increase in understanding, which have been effectively demonstrated by the (re) 
insurance sector over the past 15 years:  
(1) employ more scientifically trained staff and 
(2) train existing and future staff in the necessary skills to engage with and use science 
Both of these should also lead to more partnerships with scientific organisations. Unfortunately, 
building scientific capacity within NGOs is a challenge because of the need to minimise what donor 
and other sources of funding refer to as overheads, into which scientific capacity may fall.  This 
challenge has to be overcome if understanding and using science is not to become yet another 
element of rhetoric. To this end, training is a relatively quick, simple and cost effective way of 
introducing meaningful numbers of NGO staff to science and the scientific method in order to 
improve their scientific literacy, skills and confidence. Such an approach should be linked to 
initiatives to professionalise the humanitarian and development sectors within the UK and 
elsewhere.     
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Section 4: Applying scientific information and methods to humanitarian and 
development work 
 
The sections described so far have looked at defining the problem to be addressed and the reason 
for integrating science, how it might be accessed and what sort of information might be available, 
as well as some basic insight into understanding science and being able to assess its credibility.  All 
of these have to be considered when applying science.  In order to apply science, it is necessary to 
present information so that it is understandable and, therefore, enables users to make informed 
decisions.  The application of science is iterative and involves learning and adapting in light of new 
information that may become available. 
In this section, we discuss not only the application of scientific information but also the use 
scientific methods for collecting, analysing and presenting data.  Suggestions are also made as to 
how to manage the process of integrating science in an ethical and accountable manner.   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Do you know when to include the science?  
Do you know what scientific methods could help? 
Have you discussed accountability with the scientist/source of 
information?  
Have you ensured that the information users have the right tools 
and capacity to manage uncertainty? 
Have you ensured that information users have a clear understanding 
of the credibility of the science?   
Have you spoken to the scientist about any ethical guidelines they 
have to adhere to?  
Are you and the community aware of the levels of confidence and 
uncertainties of the information you are using?  
Have you combined the relevant sources of scientific and other 
technical expertise with what advice on what to do?  
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Opportunities for applying science 
Table 2 outlines some examples of where science can be integrated into existing strategies and 
programmes at varying scales. 
Level Scale Application 
International/strategic Regional Country prioritisation 
 Multi-hazard assessments in order to prioritise 
strategic interventions. 
Programme National Country strategy paper 
 Evidence of existing and future risk 
 Data with regard to past risk 
 Quantifiable risk 
 Sub-national Natural resource management 
 Remote sensing 
 Environmental impact analysis 
Human displacement 
 Expertise in health and shelter 
Project Local Local level assessment, e.g. content analysis (hazard, 
vulnerability and capacity), needs assessment,  livelihoods 
analysis 
 Use scientific information to complement local 
knowledge 
 Use scientific expertise to interpret change seen at 
local level 
Early warning system 
 Threshold for triggering the warning system 
Table 2: opportunities for integrating science  
Of particular interest to NGO practitioners is the application of science at the community level and 
whether this information can be transformed into something that is understandable and useful to 
the community.  Examples of where science might be applied are listed below. 
1. Participatory vulnerability and capacity assessments  should incorporate scientific advice in the 
risk assessment and community planning process:  
 During pre-screening of risks (largely top down, where scientific advice can give an NGO 
guidance on the key issues to address in a particular region or locality); 
 By bringing together community-based mapping with similar scientific processes, such as 
GIS mapping, to develop accurate participatory maps of risks and vulnerabilities; 
 During event timeline development, where the perceptions and recollections of climate, 
geophysical and other events are triangulated against the scientific record to accurately 
establish past and identify potential future trends; 
 During the action planning - an interactive and iterative process at the community level.  
Local knowledge can provide local specificity and context to enable more specific scientific 
advice to be guided by the priorities as expressed by the community, information users, etc. 
 By guiding the revision of community-based plans/repeat PVCAs as new scientific 
information is developed or new risks and stresses amenable to scientific 
solutions/mitigation emerge.  
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2. Training and education: science-based field schools e.g. climate field schools that bring user 
groups together with climate scientists in a series of training sessions over a specific period of time 
to enable better integration of short, medium and long-term climate science into community or 
group-led resilience and development processes. 
3. Participatory research: where scientific research and advisory services are based on diagnostic 
studies of community-prioritised issues and challenges rather than those of the scientific/policy-led 
bureaucracies. Research is likewise based in the community (e.g. participatory research involving 
farmers) rather than in isolated research environments.   There is a need to ensure that community 
interaction and consultation is designed to identify challenges, issues and opportunities that could 
benefit from subsequent support by scientists. 
In order to explore this further, let us look at a fictional scenario of building flood defences for a 
community living close to a river: 
The community are regularly affected by flooding.  The local people have good knowledge with 
regard to the flooding but this is based solely upon their recollection rather than any systematic 
monitoring of the flooding.  They have no memory of a large scale flood and there is a proposal 
to build flood defences by the banks of the river in order to protect the community.  The heights 
of these defences are based upon the flood height as described by the community.  They 
indicate that the flood waters rose to their knee height.   
 
Figure 7: Local communities examining flood waters in Xai Xai town Mozambique February 2013. Source: Laura Purves, CAFOD. 
There are two reasons why science needs to be applied: 
1. In order to check (triangulate) the communities’ knowledge with additional 
information and knowledge.   
2. To establish a more systematic method of determining the height of the flood 
defences, as flood heights (even during the same event) can differ from place to place.  
Obviously you can take an average of what the community indicate as the height of 
the flood but this omits the fact that some may have been standing in dips or at raised 
points at the time of the flood.  As such, their memory of the flood height may not be 
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representative.  Flood depth can change depending on whether the height was 
measured at the peak of the flood or when the waters had begun to recede. 
You are able to find support from a local hydrologist (a scientist who specialises in water and 
geology) who has actually done some mapping of large-scale flooding in the area – they are 
able to: 
 Demonstrate the flood height of a much larger flood that occurred 70 years ago. 
 Assign a return period (inverse of probability) for a flood of this height to occur.  
Based on the additional scientific information, the community decide to invest more in their 
flood defences and build them higher.  However, the hydrologist points out that the proposed 
flood defences are unsuitable as they are likely to increase the risk of flooding to downstream 
communities.  He speaks to a colleague who is an engineer who suggests a more appropriate 
measure of drainage and improved land use planning. 
Given what you and the community have learned from the hydrologist, you decide that this is a 
good opportunity to improve the communities’ understanding of flooding in their region and 
establish a baseline of data regarding flooding.  The community, therefore, establish their own 
monitoring system: 
 Volunteers from the community to be flood monitors are given a camera, map and 
mobile phone as well as training on the health and safety of measuring the height of 
the flooding as well as where to take regular measurements of the river level (and after 
periods of heavy rainfall) from a set of predefined points;   
 The hydrologist teaches the volunteers about different types and sources of flooding.  
As a consequence of engaging with the scientists, the community soon discover that the reason 
for the increased magnitude of the floods is attributable to surface water flooding (combined 
with that from the river) because of a new road the local government recently built through the 
town that is preventing the water from draining away.  The baseline of information collected by 
the community is regularly shared with the hydrologist who helps the community establish an 
early warning system for certain types of flooding.  A low cost rain gauge based warning system 
for surface water flooding is also funded. 
This scenario highlights two important points: 
1. Scientific opinion and information may disagree with what the community and/or NGO would 
like to do (e.g. flood defences were in appropriate).  Such a situation needs to be well managed 
and changing attitudes can only come about if people have complete trust in the science they 
are using; 
2. Scientific methods of monitoring and recording data can assist with increasing resilience and 
empowering communities to better understand and take ownership of their own situation and 
establish ‘community scientists’. 
Despite a tendency to polarise the views of scientists and local communities, they can very much 
learn from one another.  Communities, if adequately trained and capacitated, can be invaluable in 
 28 | P a g e  
 
the systematic collection of data regarding hazards and risk, which can be interpreted by scientists 
to inform strategies for increasing resilience24.   
Community knowledge can often be the only immediate information available and by ensuring that 
it is systematically recorded and (as far as possible) bias removed, baselines can be established.  By 
applying good scientific procedures to ensure the quality of the data being collected the information 
produced will be more robust.  Simple techniques to ensure data is well recorded include: 
 Having a consistent approach to when and how often to record information and take 
measurements. 
 Knowing to take these from the same, predefined point (or persons to compare interviews 
over time) in order to create a baseline and capture subsequent changes. 
Educating communities on how to measure their own risk scientifically should help to inform their 
decision-making and also internalise the science that is being presented (see Case study 4).   
Managing stakeholder expectations 
The process of applying scientific information relies upon good communication and continual 
discussion that challenges and reviews of all the available information throughout the process.  
Where community knowledge contradicts the science (or vice versa) it is important to engage a 
participatory dialogue, whilst also triangulating any other available sources of information. 
In general, experience has shown that communities are amenable to outside information, even if it 
contradicts their own.  There may, however, be resistance to the science from the community, who 
may not be willing to accept or take appropriate actions based on the results.  It is not only 
necessary to know where and when to bring in science but also who to target – some community 
members may not be willing to engage with scientists (and vice versa), whilst others may be more 
open to listening to this information (see case study 5).  In order to help manage the process of 
integrating science, engagement with science should not be a one off; it should be maintained 
throughout the project.   
Scientists are also limited in their time and availability, often due to factors beyond their control (e.g. 
institutional (funding) constraints) and their willingness to engage with NGOs may be because of a 
desire to do so and not necessarily because they are incentivised to do so by their institutions.  It is 
important that NGOs are mindful of this, especially if frustrations develop over the immediate 
availability of the scientists.  Likewise it is necessary to ensure that scientists are aware of the 
resource and time constraints upon NGOs and the communities they assist.  
However, arguably it is through well-established partnerships that some of these potential conflicts 
can be surmounted; by having a key contact within a university, information may be more quickly 
acquired.  Establishing formal partnerships enables the development of Terms of Reference – 
agreement on what to expect, what not to expect and any resource sharing to facilitate enhanced 
scientific support. 
                                                          
24
 The Big River Rising Documentary is available online http://www.christianaid.org.uk/whatwedo/in-
focus/big-river-rising/background.aspx 
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Case study 4: Citizen Science in action 
In flood prone Malawi, Christian Aid with local partner Evangelical Association of Malawi brought 
together community members from Village Civil Protection Committees with scientists from the 
Department of Climate Change and Meteorology and District Council staff responsible for water 
management and disaster risk reduction. This enabled:  
 Flood risk mapping 
  The development of an action plan and implementation of flood mitigation measures. 
 The calibration and correct siting of river level gauges, with an easy-to-read traffic light 
system to facilitate early warnings. 
 The establishment of community-managed rain gauges to enable them to supplement this 
system and their local indicators with their own data recording for water and drought 
management. 
.  
The Chikwawa community in Malawi check 
their own rain gauge as part of their flood 
monitoring system. Source: Richard Ewbank, 
Christian Aid 
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Case study 5:  Integrating science is more than just the provision of information  
In February 2006, a major landslide buried the barangay (village) of Guinsaugon in Southern Leyte, 
Philippines.  Shortly afterwards, technical investigations were made of nearby slopes to determine 
the risk to adjacent communities.  Below is an extract from ‘From Catastrophe to Opportunity: 
Children in Asia creating positive social changes after disasters’ (page 50-51), which describes the 
actions Plan Philippines’ and the community took based upon the available scientific information and 
the resistance they experienced from some members of the community.   
The Mining and Geosciences Bureau [MGB] in the Philippines Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources conducted a thorough technical study of the landslide-prone area and found that 
two villages were high-risk zones, as cracks in the mountains above could potentially lead to 
dangerous landslides.  With this vital information, it became clear that those living in the threatened 
areas – one of which was Santa Paz – ought to take precautionary steps to prevent a disaster from 
occurring… 
After the result of the bureau’s findings, the children in Santa Paz made a significant decision.  Their 
school was located below an area in the mountains considered to be hazardous, and they noticed 
that mud and rocks had fallen down near the school.  After a minor mudslide occurred nearby, some 
students, under careful supervision, ventured up the mountain to investigate the situation.  Once 
they saw the cracks in the mountain, they decided that it was indeed too risky for the school to 
remain in its location.  The school children overwhelmingly voted to evacuate and the teachers 
agreed. Within 12 hours, Plan Philippines offered to provide temporary tents for the children to learn 
in.  Plan also gave approval to build a school out of range of the landslide danger zone, and 
construction of their new school started shortly after... 
According to Plan Philippines’ DRR advisor, Baltz Tribunalo, “The adults’ level of consciousness 
mattered in this process.  While children were making their decision, teachers and other community 
leaders like the members of the Municipal Disaster coordinating Council and Plan frontline staff 
helped in the processing of their decisions and related consequences, and also contributed by 
facilitating and maintain the difficult but liberating decision.” 
The children’s bold determination turned out to be controversial, as some parents were concerned 
that their children would have to walk more than an hour or longer to the new school.  Other 
community members living near the old school were unhappy because it had been abandoned, and 
some criticised the children strongly for their decision to move.  This upset the children, who felt that 
they were only looking out for their own safety… Despite the rift with some parts of the community, 
almost all of the children continued to attend the school in its temporary tent site from July 2006 to 
March 2007 and then moved in June 2007 into the new school.  They were grateful to Plan for the 
new, safer school and the training they had received.  “All students, as well as citizens in the country, 
ought to be trained in DRR,” said a 16-year-old boy from Santa Paz.  
There are a number of interrelated reasons (e.g. related to culture and day to day, livelihood 
priorities) why some members of the community chose to act upon the science whilst others did not.  
However, whilst the MGB conducted their technical study, which they shared with Plan Philippines, 
they appear not to have been involved in discussing this risk with the community.  By properly 
communicating the risk and the associated uncertainty, they could have helped bolster the argument 
the students were making for relocation.  The scientific information provided is only as useful as the 
quality of its communication. 
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Ethics and accountability 
If science is to be used to support planning, decision-making and practice then its inclusion needs to 
be transparent and reflect the contribution of all stakeholders.  NGOs and scientists operate within 
different systems of standards and with different ethical expectations.  It is important to be aware of 
the ethical frameworks under which scientists must operate and develop ways of managing areas 
where these frameworks may come into conflict with NGO approaches to accountability.  You will 
need to consider how to approach co-production of knowledge in a manner that is consistent with 
principles of participation (a core component of accountability to disaster affected communities) in 
circumstances where scientists offer advice that is in conflict with the desires and views of the 
community. 
There are systems in place to ensure the protection of participants in scientific research and UK 
academics must adhere to the ethical research principles of their institutions’ and funders’ ethics 
committees.  Examples of the ethical frameworks for researchers in the UK include those outlined by 
the Economic and Social Research Council’s (ESRC)25 and the Natural Environment Research Council’s 
(NERC)26 regulations. 
The ethical issue of particular concern is the fact that those who will ultimately benefit from the 
integration of science through the increase in their resilience and reduction in their vulnerability may 
also be the focus of the research study, however, the ideological perspective of action-research is 
that those who are researched need also to be involved as equal partners in the process.   
With regard to ethics, it is important to be aware that: 
 
When conducting research involving people, scientists are mandated to27: 
 
                                                          
25
 ESRC Framework for Research Ethics.  Available online: http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/information/research-
ethics.aspx  
26
 NERC Ethics Policy.  Available online: http://www.nerc.ac.uk/about/work/policy/ethics/ 
27
 Bryman, A., 2008.  Social Research Methods.  Oxford. 
some natural scientists may be less familiar with the potential ethical impact of their research, owing 
to less experience of working with peoplecommunities 
local in-country scientists may not have the same systems in place to ensure ethical conduct   
partnering with scientists in the private sector may bring further complications, as the objective of a 
private company or even a local government may not align with those of a humanitarian agency 
obtain informed consent from participants 
maintain anonymity and confidentiality where appropriate 
adhere to regulations regarding data protection 
similar to NGOs, ensure no harm comes to participants and the environment 
give participants the right to withdraw from the study at any point 
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However, these general principles are outlined with two caveats: First, the ‘do no harm’ principle in 
scientific research is often combined with a weighing of risks and benefits of the research. The risks 
posed to the research participants are weighed against the broader benefits to society. This kind of 
risk-benefit calculus may sit at odds with NGO practice of do no harm, which is underpinned by an 
NGO’s mandate to improve the lives of others. With an NGO’s approach to ‘do no harm,’ posing a 
risk to a single community on the basis that there may be a wider benefit for other communities may 
not work as a justifiable approach.  
A second caveat is that research ethics frameworks are developed and applied differently across 
different scientific disciplines in the same country. For example, clinical trials are regulated under 
different frameworks than social science, and natural science & technology fields can feature their 
own iterations of the above general principles. Not all scientists will have the same view on research 
ethics and it will be important for you to arrive at a clear understanding of how a particular scientist 
or university department approaches its ethical obligations in research.  It is, therefore, necessary to 
agree upon a common set of established ethical guidelines prior to visiting the project site so as to 
ensure the protection of the beneficiaries of science as well as the scientists and NGOs.   
Accountability is a particular sub-set within the broader ethical obligations of an NGO or scientific 
community. With regard to NGOs, accountability mechanisms serve as the main frameworks for 
ensuring an ethical approach to their interventions28.  The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 
(HAP)29 standard explicitly covers accountability to both the people that an intervention aims to 
assist and the local partners involved in that intervention. So requirement 3.2 expects an 
implementing organisation to: 
‘share with the people its aims to assist and other stakeholders’ information appropriate to 
their need’  and 3.6 expects an organisation to ‘work with its partners to agree on how and 
when they will share information, including with the people they aim to assist, and to put this 
agreement into practice.’   
However, these mechanisms do not include specific requirements or criteria that dictate what 
credible science is and how it should be used.  This is partly due to the lack of any internationally 
agreed standard and partly due to the context-specific use of science, which makes it difficult to 
define standards that would cover every intervention. Some of what NGOs do with the community is 
innovative, and there is a need for transparency and accountability concerning the source of the 
scientific information used so that those involved can make the right choice as to whether or not 
they want to use the information, and be involved in generating the evidence of its benefit to their 
situation. What is important, as the HAP Standard makes clear, is full accountability and informed 
consent by all stakeholders and especially from those the intervention intends to assist. 
Scientists are held to account by their peers and the process of peer-review.  They are also 
accountable to their institutions and funding bodies but there is little definitive guidance as to how 
this accountability might be extended to engagement with the humanitarian sector.  Accountability 
needs to be clearly mapped and defined, especially if agencies want to incentivise scientists to 
engage in humanitarian and development work.   
                                                          
28
 See DEC accountability framework; People in Aid; and Interaction Accountability standards. 
29
 Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, 2013.  Available online: http://www.hapinternational.org/ 
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The idea of co-production of knowledge by integrating science with local and other sources of 
knowledge may assist in overcoming any fears scientists may have about being held solely 
accountable for any decisions based upon the scientific information and knowledge provided.  In 
order to be successful there is, however, a need to remove fear of failure and encourage flexibility in 
light of new information. 
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Section 5: Monitoring and evaluating the impact of science 
 
Whilst all projects require a process of monitoring and evaluating (M&E) their impact (e.g. a 
reduction in vulnerability), here we make specific reference to the M&E of integrating science in a 
project. Monitoring the integration and therefore the impact of science should take place 
throughout the entire process of engagement since it cannot be assumed that the science makes a 
valuable contribution or that you will learn and progress from this engagement without first 
collecting evidence.  Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) cannot be reduced to simple formulae; 
however this section makes suggestions on how the impact of integrating science may be 
measured and how you might adjust your existing techniques 
Although M&E of science integration is recognised as important it is a relatively new approach for 
the NGO sector.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
What do we mean by the impact of science? 
To some extent impact is shaped by donors and funders, meaning that both NGOs and scientists are 
constrained by how their respective funding institutions define and measure impact.  Yet 
partnerships with scientists create dialogues and require flexibility to continuously adapt 
programmes and projects in light of the learning and knowledge produced as stakeholders work 
What are you trying to measure? 
Do you know when you should be measuring impact? 
What indicators are appropriate to the project? 
Have you managed to capture the learning as well as the outcomes of 
the project? 
Have you measured the communities’ perception of change? 
Are there impacts that you can quantify as well as describe?  
Have you recorded the unanticipated as well as anticipated impacts?  
Have you communicated these impacts beyond your organisation and 
funder – even if parts of the project were unsuccessful?   
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together on a problem.  There is, therefore, a need to challenge the funding structures that require 
predetermined goals and impacts. The best way to influence donors is to demonstrate positive 
impact through these partnerships, however this requires us to monitor and provide evidence.  
Scientists are encouraged to strive towards ‘academic excellence’, with impact being measured in 
the context of the number of peer-reviewed articles published in ‘high-impact’ journals.  However, 
NGOs demonstrate impact through positive change for their target vulnerable communities.  
Therefore measuring the impact of science information may be new to scientists who may currently 
only have to demonstrate a pathway to impact rather than actual change. Key issues are therefore 
those common to all impact assessment – the need to detect an impact, attribute it to the use of 
scientific information and advice and triangulate the impact using more than one assessment 
methodology or source of information. 
In terms of measuring the impact of integrating science, this should encompass not simply the 
communication of science to users, but also whether: 
 the scientific information has been understood; 
 the scientific information has been used to guide a decision-making process; 
 that decision-making process has resulted in an enhancement of resilience; 
 this contributes to achieving the project purpose (or specific objective) and/or any other 
unexpected purpose; 
 the process of integration has been mutually beneficial and accountable to all stakeholders, 
e.g. scientists, NGOs and communities, resulting in not only learning and change for those 
using the scientific information but also for those providing it (see case study 6). 
This approach is similar to the Kirkpatrick model for training evaluation30 which has four levels of 
evaluation: reaction, learning, behaviour and results. Importantly, we are not just talking about the 
evaluation of the outcome of using science but also monitoring and learning from the process of 
engaging with science. 
Why do we want to measure the impact of integrating science?  
It is necessary to measure and learn from both successful and failed approaches in integrating 
science, as it is only through acknowledging those failures that improvements can be made to future 
projects.  Beyond ensuring that the aim of the project and the needs of the community have been 
addressed, we need to measure impact in order to: 
 inform on-going management of science integration initiatives, enabling NGO practitioners, 
scientists and (most importantly) those applying the science to support their resilience to 
understand the impact of the science they are using and make adjustments accordingly;  
 meet the impact evidence requirements of donors and influencing their future funding 
strategies; 
                                                          
30
 Information on the Kirkpatrick model available at http://www.kirkpatrickpartners.com 
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Case study 6: Climate Exchange Approach – impact for all stakeholders 
The information below includes the reflections of the stakeholders included in the climate 
science exchange outlined in case study 3, which was coordinated by the Humanitarian Futures 
Programme (HFP).  Between 2009-2012 HFP developed a series of two-way exchanges 
between climate scientists and meteorologists from national meteorological services in Kenya, 
Senegal and UK and a number of UK universities, communities at risk of flood and drought in 
Senegal and Kenya and partnering humanitarian and development organisations, with 
Christian Aid coordinating exchange activities in Kenya (as outlined in case study 3), and the 
Senegal Red Cross parallel activities in Senegal (Visman 2014). 
Consisting of a series of community-based workshops and evaluations, tailored systems for 
provision of seasonal and weekly forecast updates directly to at-risk groups, technical reviews 
and national workshops timed around the rainy seasons, the exchange has been able to 
demonstrate benefits for all actors: communities at risk, partnering humanitarian and 
development agencies and participating scientists: 
Communities at risk: Participating groups have increased their trust in and use of forecasts 
provided by national meteorological services, becoming ‘demanding customers’ of community-
based climate services and also developing for themselves innovative relevant channels for 
communicating climate information. Participating farmers attributed significant yield 
improvements to their ability to change key agricultural decisions based on improved access to 
and understanding of seasonal and short-term forecasts. Communities at risk of flood and 
drought were able to use information to inform a range of life/livelihood decision making 
processes, protecting vulnerable members and household assets when heavy rain was forecast, 
and employing seasonal forecasts and community-managed rain gauges to support planting 
decisions. 
Humanitarian and development agencies: The exchange supported increased access by 
participating humanitarian and development agencies to climate information providers, 
resulting in the signing of formal agreements with national meteorological services and on-
going engagement in regional climate fora. Exchange between the two country demonstration 
studies heightened awareness of the potential to employ climate information across 
timeframes, to support humanitarian, disaster risk reduction and development decision 
making.   
Scientists: The exchange process has been as much about scientists learning how best to 
contextualise their learning within the realities of those living in complex risk situations, as 
their developing sufficient understanding amongst directly affected people and policymakers 
for them to begin to ask the right kind of questions. Creating channels for community concerns 
to directly inform scientists opens the possibility for re-interrogating existing data to identify 
new and additional relevance, as well as enabling directly affected people an opportunity to 
inform the focus of current and on-going scientific research. 
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 grow an evidence base of projects where science has been integrated successfully (or not) 
for multiple advocacy objectives:  
o the development of future strategy on what scientific research should focus on;  
o the promotion of public investment for science that is considered useful by 
vulnerable communities and the organisations providing humanitarian and 
development services to them; 
o to support advocacy on rights-based issues related to science e.g. preventing the 
intellectual property rights of vulnerable communities being privatised under 
corporate copyright laws; 
o to inform strategic planning and promote the uptake of science within NGO as a 
whole, rather than on an individual project basis; 
 capture learning from the process of integrating science to inform good practice; 
 ensure accountability to all stakeholders. 
For more information on the challenges of gathering evidence for humanitarian action please refer 
to the Evidence & Knowledge in Humanitarian Action paper, produced by the Active Learning 
Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action31. 
When is impact measured? 
M&E are processes that should be incorporated into any project from the very outset.  The impacts 
of integrating science do not simply relate to the outputs of the project but unexpected outcomes 
(such as organisational change) can also come about through the engagement with scientists.  
Projects should be monitored against the aim of integrating science, whilst maintaining a degree of 
flexibility in the monitoring process to capture any unanticipated changes.  
Any impact will take time to emerge, so focusing significant impact assessment in the first year or 
two of a project is likely to generate slim returns.  However mid-term reviews provide an 
opportunity to identify where impact is emerging and how the evidence gathering process should 
develop between the mid and end points of an intervention as impact is expected to strengthen. 
Typically this requires that, and often works best when, evidence gathering is planned and 
incremental – getting community leaders to maintain simple logs or records ensures that the impact 
recorded is grounded in community experience and can be used to support community 
management of scientific advice as well as projects and other stakeholders. This gradual 
accumulation of results can then be periodically aggregated and assessed so as to ensure that it will 
meet the anticipated requirement at the end of the project, e.g. from an external evaluation. It also 
avoids the frantic diversion of staff to intensive impact assessment processes in response to external 
demands. A key feature of this approach is to measure a smaller number of strongly attributable, 
priority indicators well and measure them consistently, rather than trying to measure a lot over an 
unmanageably large sample size. 
How do we measure the impact of science? 
You may wish to explore how impact can be related to the existing structures and frameworks your 
organisation adopts.  If, for example, we relate impact assessment of science to the Sustainable 
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 Available online: http://www.alnap.org/story/147.aspx 
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Livelihoods Approach, scientific advice is about enhancing human capital or capacity to make 
decisions which, in turn enhance the other asset categories (see figure 8).  So the focus of impact 
assessment is how scientific advice has enabled an improvement in effective decision making that 
delivers a more tangible impact, such as an increase in yield (as in case study 3), an improved flood 
management system at catchment level or an early warning system that saves lives and assets. 
 
Figure 8: Relating the integration of scientific information into the sustainable livelihoods approach.  Source: Christian Aid (2013). 
The ELRHA Dialogues for Disaster Anticipation and Resilience32 house a number of case studies, with 
the impact of each of these projects being measured under the following headings:   
 Baseline against which impact is measured 
 Impact on vulnerability 
 Informing specific humanitarian decision making process 
 Informing focus of current/proposed scientific research 
These case studies are a useful resource in terms of understanding how projects that have 
integrated science have been measured in terms of the impact of the science. 
The challenge is in determining whether communities have fully internalised the scientific 
information (has it been used to inform decision-making and been put into practice) and how to 
attribute change (especially in long-term) to the integration of science. 
Attributing the impact 
The impact of science can also be viewed as time-dependent; whilst there may be more short-term 
benefits in terms of knowledge acquired by the community, the long-term impact of integrating 
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 See: http://www.elrha.org/dialogues 
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science on increasing resilience may only be truly measured when tested by (for example) the 
occurrence of a stress or shock and whether this results in a major disaster or deterioration of 
development aims.  However, it still may be possible to determine whether things have improved, 
by looking at the changes that have been made, e.g. in land use planning, the implementation of 
building codes and the deployment of training.   
An example of measuring the impact of science comes from case study 3 and 5.  In this case, the 
emphasis was on following the impact chain as far as was practically possible. So impact at the 
relatively superficial level could involve simply ascertaining that the climate science being extended 
to farmer groups was understood, but this raises the question…with what consequences?  It should 
also inform a decision-making process, in this case when to plant, what to plant, etc.  But even 
inquiry to this extent does not draw out the evidence needed to justify the hypothesis that yields will 
improve, so further investigation attempted to answer this question by asking farmers to what they 
might attribute the improved production they experienced. Additional resources would have 
allowed further progress down the chain. So what if yields have increased – does this result in 
increased income?  What has that income been spent on?  How has this expenditure improved 
resilience for the future?  Has the experience had any influence on the future generation of climate 
science and provision of climate services? These are all lines of enquiry to deepen the evidence of 
the impact of science. 
Triangulating the impact 
A challenge for impact assessment as we seek to move further down the impact chain is guarding 
against bias. In the above case, the yield results were based on self-attribution by farmers, which can 
be prone to a variety of biases. A solution is therefore to triangulate this result with a more 
quantitative assessment, for example a statistical measurement of yield and comparison with the 
average yields in the District or comparing with a group that had not used climate science in the 
same way. This would involve a substantial addition of effort and resources, but will increase the 
value of the information for both management and advocacy purposes. 
Consulting many different sources of information, e.g. from the community, NGO, scientists and 
other stakeholders involved in the process will help to better determine the extent to which science 
is responsible for any observable strengthening of resilience.  Where possible combining both 
qualitative and quantitative (e.g. a recorded decrease in the number of floods) measures will also 
help.   
Once impact is measured, it is essential that it is communicated not only to all stakeholders, but to 
wider audiences in order to inform other agencies and institutions of the benefits (and challenges) of 
integrating science.  
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Summary 
 
The integration of science necessitates the incorporation of all the relevant, available and credible 
sources of natural and social scientific information and knowledge deemed essential for solving a 
humanitarian/development problem and thereby contributing to increased resilience.  The 
process of science integration should also help scientists present their results in a relevant and 
user-friendly context, which should be assisted by those at risk informing and/or being involved in 
research. 
Science can provide useful information and knowledge but also a series of methods that can help to 
improve the analysis conducted by NGOs.  The process of integrating science is iterative and will 
require revisiting each of the five components listed below, within a single activity.  The users of 
science should learn from and adjust their approach in light of any new scientific information that 
emerges during the process of engaging with science and scientists. 
1. Define the problem and the purpose of integrating science with the users of science 
2. Access the science 
3. Understand scientific information 
4. Apply the science 
5. Monitor and evaluate the impact of science 
Finally, science should not be viewed as an added burden but valued as something that can help 
NGOs and communities make better informed decisions about building resilience. 
In order to increase the current level of scientific integration for the purpose of building resilience, 
we suggest the need for greater funding for interdisciplinary partnerships between NGOs and 
scientists as well the need to increase scientific capacity within NGOs. 
Acronyms 
ABUHC Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Centre 
BGS British Geological Survey 
CCSMKE Christian Community Services Mount Kenya East 
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction 
CAFOD Catholic Agency for Overseas Development 
ELRHA Enhancing Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance 
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council 
HAP Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 
HERR Humanitarian Emergency Response Review 
HFP Humanitarian Futures Programme 
KMD Kenya Meteorology Department 
NERC Natural Environment Research Council 
PCM Project Cycle Management 
UCL University College London 
UKCDS UK Collaborative on Development Sciences 
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